Hart's pluralism is therefore "localized" (↪Leontiskos). — Leontiskos
Differentiates syncretism (which he likes) from perennialism (which he doesn’t). Describes John Hick as a ‘well-meaning syncretist thinker, not a perennialist’. Sees value in syncretism and says the different faiths complement each other (as did I). — Wayfarer
That whole tradition [of perennialism] can be tossed in the waste basket.
I am much more interested in... Not trying to deny what differentiates [religious traditions] from one another, and not being afraid to discover what unites them to one another. — David Bentley Hart
I am not familiar with the term "perennialism" — Leontiskos
Seems contradictory to me to say that the same Nature is both orderly and disorderly
Does naturalism explain the phenomena it purports to?
what does naturalism say requires an explanation
and does naturalism succeed at explaining what it says requires explaining?
Similarly, would you mind expounding the Naturalism Thesis?
it seems to me that if we talk about laws, we must talk about a lawgiver, although you seem to disagree with this.
Okay, as in plants, animals, people, rocks, and so on and so on, these are the natural members correct? Tell me again how laws fit into that ontology?however, for me, I mean 'a member of nature'. — Bob Ross
It seems perfectly plausible that 'laws' are behavioral patterns of how things relate to one another, and perhaps they are fundamental or derivates of other natural things. — Bob Ross
Side note: it seems to me that if we talk about laws, we must talk about a lawgiver, although you seem to disagree with this. — NotAristotle
For one thing this is an anthropomorphism fallacy - by attributing human-like characteristics (such as legislating laws) to the concept of the 'laws of nature'. Laws of nature are descriptive, not prescriptive, and do not imply a conscious lawgiver. The word 'laws' is a distraction. 'Natural regularities' might be a better term.
What will we take to be a sufficient and adequate explanation of a given phenomenon?
I'll give an example: let's suppose there is a storm.
Now this explanation either proceeds on infinitely, or it has a starting point. If it proceeds infinitely, I am inclined to regard that as a most unparsimonious account of reality
Okay, as in plants, animals, people, rocks, and so on and so on, these are the natural members correct? Tell me again how laws fit into that ontology?
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I don't think laws can be derivative of natural things, otherwise they would be ordered by the natural things not the other way around, right?
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