Or consider this alternative example: instead of saying "that domino fell because the number 7 is prime", we can construct, in principle, a domino computer that calculates if a particular move is check mate, given a particular position.

Dominos can make logic gates, which means the domino system is turing complete. We already have algorithms to calculate if a particular position is check mate, so it's possible, in principle, to set up a series of dominos such that the last domino will only fall over if, say, Queen to D4 is checkmate given a particular arrangement of pieces.

So, you set up your dominos, you knock down the ones you're supposed to to represent "queen to D4" or whatever, and you watch them go, and eventually the dominos stop falling, and either the final Domino has fallen or it's still standing.

You've seen it fall, so you say "that domino fell because queen to D4 is checkmate".

Seems kinda crazy to me. And yet... how computers work already is not too far removed from that, don't you think?

I've seen several articles about interesting ways to do logic and computation. Scientific American had one that designed a Turing machine consisting of only tracks and one train. Being a Turing machine, it could compute anything. Same with the domino computer. I'm pretty sure one can be built from dominoes, but unlike the tracks, no path can be taken twice, so time needs to be a spatial dimension.

As for the question in the stackexchange post:

Why did the last domino fall?
Answer 1: Because the penultimate domino made it fall.
Answer 2: Because the number 7 is prime

Both correct answers of course, which simply illustrates that there is never just one correct answer to 'what caused X to happen?"
But 2 is debatable. It requires the assignment of meaning to the input, and that meaning can in theory only come from whatever set up the dominoes for this particular purpose. In the absence of the meaning that the purpose gives, the last domino falls only because of it being a causal outcome of some prior state.

Why was my house destroyed?
1) because a hurricane swept through
2) because the strain capacity of pine is below a certain threshold
3) because a butterfly in the Amazon wiggled its wings 6 months ago

How can a physical system, in which each piece is truly only following local physical rules, be said to produce a certain output "because the number 7 is prime"? — flannel jesus

Well, because the physical system produces that output for certain input values, which in this case happens to correspond to only inputs that, when represented by some standard, happen to encode prime numbers.

Then there is a bigger question: Given the domino computer that lets the last domino fall only if the input is prime, suppose no input is ever made to it. The thing sits in its unfallen state awaiting the initial push. It is already determined that the last domino will fall if the encoding of 7 is entered. It being deterministic, the actual falling of the dominoes need not happen for the result to be determined, which means instantiation of the computation is not necessary for 7 to be prime.

Dominos can make logic gates, which means the domino system is turing complete. — flannel jesus

I agree that it can be Turing complete, but it's hard to implement a normal gate since the domino one can only be used once, and gates need to be used multiple times. So it gets complicated, but I think it can be done anyway. The train track thing was easier since the same track and switch could be traversed multiple times.

We already have algorithms to calculate if a particular position is check mate, so it's possible, in principle, to set up a series of dominos such that the last domino will only fall over if, say, Queen to D4 is checkmate.

Yes, that's just like the prime detector. There's no need even to describe the move. It matters not from whence the queen came, only that the board position includes it being at D4 as part of the state to be evaluated. Apparently you envision the prior state as the fixed setup, and the move in question as the input to be tested.

You've seen it fall, so you say "that domino fell because queen to D4 is checkmate".

Yes, just like 'because 7 is prime'. You don't need to see it fall. You need only to realize that it would fall if Q-D4 is entered to know that the move would be checkmate. And if you take epistemology away, Q-D4 is still checkmate even though no move is ever entered and nobody knows about the dominoes. It is still checkmate because the last domino would fall if that input were entered.

And yet... how computers work already is not too far removed from that, don't you think?

Turing machines are deliciously inefficient. Computers are simply far more optimized than these deliberately inefficient devices that accomplish the same thing.

You never asked if the domino setup can be conscious. Answer: Depends who you ask.

Something else to consider:

https://www.mathnasium.com/ca/blog/20160422-math-in-nature-a-prime-life-cycle-for-periodical-cicadas

I agree, it's a good question, but I think we need to sharpen it, as follows:

"What caused the last domino to fall?"

