As such, I argue that, given certain premises in this post, we should expect an afterlife that plays closer to our ideals than the aforementioned bottomless pit of fire - or an arbitrary eternity in heaven. — ToothyMaw

Problem with Afterlife is that it is a term which cannot be perceived or verified both empirically and analytically.

Empirically, no one has seen the existence of Afterlife or anyone who is living in their Afterlife in reality.

Analytically, Afterlife is a concept to mean a life via resurrection in different heavenly world after present life in this world. 

Nothing wrong with that.  But again there is no way to check its existence visually or physically in any possible way.  It is just a word that some people talk about. Analytic deduction cannot verify existence. Only sensory perceptions and observations could verify existence. Again, no real life data for any type of verification or validation is available for the concept in anywhere in the world and the history of mankind.

Hence Afterlife should belong to the noumena as a thing-in-itself in Kantian terms?  One can only make sensible discussions on it if one accepts the possible existence of thing-in-itself and noumena in the domain of faith and religious beliefs? 

Problem with Afterlife is that it is a term which cannot be perceived or verified both empirically and analytically. — Corvus

You agree that when one dies, they either go to an afterlife or cease to exist, right? And also that we cannot evaluate the proposition 'there is an afterlife'?

One is either agnostic or makes the claim that there is evidence that the afterlife does or doesn't exist - that's what matters. Moliere, for instance, says that he believes that if we can evaluate the proposition 'there is an afterlife', he would claim that it is false. He has not provided evidence, but it is of little import, as I agree with you - its existence cannot be verified before dying. However, unlike you, I think it can be perceived - if it exists - insofar as the events of the afterlife can be predicted and then affect, at least partially, one's existence in the afterlife by affecting one's time on Earth.

This is because one could potentially guess what will happen when we die - even if an accurate guess is unlikely. But if we evaluate a number of guesses, we could notice some commonalities, which, given a set of guesses sharing such commonalities, we can infer that those elements shared are more likely to be true given equal probabilities for each guess to be true.

That is, if our intuitions and reasoning about it are worth anything. There is also likely a limit to what can be guessed if the afterlife is like our time on Earth at all, which indicates that the set of potentially accurate guesses is not infinite or can at least be made up entirely of pieces that could be predicted.

If there is any modicum of "you" in the afterlife, what is that "written upon"? Presumably, even for dualists, the Brain provides the infrastructure for the memories, emotions, ideas. Even if there is an inner Being benefitting/directing (which i doubt). Even if there is a soul, how does it extend these things beyond the existence of the Brain?

If there is an "afterlife," I submit that it cannot in any possible way resemble this life.

I definitely do, sorry if I came across as unwilling to engage. — ToothyMaw

Oh no worries -- I was just making a bit of a joke. You were right to give more focus.

That's actually good. Maybe you could point out what doesn't make sense to you? — ToothyMaw

Cool. Let's start with this part:

Agreed. I bypass this discussion, however, by stipulating in my argument that one either goes to an afterlife or one doesn't after dying. This is true regardless of whether we can evaluate the proposition 'there is an afterlife'. Then, to follow, if there were an afterlife, what might we expect it to look like? From there, my (bulleted) argument is mostly straightforward. — ToothyMaw

I'm going to try and draw an analogy here to point out how this seems like a difficult question to answer with any sort of probabilistic reasoning about the veracity of what might be:

Suppose on Vulcan they host an Olympics, very much like our own but instead with Vulcan sports. By virtue of the form "Either one goes to the Vulcan Olympics or one does not go to the Vulcan Olympics after being evaluated to go to the Vulcan Olympics by the Vulcans"

Does this sidestep whether or not the Vulcan Olympics exist in order to then talk about the more probable paticulars of the Vulcan Olympics? How could we possibly evaluate something which we have no familiarity for?

To bring it back to the difference between Eternal Torture vs. an Earth-like afterlife: With how much we know we'd be just as much in the right to claim that the Eternal Torture afterlife is more likely.

Or, at least the philosophical difficulty that I see is -- how could you make your version of the afterlife more rationally appealing? Or, if philosophy be not defined by rationality, just philosophically appealing in a manner that isn't simply a statement of our intuitions on the manner? How do we make arguments about such an ephemeral notion?

