A 'right' would be a limitation on society that has been deemed to be of greater benefit for the individual to have for the benefit of society

Under your definition, then, people who are not a part of a society do not have the right to life nor bodily autonomy.

I would say that rights are innate. It is a mistake to think of rights as relative to societies, because they are then subject to the whims of the society and not subject to what is good (morals).

It may be for the benefit of one society to persecute and enslave outside members, whether they be a member of another society or not, and I would say that this still violates their rights.

Also, I would consider your definition to be a form of privileges, because it makes no difference to me if society is constraining themselves from doing something to the individual or allowing the individual to do things—and, as a matter of fact, they sound like essentially the same thing: an allowance requires others to constrain themselves insofar as they cannot violate what has been allowed.

Everyone is someone's son/daughter. How many parents would want justice or revenge? Society runs on trust.

This is a perfectly fair point, and I see why you would conclude this in your theory. I think that, still your view also agrees (along with what you said here above) that all else being equal it is better to save the 5 by sacrificing the 1. I don’t think we are going to progress anywhere on this point, but it was worth mentioning that the two claims are perfectly compatible with each other.

Why is the intention, not the result, good? Can this be proven?

I agree that results (consequences) can be good or bad, as I am not a deontologist, but the point is that intentions are also either good or bad. Whether the intention is good or bad is completely despite any consequences that my be brought about.

For example, if I intend to rob someone and end up accidentally saving their life, then my intention was bad and the consequences of my actions was good. If one is only evaluating how good or bad intentions are relative to the consequences (actualizing it) brings about, then there is no room to declare the intention bad in this case: the intention of robbing them was good. This is obviously wrong.

The intentions and consequences matter; hence why I am not a consequentialist nor a deontologist.

I have a hunch that you do not mean ‘consequentialism’ in the traditional sense of the term, and probably agree with me on these points.

They have a choice to torture or not torture Billy; but the reason Dave should not torture billy is certainly should not be relative to what else they could be doing — Bob Ross

Under this theory, it certainly is. Can you explain in this moral theory why its not?

If whether it is immoral to torture billy is undefined without explicating all possible skills Dave could be acquiring instead, then something is very wrong with your theory.

Honestly, I am not going to go into detail, because I think you simply aren’t appreciating what ‘excluding all other variables’ means.

The word 'seeming' implies its an inductive reason.

A seeming is not an induction, and seeming is a grasping of something. It could seem to be correct to induce or abduce X, but the seeming is not identical to the induction or abduction itself.

I don't think there's any 'seeming' to it. 1+3=1 is just objectively wrong. This phrase seems confusing at best and unnecessary at worst. Is there anything this phrase serves that cannot be conveyed using common language?

The difference between an ‘intellectual seeming’ and ‘feeling’ serves the purpose of distinguishing a cognitive grasping of something vs. having a particular feeling towards it.

Let’s take a different example that may suffice to elaborate. Imagine you get up in the morning, walk into the bathroom, and start brushing your teeth. The question pops into your head: “am I in a simulation?”. You conclude: “Nah, it seems like, given my experience and knowledge, I am not in a simulation, although it is actually and logically possible.”. This abduction is your reasoning, sherlock-holmes style, about the information you have that makes you conclude that your aren’t in a simulation; and the seeming is that you find the abduction valid and correct: it seems right that this abduction demonstrates that you are not in a simulation.

EDIT:

Silly me forgot to completely convey the point. Imagine that I added to the hypothetical that you really wanted to be in a simulation: would that change that it seems to you that you are not in one? Of course not.

Oh, please do! I understand the respect here, and yes, feel free to give your own moral conclusions and why you believe they are objectively true.

I shall indulge myself then, and briefly explain my theory and apply to an example.

Firstly, when analyzing morals, it is chiefly important to understand the an analysis of ‘what is good’ is split into two main subsections: (1) an analysis of the nature [of the property of] goodness, and (2) what can be predicated to be good. Most people skip #1 and go straight to #2, it causes all sorts of problems.

For example, I, with all due respect, consider your theory to be making such a mistake (of skipping #1): when you declare, even if I were to grant it as true, that “existence is good”, I do not take you to mean that “[the property of] goodness is identical to [the property of] beingness” but, rather, that “what can be predicated as good, in a supreme and ultimate sense, and of which all other ‘things’ which could be predicated as good are good, is existence [or, if you like, more existence]”. Such a statement says nothing about what goodness actually is, but rather what can be said to ultimately be good. Your is missing an analysis of the nature of goodness: it only covers, at best, The Good.

For me, I will briefly say that goodness, in my theory, is identical to ‘having value’ and moral goodness is identical to ‘having intrinsic value’. I will leave out the details on why for now.

‘What is good’ in the sense of ‘what can be predicated as being good?’, in my theory, is thusly identical to asking “what can be predicated as being intrinsically valuable?”. To answer, I am required to give an analysis of intrinsic value.

To keep things brief, I consider ‘intrinsic value’ to be value which is demanded by the ‘thing’ in virtue of its nature: it is value which can be ignored or denied, but only superficially. A great example (to initially convey the point) is pain: pain has intrinsic value (in the sense of avoiding it) insofar as one can superficially say or feel that “avoiding pain is not valuable” but when put in a state of serious pain it is undeniable that it there is value (all else being equal) in avoiding it . It is hard, in an active state of pain, to actually believe that the avoidance of it has no value: this kind of demand from the nature of the ‘thing’ is what I mean by ‘intrinsic value’. Now, it is common to take the analogy too far, and conclude that pleasure and pain are themselves, beings intrinsically valuable, are The Good: this is a mistake. There are states which demand more value which, if grasped by the person, can lead one to overcome (some or even all) pain or pleasure to acquire it; and the end result is far better than mere avoidance of pain and pursuit of pleasure. An easy example of this is Aristotle’s eudamonia (i.e., ‘flourshing’ or ‘happiness’, as roughly translated): for one to truly flourish, they must overcome and even volunteer to be in pain or give up pleasure. This state is, when properly understood, more demanding of value in the sense that it, when compared to other states (such as a state of pain), is even more difficult to deny the value of it (over other states [such as a state of pain or pleasure]). A person can easily say “this pleasure I am currently having, albeit it fleeting and swift, is more valuable than a state of supreme flourishing”, but if that person were put in such a state of (supreme) flourishing (viz., they had a deep sense of fullfilment, their goals were being realized, they were optimally mentally and physically healthy, they had loving relationships with others, etc.) then it is hard to imagine, if that person has reasonably sufficient cognitive capacities, they could genuinely deny its superior value (over that pain or pleasure): if they did, then it would be very superficial of a denial indeed. Now, although eudamonia (i.e., ‘flourishing’ or ‘happiness’) is intrinsically valuable, it is not The Good. Just like how it may be hard to understand how more demanding (of value) flourishing is over pursuing pleasure but, nevertheless, if one were placed in such a state their denial (of the supremacy of such a state) would be superficial, so it is when one who is taken out of a state of flourishing and put in situation wherein there are mutually, harmonized flourishing between subjects. For example, if one who has achieved an optimal state of flourishing must relinquish or sacrifice some of it, or even most of it, to help them and another achieve mutually beneficial flourishing, then this will be an undeniably better state than the first. One can deny it, but have a person who was alone in their flourishing achieve mutual flourishing with another, and this achieved state will demand recognition as better than the first—any denial of it is superficial. In fact, one can abstract these movements of reason, as exemplified in my examples, until they get to one supreme state (of which nothing can be demanded with more vigor): universal flourishing.

The Good, in my theory, is thusly universal flourishing (which relates very closely to universal harmony).

This theory, since it posits the The Good as universal flourishing, is not subjective: whether or not a ‘thing’ is flourishing is not stance-dependent—it is not dependent on conative nor cognitive dispositions. There is a fact of the matter, and we can investigate and acquire these facts because moral judgments are cognitive and some are true. Therefore, this is a form of moral realism.

Let’s take the Dave example to illustrate one difference between our views. In your view, whether or not it is immoral to torture Billy to acquire the skill of torturing is undefined; in mine, it is immoral, because torturing a person for the sake of acquiring a skill does not uphold nor progress towards a state of mutual flourishing between them.

This is getting long, so I will stop here (;

Bob

Under your definition, then, people who are not a part of a society do not have the right to life nor bodily autonomy. — Bob Ross

I need to define society. A society occurs when there is more than one person involved. If there is no society, there are no other people. Meaning there is nothing else outside of yourself to dictate what you can and cannot do.

I would say that rights are innate. It is a mistake to think of rights as relative to societies, because they are then subject to the whims of the society and not subject to what is good (morals). — Bob Ross

Rights only come about with the interplay of the individual and societies. While yes, it is relevant to the society, it is factual to the well being or detriment of the society. In cases where we could document that individuals having rights benefitted all societies, we could call these universal rights. In other societies and cultures, people having a 'right' may benefit that particular culture, but not others. But, a right should be based on concrete and provable benefits, not simply societal opinions. For example, some people argue that universal health care is a right, despite costs. Perhaps in a wealthy society, it can be. In a society with limited resources, it could bankrupt it.

It may be for the benefit of one society to persecute and enslave outside members, whether they be a member of another society or not, and I would say that this still violates their rights. — Bob Ross

If we are talking universal rights, yes. Because what we also must consider is the interplay between societies. If one society starts enslaving another population, that other society may ban together with others and overthrow the enslaving society. Not to mention trade and interchange of culture between the two is likely going to be stifled. Its been found slavery tends to hold societies back as well. My favorite reference to this is that the American economy improved more after slavery was eliminated. https://www.econlib.org/archives/2014/09/ending_slavery.html#:~:text=Former%20slaves%20would%20now%20be,productive%2C%20and%20hence%20richer%20country.

Also, I would consider your definition to be a form of privileges — Bob Ross

There is a very key difference though. Privileges are permissions from society. Rights are restrictions on society. Privileges can be granted or taken away without a large impact on a societies health. People generally don't foment revolution because of them. Adding or taking away rights directly benefit or hurt a society in a large way.

I think your main issue is that I've noted society is the one that grants rights, and you see that no different than granting privileges except by degree. The point I'm trying to make is a right is a restriction on society that provably benefits it overall. So even if a society does not grant free speech for example, it would be better overall if it did grant such a right. Might makes 'what is granted'. Might does not make 'right'.

I think that, still your view also agrees (along with what you said here above) that all else being equal it is better to save the 5 by sacrificing the 1. — Bob Ross

What do you mean 'all else being equal'? That doesn't convey anything to me in this sentence. If we remove society, like in the case of the lizards, then yes. But we just can't remove society from human kind. So no, generally its wrong to sacrifice someone against their will to save 1. "All else being equal" doesn't address the calculus going on.

Whether the intention is good or bad is completely despite any consequences that my be brought about.

For example, if I intend to rob someone and end up accidentally saving their life, then my intention was bad and the consequences of my actions was good. — Bob Ross

Right, but why was your intention bad? With my answer, its easy to understand. Lets say that 99% of attempted robberies result in harm. Just because this 1% resulted in something good, doesn't suddenly make attempting to rob people a good intention. This is about expected results.

To make it clearer, let us say that in a culture I call people 'sir' as I am intending to be polite. Now in another culture, the word 'sir' is actually slang for an insult. When I use the word, I'm intending to convey politeness. When they get angry and explain that it is also an insult, I insist that I will continue to the use the word as my principle demands that I use 'sir' when talking to people. I have all intention that I will change their ways, that I'm really being polite and civilized, and I must do this to stay virtuous. Yet, the reality is I'm just making a lot of people angry at me and being rude.

Without outcomes to measure intentions, there's nothing to back 'what is virtuous' besides subjective op
inion. But with an objective measurement that 'greater existence is better', we have an outcome that we can measure our intentions by. This allows us to say with objective confidence what 'virtues' are generally more good or bad within a society.