This prevents at least some of the "resolution by ambiguity" responses we'd be tempted to make (different levels of "why" questions, etc.). The reason the question is interesting -- and hard to answer -- is because it's asking if some kind of mental or "rational" causality is even possible. You can't get to a putative "dual explanation" until you first take a position on this kind of causality, and whether chains of physical causality can ever be grounded in the mental.

- Another question here asks how rational processes can be represented in non-rational systems (i.e. How is it that the correct answer can be "both"?).

I would want to say that the rational/mental meaning supervenes on the purely physical system, in much the same way that the meaning of a word supervenes on the written symbols or spoken phonemes. The difference is that a word-sign represents a non-discursive thought, whereas the domino-sign represents a discursive thought, and provides a validation method. The basis for the discursive domino-sign is the fact that logical reasoning or inference utilizes identifiable, deterministic patterns, and we are able to order the dominoes in such a way that they mimic those patterns. For Aquinas, reasoning is always a kind of ordering, and in this case there is parity between the order inherent in logical reasoning and the order imposed on the dominoes. Ergo, a decision procedure for determining whether a number is prime can be externalized in the relations between material objects – in this case binary gates.

I would want to say that the rational/mental meaning supervenes on the purely physical system, in much the same way that the meaning of a word supervenes on the written symbols or spoken phonemes. — Leontiskos

Interesting. I think the problem here is that a written symbol or a spoken phoneme already has meaning built into it, in your sense. Consider the written symbol, strictly as a physical object. If I remove a serif from one of the letters, this ought to change something in the meaning of the word, on strict supervenience. It doesn’t, of course, because we don’t really begin from the physical objects when we consider the word/meaning relation; we’ve already been taught how a letter of the alphabet works, and why there can be infinitely many permutations of calligraphy that don’t affect meaning.

Not to say that supervenience is dead wrong here. Could you work up an example that preserves the basic “if A changes, then B changes” idea of supervenience as applied to symbols and meanings?

- "Change" is applied to the meaning of (written) words insofar as the letters change, not insofar as the serifs change. The meaning of a word supervenes on these letter-changes, and because written letters are physical realities, the meaning is supervening on physical realities. A similar fact holds with the dominoes, for the meaning supervenes only on particular kinds of changes among the dominoes, namely whether they stand or fall.

But I do think you are right that there is a difference, and I tried to get at the difference with the ideas of discursivity and a validation method. Yet the similarity is also worth noting, for in both cases a mind is infusing material reality with meaning. In the case of the domino-sign the meaning is somewhat active, and able to yield new information.

"Change" is applied to the meaning of (written) words insofar as the letters change, not insofar as the serifs change. — Leontiskos

Right, that’s what we want to say. But is this really a supervenience on strictly physical reality? Let’s back up: What makes a letter the key unit of significance, and thus one of the physical items upon which the meaning of a word may supervene? What happens between the serif and the letter, as it were? This is all presumably a matter of convention, but we still must ask, At what point does the meaning get injected? I can say “ArchG [that is, the archetypal letter G upon which various calligraphical variations may be built] is, in English, the 7th letter of the alphabet” and say similar things about H’s position, and I’s, etc. That’s what the physical item means, or symbolizes, along with, perhaps, some pronunciation rules.

But what’s the difference, what happened, between, say, an upside-down G, which means nothing, and good old G? How does the “correct” physical organization produce meaning? Don’t we want to say that the meaning comes from somewhere else entirely, namely whatever group of humans have contrived this alphabet? (Or, as you put it, “a mind is infusing material reality with meaning.”) So by the time we arrive at the level of “the meaning of a word supervening on letter-changes,” we’re already working with a dual description, i.e., G as physical item, and G as symbol. Therefore (finally!): Can this really be supervenience between the physical and the mental, if G is already being used as a meaning vehicle? What is the (allegedly) strictly physical description of the subvenient set?

These are real questions on my part. I’m not sure about any of it.