Why wouldn't there be brains in the afterlife? Maybe upon dying one's memories, for instance, are copied and stored on a computer that then encodes the information into a new, less fleshy brain that will last almost indefinitely? That one died in the process is a given - but one would basically still be the same person, at least as far as memories go. Other aspects of being might be replicable too.

That such an eventuality seems too obviously tailored to human experience and understanding does not mean that it cannot be the case.

Nice. A perfect remedy for thanatophobia!

That is, if our intuitions and reasoning about it are worth anything. There is also likely a limit to what can be guessed if the afterlife is like our time on Earth at all, which indicates that the set of potentially accurate guesses is not infinite or can at least be made up entirely of pieces that could be predicted. — ToothyMaw

Afterlife is not that vacuous concept as some folks make out.  It depends on how much credibility we give to our reason.

If we blindly trust our reason as truly and absolutely the only criteria for knowledge, then afterlife looks and sounds like a vacuous concept. But we see the obvious limitations and restrictions in its ability of knowing the abstracts.

If we say, like Kant had done in his CPR, our reason has limitation in its ability to know, and it is not the only and truly the criteria for our knowledge, then Afterlife, Immortality and God concepts all wake up from the vacuity as a plausible possibility.

the fear of death is an adequate explanation for why people bring up the notion of an afterlife.
— Moliere

Another good point. — ToothyMaw

To use your precision/accuracy distinction...

We can see the general commonalities between various descriptions of the afterlife -- some of them have hellfire, some of them depersonalize you into a nous of some kind, some of them are re-occuring, some of them give rewards for doing good things in this life.

With how I read you: You're saying these guesses are imprecise, but perhaps accurate, and if we accumulate these guesses we might be able to say which or the other is more likely.

I don't think the distinction between precision/accuracy is relevant here. I tried to think through it and it just doesn't make sense to talk about precision/accuracy with respect to, say, fictional characters.

We can say "Bilbo Baggins is shorter than Gandalf", and I think that's true. But we cannot say how precise/accurate that statement is -- we infer it from the story on the basis that Bilbo is a Hobbit, and Hobbits are shorter than Wizards, and Gandalf is a Wizard. or something like that.

This seems the same to me as applying the precision/accuracy distinction to the afterlife, along with plausibility.

Aesthetics is somewhat like this in that we're looking for ways to reason about how we make decisions on art. That's why the topic interests me a lot as a possible philosophical jumping point.

But it's not an easy topic to do more than simply state our opinions on. It's hard to do philosophy here.

How about Freddy's eternal return – an "afterlife" of This Life lived over again and again and again ... ad infinitum:

https://philosophynow.org/issues/137/Eternal_Recurrence_Revisited

Suppose on Vulcan they host an Olympics, very much like our own but instead with Vulcan sports. By virtue of the form "Either one goes to the Vulcan Olympics or one does not go to the Vulcan Olympics after being evaluated to go to the Vulcan Olympics by the Vulcans"

Does this sidestep whether or not the Vulcan Olympics exist in order to then talk about the more probable paticulars of the Vulcan Olympics? How could we possibly evaluate something which we have no familiarity for?

To bring it back to the difference between Eternal Torture vs. an Earth-like afterlife: With how much we know we'd be just as much in the right to claim that the Eternal Torture afterlife is more likely. — Moliere

This is my best attempt at defending something quite difficult to defend, it seems:

First off, I don't see how you could support the assertion that eternal torture is more likely. I think you would need some evidence. Also: is the dichotomy of going to the Vulcan Olympics or not going to the Vulcan Olympics similar to the dichotomy of experiencing an earth-like afterlife or eternal torture? I would say not.

Not knowing if one goes to the Vulcan Olympics or what exactly constitutes Vulcan sports doesn’t equate to it being equally or more likely that the Olympics consists of eternal torture. I grant that the afterlife might consist of eternal torture, but there is no reason to believe that every idea about the afterlife is equally likely to be true insofar as the distribution of the actual possible events in the afterlife that might happen are concerned - even without supplying evidence.

Is it equally likely, for instance, that someone might mount a jetpack on a pig and send it flying, or that a pig might sprout wings? In both instances the condition that pigs can fly, which is unlikely to be true, is met, but, given certain constraints, such as the near impossibility of sprouting wings, one conclusion is more likely than another.