The intentions and consequences matter — Bob Ross

Correct. My only point is that to have meaningful and objectively evaluated intentions, it must be based on meaningful and objective expected outcomes.

If whether it is immoral to torture billy is undefined without explicating all possible skills Dave could be acquiring instead, then something is very wrong with your theory. — Bob Ross

Or something is wrong with your example in addressing the theory. Lets move on from this until later however. I think we're having much more productive conversations in the other areas and you're getting a better understanding of what the theory means through these more basic examples.

You conclude: “Nah, it seems like, given my experience and knowledge, I am not in a simulation, although it is actually and logically possible.”. This abduction is your reasoning, sherlock-holmes style, about the information you have that makes you conclude that your aren’t in a simulation; and the seeming is that you find the abduction valid and correct: it seems right that this abduction demonstrates that you are not in a simulation. — Bob Ross

I still see this as no different than inductive reasoning.

For example, I, with all due respect, consider your theory to be making such a mistake (of skipping #1): when you declare, even if I were to grant it as true, that “existence is good” — Bob Ross

Such a statement says nothing about what goodness actually is, but rather what can be said to ultimately be good. Yours is missing an analysis of the nature of goodness: it only covers, at best, The Good. — Bob Ross

I admit to a little confusion. How is pointing out "The Good" missing an analysis of The Good? Don't I go immediately afterward and examine how we measure existence, and how we can create states of optimal goodness? This is a little too abstract for me. Could you point out where my logic or examples miss this?

For me, I will briefly say that goodness, in my theory, is identical to ‘having value’ and moral goodness is identical to ‘having intrinsic value’. — Bob Ross

To be objective, you need a solid foundation. What is objective value? What determines value?

To keep things brief, I consider ‘intrinsic value’ to be value which is demanded by the ‘thing’ in virtue of its nature — Bob Ross

To keep things brief, I consider ‘intrinsic value’ to be value which is demanded by the ‘thing’ in virtue of its nature: it is value which can be ignored or denied, but only superficially. A great example (to initially convey the point) is pain: pain has intrinsic value (in the sense of avoiding it) insofar as one can superficially say or feel that “avoiding pain is not valuable” but when put in a state of serious pain it is undeniable that it there is value (all else being equal) in avoiding it — Bob Ross

I agree that pain has value in the fact that its purpose is to ensure the living being stops injuring itself and gives itself time to heal. However, pain has no intrinsic value in itself. If I'm going to get surgery, feeling the pain from the knife serves no purpose at that point. Something that has intrinsic value means that it has value in itself. But in this instance, it does not.

Lets compare this to my theory. I would note that as long as pain helps a living being preserve itself and ultimately live longer more intact, then it is an incentive that helps extend the existence of a life. But if we can obtain the same outcome of existent life without pain, there is no harm in using pain relief medication. Pain is good within the greater context of its impact on a life.

There are states which demand more value which, if grasped by the person, can lead one to overcome (some or even all) pain or pleasure to acquire it; and the end result is far better than mere avoidance of pain and pursuit of pleasure. — Bob Ross

But this is not intrinsic value, but extrinsic value. If something motivates you to do something that is good, it is good in virtue of its ultimate outcome, not good merely in itself.

An easy example of this is Aristotle’s eudamonia (i.e., ‘flourshing’ or ‘happiness’, as roughly translated): for one to truly flourish, they must overcome and even volunteer to be in pain or give up pleasure. — Bob Ross

Why is flourishing valuable?

Just like how it may be hard to understand how more demanding (of value) flourishing is over pursuing pleasure but, nevertheless, if one were placed in such a state their denial (of the supremacy of such a state) would be superficial — Bob Ross

I grew up with a family of alcoholics. My mother desires pleasure far more than flourishing. This is not superficial, but a real choice. Are we saying my mother determines value? Or is there a value beyond a person's personal desires? If so, what objectively determines that value?

if one who has achieved an optimal state of flourishing must relinquish or sacrifice some of it, or even most of it, to help them and another achieve mutually beneficial flourishing, then this will be an undeniably better state than the first. — Bob Ross

How is it undeniable? Where is the proof?

The Good, in my theory, is thusly universal flourishing (which relates very closely to universal harmony). — Bob Ross

That's a fine opinion, but not an objective argument. There are a lot of assumptions here that need clear answers.

This theory, since it posits the The Good as universal flourishing, is not subjective: whether or not a ‘thing’ is flourishing is not stance-dependent—it is not dependent on conative nor cognitive dispositions. — Bob Ross

Oh, I'm not arguing that your definition of flourishing and the criteria to meet flourishing are not objective. My question is what is objective value, and why is flourishing part of that objective value?

In your view, whether or not it is immoral to torture Billy to acquire the skill of torturing is undefined — Bob Ross

No, its not undefined. You simply haven't given a thought experiment which can be accurately evaluated. I've asked you to provide aspects to make it complete. Do so, and you'll have your answer.

in mine, it is immoral, because torturing a person for the sake of acquiring a skill does not uphold nor progress towards a state of mutual flourishing between them. — Bob Ross

Of course, because your criteria for goodness is mutual flourishing. But you haven't given any objective reasons why mutual flourishing is good. My criteria for goodness is relative outcomes of existence. This is objectively concluded. To evaluate a moral outcome, you need a thought experiment that compares relative outcomes of existence.

This is getting long, so I will stop here (; — Bob Ross

Honestly I was worried it was going to be a lot longer than this. :D Well done Bob, I'm enjoying digging into these ideas.

I need to define society. A society occurs when there is more than one person involved.

Ok, I was using society in the sense of an institutionalized state.

Rights only come about with the interplay of the individual and societies

They are only explicated in societies. You still have a right to life even if you are the only human left.

If we are talking universal rights, yes. Because what we also must consider is the interplay between societies.

The interplay of societies doesn’t imply rights in the sense that you have set up: if the societies determine rights, then two societies which are not subsumed under another, larger society would have no way to resolve any disputes between society members of one vs. the other.

Privileges are permissions from society. Rights are restrictions on society.

If society is making up rights, then they are also permissions.

I think your main issue is that I've noted society is the one that grants rights, and you see that no different than granting privileges except by degree. The point I'm trying to make is a right is a restriction on society that provably benefits it overall. So even if a society does not grant free speech for example, it would be better overall if it did grant such a right.

Correct. A ‘right’ in the traditional sense of the word does not exist in your view; and both what you call a ‘privilege’ and a ‘right’ are subcategories of what I would call ‘privileges’.

You have removed the possibility of having rights despite what one’s society considers a right.

What do you mean 'all else being equal'? That doesn't convey anything to me in this sentence.

It means ‘excluding all other factors [than what was explicated in the sentence]’.

Right, but why was your intention bad? With my answer, its easy to understand. Lets say that 99% of attempted robberies result in harm. Just because this 1% resulted in something good, doesn't suddenly make attempting to rob people a good intention. This is about expected results.

It is bad because it violates a general moral principle that robbery is (generally) wrong. It is generally wrong, because it is morally bad, when analyzed in isolation, to rob someone. Why this is the case will depend on the ethical theory in play.

It isn’t about what one expects to happen if people start robbing by-at-large per se, although that is relevant too, but, rather, about whether or not robbery is bad in-itself. If robbery is bad in-itself, then an intention to do it is bad.

When they get angry and explain that it is also an insult, I insist that I will continue to the use the word as my principle demands that I use 'sir' when talking to people

This is just a conflation of words, and not an absurd insistence on one’s duty to a principle. The principle would be ‘one should be polite’, not ‘one should say the word ‘sir’, specifically in English’.

Without outcomes to measure intentions, there's nothing to back 'what is virtuous' besides subjective op
inion

What backs it is if the action is virtuous or not. Whether it is virtuous depends on moral principles.

I admit to a little confusion. How is pointing out "The Good" missing an analysis of The Good?

“The Good” refers to what can be predicated to be good (i.e., what has the property of goodness) in a supreme and ultimate sense (viz., the highest good); whereas ‘goodness’ is the property being predicated to “The Good”.

When you say “existence is good”, you are saying “one can validly predicate ‘existence’ with the property of ‘goodness’”. It is still an entirely valid question to ask: “what is ‘goodness’?”.

The Good and goodness are not the same thing.

To be objective, you need a solid foundation. What is objective value? What determines value?

Not at all. To be objective, is to exist mind-independently. Goodness is identical to ‘having value’ because that is, at its core, what the ‘being good’ is about. An easy way to demonstrate this, is to think of what ethics, axiology, and pragmatism would be if it had nothing to do with value: it would be merely about what is and not what ought to be—and this is a fundamental shift from what the studies traditionally are about.

“Objective value” is just intrinsic value; for it is the only type of value which a thing can have in-itself. The other option is extrinsic value, and this is not itself objective.

If I'm going to get surgery, feeling the pain from the knife serves no purpose at that point.

The point is that, all else being equal, avoiding pain has value in-itself.

But this is not intrinsic value, but extrinsic value. If something motivates you to do something that is good, it is good in virtue of its ultimate outcome, not good merely in itself.

The value is intrinsic, because it is value a thing has in-itself. Another way to describe it, is that intrinsic value is value which if a thing has it will be value demanded solely due to its nature.

The fact that someone can be motivated to value or not value it, is not relevant itself to whether the thing demands to be value because it has intrinsic worth.

Why is flourishing valuable?

It is intrinsically valuable, because, as per its nature, it demands value. Which can be easily understood when one is in such a state.

My mother desires pleasure far more than flourishing.

Flourishing has more intrinsic value than pleasure, and this can be demonstrated with a hypothetical.

Imagine two states that your mother could be in. The first is constant pleasure obtained by being an alcoholic. The second is a persistent state of flourishing, happiness, and prosperity.

She may say, without being put in both states (to compare), that she prefers the first; but really, the second is better. And she would realize that if she were put in the second.

Are we saying my mother determines value? Or is there a value beyond a person's personal desires? If so, what objectively determines that value?

Intrinsic value is objective. She does not determine whether or not a state of flourishing has intrinsic value nor how much.

How is it undeniable? Where is the proof?

It is impossible to non-superficially deny the value of a state that has intrinsic value when they are in that state: it is, of course, easy to say when not in the state.

That's a fine opinion, but not an objective argument.

I don’t see how it isn’t an objective argument; insofar as the argument demonstrates (to my satisfaction) that morality is objective, and The Good is universal flourishing.

There are a lot of assumptions here that need clear answers.

In a trivial sense, of course. I can’t write an 800 page book as my response (:

Besides that, what assumptions?

My question is what is objective value, and why is flourishing part of that objective value?

“Objective value” is another phrase for ‘intrinsically valuable’; and flourishing has intrinsic value because the state demands to be valued in virtue of its nature, and this is hard to demonstrate if you haven’t experienced it—this is an empirical claim, and not something abstract.

Of course, because your criteria for goodness is mutual flourishing.

No. Goodness is not ‘mutual flourishing’, let alone ‘flourishing’. Goodness is the property of ‘having value’.

Well done Bob, I'm enjoying digging into these ideas.

You too, my friend!

Bob

Perhaps I should elaborate more on the difference between answering "what can be considered good?" and "what is [the property of] goodness?".

When one says "this car is red", they do not mean to explain anything about the property of redness; but, rather, that the car has such a property. It is still perfectly valid to ask: "what is redness?".

When one says "more existence is good", they do not mean to explain anything about the property of goodness; but, rather, that "more existence" has such a property. It is still perfectly valid to ask: "what is goodness?".

Your theory presupposes a property of goodness, of which your analysis (so far) is the discovery of what can be predicated to have such a property, but, interestingly, doesn't give any analysis of the property itself--it is merely a presupposed, notional, property that is utilized for the rest of the analysis.

Now, instead of meaning "more existence is good" in an analogous sense to "this car is red", you may mean it as an identity relation---that 'is good' here refers to "goodness is identical to the property of 'having more existence' [or something like that]" (i.e., goodness = having more existence). I think there are good reasons to believe that goodness cannot be reduced to such a claim.