The meaning of a word supervenes on these letter-changes, and because written letters are physical realities, the meaning is supervening on physical realities. — Leontiskos

I'm inclined to believe that the same principle applies in the case of rational inference and neural biology, contra 'neural reductionism'.

a mind is infusing material reality with meaning — Leontiskos

Consider this analogy. There is a sentry in a watchtower, looking through a telescope. The watchtower stands on top of a headland which forms the northern entrance to a harbour. The sentry’s job is to keep a lookout. When he sees a ship on the horizon, he sends a signal about the impending arrival. The signal is sent via a code - a semaphore, comprising a set of flags. One flag is for the number of masts the ship has, which provides an indication of the class, and size, of the vessel; another indicates its nationality; and the third indicates its expected time of arrival - before or after noon. When he has made this identification he hoists his flags, and then tugs on a rope which sounds a steam-horn. The horn alerts the shipping clerk who resides in an office on the dockside about a mile away. He comes out of his office and looks at the flags through his telescope. Then he writes down what they tell him - three-masted ship is on the horizon; Greek; arriving this afternoon. He goes back inside and transmits this piece of information to the harbourmaster’s cottage via Morse code, where it is written in a log-book by another shipping clerk, under ‘Arrivals’.

In this transaction, a piece of information has been relayed by various means. Firstly, by semaphore; secondly, by Morse code; and finally, in writing. The physical forms and the nature of the symbolic code is completely different in each step: the flags are visual, the morse code auditory, the log book entry written text. But the same information is represented in each step of the sequence.

In such a case, what stays the same, and what changes?

Answer 1: Because the penultimate domino made it fall.

Answer 2: Because the number 7 is prime.

Answer 1: efficient cause

Answer 2: formal cause

"Answer 2: Because the number 7 is prime."

Yes. But only because the person who set the dominoes up did so so that they would end that way if they began falling in certain ways, then choose the way the dominoes would begin falling.

Which is the same reason a computer comes up with the answer it comes up with.

It's all because of what those numbers mean to humans.

But is this really a supervenience on strictly physical reality? — J

Those who cannot read English cannot tell the difference between a letter-change and a serif-change, but I used the example precisely because you can read English. English speakers are in a position to understand that, "the meaning of a word supervenes on the written symbols," because they understand that when words change, meaning changes, as is said in the quote by Pascal in my bio. In English serif-changes cannot effect word-changes.

How does the “correct” physical organization produce meaning? — J

By convention. Word-signs are based on convention.

So by the time we arrive at the level of “the meaning of a word supervening on letter-changes,” we’re already working with a dual description, i.e., G as physical item, and G as symbol. Therefore (finally!): Can this really be supervenience between the physical and the mental, if G is already being used as a meaning vehicle? What is the (allegedly) strictly physical description of the subvenient set? — J

That's what a sign is: a perceptible reality with an attached meaning. The strictly physical description is simply the perceptible realities, without taking into account any meaning they might possibly have.

Do copyists need to understand the language they are copying? No, although it can be helpful to have such understanding. Similarly, when a copy machine makes a copy, it is copying the physical reality without in any way interacting with the meaning.

I recall a story about Bobby Fisher where he delivered an audible message in a language he did not know. He simply memorized and repeated the sounds he had heard, and the person to whom he delivered the sounds was able to understand their meaning. Similarly, it is possible to find an ancient text which we cannot interpret, and nevertheless know that it has meaning within a linguistic context that we are ignorant of. These are all ways in which the material sign and the formal sign differ; or in which the material aspect of the sign and the formal aspect of the sign differ.

One of the interesting things about the OP is that the dominoes are "copying" a form of human reasoning (about prime numbers), and this domino setup is to the decision procedure for prime numbers what the manuscript of Huck Finn is to Huck Finn, or what Fisher's vocal sounds are to the meaning of those sounds. In all such cases non-mental artifacts are imbued with meaning.

I'm inclined to believe that the same principle applies in the case of rational inference and neural biology, contra 'neural reductionism'. — Wayfarer

I think that's probably right. From above, "logical reasoning or inference utilizes identifiable, deterministic patterns, and we are able to order the dominoes in such a way that they mimic those patterns."

In this transaction, a piece of information has been relayed by various means. Firstly, by semaphore; secondly, by Morse code; and finally, in writing. The physical forms and the nature of the symbolic code is completely different in each step: the flags are visual, the morse code auditory, the log book entry written text. But the same information is represented in each step of the sequence. — Wayfarer

Right, and it is an interesting example.