Thus, a guess about what might happen in the afterlife, although unlikely to be true, could be more likely than another, even if both could accurately explain why the afterlife consists of certain events - why pigs can fly.

Why certain guesses are more likely is reflected in how much potentiality they contain: that people should live modestly and donate money to charity is reflected more heavily in the behavior of people who believe such a thing than those who might only believe in an afterlife of eternal torture. Furthermore, those who believe in ET (eternal torture), can and will do next to nothing to affect their plight, probably.

You might claim that we all go to the same afterlife, so what does this matter? The modest people and the ET people go to the same place regardless of their beliefs.

This is true, but the people who allow their behaviors to dictate, at least partially, what happens in the afterlife if they are right are committing to predicting what will happen as a function of time and their existence on Earth - unlike ET. That they are indeed predicting what might happen has a much greater chance of being true than ET if the afterlife is earth-like, and, in all likelihood, much less chance if the afterlife is not earth-like. So, what would indicate whether or not the afterlife is earth-like?

I think that's the wrong question.

There is an infinite combination of ways to add the numbers 4 and 5. However, they always add up to a whole number greater than 8. Let's say that there is a hidden whole number greater than 8 we are trying to add to. Since, no matter what combination of ways the numbers 4 and 5 are added, we get a whole number greater than 8, any combination of ways those numbers are added are valid guesses for the hidden number. That doesn’t mean that we will, or even can, accurately guess the hidden number with 4 and 5, but every sum is a valid guess made up of 4 and 5. Therefore, we can predict that the hidden number could consist of some sum of the numbers 4 and 5, if not necessarily both of them.

The analogue to summation is to guess what the afterlife consists of, with the numbers representing events. We know that the afterlife might be earth-like, and if it is (the condition that the hidden number is a whole number greater than 8), we can guess at the actual composition of the afterlife by combining potential elements - the building blocks - we might be aware of on Earth.

Thus, if the afterlife is earth-like, we have significant guessing power, which we don’t have if the afterlife is not earth-like; there are many different (perhaps infinite), overlapping ways to combine earthly predictions of events that could each be discrete events in themselves included in, and “adding up” to, approximations of the real afterlife.

Furthermore, there are no constraints regarding what might be possible if the afterlife is not earth-like. Thus, if there is a similar chance of the afterlife being some sort of eternal hell or earth-like, the fact that the equally likely earth-like afterlife could be more accurately predicted indicates that those who have ideas about an earth-like afterlife have more predictive power regardless of the truth of whether or not it is earth-like.

People don't try to make me feel better, so why should I toil to do so for other people? Philosophy isn't meant to comfort people. If someone wants a safe space for their phobia they shouldn't engage with people on a philosophy forum, which is the equivalent of the wild west but populated by pedants and egotists instead of just egotists.

First off, I don't see how you could support the assertion that eternal torture is more likely. I think you would need some evidence. — ToothyMaw

Fair. I agree there. We need evidence to support assertions of likelihood.

But then I think -- we have no evidence of an afterlife being a particular way. At least I would not count various intuitions of persons as "evidence", though it seems you might.

When I say that the fear of death is adequate as an explanation, I mean that all the theories of the afterlife are directed towards that fear, rather than the literal words they use. "Hellfire" afterlives are usually part of a culture where some actions are bad and avoiding those actions is the most important thing.

There's an interesting relationship to be had between what people do with their lives and their beliefs about an afterlife -- but for the most part I don't think it holds for most people. Most people will do what people do, regardless of the truth of their view towards the afterlife, because none of us have evidence about it -- so my suspicion is that all thoughts on the afterlife are something like fiction.

I suppose that's why I brought up Vulcan Olympics, though it didn't work.

Is it equally likely, for instance, that someone might mount a jetpack on a pig and send it flying, or that a pig might sprout wings? In both instances the condition that pigs can fly, which is unlikely to be true, is met, but, given certain constraints, such as the near impossibility of sprouting wings, one conclusion is more likely than another.

Thus, a guess about what might happen in the afterlife, although unlikely to be true, could be more likely than another, even if both could accurately explain why the afterlife consists of certain events - why pigs can fly. — ToothyMaw

In you first example you're talking about things we know about.