Firstly, goodness, then, would not be normative; because it only refers to whether something has or does not have 'more existence' than some other possibility. This transitions ethics into a science of what is, and not what should be.

Secondly, it doesn't seem correct that "having more existence [than ...] is to have more existence [than ...]" is identical in meaning to "to be good is to have more existence [than ...]": the latter seems to add something extra, in meaning, by denoting what is good as opposed to expressing a tautology. It is important to note that, if a property is identical to goodness, then the sentence that expresses a tautology [of the property] must be identical to a sentence that expresses the property as goodness---and this is true because they are (supposed to be) identical, which makes them interchangeable.

Just something to think about (;

Bob

I need to define society. A society occurs when there is more than one person involved.

Ok, I was using society in the sense of an institutionalized state. — Bob Ross

That one's on me, I didn't define it ahead of time.

Rights only come about with the interplay of the individual and societies

They are only explicated in societies. You still have a right to life even if you are the only human left. — Bob Ross

I think we're more in a semantics disagreement here than an disagreement of underlying concepts. My point is that if there are no other human beings, there are no rights. We don't exactly get to tell a hungry lion, "I have a right to life." No one is there to care. Is it more moral for you to live instead of die? In almost all cases, yes. If you want to call it a right its fine. Its the right of a society of 1. I just prefer to note that a society has a minimum of 2.

If we are talking universal rights, yes. Because what we also must consider is the interplay between societies.

The interplay of societies doesn’t imply rights in the sense that you have set up: if the societies determine rights, then two societies which are not subsumed under another, larger society would have no way to resolve any disputes between society members of one vs. the other. — Bob Ross

If rights are societally subjective, then yes. But if they are societally objective, as in these rights to individuals improve and strengthen societies more than those who do not have them by fact, then there is data for one society to point to.

Privileges are permissions from society. Rights are restrictions on society.

If society is making up rights, then they are also permissions. — Bob Ross

I think my above definition gives a clear enough demarcation between the two to denote two separate words. I believe your real issue is that in both cases, these things are determined by societies and not any one individual. If it makes it easier, we can say an individual can give a permission to itself vs a restriction to itself. I think you would agree with this. As to whether a right or permission has any import in a society of 1, I leave that up to you. Its not that important as long as the difference between permission vs restriction is understood and accepted.

Correct. A ‘right’ in the traditional sense of the word does not exist in your view — Bob Ross

How would you define a right then? You have to understand that in 'the traditional sense' we have not had an objective morality. There are going to be a lot of things an objective morality challenges. The question is whether the subjective challenge holds when looked at in its reasoning.

It is bad because it violates a general moral principle that robbery is (generally) wrong. It is generally wrong, because it is morally bad, when analyzed in isolation, to rob someone. Why this is the case will depend on the ethical theory in play. — Bob Ross

Right, and according to my ethical theory which attempts to be objective, robbing someone is generally bad because of the expected outcome. A belief that the moral theory is 'wrong' only works with subjective moral theories. But with an objective basis, I am rationally permitted to dismiss such opinions if they don't clearly demonstrate why my conclusion is wrong. Objectively why is another moral theory right, and why is the one I've proposed wrong?

If robbery is bad in-itself, then an intention to do it is bad. — Bob Ross

True, but it must be objectively demonstrated why robbery is bad in itself. I haven't seen that yet in a way that isn't subjective. I can objectively conclude robbing others is generally bad due to probability.

When they get angry and explain that it is also an insult, I insist that I will continue to the use the word as my principle demands that I use 'sir' when talking to people

This is just a conflation of words, and not an absurd insistence on one’s duty to a principle. The principle would be ‘one should be polite’, not ‘one should say the word ‘sir’, specifically in English’. — Bob Ross

Fair, I used a poor example. My overall point is that if intentions are good in themselves regardless of the outcome, then logically we can create a situation in which an intention always has a negative outcome and yet it would be considered moral.

To be objective, you need a solid foundation. What is objective value? What determines value?

Not at all. To be objective, is to exist mind-independently. Goodness is identical to ‘having value’ because that is, at its core, what the ‘being good’ is about. — Bob Ross

But what is objectively 'having value'? Living things value situations. Unliving things don't have a concept of value. Why is what one person values suddenly objective? If value does not involve a living thing, what is determining value at that point?

An easy way to demonstrate this, is to think of what ethics, axiology, and pragmatism would be if it had nothing to do with value: it would be merely about what is and not what ought to be—and this is a fundamental shift from what the studies traditionally are about. — Bob Ross

To know what ought to be, you have to know the value of what is. This doesn't answer the question though. What is an objective definition of value, and why is it good beyond it being an apparent synonym?

When you say “existence is good”, you are saying “one can validly predicate ‘existence’ with the property of ‘goodness’”. It is still an entirely valid question to ask: “what is ‘goodness’?”. — Bob Ross

I believe I've answered that question though. Good is "What should be." "Goodness" is a state of reality with the embodiment of "What should be" as "What is".

“Objective value” is just intrinsic value; for it is the only type of value which a thing can have in-itself. — Bob Ross

The problem again is 'intrinsic value'. A thing without a mind cannot value itself. And you've noted that extrinsic value doesn't count either. If so, what is 'intrinsic value' then? Is this a real phrase? Is it just a combination of words that doesn't represent anything in reality?

The fact that someone can be motivated to value or not value it, is not relevant itself to whether the thing demands to be value because it has intrinsic worth. — Bob Ross

Right, so you're saying something has value for existing. Why Bob? Why is there intrinsic value in existence?

Why is flourishing valuable?

It is intrinsically valuable, because, as per its nature, it demands value. Which can be easily understood when one is in such a state. — Bob Ross

If intrinsic value doesn't care about our opinion of it, being in a state of higher value, and making a judgement about it, is irrelevant. Because one can be in an objectively higher value state, but subjectively believe they aren't. Let me explain as I've had two alcoholics in the family. My father recovered, my mother never did.

My father went to AA. He's known tons of addicts over the years. There are plenty of people who choose that lower state of existence. They know what its like to be sober, and they despise it. For the first year or two of my father quitting, he hated it. Its why so many can't quit Bob. Its why so many become alcoholics or druggies in the first place. For them, there is more value in being hopped up than not.

The way Alcoholics Anonymous works is to emphasize a higher power. The point is to get the addict thinking outside of their own state. In psychology, getting the patient to realize their choices impact more than themselves is a key of getting someone out of their addiction. Addicts are inherently selfish individuals who gain immense pleasure and satisfaction out of their state of being. My dad once told me, "You get F'd up because you don't want to feel normal."

In an abstract armchair sense of 'people will always choose the more positive state', it sounds good. In reality, people aren't like that. Many people choose the state that we we would consider less valuable. And that lends doubt to the idea of states being 'intrinsically good'. If people don't choose them when given a choice, why are they intrinsically good?

Imagine two states that your mother could be in. The first is constant pleasure obtained by being an alcoholic. The second is a persistent state of flourishing, happiness, and prosperity. — Bob Ross

My mother has repeatedly chosen the first one. She is able to hold her job, makes enough money, and is able to do what she wants with her life. And she drinks half a bottle of wine each night and becomes intolerable to talk to. She does not care. She chooses alcohol and being drunk or buzzed every time.

Intrinsic value is objective. She does not determine whether or not a state of flourishing has intrinsic value nor how much. — Bob Ross

I can agree with the second statement. But how is intrinsic value objective? But at this point I'm repeating myself.

That's a fine opinion, but not an objective argument.

I don’t see how it isn’t an objective argument; insofar as the argument demonstrates (to my satisfaction) that morality is objective, and The Good is universal flourishing. — Bob Ross

Because an objective argument does not care about our satisfaction. Objectivity persists despite our opinions or feelings about it. You have not clearly defined value in an objective manner. You've stated good = value, but without a clear definition of value, its just dodged the definition by synonym.

“Objective value” is another phrase for ‘intrinsically valuable’; and flourishing has intrinsic value because the state demands to be valued in virtue of its nature, and this is hard to demonstrate if you haven’t experienced it—this is an empirical claim, and not something abstract. — Bob Ross

A few counter points of issue to sum:

Objective value = intrinsic value is a synonym, not a demonstration of meaning. First you need to objectively define 'value'.

If intrinsic value does is not determined by extrinsic opinion, it does not demand to be valued, it just has value. There is nothing which objectively demands I care about something's intrinsic value as an extrinsic evaluator.

Intrinsic value by your definition, is an abstract value. To empirically experience it, we must know what that abstract is, and give objective examples of that abstract. For example, I have an abstract definition of the color red, then an empirical experience of the color red. How can I, and extrinsic evaluator, empirically experience the intrinsic value of something else in an objective manner? Its already been shown that sometimes people will willingly pick lower states of value when given the choice. Objectively, why are they wrong to do so? How do we prove it a lower state despite their happiness in picking it?

Your theory presupposes a property of goodness, of which your analysis (so far) is the discovery of what can be predicated to have such a property, but, interestingly, doesn't give any analysis of the property itself--it is merely a presupposed, notional, property that is utilized for the rest of the analysis. — Bob Ross

I don't see how I've done this. Let me explain why.

1. Good = "what should be" A clear definition.
2. Existence should be is logically concluded as being the most reasonable conclusion when faced with our limitations. So existence has the property of being good.
3. Existence is quantified. This lets us show how existence can express itself, and also show us there are scenarios that decrease or increase overall existence based on how it all interacts with itself.

Now, instead of meaning "more existence is good" in an analogous sense to "this car is red", you may mean it as an identity relation---that 'is good' here refers to "goodness is identical to the property of 'having more existence' [or something like that]" (i.e., goodness = having more existence). I think there are good reasons to believe that goodness cannot be reduced to such a claim. — Bob Ross

I'm just noting that if existence is good, more existence is "gooder" :D. Its just a logical step after the first claim.

Firstly, goodness, then, would not be normative; because it only refers to whether something has or does not have 'more existence' than some other possibility. — Bob Ross

Not at all. If existence is "What should be" then to determine "What should be" we should know "what it is". How can I evaluate two scenarios if I don't know what those two scenarios entail? If I can calculate one scenario results in more existence than a second scenario, only then can we know the first scenario is better right? I'm a little confused how you think being able to evaluate the goodness of a situation removes it from comparative evaluation with another potential scenario?

Secondly, it doesn't seem correct that "having more existence [than ...] is to have more existence [than ...]" is identical in meaning to "to be good is to have more existence [than ...]": the latter seems to add something extra, in meaning, by denoting what is good as opposed to expressing a tautology. — Bob Ross

I don't understand what you're trying to say here. What does [than ...] mean? I'm just noting that if we have two potential scenarios, the one with the most existence is what should be.

Great discussion, I look forward to your replies!

We don't exactly get to tell a hungry lion, "I have a right to life." No one is there to care.

That one has a right, is different than whether anyone else recognizes it.

Its the right of a society of 1.

A right is innate to a person, if one admits that it applies even if there is one person left: saying there is a “society of 1” is confused language for “one individual”.

But if they are societally objective, as in these rights to individuals improve and strengthen societies more than those who do not have them by fact, then there is data for one society to point to.

This gets you out of the first objection, but not the second: a right is something which cannot be violated in any circumstances. Within your idea of a right, it is something that can be taken away in various circumstances where it benefits the society (e.g., sacrificing one innocent citizen to save 1,000,000 citizens)—that is what is normally called a privilege.

I believe your real issue is that in both cases, these things are determined by societies and not any one individual

It is more than that though: if the society needs to violate one citizen’s rights to save itself, then, unless I am misunderstanding, in your view that is morally permissible (at best) and obligatory (at worst). It is not a right if it can be taken away: that’s a privilege.

How would you define a right then?