In such a case, what stays the same, and what changes? — Wayfarer

If Morse code can handle all of the nuance of semaphore, and the written language can handle all of the nuance of Morse code, then the fidelity of the original message could be preserved throughout. I would want to say that if everyone involved is from the same culture and equipped with the same linguistic abilities, then the communication will be effective.

Of course the simpler answer is that the meaning stays the same while the physical media change. What are your thoughts?

Only that it suggests some form of dualism, although nearer to traditional than Cartesian.

I agree with all of this, and I think it’s a good account of how the process works. My nagging question is, in a way, terminological, but it may be important when we remember that the word/meaning example was originally given as an analogy to the harder question about how rational/mental meanings can supervene on physical systems tout court. Let me try to restate it, and perhaps in doing so I’ll find the answer!

The letter G, on my understanding, is not a (merely) physical item. To be seen as “the letter G”, to be recognized as such, is also to apprehend its meaning. One reason we know this is true is that infinitely many versions of the letter may be written – physical alterations, in other words – without altering our ability to recognize it as the letter G.

So we can’t use the letter G as the subvenient term in a supervenience relation between the strictly physical and the strictly mental. The letter G is already a hybrid, it already requires mental content, or meaning (or whatever term is least controversial) in order to be paired with what supervenes upon it.

Now there’s no rule that says that the only kind of supervenience is between the strictly physical and the strictly mental. But that is the most common use of the term, and I think it’s the one we should be concerned about here. Again, remember that we want to wind up with a better understanding of the OP question about the two kinds of causation, re the dominoes. I agree with @Wayfarer that these correspond to efficient and formal cause, but this merely shows us that the problem is a very old one. “Formal cause” is a sort of blank check, and we need to cash it out in a way that doesn’t turn it into just another physical cause in fancy dress.

So maybe the question about the letter G becomes: If there were a strictly physical subvenient item somewhere in the neighborhood, where would we look for it? On my view, it has to be “beneath” or “prior to” the letter G itself, which is already a physical/meaning hybrid.

So we can’t use the letter G as the subvenient term in a supervenience relation between the strictly physical and the strictly mental. — J

Right. Your recognition of a G supervenes on a much more complex system involving your eyes, optic nerves, and processing in neural networks in your brain.

So maybe the question about the letter G becomes: If there were a strictly physical subvenient item somewhere in the neighborhood, where would we look for it? On my view, it has to be “beneath” or “prior to” the letter G itself, which is already a physical/meaning hybrid. — J

Yes, I think I have understood what you are asking, but I think my last post to you illustrates where the strictly physical item is located. In one sense you are asking an Aristotelian to show you matter without form, and this is impossible. Incidentally, @apokrisis has written well on these topics, but let me try to say more…

This is where I think I most clearly addressed your question:

That's what a sign is: a perceptible reality with an attached meaning. The strictly physical description is simply the perceptible realities, without taking into account any meaning they might possibly have. — Leontiskos

For English speakers the shape, 'G', carries with it an intrinsic meaning. For someone who has no knowledge of the English language, the shape 'G' (presumably) does not carry with it an intrinsic meaning. The non-speaker encounters the physical shape in isolation from linguistic meaning; the speaker encounters the physical shape as already intrinsically bound up with the meaning. For the English speaker the mere shape can only be accessed by prescinding from the attached meaning as far as possible (this is in fact possible albeit difficult, and is called "deautomatization").

So if you are looking for the physical perception in G-conceived-as-a-letter you will not find it, because G-conceived-as-a-letter is already a matter-form compound (where "form" here indicates semantic/linguistic form). Instead, the matter of the G-letter sign is found in G-conceived-as-a-shape. It seems to me that you are looking in the wrong place, and thereby committing a kind of category error. The linguistic form of 'G' is a mental relation, existing in the mind and not in mind-independent reality. Its complement (G-conceived-as-a-shape) is also a mental relation, a conception, albeit an inverted mental relation which is difficult for the English-speaker to access given the speaker's intellectual habit of associating the shape with a linguistic meaning. For the non-English speaker 'G' does not have a linguistic form; it has only a shape form, and therefore the non-speaker is immediately able to access G-conceived-as-a-shape, and they are entirely unable to access G-conceived-as-a-letter (unless they learned English).*