But the afterlife? Because we don't know about it we cannot say what is more likely.

I can say what persuades me that there is no afterlife, but unless that argument sits well with you I have no method of proof for what an afterlife might be like, even if it might not be.

Furthermore, there are no constraints regarding what might be possible if the afterlife is not earth-like. Thus, if there is a similar chance of the afterlife being some sort of eternal hell or earth-like, the fact that the equally likely earth-like afterlife could be more accurately predicted indicates that those who have ideas about an earth-like afterlife have more predictive power regardless of the truth of whether or not it is earth-like. — ToothyMaw

I think this is the bit that's causing me to reply most -- if there are no constraints then there's no predictive power. It's an imaginary. Just like since there's no evidence for any of the afterlives, we cannot infer that one afterlife is more or less likely than another -- we have no evidence as these are just beliefs that arise due to the fear of death.

In you first example you're talking about things we know about.

But the afterlife? Because we don't know about it we cannot say what is more likely. — Moliere

The point I was making was that given constraints, one guess about the afterlife could be more likely than another. If the afterlife is more earth-like, then people who believe generosity is the key to being admitted to an afterlife in which they are rewarded for their virtuous behavior are more likely to be right than someone who makes the claim that the afterlife will consist of the kinds of things we associate with an unknowable eternal hell.

So, I'm not saying one or the other thing is true, or has to be true, but rather that, given constraints, one is more or less likely to be true, even if both explain why the afterlife might consist of some event(s) - the condition of pigs flying, in my example. We don't have to know if pigs can fly to evaluate if the jetpack is more likely than sprouting wings.

But then I think -- we have no evidence of an afterlife being a particular way. At least I would not count various intuitions of persons as "evidence", though it seems you might. — Moliere

I don't take people's intuitions as evidence in my argument. I argue that those with ideas of an earth-like afterlife have more predictive power even if the likelihood of either ET or an earth-like afterlife can only be estimated to be equal - or even if we must be totally agnostic about the likelihoods.

Furthermore, there are no constraints regarding what might be possible if the afterlife is not earth-like. Thus, if there is a similar chance of the afterlife being some sort of eternal hell or earth-like, the fact that the equally likely earth-like afterlife could be more accurately predicted indicates that those who have ideas about an earth-like afterlife have more predictive power regardless of the truth of whether or not it is earth-like.
— ToothyMaw

I think this is the bit that's causing me to reply most -- if there are no constraints then there's no predictive power. It's an imaginary. Just like since there's no evidence for any of the afterlives, we cannot infer that one afterlife is more or less likely than another -- we have no evidence as these are just beliefs that arise due to the fear of death. — Moliere

I agree: There is no way of knowing if ET or something like it is more or less likely than an earthy afterlife. And since, as you recognize, there are seemingly no constraints on an afterlife that is unlike anything we might experience on Earth, there is very little predictive power involved in trying to ascertain what such an afterlife might consist of. On the other hand, an earthy afterlife, as I made the point, can be more accurately predicted - even if not in its entirety, in all likelihood. So, there are constraints on what an earth-like afterlife could consist of but no constraints on which, or how many, earthy events can be guessed.

Thus, given that we are agnostic about the likelihood of any one kind of afterlife existing compared to another, we can only try to predict the afterlives that we can fathom - which are almost entirely earthy - and they stand to be more accurate as a function of the inherent constraints and combinability of somewhat familiar, earthy events.

That beliefs about the afterlife merely arise due to the fear of death is likely, I admit that. But that doesn't mean that they are false, or not worth analyzing. A man on death row will often do or say anything to be acquitted. Does that mean that his attempts to evade death are invalid? I would say that if the man is committed to living, his fear is his own greatest ally.

By the way, I'm using the term "earthy" to mean "of or reflective of earthly qualities", and "earth-like" to denote an afterlife that is sufficiently earthy to be considered potentially predictable by people before dying. I think I was consistent in my usage in my latest post, sorry if not.

I am also arguing not that there is only one most likely afterlife based on the fact that earth-like afterlives can be more accurately predicted, but rather that the proliferation of ideas about earth-like afterlives stand greater chances of being more true when compared to any one unearthly possibility - such as ET. Whether or not my previous assumption that we can find commonalities in these ideas that stand a greater chance of being true is likely is unknown.