A ‘right’ is an innate and unalienable entitlement to be in (or not in) certain states (and, consequently, to be permitted [or not permitted] to perform certain actions which do not [or do] violate those entitlements).

Our difference, is that you consider entitlements to always be created by societies; whereas, I think societies create laws to uphold entitlements, of which are derived from innate features of the ‘thing’ which is entitled.

Your ‘rights’ are alienable; mine are not.

For example, it does not matter if me sacrificing you could save the entire rest of my city: you have a right to life, being that you have not forfeited that right (either voluntarily or by way of violating someone else’s rights), and I cannot violate that to save my city. Your right is unalienable: it is not something I can decide, upon the circumstances, to (validly) revoke.

You have to understand that in 'the traditional sense' we have not had an objective morality

There has never been, to my knowledge, a society which was predicated off of the use of moral anti-realism: they have always been forms of ‘objective morality’.

You may not found their versions of ‘objective morality’ compelling or true; but it is a misconstrual to think society has, by-at-large, been operating in institutionalized moral anti-realism: people are largely moral realists, and laws are derived, historically, from what has been considered moral fact.

robbing someone is generally bad because of the expected outcome.

Then, under your view, robbing someone isn’t wrong in-itself; because you are not looking at the nature of the action but, instead, looking at its consequences. I think the nature of the action demonstrates sufficiently that it is wrong to do.

True, but it must be objectively demonstrated why robbery is bad in itself. I haven't seen that yet in a way that isn't subjective.

It is wrong in-itself because it is a form of depravity and a violation of a person: that why it is generally held by people, even throughout history, as morally (factually) wrong.

More specifically, under my theory, the reason depravity and the violation of a person in this sense (of robbery) is wrong, is because it is anti-thetical to universal flourishing—which is what has the most intrinsic value.

I can objectively conclude robbing others is generally bad due to probability.

I don’t see how the probability would not be 100% that it is wrong: the nature of the crime is itself immoral. That’s like saying rape is sometimes good, because there isn’t a 100% probability of it being bad: the nature of the crime is abhorrent, irregardless of what consequences may be brought about by committing it (in each circumstance).

My overall point is that if intentions are good in themselves regardless of the outcome, then logically we can create a situation in which an intention always has a negative outcome and yet it would be considered moral.

I didn’t understand this part. An intention can be bad, and its nuanced consequences good; and vice-versa. This makes sense to me: are you contending with that?

Now, on to answering your questions about my theory.

By ‘objective value’, I am assuming you mean value which is objective; and this is not synonymous with intrinsic value per se. Any value which is objective, is just any value which exists mind-independently and the truth of the matter (whether it has such value) is stance-independent. Where intrinsic value ties in, is that it is the only possible form of ‘objective value’ because it is the only type of value which is inscribed, so to speak, on the thing per its nature: it is the only form of value that is of the thing in-itself. The only other option is extrinsic value, that it is obvious why that is not objective.

Now, my view allows for value, which is intrinsic, that is not merely an axiological judgment made by a subject: intrinsic value is embedded, superveniently, in the thing which has it. Whether or not a subject values it, is independent of the truth of the matter of whether or not it has value.

A useful way of thinking about intrinsic value, by my lights, is that the thing which has it demands recognition as valuable; and that is how one can decipher whether or not one simply values the thing because of their own (cognitive or conative) disposition, or whether it has actual value. I do not mean ‘demands’ in a personified sense.

A great example is the pain example, but I have already explicated that one; so I will leave it there.

In an abstract armchair sense of 'people will always choose the more positive state', it sounds good. In reality, people aren't like that. Many people choose the state that we we would consider less valuable.

This isn’t a contention with anything I said, and I wholly agree. Some people simply lack the cognitive ability, or the wisdom, to see that the state is better; and some are so defective or damaged that they no longer can recognize it, even though they could have earlier in their life.

Your mother is a great example (and by the way, I am sorry to hear that your parents were addicts and I hope that they both find a way to beat it!): the addiction of alchohol, like many drug addictions, is so damaging, after a long time of abuse [of it], that it negatively affects the person into yearning for it over and over again. This does not mean that the state they are in is the most valuable, nor that it has intrinsic value (in a positive or negative sense).

My point was that, in isolation, and reasonably healthy and intelligent person will not be able to deny the value of a state that has (negative or positive) intrinsic value if put in that state. Of course, if you put a defective person, a damaged person, a really cognitively impaired person, in such a state, then we would not expect them to fully grasp that state properly (due to their condition).

Now, on to your analysis of goodness.

1. Good = "what should be" A clear definition.

“Good” is not a property. Your definition needs to of the form “goodness is <insert-definition-here>”. Likewise, “what should be” is not a property. Thusly, you have not analyzed the property of goodness whatsoever in making this remark.

To be charitable, let’s just say you mean that “goodness is ‘to ought to exist’”. Ok, let’s break this down.

The first issue with this was, interestingly enough, already explicated by you:

To know what ought to be, you have to know the value of what is

If:

1. the property of goodness is not ‘being valuable’; and
2. one needs to know the value of what is to know what to predicate as ‘”oughting” to exist’; and
3. you reject the idea of intrinsic value

Then what can be predicated as good under your view is dependent on subjective dispositions because what is valuable is always extrinsic.

The second problem with this is that, on a similar note, what we determine as good is relative to what is valuable; and it seems incorrect to posit vice-versa (or something else entirely). One cannot tell what ‘should be’ without ‘what is valuable’; but, of course, I guess, depending on how you hash out the terminology, there may be a coherent way to posit ‘goodness’ as ‘to ought to be’--I just don’t see it.

The third problem is that by ‘goodness’ I am assuming you mean ‘moral goodness’ with your definition, and the property of ‘to ought to be’ is not a purely objective analysis and, consequently, your view of moral goodness is not solely about what might be objective.

With mine, on the other hand, moral goodness is ‘to have intrinsic value’, and so it is always an objective matter of dispute what is morally good; with respect to how you defined it, that is not the case. Disputes about what ought to be by means of subjective dispositions are still about what is morally good under your metaethical view of ‘goodness’.

Existence should be is logically concluded as being the most reasonable conclusion when faced with our limitations. So existence has the property of being good.

Your argument here is:

If it is most reasonable to conclude that something should exist, then it should exist.

This is not morally objective at all, because it does not reference any sort of objective value nor normativity. One can simply deny it without violating any objective value nor normativity.

On the other hand, a claim like:

If something has intrinsic value, then it should be.

This is morally objective, because what is intrinsically valuable is a matter of objective dispute; and should is entailed from value. To contrast, if I were to say:

If something has value, then it should be.

This is not expressing anything normatively objective specifically; because it entirely possible to value something extrinsically.

I don't understand what you're trying to say here. What does [than ...] mean?

I added in ‘[than ...]’ because your original formulation of ‘more existence’ doesn’t make literal sense: ‘more’ implies a comparison—so I added in a filler [than …].

Bob

Cool discussion on rights to start with! I still feel like we're not terribly off from one another. The difference is the lens approach from our different theories. As such I'm going to start with your theory, then address rights after.

By ‘objective value’, I am assuming you mean value which is objective; and this is not synonymous with intrinsic value per se. Any value which is objective, is just any value which exists mind-independently and the truth of the matter (whether it has such value) is stance-independent. — Bob Ross

This is a description of something that is objective, but not a concrete proven example of an objective value. In other words, I'm asking for a knowable value that cannot be easily denied using rational thought. So far all you've effectively stated is that a value is a value, and its objective because its mind-independent. What is a value? What reasons, evidence, etc. point to a value being something which exists independently from an opinion or mere belief?

Where intrinsic value ties in, is that it is the only possible form of ‘objective value’ because it is the only type of value which is inscribed, so to speak, on the thing per its nature: it is the only form of value that is of the thing in-itself. — Bob Ross

This also doesn't answer anything Bob. First, what is a value? Second, how is it inscribed? There needs to be a clear definition, and then an example of clear application. Third, if value is a 'thing in-itself', then it is unknowable. As a callback to previous conversations, a thing-in itself can never be labeled or ascribed. It exists only as a reminder to us that everything we speak about is an interpretation of some 'thing'. What that thing is, we can never know.

I should be more clear as well when say 'objective morality' When we're talking about morality, we're talking really about an objective foundation. To my mind, there is not a moral theory out there besides this one that uses an objective foundation. Moral foundations vary from deism, societal stability, hierarchy dominance, and idealism. But the foundations themselves are questionable. If for example a moral theory is based on there being a God, I would ask, "Can you prove God exists? What is God?" and so on. For your value based theory, I'm asking you to objectively show what 'value' means. Can you prove values exist? What is a value?"

Its important to do so because we want to avoid what I call "Gandalfian Philosophy" (Or Phictional Philosophy for fun). Gandalf is a character in the Lord of The Rings series of books by JRR Tolkien. He has a particular personality and way of working. We can debate what he would do in a particular situation. If the Hobbits were misbehaving would he turn them into toads or berate them? "Oh, he would berate them of course, Gandalf isn't the type to use his magic to punish and intimidate friends!" And of course, we come to some lovely conclusions that make logical sense that everyone agrees with. There's just one problem. Gandalf is a fictional character. The foundation destroys any semblence of the theory meaning any more than a fictional game.

So, does intrinsic value exist, or is it a fictional invention? You get the idea.

A useful way of thinking about intrinsic value, by my lights, is that the thing which has it demands recognition as valuable; and that is how one can decipher whether or not one simply values the thing because of their own (cognitive or conative) disposition, or whether it has actual value. I do not mean ‘demands’ in a personified sense. — Bob Ross

A demand is a personified meaning. At best we can apply it to an animals stubbornness. How does a rock demand? And even if it does demand, why do I have to care? Why should I listen to its demands? "Because its innate" is not an answer. We're missing some logic here.

A great example is the pain example, but I have already explicated that one; so I will leave it there. — Bob Ross

I thought I addressed it but I'll point it out again.

I agree that pain has value in the fact that its purpose is to ensure the living being stops injuring itself and gives itself time to heal. However, pain has no intrinsic value in itself. If I'm going to get surgery, feeling the pain from the knife serves no purpose at that point. Something that has intrinsic value means that it has value in itself. But in this instance, it does not. — Philosophim

In an abstract armchair sense of 'people will always choose the more positive state', it sounds good. In reality, people aren't like that. Many people choose the state that we we would consider less valuable.

This isn’t a contention with anything I said, and I wholly agree. Some people simply lack the cognitive ability, or the wisdom, to see that the state is better; and some are so defective or damaged that they no longer can recognize it, even though they could have earlier in their life. — Bob Ross

Then I misunderstood your intention with the example. I asked for an objective example of being able to know intrinsic value. My understanding was that when faced with a choice between two value outcomes, we will always choose the higher value outcome. Because we do this, it proves one is the intrinsically higher value outcome. My problem with this was two fold:

1. This is an extrinsic judgement with no proof of intrinsic value.
2. People choose the 'wrong' value outcome.

These two points combine leave too many questions. How does an extrinsic value evaluation which can be disagreed upon by multiple people prove objective intrinsic value to a particular state? Even if the majority choose state 1, does that prove that state one is the state with more intrinsic value?

My point was that, in isolation, and reasonably healthy and intelligent person will not be able to deny the value of a state that has (negative or positive) intrinsic value if put in that state. Of course, if you put a defective person, a damaged person, a really cognitively impaired person, in such a state, then we would not expect them to fully grasp that state properly (due to their condition). — Bob Ross

This is a nice thought, but begging the question.

1. A healthy person will always choose the right value state.
Q: But what about people who don't choose the right value state?
A: Its because they aren't healthy.

The question being begged is the proof that a healthy person always chooses the right value state. You're assuming this, not proving this.

