I do not see how something "computing really hard," ever necessitates the emergence of first person subjective experience. — Count Timothy von Icarus
I think panpsychism might fall under the heading of a paradigm shift. — Patterner
But, assuming panpsychism isn't true, what other ideas being suggested do? — Patterner
Analytic Idealism is a theory of the nature of reality that maintains that the universe is experiential in essence. That does not mean that reality is in your or our individual minds alone, but instead in a spatially unbound, transpersonal field of subjectivity of which we are segments. Analytic Idealism is one particular formulation of Idealism, which is based on and motivated by post-enlightenment values such as conceptual parsimony, coherence, internal logical consistency, explanatory power and empirical adequacy. — Essentia Foundation
In any case, what do you think about the argument overall? — Malcolm Lett
Far from unintentional. The theory is based around the need for a feedback loop. The theory very much creates a Strange Loop.Your own term, "Meta-Management", may be an unintentional reference to a feedback loop. — Gnomon
I don't have the background to be able to respond to any of the detailed points — Malcolm Lett
Unless someone can find major holes in my argument there, it makes the case for the need for alternate explanations much weaker. — Malcolm Lett
The usual argument against such a stance is that it leaves an explanatory gap - that consciousness "feels" a certain way that cannot be explained mechanistically / representationally / reductively / and other variations on the theme.
Point number 1:
Our intuition is the source of that complaint. — Malcolm Lett
We have only one source of information about conscious experience - our own. Not even of yours, or theirs, just my own. A data point of one. — Malcolm Lett
True, the idea isn't new. But, if it was found to be factual (can't imagine how that could happen), the acceptance of it would be. The world would have a very different concept of reality.I think panpsychism might fall under the heading of a paradigm shift.
— Patterner
I think it might present one, in the Nagel sense. I don't quite think it's anything new, generally. Panpsychism the concept has been around millennia. — AmadeusD
And it is reductive. A macro characteristic is not reductive only if the same characteristic is present in the microscopic constituents. To be reductive, we need to be able to see how the properties of the microscopic constituents combine to make the macro property. Which we can do with liquidity, as well as solidity. We know why a substance's solid form is more dense than its liquid form. And we know why H2O is an exception to that, which is why ice floats in water. Which is why a lake does not freeze from the bottom up, allowing life to get through the winter.I think of this description as being reductive, but then I also think of the explanation of H2O producing the wetness of water as being reductive. — Malcolm Lett
Objection: the argument appeals to an indubitable fact. The ‘explanatory gap’ you summarily dismiss was the substance of an article published by a Joseph Levine in 1983, in which he points out that no amount of knowledge of the physiology and physical characteristics of pain as ‘the firing of C Fibers’ actually amounts to - is equal to, is the same as - the feeling of pain. — Wayfarer
One cannot conclude from my version of the argument that materialism is false, which makes my version a weaker attack than Kripke's. Nevertheless, it does, if correct constitute a problem for materialism, and one that 1 think better capωres the uneasiness many philosophers feel regarding that doctrine. — Levine (1983)
Precisely. There are so many arguments claiming that materialism can never explain consciousness that anyone who proposes a materialistic explanation is summarily dismissed. And yet the fact is that we don't know what consciousness is. So we can't be certain about the correctness of those arguments.We do not know that consciousness is a physical characteristic. We do not know how it comes about. Therefore, we cannot reduce it to the properties of its constituents. — Patterner
I do not see how something "computing really hard," ever necessitates the emergence of first person subjective experience.
— Count Timothy von Icarus
This is the thing. The thing. It simply isn't needed, until we can assess why. At what point what a being need phenomenal consciousness? It's an accident, surely. Emergence, in whatever way, on the current 'facts' we know. — AmadeusD
But I'm trying to show that a reductive materialistic explanation can go much further in explaining conscious phenomenology than is generally accepted by those who dismiss reductive materialism. — Malcolm Lett
Even if reductive materialism is not the totality of the answer, it's an indispensable ingredient.I'm also not trying to prove that materialism and reductive explanations are absolutely true. But I'm trying to show that a reductive materialistic explanation can go much further in explaining conscious phenomenology than is generally accepted by those who dismiss reductive materialism. — Malcolm Lett
Chalmer's view is based on his intuition about whether he can conceive of something or not. — Malcolm Lett
And yet the fact is that we don't know what consciousness is. — Malcolm Lett
One way or another, the capacity for consciousness was always there in the first place. If the capacity wasn't always there, consciousness couldn't exist.Indeed. And the problems with trying to explain how it comes about leads to the idea that maybe it didn't come about at all, but was always there in the first place. — bert1
One way or another, the capacity for consciousness was always there in the first place. If the capacity wasn't always there, consciousness couldn't exist. — Patterner
I don't know of any reason to believe most things are full-on conscious. How do you define "full-on" that allows particles, or rocks, or the vast majority of things, to fall under the umbrella?We may have a conceptual disagreement, I'm not sure. I think you are suggesting some kind of phenomenality/proto-consciousness as a precursor to consciousness which isn't full-on consciousness, whereas I don't think such a thing is conceptually distinguishable from full-on consciousness. — Patterner
My thought is that there isn't any not having an experience.There doesn't seem to be any intermediate stage between having an experience and not having one. — bert1
Trying to understand the terminology. If full-on consciousness can be of not very much experience/very little content, is our consciousness also full-on, but with much more experience/greater content? — Patterner
My thought is that there isn't any not having an experience. — Patterner
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