I am also arguing not that there is only one most likely afterlife based on the fact that earth-like afterlives can be more accurately predicted, but rather that the proliferation of ideas about earth-like afterlives stand greater chances of being more true when compared to any one unearthly possibility - such as ET. — ToothyMaw

Why would the proliferation of ideas about any unknown influence its chances of being true?

If we are to judge whether an idea is more or less likely to be true then we can either --

Stipulate the likelihoods in order to make a computation.

Or have some measurable in order to compute likelihoods or at least be able to make comparisons between probabilities.

If what you're saying is that assuming the afterlife is earth-like then it would be more predictable then isn't that a bit obvious?

But for the latter -- I don't think you can count "number of ideas" as a unit for judging likelihoods.

As such I think neither proposition -- ET or Earthlike -- can be evaluated on the basis of likelihood since there is no evidence for either.

I think all we're left with is a generic appeal to what makes sense to us, and clearly that differs between people.

Why would the proliferation of ideas about any unknown influence its chances of being true? — Moliere

I'm not saying that an earth-like afterlife is more likely because there are a lot of guesses, but rather that those guesses, if they stand to be truer given that it is unknown if they are more or less likely to be representative of the afterlife than ET+ (unknowable eternal torture or anything else unknowable), we can only guess that it is more likely that our predictions regarding earth-like afterlives are more likely to be truer than any other guess(es) even in the context of not knowing the nature of the afterlife.

If what you're saying is that assuming the afterlife is earth-like then it would be more predictable then isn't that a bit obvious? — Moliere

I'm not just saying that an earth-like afterlife is more predictable, but rather that we can compare the likelihood of an earth-like afterlife to any other, and conclude, based on the potential for accuracy within each possibility - earth-like or ET, in this case - that the earthy predictions stand to be truer than other guesses. This doesn't affect or reflect the actual probabilities of what the afterlife consists of, but rather is a statement on which ideas about the afterlife are more likely to be truer.

If we are to judge whether an idea is more or less likely to be true then we can either --

Stipulate the likelihoods in order to make a computation.

Or have some measurable in order to compute likelihoods or at least be able to make comparisons between probabilities. — Moliere

The comparison between probabilities is this: if one or the other afterlife is true, which is more likely to lend predictive power to people's ideas of the afterlife? There is a spectrum of potential afterlives, and where it overlaps with people's ideas is where this predictive power exists. So, the actual probabilities of what the afterlife consists of don't matter if the most predictive guesses - from our point of view - are constrained by something like our limited beliefs on Earth.

As such I think neither proposition -- ET or Earthlike -- can be evaluated on the basis of likelihood since there is no evidence for either. — Moliere

If it is true that one or more guesses are more likely to be truer as constrained by something like the dichotomy between an earth-like afterlife or ET+, do we really need evidence to say so? After all, I'm not saying "the afterlife is earth-like", or "the afterlife is eternal hell".

I'm not just saying that an earth-like afterlife is more predictable, but rather that we can compare the likelihood of an earth-like afterlife to any other, and conclude, based on the potential for accuracy within each possibility - earth-like or ET, in this case - that the earthy predictions stand to be truer than other guesses. — ToothyMaw

So we compare Afterlife 1 to Afterlife 2. How do we do this comparison?

You say "based on the potential for accuracy within each possibility"

So that's not probability, but a potential for accuracy within a possibility, and it's not based on evidence. So what's it based on?

How does one evaluate the potential for accuracy within a given possible afterlife?

So we compare Afterlife 1 to Afterlife 2. How do we do this comparison? — Moliere

By evaluating whether or not Afterlife 1 is a better guess than Afterlife 2. Really that is all we can do - guess at whether or not our guesses are good. I don't know if that really counts as comparing probabilities from a mathematical standpoint, but from my point of view it certainly seems like a guess on something constrained is more likely to be true than a guess made unconstrained. This is how I see it:

This whole thing is about guesses and their potential accuracy, not hard probabilities that we can precisely nail down, and I still say that a prediction in favor of an earth-like afterlife has more predictive power than ET+.