“Good” is not a property. Your definition needs to of the form “goodness is <insert-definition-here>”. Likewise, “what should be” is not a property. Thusly, you have not analyzed the property of goodness whatsoever in making this remark. — Bob Ross

Bob, I noted the word "Good" not goodness here. I wasn't trying to describe goodness with the word good. Your criticism is about goodness in regards to the word Good, when I describe goodness earlier. I think it was forgotten in the long post, all good. :) Here it is below:

I believe I've answered that question though. Good is "What should be." "Goodness" is a state of reality with the embodiment of "What should be" as "What is". — Philosophim

As for debating whether Good as a property, I'm not claiming it is or isn't a property. I'm just giving you the definition.

To know what ought to be, you have to know the value of what is

If:

1. the property of goodness is not ‘being valuable’; and
2. one needs to know the value of what is to know what to predicate as ‘”oughting” to exist’; and
3. you reject the idea of intrinsic value

Then what can be predicated as good under your view is dependent on subjective dispositions because what is valuable is always extrinsic. — Bob Ross

I've never claimed point one. Goodness is what should be. If we can determine the value of existence in two scenarios, then the scenario with the most value is what should be.

Point two, we determine value by material existence, expressions of identity, and potential expressions of identity.

Point 3, I do not reject the idea of intrinsic value. I'm asking you to demonstrate what intrinsic value is. I can clearly point out intrinsic value in my theory. Its existence. Why? Because existence is good, and we have a rationale for why its good. There is intrinsic value in a thing's existence. The question is whether that value in tandem with other values, produces greater, equivalent, or lesser value overall.

So you see, I don't disagree with an idea of intrinsic value, but I have the answer of what a value is (what should be), I explain why something should be, and build from there. You don't have an answer yet as to what a value is. You don't have an example of how we can objectively know what an intrinsic value is. I'm noting that in your theory, you need something else that explains questions in your foundation.

Then what can be predicated as good under your view is dependent on subjective dispositions because what is valuable is always extrinsic. — Bob Ross

Extrinsic evaluations can be subjective or objective. Objective evaluations of value can be determined by observations and calculations.

The second problem with this is that, on a similar note, what we determine as good is relative to what is valuable; and it seems incorrect to posit vice-versa (or something else entirely). — Bob Ross

How is it incoherent to say "What is not valuable is not good?" Because what is valuable is good. Explicated and identified Good = moral value.

The third problem is that by ‘goodness’ I am assuming you mean ‘moral goodness’ with your definition, and the property of ‘to ought to be’ is not a purely objective analysis and, consequently, your view of moral goodness is not solely about what might be objective. — Bob Ross

As a reminder (its been a while) we worked back that all moral questions will inevitably boil down to the foundation of, "Should there be existence?". Assuming there is an objective morality leads us to the conclusion "Yes." because the opposite leads to a contradiction in itself. Of course, if there is no objective morality, its moot. But if there is, this is the basic answer it must start with.

With mine, on the other hand, moral goodness is ‘to have intrinsic value’, and so it is always an objective matter of dispute what is morally good; with respect to how you defined it, that is not the case. — Bob Ross

Its not because you have no way of demonstrating what intrinsic value is besides just stating the phrase. Ironically, you need my theory to make your theory work. I'm not saying you need to make value the same definition as myself, but it still needs further explication on your end.

Disputes about what ought to be by means of subjective dispositions are still about what is morally good under your metaethical view of ‘goodness’. — Bob Ross

My moral theory can involve subjectivity and subjects. But the means of evaluation are objectively the same. What creates more overall existence over time. In cases where we do not have all the information, we can then result to the induction hierarchy based off of what can be objectively evaluated.

Ok, I think addressing anything else in this section will just be repeating myself more, so back to rights!

This gets you out of the first objection, but not the second: a right is something which cannot be violated in any circumstances. — Bob Ross

True, but that's a necessary consequence of the theory in general. I think that's a strength, not a weakness. In America, rights are regulated and negotiated all the time. One common instance is when a conflict of rights arises. The supreme court ultimately debates the resolution to these conflicts.

Rights as inalienable absolutes are fine in theory, but impractical in practice. A right being negotiable on dependent circumstances also doesn't mean those circumstances happen often, but having an objective evaluation tool when they do happen is much more useful than an insistence that they are non-negotiable. An insistence of inviolable rights when this has never existed in practice is an ideal against the real.

We don't exactly get to tell a hungry lion, "I have a right to life." No one is there to care.

That one has a right, is different than whether anyone else recognizes it. — Bob Ross

I wouldn't call that a right, just a moral outcome. It is more moral for you to continue living then not in most circumstances.

I believe your real issue is that in both cases, these things are determined by societies and not any one individual

It is more than that though: if the society needs to violate one citizen’s rights to save itself, then, unless I am misunderstanding, in your view that is morally permissible (at best) and obligatory (at worst). It is not a right if it can be taken away: that’s a privilege. — Bob Ross

Lets look at it this way. I restrict myself from eating ice cream. I remove that restriction from myself. A restriction being taken away does not make it a privilege. Again, depending on the calculus, yes, it absolutely should violate the rights of one individual to save the entire society. Depending on the calculus, no, they absolutely should not violate the rights of one individual to save the entire society. The only absolute is that the scenario which generates the most existence should be chosen. Moral precepts are digests for normative situations.

In most normal situations, a government's violation of a citizen's rights for its personal benefit will not result in greater overall existence. In extreme circumstances, things can change. But noting that in extreme circumstances things can change does not allow us to disregard the 99% of cases where we have a different answer. The fact my theory can explain extremes instead of insisting on answers that don't make sense is a strength. Absolute moral theories without a strong objective foundation always choke on exceptions. Mine has a path forward to handle the exceptions that do not invalidate normal moral circumstances.

robbing someone is generally bad because of the expected outcome.

Then, under your view, robbing someone isn’t wrong in-itself; because you are not looking at the nature of the action but, instead, looking at its consequences. — Bob Ross

Correct. Lets say a person is starving, has no means to pay anyone for food, and requests for food are refused. Should the man starve? Or are they justified in robbing someone for food in this instance?

Lets say a spy has a cypher in their pockets they use to decode messages. If the spy is in my country, is it immoral to rob the spy of their cypher?

Absolutism would always say 'no' or end up compromising on rights due to rights conflict.

My overall point is that if intentions are good in themselves regardless of the outcome, then logically we can create a situation in which an intention always has a negative outcome and yet it would be considered moral.

I didn’t understand this part. An intention can be bad, and its nuanced consequences good; and vice-versa. This makes sense to me: are you contending with that? — Bob Ross

I'm pointing out that logically, if intentions do not care about results, then in theory we can create a good intention that always ends in terrible results. How do we justify such an intention as moral?

Ok, these are getting long again! Feel free to collapse some concepts as I think there's a bit of repeat on my end.

Great discussion! Unfortunately, as I was parsing your response, I have found it to be going in too many directions for my mind to manage properly. So I have condensed it into the parts I think are most critical to our conversation (so far). Feel free to include more if I have missed something that you deem also critical. Let’s dive in.

Firstly, you demand an analysis of valuableness, and I expected no less. However, I must note that you seem to be conflating this a bit, in the way you were expressing this concern, with an analysis of intrinsic value. I was not intending to give an analysis of valuableness thus far, and am only attempting it for the first time in this discussion right not.

Valuableness in an unanalyzable, primitive property: all that can be described of it is with synonyms (e.g., ‘to be of value is to have worth’, etc.). Now, to substantiate this claim and be brief, I need to (1) demonstrate that your idea of valuableness (as identical to ‘to ought to be’) is a blunder and (2) provide an analogy to another unanalyzable, primitive property that I think you will be able to appreciate.

With respect to #1, it is obvious that valuableness is not identical to ‘to ought to be’ by way of examples (of its valid use). For example, when one says “that diamond is worth $1500”, they are not commenting on whether it should exist per se but, rather, that it has a specific, quantitative worth. In short, it is impossible to convert quantitative values to the property of ‘to ought to be’. Only after a comparison of value, can one determine which things out of the things which have value should exist and, thusly, the two properties are not identical.

With respect to #2, a great example of an unanalyzable and primitive property is ‘beingness’. It is impossible to explain ‘beingness’ without circular reference (e.g., it is ‘to exist’, it is ‘to be’, it is ‘presence’, etc.). There is simply no way to analyze ‘beingness’, and this is because it is so primitive of a property: we can only explain properties by means of other properties when they are not primitive. The primitive ones are what we use to describe the non-primitive ones, leaving us nothing but intuitions to guide us for the former. I submit to you, that ‘valuableness’ is akin to ‘beingness’. We say it is ‘to have worth’, but ‘worth’ is just a synonym for ‘value’; just like ‘being’ is synonym for ‘exist’.

If you cannot grasp, by way of intuition, what ‘beingness’ is, then I simply cannot afford any help other than to cite synonyms for it (e.g., ‘to exist’, ‘to be’, ‘presence’, etc.). Likewise, if you cannot fathom what ‘valuebleness’ is, then I simply cannot afford any help other than synonyms, like ‘it is “to have worth”’.

You find this unsatisfactory, but I urge you to think about ‘beingness’, and see if you feel the same about that property—I doubt it. If you do, then we will just have to agree to disagree on this part; being that we are disputing a primitive property, which makes the dispute very peculiar indeed.

Secondly, I don’t see it as an advantage to posit rights as relativistic. I absolutely agree that our moral principles cannot be absolute; but what it is a right, for it to be a right in the traditional sense, requires that it is irrevocable but does not require us to posit an absolute principle—e.g., the right to life is not the same as the absolute right to live nor the right to everything one needs to stay alive, but this takes nothing away from the fact that the right to life is irrevocable.

Of course, I also agree that we refurbish them; but this is not because the fact of the matter about what is a right has changed but, rather, our understanding of it.

When you relativize rights, you mask mere privileges under the name of something with much more vigor to its name.

Thirdly, you ask for evidence of intrinsic value. I have already given it, but there are some things worth clarifying:

1. You are correct that the nature of a thing demanding value is a personification: I was mistaken on that.

2. When I say a thing demands value, I mean it in the sense of innate insistence.

3. One thing I have failed to mention, is that intrinsic value is only possible for states; because nothing else can provide innate insistence on value. Thusly, to take your rock example, a rock can’t have intrinsic value, simply because it cannot innately compel whatsoever. However, the state of pain can.

4. A very legitimate concern when endeavoring on the discovery of intrinsically valuable states, is how one can safely distinguish the value of a state due to extrinsic vs. intrinsic value; and this I think you have mentioned a couple times (in different words). I answer, to your dissatisfaction, that a rational and healthy person would only be able to superficially deny its value when in that state. This does not beg the question, because I am not presupposing the truth of the conclusion in an (implicit) premise; and it is not confirmation bias because I am not saying that a person is definitely unhealthy or irrational if they deny it in a non-superficial sense: I am saying that, based off of the empirical knowledge on rational + healthy people in such states, it is sufficiently proven that they confirm the value of such states.

Fourthly, you noted the Kantian position on things-in-themselves again; and I wanted to briefly note that I deny that altogether. I think you are conflating absolute truth with things-in-themselves: the former is what you are really arguing is unobtainable (by my lights).

Fifthly:

"Goodness" is a state of reality with the embodiment of "What should be" as "What is".

“what should be” and “what is” are both not properties. You have failed to give an analysis of the property of goodness again. I am assuming, to be charitable, you mean that goodness is identical to ‘to ought to be’. If that is wrong, then please correct me.

Sixthly:

Explicated and identified Good = moral value

&

I have the answer of what a value is (what should be)

I am not following. First, I thought you were saying ‘goodness’ is ‘to ought to be’; now you seem to be agreeing with me it is ‘to have value’. You have also said

Good = "what should be"

but now are saying it is “moral value”: which is it?

Are you saying ‘to ought to be’ and ‘having value’ are identical?

Then, to make matters more confusing, you have also said that

To know what ought to be, you have to know the value of what is

: that implies you need to determine the value of a thing before you can determine whether it ought to be, but you have also indicated (above) that what is good is both ‘to have value’ and ‘to ought to be’ which indicates they are simultaneous judgments one would make.

