I do not think the complete scientific method can exist without philosophy. I do not think a completely philosophical exploration can be complete without science. — Philosophim

So, it appears that you, like me, see the two disciplines connected within a bi-conditional relationship.

There is a huge gulf between physics and materialism. Physics describes how matter behaves; materialism is the desire to acquire wealth and comfort. How did isms get mixed up with science in the first place? — Vera Mont

You refer to a frequent problem of language. Materialism within science circles means matter is the basis for all of existence; there is no immaterial realm. Materialism within social circles means, as you say, prioritizing the acquisition of wealth. Usually, the two senses can be kept distinct by using "materialism" for the scientific sense, and using "materialistic" for the social sense.

So, it appears that you, like me, see the two disciplines connected within a bi-conditional relationship. — ucarr

Yes, that's correct. :)

Science can't do ethics.

no science is ever done purely a priori, and no philosophy is ever done purely a posteriori;
— Mww

Do you think it's also true when we switch the position of the two disciplines in the above statement? — ucarr

If the differences between the two hold, one cannot be switched with the other. So, first, it would have to be shown how they are not, in order to show how the purities by which each is conditioned, are removed. Still, it is the requisite of metaphysics that it is purely a priori, eliminating it from being even partially a posteriori, as the switch in positions would ask.
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I suppose I'm saying science and philosophy are two sub-divisions, or specializations operating under one over-arching category. — ucarr

I might agree with that, iff the one over-arching category, is reason. Science and philosophy are both done by humans, and reason is the singular human condition, so….
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If a philosopher is not first a scientist, then they need to always maintain a direct line to someone who is. — ucarr

The philosopher doesn’t need a scientific consult if he is theorizing in, or merely speculating on, that which cannot at all be legislated by natural law. Or, in the interest of fairness, why would he?
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I think the relationship between scientific truth and philosophical truth is bi-conditional. — ucarr

I don’t understand what bi-conditional means. Nevertheless, I’m not sure there is a relationship between truths predicated on an observable natural order, and truths predicated on speculative conceptual order.
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philosophy differs from science merely in the determination and application of rules.
— Mww

I think this difference, when the two disciplines dialog constructively, for my reasons above, shrinks to a near vanishing point. — ucarr

If it is the case these two dialogue constructively only by means of reason, then the difference may well vanish with respect to the determination of rules, but would remain for the application of them, insofar as rules determined as governing empirical conditions cannot apply to abstract conceptions. Bearing in mind, of course, cause/effect is a principle, not a rule, and as such applies to both.

Anyway….worthy subject, but I can’t think of much else to say about it.

I do not think the complete scientific method can exist without philosophy — Philosophim

Agreed. But that philosophy should be provided by the scientists.

There is a huge gulf between physics and materialism. — Vera Mont

I know you've already discussed this, but I wanted to draw out a point. This is the view that physics is paradigmatic for science generally, and by extension, as a model for reliable knowledge. That is the basis of physicalism, which is how 'philosophical materialism' is described nowadays. And that is a theory about the nature of reality, which claims that the fundamental constituents of reality are material in nature. Usually it is associated with the idea that the mind is also a product of those material constituents, mediated by the brain. And that, I think, is more or less the default view of scientific culture.

Of course. Assuming that physical manifestations are caused by physical means through physical processes is a prerequisite of sound scientific method.
But that doesn't mean a scientist can't have irrational, fanciful and religious beliefs in his personal life.
Science is fact-based; human thinking is not not necessarily so.

But that doesn't mean a scientist can't have irrational, fanciful and religious beliefs in his personal life. — Vera Mont

Can't help but notice your categorisation of 'religious' with 'irrational' and 'fanciful' there. That is a value judgement, no?

The philosopher doesn’t need a scientific consult if he is theorizing in, or merely speculating on, that which cannot at all be legislated by natural law. Or, in the interest of fairness, why would he? — Mww

Consider the pertinence of the following: a philosopher arrives at some logically valid statements about the potential of the reasoning mind: it can work through unlimited higher orders of categorical thinking within a discipline. The conclusion is that human freedom is unlimited by the standard of higher orders of categorical thinking. However, neuroscience discovers through long-term testing that the human brain, after reaching higher order X of categorical thinking, cannot process the data transfer rate from short-term processing to full cognition beyond higher order X without experiencing fatally high-volume error rates. The first conclusion being that artificial intelligence must take over beyond order X of categorical thinking. The philosopher would not know this a priori. The second conclusion being that the landscape of categorical perception beyond order X is not a reality for humanity whereas it is for artificial intelligence. The philosopher would not know the limit of what can be humanly real by this standard a priori.

Science is science of x.