You are a musician. You have an audience of two, one person who has never heard the Beatles and one who has. You play the melody of "Eight Days a Week" on your instrument. One person hears a linguistic form and one does not, although both are hearing a matter-form compound. That which the person who has heard the Beatles does not hear is precisely what is the matter relata in the linguistic matter-form compound; and it is only the person who has not heard the Beatles who is able to easily and fully access this "relata." But the subtlety lies in the fact that for the Beatles-person this relata is a relata or indecipherable aspect of the melody they hear, not a separately existing thing; and for the non-Beatles-person it is a separately existing thing—it is the melody itself, devoid of any linguistic or lyrical aspect, and therefore not a relata. In one way these two things are the same thing, and in another way they are different things. Both listeners hear the "material" melody, yet for one it is complete in itself and for another it calls out to the lyrics. The non-Beatles-person's matter-form compound is the matter relata of the Beatles-person's linguistic matter-form compound.

(I think your question about specifying what counts as G-conceived-as-a-letter and what does not count as G-conceived-as-a-letter is a somewhat different topic, because for the English speaker some things count as G-conceived-as-a-letter and for the non-English speaker nothing at all counts as G-conceived-as-a-letter. That question is a question only for English speakers, and it speaks to a much more subtle question of the relation between matter and form in English writing. For Aristotle the matter-form compound is irreducible, and so this phenomenon is everywhere, and like "turtles all the way down." There simply is no getting outside of it.)


* And what is the difference between a linguistic-conception and a shape-conception, or between the speaker's shape-conception and the non-speaker's shape-conception? The former elements of both pairs are more abstract and "mental" than the latter. For example, we could say that, for 'G', the linguistic form builds upon the shape-form which builds upon the ink-form. Or if we wanted to speak in geometrical terms, the linguistic form builds upon two-dimensional shape which builds upon one-dimensional points. The linguistic form is always higher in the sense that it presupposes the lower forms, whereas the lower forms do not presuppose the higher forms. Language users are able to do more with shapes than non-language users.

Does anyone think a system of dominoes could be conscious?

I think if it can't, it's because what other people have mentioned - the dominos fall and don't pick themselves back up. Consciousness might require a certain level of recursion, and Dominos, becaus they fall and stay down, are kinda hampered in their ability to implement recursive algorithms.

I think computers - or even neurons - are basically fancy dominos without that limitation.

I think if it can't, it's because what other people have mentioned - the dominos fall and don't pick themselves back up. Consciousness might require a certain level of recursion, and Dominos, becaus they fall and stay down, are kinda hampered in their ability to implement recursive algorithms.

I think computers - or even neurons - are basically fancy dominos without that limitation. — flannel jesus

What I meant by a system of dominoes includes a machine that continually sets them up after they fall according to some program.

oh well then, in principle... MAYBE

Though I'm partial to the idea that, rather than dominos being conscious, or a computer being conscious, or a brain made of neurons being conscious, what if it's the *process* that's conscious? The process is substrate independent, maybe THAT'S the thing that's conscious, and not the thing the process is implemented on.

I believe someone linked to process philosophy earlier in the thread.

oh well then, in principle... MAYBE

Though I'm partial to the idea that, rather than dominos being conscious, or a computer being conscious, or a brain made of neurons being conscious, what if it's the *process* that's conscious? The process is substrate independent, maybe THAT'S the thing that's conscious, and not the thing the process is implemented on. — flannel jesus

If it's substrate independent, there could be "flashes" of consciousness happening all around us as processes occur in various things: meteor swarms, shifting sand dunes, clouds, etc.

what process do you think shifting sand is implementing that's conscious?

what process do you think shifting sand is implementing that's conscious? — flannel jesus

There doesn't seem to me to be much difference between dominos falling over and sand grains moving around.

yes, but a series of dominos don't implement a process, like the process that can determine if a number is prime, unless they're set up in a specific way. So the question is, what way of setting up sand implements that process?

yes, but a series of dominos don't implement a process, like the process that can determine if a number is prime, unless they're set up in a specific way. So the question is, what way of setting up sand implements that process? — flannel jesus

Well, if there are a lot of processes that result in consciousness, and a lot of sand dunes being blown around by the wind, then occasionally, through random shifting of sand particles, some process that results in consciousness should occur through random chance.

but you haven't described any process that could happen.