Seventhly, morality does not boil down to the question of “should there be existence?”, nor is that a moral foundation. A moral foundation is the core of an ethical theory, and that is going to be, in any good theory, an outline of the hierarchy (i.e., the ontology) of things with intrinsic value.

I look forward to hearing from you,
Bob

Great discussion! — Bob Ross

Absolutely! And yes, its great for us to condense these down every once in a while so they don't become reams of papyrus scrolls. :)

Valuableness in an unanalyzable, primitive property: all that can be described of it is with synonyms (e.g., ‘to be of value is to have worth’, etc.). — Bob Ross

I'm surprised you're going this route. First, I was able to point out what value meant, and a concrete example of value in my theory. I'll address it again towards the end of this post. Second, it still means you then have to point out what the synonym for value is, and then explain what that means. It just kicks the ball over a notch at best.

With respect to #1, it is obvious that valuableness is not identical to ‘to ought to be’ by way of examples (of its valid use). For example, when one says “that diamond is worth $1500”, they are not commenting on whether it should exist per se but, rather, that it has a specific, quantitative worth. In short, it is impossible to convert quantitative values to the property of ‘to ought to be’. — Bob Ross

That is because you are comparing two types of values. There's monetary value and moral value. If I state that $1500 has more value than $750, this is an example of comparative monetary value. If I say one state of existence is 20 ex(existence), and another state of existence is 25 ex, the one at 25 ex has more moral value. If existence is 'what should be' and explicated and identified good is what is how we establish moral value, then there is nothing wrong with me pointing out moral value.

With respect to #2, a great example of an unanalyzable and primitive property is ‘beingness’. It is impossible to explain ‘beingness’ without circular reference — Bob Ross

Certainly, but that doesn't mean we don't have a meaning within that circularity that we can point to. We all know what existence is as a concept. Beingness is pointing to a slice of existence and noting that it is existing. It is embodying 'being'. Its primitive because we cannot go deeper than that. The problem is I have no idea what you're pointing to by saying a thing has value within your theory. I don't know how to evaluate it. And 'value' by definition, is used for evaluation.

Value is a an implication of worth generally. Implicit in using value is the understanding that some things have more worth than others. In implicit speech, when we say, "I value that," we're also saying, "...more than these other things.". If everything has the same value, value loses meaning. Value is generally used as a relational measurement of worth. Even then, value is not a primitive because there's a question of 'evaluation'. How do we determine something has value? Why is X valued more than Y?

I absolutely agree that our moral principles cannot be absolute; but what it is a right, for it to be a right in the traditional sense, requires that it is irrevocable but does not require us to posit an absolute principle — Bob Ross

Irrevocable and absolute are the same in our analysis though. If I say, "I have the right to life," and its irrevocable, that means that in no way is it ever right for me to be killed. That's absolute. The moment we say, "Except for the case when its war," then our right is no longer irrevocable. An absolute principle is one which does not change no matter the context. Relativistic principles can. If the right has an "Except" clause, its relativistic.

Of course, I also agree that we refurbish them; but this is not because the fact of the matter about what is a right has changed but, rather, our understanding of it. — Bob Ross

Sure, I can get behind this. For example if we said, "Every life has the right to life," but then later said, "Actually, only every human has the right to life," we're still saying the right is absolute, its just we were wrong the first time around. Of course, the question then comes into play, "How do we know if our claims of an absolute right are correct?" How do we prove this absolute under your theory? I can show there are a few absolute moral guidelines that work because a violation of them always results in less existence under my theory. Its just there are fewer absolute rules that I can prove then I think you would like. Can you prove the same under your theory?

When you relativize rights, you mask mere privileges under the name of something with much more vigor to its name. — Bob Ross

I will state once more that an allowance is not the same as a self-restriction. Your real issue is that I state society determines both. But can we both agree that a privilege is an allowance by a society, while a right is a restriction on a society? I think are real argument is that I say such a restriction is established by a society, while you believe such restrictions are not established by societies. Is this fair to say?

Regardless, how do you answer questions of conflicting rights? How do we manage exceptions like stealing for food?

Thirdly, you ask for evidence of intrinsic value. I have already given it, but there are some things worth clarifying: — Bob Ross

I have not understood this evidence Bob. Please point it out again.

2. When I say a thing demands value, I mean it in the sense of innate insistence. — Bob Ross

This still doesn't mean anything. If I insist that I'm worth 10 million dollars and society should give it to me, society is not obligated to do so. Why should anyone care about what I insist my intrinsic value is? And again, how is this intrinsic value determined? This doesn't make sense.

3. One thing I have failed to mention, is that intrinsic value is only possible for states; because nothing else can provide innate insistence on value. Thusly, to take your rock example, a rock can’t have intrinsic value, simply because it cannot innately compel whatsoever. However, the state of pain can. — Bob Ross

A rock can have a state of being. I'm going to infer what you mean is intrinsic value is the state of a living being. According to your theory then, non-living things have no value. In my theory, they do. If in the future we come up with a matter destroying ray, I can argue why such a thing would be immoral, and that we should only focus on matter deconstruction rays. Under your theory, its fine to destroy matter as we wish as long as it does not affect life.

If only states of life can have value, why? What determined that? Why is life special when it is clearly made up of non-life? The state of pain is a physical process of electrical impulses traveling down nerves. If the state of pain has value, but we eliminate the non-life of those electrical impulses, it would destroy pain. But then doesn't this mean the non-life part of pain, the electrical impulse, now has value as well?

Is the state of pain only valuable if we're conscious of it? Pain inhibitors don't block the initial signals of pain being sent by areas of the body, only the end receptors to the pain message. Is the pain now valueless because the receptors don't fire? Or what if the receptors do fire, but the brain cannot interpret the message into the qualia of pain? Or is the 'state of pain' simply the conscious qualia of it to begin with?

My theory of pain looks at the entire thing. The physical and the qualia. We can evaluate moral pain blocking techniques. Lets say we had different pain blockers that affected different parts of the body. The cells firing, the receptors, and the brain's qualia. We would want to do the least amount of disruption to the system, so a targeted effort to the area that caused the least disruption would be the most moral pain blocker to use.

I answer, to your dissatisfaction, that a rational and healthy person would only be able to superficially deny its value when in that state. This does not beg the question, because I am not presupposing the truth of the conclusion in an (implicit) premise; and it is not confirmation bias because I am not saying that a person is definitely unhealthy or irrational if they deny it in a non-superficial sense: I am saying that, based off of the empirical knowledge on rational + healthy people in such states, it is sufficiently proven that they confirm the value of such states. — Bob Ross

Bob, its not sufficiently proven at all. Rational and healthy people choose lower states of being without question.

1. You have not given a way for us to evaluate the intrinsic value of a state extrinsically, yet base it off of people's extrinsic evaluations in a contradiction.

2. Your only counter thus far to people who choose states of lower value are that they are unhealthy or irrational. Which implies that healthy rational people automatically choose better states. This absolutely begs the question: "Why are healthy and rational people always able to evaluate higher value states 100% of the time?" We still haven't been given the criterion for evaluating innate value yet. What is the rational process they use? How does health contribute to this? Is an unhealthy rational person incapable of choosing a state of higher value?

Fourthly, you noted the Kantian position on things-in-themselves again; and I wanted to briefly note that I deny that altogether. I think you are conflating absolute truth with things-in-themselves: the former is what you are really arguing is unobtainable (by my lights). — Bob Ross

"In his doctrine of transcendental idealism, Kant argued the sum of all objects, the empirical world, is a complex of appearances whose existence and connection occur only in our representations.[2] Kant introduces the thing-in-itself as follows:

'And we indeed, rightly considering objects of sense as mere appearances, confess thereby that they are based upon a thing in itself, though we know not this thing as it is in itself, but only know its appearances, viz., the way in which our senses are affected by this unknown something.'"

— Prolegomena, § 32

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Thing-in-itself#:~:text=In%20Kantian%20philosophy%2C%20the%20thing,independent%20of%20representation%20and%20observation.

In very simple terms, we have a 'thing in-itself' vs a 'thing as-ascribed'. If you ascribe anything to a 'thing in-itself' you are confused and actually creating a 'thing as-ascribed'. You cannot ever give any type of identity to things in themselves. It is merely a base philosophical concept to demonstrate there is something upon which we are representing, but that we can never in our representing, what that thing in itself as it is. Thus there is no 'value' as a thing in itself. That's an ascription. A representation of something which cannot be identified or known.

Fifthly:

"Goodness" is a state of reality with the embodiment of "What should be" as "What is".

“what should be” and “what is” are both not properties. — Bob Ross

I don't understand why this matters. The definitions of good and goodness are what they are. If they aren't properties to you, then they aren't properties. You'll have to explain to me the importance of this because I just don't understand.

Sixthly:

Explicated and identified Good = moral value

&

I have the answer of what a value is (what should be)

I am not following. First, I thought you were saying ‘goodness’ is ‘to ought to be’; now you seem to be agreeing with me it is ‘to have value’. You have also said — Bob Ross

You are the one who put it as 'to ought to be', not me. I'm trying to show you what value means here, but it seems I dropped the ball. Let me try again.

Moral value is the evaluation of total good in any one scenario. Just like monetary value is defined by an explicated and identified price, so moral value is defined by an explicated and identified value of goodness. The explicated and identified way we evaluate good is through the expression of identities and potential through time. Thus we can tally this up in any scenario, and that is its moral value. In scenario 1 there is a moral value of 20, and in scenario there is a moral value of 25. Thus I have clearly laid out what value means and demonstrated an example of its existence and how we use it. Can your theory do the same?

Then, to make matters more confusing, you have also said that
To know what ought to be, you have to know the value of what is
: that implies you need to determine the value of a thing before you can determine whether it ought to be, — Bob Ross

If I give you the choice of a green jewel vs a red jewel, but you don't know the monetary value of each jewel, can you make a knowledgeable decision to choose the jewel with the most value? No. You must know the value of each before you can make a correct monetary decision. The same goes with moral decisions. We need to know the value of the potential states before we can make the correct decision.

Seventhly, morality does not boil down to the question of “should there be existence?”, nor is that a moral foundation. — Bob Ross

You've said this in the past and that's fine for now. Lets see where your moral theory takes you.

A moral foundation is the core of an ethical theory, and that is going to be, in any good theory, an outline of the hierarchy (i.e., the ontology) of things with intrinsic value. — Bob Ross

And what determines intrinsic value? Alright, that's it for now Bob!

Great response! However, I don't think we are making any real progress, because we are having ~10 discussions about ~10 different subjects at once (:

Therefore, I would like us, if you agree, to dive into one of those subjects; and then move onto the next once we finish (and so on and so forth). I would like to leave it up to you: which major point do you want me to respond to (in depth) first?

Bob

Not a problem Bob!

Lets start with taking your theory and addressing my criticisms with your current definition of value not quite working. Once we can establish a solution there, we can go back to your criticisms of how my theory approaches 'the Good'.

Sounds good!

Reading through your critiques of my view of valuableness, I get the feeling you may be making the same conflation between “valuableness” and “what has value”, just like your conflation between “goodness” and “what is good”. “Valuableness” is a property, and thusly does not mention what can be predicated to have it. To evaluate whether something has the property of valuableness, is just to assess that it has worth and not how much; which is to say nothing beyond saying it has value. How much value is not something determinable from the (general) property of valuableness itself: if that were the case, then we would have to posit an infinite amount of properties to account for each value—which is clearly misguided. So, how one can determined the exact value of something, which is an ‘evaluation’ in the sense that you implied, has no bearing on whether or not the property of ‘having value’ is primitive or not because the property will necessarily, even if it could be defined, not contain a means of evaluation but rather is the mere idea of ‘worth’ in general.