Except philosophy, which is the science of science or the science of scientiIzing. So philosophy is inherently self-reflective taking as its subject, the subject. — Fire Ologist

Are you answering "yes" to the question:

Is every category of philosophy a type of metaphysics? — ucarr

Agreed. But that philosophy should be provided by the scientists. — jgill

I understand what you're stating in a general sense. I think good philosophy should use as many facts and hew as close to current scientific understanding as possible.

I still think there are some cases where we need strong philosophy and where philosophers can help science. Knowledge, morality, and 'God' (or the nature of origin) are the few that come to my mind. However, other philosophy like "Philosophy of mind" is pretty much dead as an independent philosophical field and should be kept in the realm of science as much as possible.

Basically prior to there being a science, philosophy is our necessary start. Once there is an established science, philosophy must use that science as a basis.

It's three different available categories. There are several more, but I doubt scientists would hold those.

Are you answering "yes" to the question:

Is every category of philosophy a type of metaphysics? — ucarr

In the following sense, yes. Philosophizing is a reflective, meta activity. The earth formed and out of the waters animals diversified, and human beings thought. Somewhere in there was a moment where philosophy was new. At that moment, there was the thing (earth, waters diversifying animals, etc), and now the meta thing held or dispersed by a human. Philosophizing is humans being meta with things.

In the following sense no. Metaphysics starts with concepts (the meta) and gets theoretical and speculative from there (more meta). Metaphysics is a category of philosophy. But it is separate from logoic, which I think belongs in philosophy. Logic is pretty meta, pretty human, but maybe not just human, so maybe not only metaphysics (though it is a category of philosophy.)

I see ethics as tied to having a body in the world interacting with other bodies, causing ethical quandaries and being affected (so the effect) by ethical behaviors. So ethics as a category of philosophy can’t stay purely metaphysical.

Epistemology is like logic and metaphysics overlapping - maybe another type of metaphysics. Ontology overlaps with pure physics, but is maybe half metaphysics and half physics.

Agreed. But that philosophy should be provided by the scientists. — jgill

Any bumper sticker you can provide for why? It seems odd to me. Like saying hydrologists need provide the engineering know-how for hydro-dams.

….a philosopher arrives at some logically valid statements…. — ucarr

….neuroscience discovers through long-term testing…. — ucarr

How would the scientist test the philosopher’s logically valid statements, the subject and predicate of which are merely abstract conceptions? At bottom would be Aristotle’s laws of thought, in which it is clear A = A would be impossible to test with deductive certainty.

I grant that science can test some philosophic statements, but I wanted to account for it, by stating that philosophers need no consult for that investigation which in no way involves natural law, which would include statements the validity of which are only logical.
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….it can work through unlimited higher orders of categorical thinking… — ucarr

….after reaching higher order X of categorical thinking…. — ucarr

Here the philosopher, specifically the metaphysician, would reject even his own the notion of unlimited higher orders of critical thinking, which makes the neuroscientist’s claims of brain data loss inherent in it, mistaken hence irrelevant. On the other hand, the philosopher may well acknowledge data transfer loss even for the levels of critical thinking he grants to human intelligence; he would simply label “forgetfulness” what the neuroscientist labels “plasticity”.

Interesting gedankenexperiment though.

If science discovers a posteriori the facts of nature, then does it follow that science, being the source of empirical truth, equates itself with materialism? — ucarr

No — 180 Proof

Is every[any] category of science a type of materialism? — ucarr

No — 180 Proof

The scope of science includes more that nature?

The scope of nature includes more than material things and their attendant physics?

Does philosophy hold aloof from science within an academic fortress of abstract math and logic? — ucarr

I don't understand this question. — 180 Proof

As the medium is limited, so is the meaning supported by that medium. This is an argument for recognizing the unbreakable link connecting science, math and logic to the natural world. Abstract thought is part of the natural world because its medium is the brain.

I make this argument here because we're examining the difference between science and philosophy. Some argue the difference is centered in the difference between the material_physicality of empirical examination and verification and the supposed immateriality of abstract reasoning.

I argue for the vanishing point of difference between science and philosophy through the essential linkage connecting brain and mind.

I see the difference centered in the older generalism of philosophy and the newer specialization of science. The specialization of science post-European Renaissance creates an illusion of profound difference between the two.

How would the scientist test the philosopher’s logically valid statements, the subject and predicate of which are merely abstract conceptions? At bottom would be Aristotle’s laws of thought, in which it is clear A = A would be impossible to test with deductive certainty. — Mww

As the medium is limited, so is the meaning supported by that medium.

If abstract thought is connected to the brain, then the limitations inherent in the material_physical dimensions of the brain: cells, synapses, electric current, gravity etc. exert controlling limits on what the content of abstract thought can be. In turn, these same limitations exert controlling limits on what the content of judgments about abstract thought can be.