Like, we know how it could happen with dominoes, because we can concretely set up that process - not for consciousness, but for some computations - so if you said to me, "if there was a sand storm of dominoes, maybe after millions of years eventually some sequence of those dominoes would line up to implement that process, and then actually run that process", I would know exactly what you mean - because I've seen it, in a video. And I would be like, yeah, that specific arrangement of dominoes could line up, and the process could run.

But I don't know what you mean when it comes to sand. How can you set up a logic gate with sand?

I don't know. Maybe a more knowledgeable person could chime in.

I think these are two different perspectives. We can ask similar questions for any complex system. So in my opinion this goes all the way back to Aristotle. Answer #1 would be the efficient cause and answer #2 the final cause.

In one sense you are asking an Aristotelian to show you matter without form, and this is impossible. — Leontiskos

For Aristotle the matter-form compound is irreducible, and so this phenomenon is everywhere, and like "turtles all the way down." There simply is no getting outside of it. — Leontiskos

This is an important clarification, and if I appeared to be asking for matter without form, I shouldn’t have been. The question, whether matter can be known without form, is an interesting one, and I tend to agree with Aristotle that it can’t, but it’s not germane to the question that I (and I think the OP) was raising, which is about meaning, not form.

I assume that Aristotle, while averring that “it’s form all the way down,” would still call any such combination of matter and form “physical.” So would I. Otherwise, we’d have nothing to contrast with “mental.” Simply adding form to matter – assuming they could even be cognized as separate – doesn’t make the resulting phenomenon mental. (Let’s sidestep phenomenal vs. noumenal, which also doesn’t seem germane here.) So what we’re left with is what most everyone agrees to call the physical world, matter plus form . . . but then there’s the pesky issue of meanings, which is something else again. It may be “form all the way down,” but it isn’t “meaning all the way down,” and that’s the problem.

Let’s try to rephrase it: We both agree that an upside-down G is matter-plus-form but no meaning (for English speakers). We also agree that the rightside-up G is matter-plus-form-plus-meaning. Here is where the “strictly physical” and “strictly mental” supervenience takes place. The meaning is now supervenient on the matter-plus-form, aka the physical object. But my point all along has been that the infusion or importation of meaning occurs at this level, not at the level of words. By the time we get to “the meaning of a word supervenes on letter-changes,” we’re already working with a subvenient term (the letter) which involves the physical coupled with a meaning. So the (not very dramatic) conclusion is that the supervenience relation between letter and word can’t be called “strictly physical / strictly mental”. We’ve agreed that the letter G already has meaning, and I think we agree that meaning is a mental phenomenon, albeit at times obscure.

G-conceived-as-a-letter is already a matter-form compound (where "form" here indicates semantic/linguistic form). — Leontiskos

Based on the above, we now need to make this more precise. We know that the G-shape would be a matter-form compound regardless, since turtles etc. By introducing the idea of semantic/linguistic form, we’ve moved into a different use of the word “form” -- indeed, it’s what I’m calling “meaning” (or perhaps cf. Clive Bell’s “significant form”). And you rightly point out that the form in this sense can’t be perceived physically. To look for it absent the mental would be a kind of category error. (I leave aside whether it’s really a good idea to use “form” in both these senses.) And then everything you say about how the mental and physical intermingle follows.

About the Beatles example: I had trouble following it because I wasn’t sure how you were using “linguistic form” here. Do you mean that the Beatles-person hears the lyrics in their head as the tune plays, while the other doesn’t? Why would this mean that the Beatles-person can’t hear the matter-relata at all? I’m not clear about the “indecipherable aspect” of the melody. I’m sure there’s more to it, if you wouldn’t mind breaking it down for me. (Or do you simply mean that the non-Beatles person is having a better time of it because unbothered by those silly lyrics? :wink: )