A guess at an earth-like afterlife must be accurate insofar as it allows for the after-existence to be affected by one’s time on earth given one remains oneself continuously even through dying and then experiencing the afterlife. That is, if the guess is indeed towards an afterlife that is made up of events that can be predicted before dying and that are reflective of the predictor's time on earth - what I have defined as an earth-like afterlife. The predictive power concomitant with beliefs corresponding to an earth-like afterlife stands to be greater as a function of this limitation, as not just any predicted afterlife will meet these conditions - such as ET. ET might be equally likely, or even more, than the afterlife being earth-like, but that doesn’t mean that it has the same potential to be as good a guess from where we stand.

This is because what makes a guess good is not just whether or not it satisfies the condition “the afterlife is an eternal hell” or “the afterlife is earth-like”, but rather that it predicts specific events, how many of those specific events occur, and in what order. Also, their causes and consequences, but that introduces much more complexity, so I’ll leave that alone. But how many events can we truly guess if it is ET? Probably very few - even if we accurately guess that it is indeed ET for everyone across the board.

I kind of rushed this reply out, I hope it makes sense.

If we have no evidence, and no probabilities, on what basis can we say that our guesses are better guesses?

You still say that a prediction in favor of an earth-like afterlife has more predictive power than Eternal Torture afterlife. And even that an ET afterlife might be more likely than an earth-like afterlife. But then note that this is different from what potentiates a good guess based upon our perspective.

what makes a guess good is not just whether or not it satisfies the condition “the afterlife is an eternal hell” or “the afterlife is earth-like”, but rather that it predicts specific events, how many of those specific events occur, and in what order. Also, their causes and consequences, but that introduces much more complexity, so I’ll leave that alone. But how many events can we truly guess if it is ET? Probably very few - even if we accurately guess that it is indeed ET for everyone across the board. — ToothyMaw

Considering we have no knowledge of the afterlife I'm still inclined to say we cannot truly guess about events in any afterlife; that is, from our perspective, there is no better guess because we don't know what we're talking about.

As such, I argue that, given certain premises in this post, we should expect an afterlife that plays closer to our ideals than the aforementioned bottomless pit of fire - or an arbitrary eternity in heaven. — ToothyMaw

Presumably with "No Exit."

The biggest problem is that it is so speculative, with no real clear evidence, which is why so many people do not believe in an afterlife at all, — Jack Cummins

I think it odd to expect evidence "in life" regarding any state of being "after life." What would be the basis upon which to expect any such evidence? And if there is no basis upon which to expect such evidence, then what would be the basis for forming any conclusions regarding the absence of such evidence? To say there is no evidence of a type we cannot have is to say nothing at all.

To say there is no evidence of a type we cannot have is to say nothing at all. — Arne

That's the bit I'm struggling with.

I believe @ToothyMaw has a notion he's coming from.

I'd like to understand that notion, cuz I think that's the only thing we can really do on a philosophy forum -- understand one another.

If there's no evidence @ToothyMaw -- then I'm asking how you decide between the likelihoods of guesses. It's ok if it's not rationally thought out or just a guess, cuz that's what I think -- but I'd have a follow up in that case.

I'd like to understand that notion, cuz I think that's the only thing we can really do on a philosophy forum -- understand one another. — Moliere

I agree. But that is something that many (including me) have to continually remind ourselves. Next to understanding, agreeing/disagreeing is trivial. Thanks for the reminder.

O yeah.
Especially cuz it's not like exposing yourself here will help you professionally. :D

that's the thought that keeps me coming back: while we're a collection of weirdos thinking our thoughts in an attempted free way, we try to keep it seperate from the professional consequences of our thoughts.

That seems the closest one can acomplish when it comes to free thought.

:lol:

@ToothyMaw

In case you missed this one ...
https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/comment/891578

And, in the main, belief in "the hereafter" tends to devalue here & now — 180 Proof

Which can also lead to great heroism, such as with Maximilian Kolbe. If we knew, for certain, that this life is all there is why not just be epicureans? Why even plant trees that will take decades to grow?

Appeal to ignorance. :roll:

I make no claims about the existence of an afterlife. I simply state a belief in one tends to lead to heroism and martyrdom, while a conviction in the lack of one wouldn't really encourage such things.