The human, whose thinking is bounded by a physical brain, is blind to those limitations of brain on content of mind, as the human gets their sense of what is real and possible from within the boundaries of those limitations as their thoughts and perceptions of reality. In addition, a serial blindness is human's inability to see what exists that lies beyond the cognitive range of brain-based consciousness.

To exalt the mind's perception of reality beyond limitations of the brain amounts to driving the express lane to fallacy without knowing it.

In the following sense, yes. Philosophizing is a reflective, meta activity. The earth formed and out of the waters animals diversified, and human beings thought. Somewhere in there was a moment where philosophy was new. At that moment, there was the thing (earth, waters diversifying animals, etc), and now the meta thing held or dispersed by a human. Philosophizing is humans being meta with things. — Fire Ologist

Your philology and classification of philosophy show promise. I think you should continue as you've been going, with a mind towards detailed elaboration with maximum rigor.

Is see that higher-order thinking (meta activity) spiderwebs through all of your counter-examples. So, even when it ranges out from higher-order thinking, philosophy is still a mixed bag of grit and gaze.

...Philosophizing is a reflective, meta activity... — Fire Ologist

I wonder if you'e thinking philosophy is always an instance of Chinese boxes?

If abstract thought is connected to the brain, then the limitations inherent in the material_physical dimensions of the brain: cells, synapses, electric current, gravity etc. exert controlling limits on what the content of abstract thought can be. — ucarr

If the human can think whatever he wants, where is the controlling limits by the brain on the content of his thought? All that’s left is to say the brain’s limits prescribe the kind of thinker a human is, the content of his thoughts be what they may.

But I feel ya. The brain informs of all our knowledge, but doesn’t give us even an inkling of the knowledge of how it informs of the knowledge we have. It’s like the brain keeps to itself its own inner workings, while at the same time permitting the ability for us to know anything else, all else being given.

To exalt the mind's perception of reality beyond limitations of the brain amounts to driving the express lane to fallacy without knowing it. — ucarr

Because we don’t know enough of how the brain works, by what warrant can we say we’ve over-reached the brain’s capacity for knowing things? I think we do know when we’re approaching fallacies, in that Nature will tells us regarding real things (never step in front of a fast-mover), and logic will inform us regarding other-then-real things (A /= B).

If the human can think whatever he wants — Mww

My point is that the human can think what the brain has the capacity to think, and not beyond that point. That's a limit far short of being able to think whatever we wish to think. Consider that when we conceive of thinking whatever we wish to think, our ability to think out to this limit is limited in ways unknown to us, as you yourself acknowledge:

The brain informs of all our knowledge, but doesn’t give us even an inkling of the knowledge of how it informs of the knowledge we have. — Mww

So, the scope of our imagination is limited, and moreover, we don't know all of the details of the limitations, and thus we're limited in our knowledge of what we need to circumvent, and how to do it.

Because we don’t know enough of how the brain works, by what warrant can we say we’ve over-reached the brain’s capacity for knowing things? — Mww

We're over-reaching when we imagine a fleshy mass of connected hemispheres has a scope of imagination beyond what protein-based matter has the capacity to conceive.

It's worth distinguish between "the philosophy of science," and "the philosophy of x science." The stuff you find in handbooks of "philosophy of biology," or "philosophy of economics," is central to the work of scientists in those fields. It generally has to do with paradigm defining theory, methodology, etc., and the articles you find in these texts are about a 50/50 split of scientists from that field and philosophers who specialize in that field (who have generally completed graduate work in the field as well).

"Philosophy of science," tends to be much broader, and not intersect with the sciences to nearly the same degree. It is fairly common to see people with PhDs in physics or biology described as "philosophers of," those fields, but it is uncommon to see a scientist described as a "philosopher of science." The latter is much more general.

The other place you see philosophy intersecting with science is in interdisciplinary areas like information science, complexity studies, etc.

If you look back at how the terms for "science" were used from St. Aquinas up through Hegel's day, there isn't really wasn't too much a distinction. A science was any systematic study of an area of inquiry. Sciences were unique in terms of having different methodologies, and different first principles (following Aristotle's ideal of a science that can be deductively derived from first principles). But "science" was not a discrete form of inquiry.

I could see considerable merits to going back to such a view. "Science," is not really a special sort of sui generis thing, distinguished from all other areas of inquiry. We have only come to think of it in this way due to a short period of history where "anti-metaphysical," views were in vouge. But of course, this didn't get rid of metaphysics, rather it dogmatically enshrined a certain metaphysics, with negative consequences for the progress of science. Only now are we really getting over the hangover caused by this.

Lines of inquiry should be judged on their relative merits, not credentialism. You constantly hear academics bemoaning the negative effects of silos and turf wars, and yet it remains a common tactic to invoke these silos as a means of ending debate (e.g., "developmental biologists cannot speak to evolution, it isn't their specialty," being invoked as a counter to EES). Particularly, the replication crisis and problems with the relationship between economics, public policy, and incentive structures should call into question the absolute authority of "scientists," in their own field of study. For example, being an economist alone does not make one necessarily better equipped to judge the validity of statistical methods.