Because I genuinely do not understanding what you are claiming is valuableness nor goodness; I am going to refrain on commenting on my objection that valuableness != ‘to ought to be’. Please give me a clear analysis of the following:

1. What is ‘goodness’? NOT MORAL GOODNESS
2. What is ‘moral goodness’?
3. What do you consider to be validly predicated as morally good?
4. What can be predicated as the highest moral good?
5. What is ‘valuableness’? NOT MORAL VALUABLENESS.
6. What is ‘moral valuableness’?

I will answer all 6 for mine now, to provide reciprocal clarity to my position:

1. Goodness = ‘to have value’.
2. Moral goodness = ‘to have intrinsic value’.
3. Anything which has intrinsic value—e.g., pain, pleasure, flourishing, happiness, prosperity, etc.
4. Universal flourishing.
5. This is ‘to have worth’, and this is just to reiterate ‘to have value’ with a synonym. The property itself is primitive, and unanalyzable.
6. This subdistinction within the property of valuableness does not exist.

Why should anyone care about what I insist my intrinsic value is?

Whether or not someone should care about what has intrinsic value, does not in takeaway from the fact that it has intrinsic value.

Moreover, that you insist on your own values being imposed on me, is not the same as an innate insistence from a state: the former could be the imposition of extrinsic value, whereas the latter is always the imposition of intrinsic value.

Likewise, why you should care about intrinsic value, is that it is morally good; and if you are a virtuous person of morally good character, then you will. There is nothing that forces, per se, anyone to value anything—but this does not takeaway from the fact that there are moral facts. All you are noting, by asking why anyone should care, is that people can devalue (or not value at all) facts.

A rock can have a state of being.

I wasn’t using ‘state’ this generically, but that is fine. It is fine to think of states as ‘states of being’, for all intents and purposes, and, to that, I would then clarify that the state of being that a rock has does not have intrinsic value because that state is incapable of any innate insistence/demand (of value).

Under your theory, its fine to destroy matter as we wish as long as it does not affect life.

Correct. This is because the states which have intrinsic value, are only possible for beings which are sufficiently alive.

If only states of life can have value, why?

No. States which are not attributable to beings that are alive can have value—it just isn’t intrinsic.

They do not have intrinsic value, because those states do not have the ability (innately) to compel or demand value.

Intrinsic value, is value which is demanded in virtue of the nature of the state: that is a very clear definition. It is value a thing has in-itself; which leads me to give a comment on transcendental idealism:

The chief mistake Kant made, is thinking that because a thing-in-itself is not directly experienced that it cannot be known at all—which is clearly false. Appearences, phenomena, are indirect experience of the things as they are in-themselves, and thusly give conditional knowledge of the nature (the things in-themselves) of the things. In a sentence, he is confusing absolute knowledge with things-in-themselves: no one has to concede that they have absolute knowledge of a thing-in-itself to say they have conditional knowledge of it, by way of theirs senses. Noumena, in the traditional sense before Kant butchered it, was the nature, the in-itself, as it expresses itself in appearances (phenomena): and this is more correct of a way to think about it than Kant’s way.

For example, let’s take your reasoning seriously that a thing-in-itself is unknowable because we only every directly experience a representation of it. Ok. Take an apple, for example: does it have mass in-itself? It seems like it does: every bit of evidence points to that conclusion—but, Kant will insist that we can’t absolutely know it is true, because we only have representations to go off of. That’s fine, Kant; that doesn’t takeaway from the fact that we have good conditional knowledge to claim that the apple itself, which is to immediately discuss as it is in-itself, has mass. See the conflation Kant made?

So, I have no problem analyzing the nature, the essences, of things—which you cannot do if you take your position seriously because the essence doesn’t pertain to mere appearances but, rather, what a thing’s actual properties are as it is in-itself—while conceding I have only conditional knowledge of it.

Even if you disagree, I don’t think this makes a difference for my use of value of a thing in-itself: by ‘in-itself’, I am not referring to absolute knowledge of the nature of a thing, but, rather, conditional knowledge of the nature of a thing. I doubt you deny we can evaluate the natures of things.

Which implies that healthy rational people automatically choose better states. This absolutely begs the question: "Why are healthy and rational people always able to evaluate higher value states 100% of the time?

Begging the question is when one presumes the truth of the conclusion in a premise, and that is not what is happening in your example here. Even if I were claiming that healthy and rational people always recognize intrinsic value 100% of the time (which I am not), that isn’t presupposing that my claim (conclusion), that we should think of what has intrinsic value in terms of value that a rational + healthy person would recognize in that state, is true as its own premise.

Now, I don’t think a rational + healthy person would always 100% of the time recognize that something has intrinsic value but, rather, that 99.99% of the time a rational + healthy person would behave as if it had value when put in that state—and that is what I mean by “they can only superficially deny its value”. Whether they recognize the value, cognitively their faculty of reason, is a separate question; and the answer is the vast majority probably wouldn’t conclude it has intrinsic value; because they don’t know what that means.

Bob

To evaluate whether something has the property of valuableness, is just to assess its worth — Bob Ross

I have no issue with this.

which is to say nothing beyond saying it has value. — Bob Ross

So then value is simply a synonym of worth. I have no issue with this. Now you have to identify worth though. None of my questions have changed, just replace my points about 'value' to 'worth' now.

How much value is not something determinable from the (general) property of valuableness itself: if that were the case, then we would have to posit an infinite amount of properties to account for each value—which is clearly misguided. — Bob Ross

This makes no sense. I have a gem worth 25$ and a gem worth 30$. We can both clearly see how much value each gem has. Is it the case that we have to put value into a phrase like 'monetary value'? If you're just saying 'value' alone has no sense of 'valuableness', sure, that's a given. We're talking about value in terms of moral value. How do we objectively determine moral value?

So, how one can determined the exact value of something, which is an ‘evaluation’ in the sense that you implied, has no bearing on whether or not the property of ‘having value’ is primitive or not because the property will necessarily, even if it could be defined, not contain a means of evaluation but rather is the mere idea of ‘worth’ in general. — Bob Ross

Its moral value or moral worth. How do you determine it? If you just say, "It intrinsically has it", then this is saying nothing Bob.

I'm skipping the "Good" analysis for now for my theory as I agree we should focus on what you mean by value first.

Goodness = ‘to have value’. — Bob Ross

This still doesn't answer what value or goodness is. This doesn't answer what good is, or how we can objectively evaluate it.

Moral goodness = ‘to have intrinsic value’. — Bob Ross

Moral goodness? What would immoral goodness be then? Again, I have no idea what value is, or how we know its intrinsic.

This is ‘to have worth’, and this is just to reiterate ‘to have value’ with a synonym. The property itself is primitive, and unanalyzable. — Bob Ross

It is when you put it into a phrase 'moral value'. If you say you can't define it Bob, then its a unicorn word and isn't real.

Likewise, why you should care about intrinsic value, is that it is morally good; and if you are a virtuous person of morally good character, then you will. — Bob Ross

Why is it morally good? Value? What is value? Morally good? Bob, you must see that you're saying a lot of nothing right now right? I feel like you're twisting yourself in avoiding the straight forward question of, "What constitutes moral value? How do we objectively determine it?"

There is nothing that forces, per se, anyone to value anything—but this does not takeaway from the fact that there are moral facts. — Bob Ross

Ok, there's no one that forces somebody to value, then how is value determined? If there are moral facts, how do we determine they are moral facts and not people just saying, "Its moral because it is."

Whether or not someone should care about what has intrinsic value, does not in takeaway from the fact that it has intrinsic value. — Bob Ross

How do I know this is a fact? If someone told me the Earth circled around the Sun, they would need to give me reasons why that is when I can look up into the sky and clearly see that it circles around us.

All you are noting, by asking why anyone should care, is that people can devalue (or not value at all) facts. — Bob Ross

That's to lead up to the question, "How do we objectively know what a thing's value is as a fact?"

I wasn’t using ‘state’ this generically, but that is fine. It is fine to think of states as ‘states of being’, for all intents and purposes, and, to that, I would then clarify that the state of being that a rock has does not have intrinsic value because that state is incapable of any innate insistence/demand (of value). — Bob Ross

Ok, so then a state that can have intrinsic value must be something that is alive.

Under your theory, its fine to destroy matter as we wish as long as it does not affect life.

Correct. This is because the states which have intrinsic value, are only possible for beings which are sufficiently alive.

If only states of life can have value, why?

No. States which are not attributable to beings that are alive can have value—it just isn’t intrinsic. — Bob Ross

There's a bit of a contradiction here. Are you trying to say, "Those with intrinsic value cannot be outright destroyed, but those with value can?" If so, once again, how do we determine value objectively?

Intrinsic value, is value which is demanded in virtue of the nature of the state: that is a very clear definition — Bob Ross

To be clearer, it is demanded in virtue of the nature of a living state. Implicit value is only in living things according to you, so could we address that explicitly so there's no confusion? How does a living thing demand implicit value? Does it ask? Does it yell? How does this word have any meaning an actual example?

The chief mistake Kant made, is thinking that because a thing-in-itself is not directly experienced that it cannot be known at all—which is clearly false. — Bob Ross

Ok, as long as you understand what Kant was stating. If you disagree with him, that's fine.

In a sentence, he is confusing absolute knowledge with things-in-themselves: no one has to concede that they have absolute knowledge of a thing-in-itself to say they have conditional knowledge of it, by way of theirs senses. — Bob Ross

No, Kant isn't confused here. Unless you're referring to something I'm not aware of in Kant elsewhere, here he introduced the concept of 'thing in-itself' to avoid an accusation of being an idealist. If all that exists is phenomenal existence, then there is nothing concrete underneath that we are representing on. The simple point he was making was that we are representers, and there is something that we are representing. As we can only express that something as a representation, it will never capture the essence of what it is in-iteself that we are representing on.

that doesn’t takeaway from the fact that we have good conditional knowledge to claim that the apple itself, which is to immediately discuss as it is in-itself, has mass. — Bob Ross

The 'itself' of the apple is not referring to the 'thing in itself' that we're looking at to represent the apple. It means the representation of the apple itself. Same with mass in itself. Or any 'representation' itself. Referring to the representation itself is not a reference to the thing in-itself that is underlying the representation.

For example, let’s take your reasoning seriously that a thing-in-itself is unknowable because we only every directly experience a representation of it. Ok. Take an apple, for example: does it have mass in-itself? It seems like it does: every bit of evidence points to that conclusion—but, Kant will insist that we can’t absolutely know it is true, because we only have representations to go off of. — Bob Ross

Kant will say it can be reasonably concluded within our representation. But despite this, we still don't know what thing in-itself that we're placing the representation of apple and mass on is. And he's right. We'll never know the truth. But you and I have had enough knowledge discussion in the past to know that what is true is outside of the grasp of humanity. All we have is knowledge.

To Kant's point, he would be ok with saying, "We know that our representation of mass fits within the rational representation of the apple, but we cannot know the truth of the thing in-itself that our representations rest on." Back to my theory of knowledge, "We can construct discrete experiences and apply them. As long as 'reality' (the thing in-itself) does not contradict this identity and its application, we can know it. But knowing it does not make it true, only just that our applied identity is not in contradiction with reality.

So, I have no problem analyzing the nature, the essences, of things—which you cannot do if you take your position seriously because the essence doesn’t pertain to mere appearances but, rather, what a thing’s actual properties are as it is in-itself—while conceding I have only conditional knowledge of it. — Bob Ross

If you want to create a definition of value and demonstrate it objectively exists, that's fine. If you want to refer to living things, as definitions, and refer to that definition by saying, "That living thing itself," that's fine. If you want to create a definition of value, then say its a 'thing in itself' that cannot be represented, then its a unicorn that cannot be sensed and outside of any rational consideration. I have an actual objective definition and application of moral value, and will rationally be able to dismiss yours outright. If you want to propose a serious position of ethics that can counter this, you must clearly define what moral value is, and how we can evaluate it. If you cannot, then by every rational measure your theory falls apart.