We're over-reaching when we imagine a fleshy mass of connected hemispheres has a scope of imagination beyond what protein-based matter has the capacity to conceive. — ucarr

Yet, for all intents and purposes, that is exactly what appears to be the case. If we are what the brain does, and we have a rather unlimited imagination, we can only be that way iff the brain has a matching unlimited capacity for what it does, such that we can then do what we do because of it.

Agreed. But that philosophy should be provided by the scientists. — jgill

Any bumper sticker you can provide for why? It seems odd to me. Like saying hydrologists need provide the engineering know-how for hydro-dams. — AmadeusD

I am speaking of the actual science, not peripheral sciences nor philosophy concerning the use of scientific discoveries. Also, I included other kinds of philosophers. I suppose it is possible for a pop philosopher to dream up a concept that clarifies an issue defying the best scientists in that area, but unlikely. On the other hand there is ample proof top scientists can produce whoppers, viz. Mathematical Universe and Multiverses.

As for hydrologists who are philosophers as well, go for it!

Anyway, this is just my opinion. When a non-scientist philosopher produces a breakthrough in quantum theory I will eat my beanie.

To some extent, science may have taken such a stronghold, that philosophy is seen as of less importance. However, the ideas of science and scientific models may rest on philosophy assumptions and even physics, as 'hard science' may rest on the metaphysical imagination. In particular, quantum physics breaks down the basics of hardcore materialistic approaches of scientific models, leading to scientific ideas and, even paradigms, being models as opposed to absolutes of objective and rational understanding.

Yet, for all intents and purposes, that is exactly what appears to be the case. — Mww

We're not satisfied with appearances, and what lies beyond the imagination of protein-based sentience cannot appear dynamically to our imaginations. So, in the instance of an unlimited protein-based sentience, we're experiencing a bounded infinity. It's a case of unlimited content across limited extent. Beyond its limits, the human brain has no specific inkling of what lies therein, and through the lens of its imagination, unlimited extent as a practical experience is mere appearance.

Consider a sentience based on protein and also on material-x. Both platforms are bounded infinities. Their combination generates an infinity larger than its constituent infinities considered respectively. At this level of infinity, data processing per unit of time is a million times the max data processing rate of both protein-based processing and material-x based processing respectively.

At our level of infinity, we can speculate in general about how motion works at super-dense spacetimes featuring millions of spacial dimensions. The specifics of the empirical experience of this super-dense motion is beyond even our imaginations because we cannot process enough information -- not even across infinite time because rate is essential and that's not achievable via serial accretion -- to go there existentially.

You say I'm there now through my imagination. Okay. I'm there now through my imagination, and, curiously, a rock lying on the ground is here with us as human sentients at the level of rock-based imagination.

So, you win the argument, and we see that rock-based imagination makes that rock lying on the ground one of our sentient peers.

All of this reads like an argument reductio ad absurdum. Is it?

...the ideas of science and scientific models may rest on philosophy assumptions and even physics, as 'hard science' may rest on the metaphysical imagination. In particular, quantum physics breaks down the basics of hardcore materialistic approaches of scientific models, leading to scientific ideas and, even paradigms... — Jack Cummins

If you're speculating about the scientific imagination being unable to expand forward without merging into the metaphysics of philosophy, then I find what you're saying interesting.

Now I can ask you what is the relationship between imagination and metaphysics?

If metaphysics is an essential component of imagination, irrespective of theme or topic, then philosophy, acting through the channel of imagination, holds ground with all other disciplines.

The pie-in-the-sky derogation of philosophy is twofold: it's a mockery of the perceived over-seriousness of philosophy; it's a veiled recognition of the imaginative power of philosophy.

Now I can ask you what is the relationship between imagination and metaphysics? — ucarr

Imagination is more important than knowledge. For knowledge is limited, whereas imagination embraces the entire world, stimulating progress, giving birth to evolution. — Albert Einstein, What Life Means to Einstein (1924)

Recall how important thought-experiments were to Einstein in devising his theory.

The imagination of protein-based sentience — ucarr

Lumpen materialism ;)

All of this reads like an argument reductio ad absurdum. Is it? — ucarr

Maybe, but more like an appeal to extremes, I would think. I mean…beyond imagination? How can we go beyond imagination except by using it?

Ok, fine. Absurdum it is.

I wonder if you'e thinking philosophy is always an instance of Chinese boxes? — ucarr

In what sense? That the philosopher doesn’t understand the symbols but can use a manual to create responses that work but have no understanding behind them? Or that the philosopher understands that the symbols are meaningless, and so, when philosophizing, is conducting a meta process while processing the meaningless symbols?