I am not referring to absolute knowledge of the nature of a thing, but, rather, conditional knowledge of the nature of a thing. I doubt you deny we can evaluate the natures of things. — Bob Ross

If you claim this, please show this. Define moral value. Demonstrate how we can evaluate it. I've given clear ways to do so on my end. If you put forward a definition of moral value that cannot be evaluated, while I have, then your theory fails.

Even if I were claiming that healthy and rational people always recognize intrinsic value 100% of the time (which I am not) — Bob Ross

Then how do we objectively evaluate intrinsic value? The point that people can decide to choose states that have high or low value is irrelevant if you're not going to give an objective way they can measure and decide.

99.99% of the time a rational + healthy person would behave as if it had value when put in that state—and that is what I mean by “they can only superficially deny its value”. — Bob Ross

This is not a real number. All we can really state is that you believe people usually choose better states than not. I have no problem agreeing with that. But we're discussing an objective morality. What objectively is a better state? How can a person evaluate objectively which state is better?

and that is what I mean by “they can only superficially deny its value”. — Bob Ross

Its superficial merely because they're in the minority? That's not what superficial means. It would be a superficial decision if they only glanced at it and didn't think deeper about it. If you're going to say they need to think deeper about it, how should they objectively do so?

Whether they recognize the value, cognitively their faculty of reason, is a separate question; and the answer is the vast majority probably wouldn’t conclude it has intrinsic value; because they don’t know what that means. — Bob Ross

Yes! I still don't know what intrinsic value means! :D I don't know how they could cognitively evaluate a situation and determine which situation has more intrinsic value than the other. This is a very real problem with your theory so far Bob. I've harped on it enough for now, but you'll need to give an objective definition of moral value, how we can evaluate moral value, and what intrinsic value is and how we can evaluate it objectively as well.

Now you have to identify worth though. None of my questions have changed, just replace my points about 'value' to 'worth' now.

I already noted, and was the first to note, that ‘value’ and ‘worth’ are synonyms: I already answered objection by explaining that valuableness is a primitive property, like beingness.

I still think you are misunderstanding what the property of valuableness, in principle, is. It doesn’t reference how much value a thing has—only that it has value. That is the property we discussing: it is the very idea of ‘value’.

Also, I think you completely misunderstood my response (with all due respect) because you kept using ‘moral value’ throughout your response, demanding an analysis of it, when I clearly indicated it does not exist. My theory doesn’t have any notion or idea of ‘moral value’, because it is does not exist. Now, what I have not noted, is why it does not exist. If you reflect back on my definitions, you will notice that valuableness is more fundamental than goodness. Moreover, you will notice that goodness is only where a moral distinction is made: this is because morality is about what is good, not what is valuable (although valuableness is relevant insofar as it is part of the definition of goodness). Value itself has no ‘moral’ markers: it is just value. Where a ‘moral’ marker comes in, is when one denotes a specific type of value, that being intrinsic value, and this is called ‘good’ in a moral sense. I am assuming you mean to ask about an analysis of intrinsic value, and not moral value.

I’ve already outlined very clearly what I mean by the properties themselves, so I will not reiterate them here.

I think the real issue you are having, is that you don’t think intrinsic value, in the sense I am using it, exists; nor how it possibly could; nor how one could go about deciphering what has it, and to what degree.

So, let me try again. Intrinsic value is ‘value which is demanded by virtue of a thing’s nature’. The only kind of thing which can demand value, is a state because it the only kind of thing, other than a subject, that can ‘enforce’ its own value (and a subject doing so is the enforcement of value derived from subjective purposes: i.e., extrinsic value: and so it doesn’t count here).

I blundered here before, by saying, at this point in my analysis, that only states which are associated with (sufficiently) living beings: I was confusing epistemology with ontology. A state which can demand (i.e., innately insistence on having) value is one which IF it were experienced by a subject, then it would compel that subject to value it to a degree equal to its insistence; but such a state could exist, of which no current subject has the capacity to experience it. So that was my mistake, I recant that portion of my analysis.

So, how do we determine that a state has intrinsic value? By experience. No subject can know that a state demands value if they lack the representative faculties, or over-arching cognitive faculties (aka: reason), to recognize it; albeit really there. However, the epistemic window we have, for everything, is experience. We experience a state, such as pain, and it is clear (to any reasonably rational person with the proper capacities to produce pain [neurologically]) that it compels value in its avoidance. Think about, Philosophim, from your own perspective: forget your parents, forget everyone else. Imagine you are in severe pain: you are seriously telling me you cannot fathom how the state of pain compels you to value its avoidance, all else being equal? I genuinely doubt that. You may have further reservations, but I am just trying to convey the basics to you here. Now, like all other empirical studies, our knowledge of intrinsic value as an institutionalized study would be a convergence of perspectives on empirical studies of states, such that we could sufficiently conclude that certain states do compel to be valued, and to a degree equal to its force of compelment.

It is important to note, that my view, unlike yours, is not a form of moral naturalism: it is form of moral non-naturalism. I don’t hold that valuableness, and subsequently goodness, is a natural property: you can’t scientifically investigate the property, because it is supervenient on the physical constitution of entities (viz., it is supervenient on the natural properties). For example, let’s say the fair market value of a diamond is $1500: can you figure that out solely from an investigation into the diamond’s physical properties? Of course not! You have to have further knowledge of the fair market to determine such. You need to examine the diamond to acquire its physical properties, and then, in addition to those properties, understand the fair market; then, you can attribute the property of value, and specifically a quantitative value of $1500, to the diamond—and this property which is does possess is no where to be found in its physical constitution. Therefore, the property is non-natural, because natural properties are physical properties (of things).

Now, it is equally important to note that by saying we cannot scientifically investigate the value (and moral properties) of things, I am not meaning to say that it is not an empirical investigation. We come to know that what states have the ability to demand value, by (1) understanding our representative faculties (such as their limitations) and (2), if our faculties are sufficient enough, empirically investigating, by means of experiencing, the state and seeing (A) if it compels, simply from its own nature, to be valued (e.g., if I really like pizza being thrown across the room, that doesn’t make pizza being thrown across the room inrinsically valuable: whereas, whether I like it or not, being in pain, by its nature, compels me to avoid it) and (B), if so, by how much force (of compelment).

Intrinsic value is factual, because it is value which is objective; and it is objective because its value is exists mind-independently and the truth of the matter whether it exists is stance-independent.

Does that help?

This still doesn't answer what value or goodness is. This doesn't answer what good is, or how we can objectively evaluate it.

I was surprised you responded with this: you even quoted my definition which clarified this. Goodness is ‘to have value’: so how can you say I haven’t answered what goodness is? You can disagree with what I claimed it was, but you certainly can’t say I didn’t answer. Likewise with valuableness: I said it is an unanalyzable property, like beingness, which is akin to beingness. That’s an answer.

We evaluate what is good, by analyzing what has intrinsic value; and we understand what has intrinsic value, as per my explanation above, by experiencing states and determining whether the state itself compels the valuing of it.

Moral goodness? What would immoral goodness be then?

Ah, I am not intending to use ‘moral’, as the adjective here, in the sense of ‘being good’—as that is circular—but, instead, to denote a sub-type of goodness which pertains to morality.

Moreover, you asked why is intrinsic value morally good? I answered this a while back: it is because moral goodness is identical to ‘having intrinsic value’; and it is identical to it because otherwise goodness pertains to what is and not what should be.

so then a state that can have intrinsic value must be something that is alive

Two things worth noting here:

1. I have altered my understanding of states such that a state which can have intrinsic value is not only states which subjects are capable of experiencing; and

2. Even if I didn’t, it would not follow (from what I said) that alive beings are intrinsically valuable (which is what you said here). Rather, the state, which only an alive being could experience, would be intrinsically valuable.

Under your theory, its fine to destroy matter as we wish as long as it does not affect life.

Correct. This is because the states which have intrinsic value, are only possible for beings which are sufficiently alive.

If only states of life can have value, why?

No. States which are not attributable to beings that are alive can have value—it just isn’t intrinsic. — Bob Ross

There's a bit of a contradiction here. Are you trying to say, "Those with intrinsic value cannot be outright destroyed, but those with value can?" If so, once again, how do we determine value objectively?

I apologize, I read your first quote wrong in haste. Whether or not one should destroy matter which doesn’t affect a life, depends on whether it has value—irregardless of whether it is extrinsic or intrinsic. A state which cannot demand to be valued, could still have value—it would just be endowed to it by a subject (viz., it would be extrinsic value). Extrinsic value is value determined by how well a thing serves a subjective purpose. There isn’t any intrinsic value in a clock; but I nevertheless won’t destroy mine because I value it for telling the time.

No, Kant isn't confused here.

I think Kant is, but I don’t think this is very important to what I am saying. By noting that a thing has value in-itself, I am noting that it has value intrinsic to its nature. I don’t see why our dispute here matters for intents of this conversation: do you deny that we can obtain conditional knowledge of the natures of things? I doubt it.

Bob

I still think you are misunderstanding what the property of valuableness, in principle, is. It doesn’t reference how much value a thing has—only that it has value. That is the property we discussing: it is the very idea of ‘value’. — Bob Ross

Right, but value without any modifier means nothing. There's monetary value, moral value, emotional value, etc. Just saying 'value' has no reference as to what you mean.

For example:
value - the regard that something is held to deserve; the importance, worth, or usefulness of something.
"your support is of great value"

value -a person's principles or standards of behavior; one's judgment of what is important in life.
"they internalize their parents' rules and values"

My theory doesn’t have any notion or idea of ‘moral value’, because it is does not exist. — Bob Ross

Then you have no objective way of evaluating morality. If there is no moral value in anything, all is permitted.

Now, what I have not noted, is why it does not exist. If you reflect back on my definitions, you will notice that valuableness is more fundamental than goodness. — Bob Ross

According to you, there is no moral value. Meaning that goodness has no value. This, by consequence, means that value is not good either. They are two separate things here.

Where a ‘moral’ marker comes in, is when one denotes a specific type of value, that being intrinsic value, and this is called ‘good’ in a moral sense. — Bob Ross

So then there IS moral value. Intrinsic value is moral value, and moral value is good. Then we refer back to your definitions:

Goodness = ‘to have value’. So now that means that all value, is a value of goodness. Meaning that the value of a gem at $25 is more goodness than a gem valued at $30.

Moral goodness = ‘to have intrinsic value’. — Bob Ross

Here we have moral goodness, or moral 'to have value' (moral value) = intrinsic value. Except that anything which has value is goodness. So all value is goodness, but only moral value, which is moral goodness is intrinsic value. But since value is goodness, then intrinsic value is really intrinsic goodness. So somehow moral evaluation only applies to certain goodness, the intrinsic kind. Except that morality is an evaluation of what is good and not good. So how do we just dismiss some goodness, while other goodness is within morality? Your words don't fit Bob. You cannot have a segment of good that isn't within moral discussion. That's a violation of the term 'morality'.

In conclusion:
valuableness is more fundamental than goodness
Value = Goodness (What is goodness? Is value less fundamental than valuableness?)
Moral goodness = that which has intrinsic goodness.
Moral value = that which has intrinsic value.
Value = that which has extrinsic value

So extrinsic value is extrinsic goodness. Intrinsic value is intrinsic goodness. Yet moral value can only refer to intrinsic goodness, whereas references to extrinsic goodness do not involve moral valuation.
I THINK I get it. Please correct me where needed.

I think the real issue you are having, is that you don’t think intrinsic value, in the sense I am using it, exists; nor how it possibly could; nor how one could go about deciphering what has it, and to what degree. — Bob Ross

Correct.

So, let me try again. Intrinsic value is ‘value which is demanded by virtue of a thing’s nature’. — Bob Ross

This statement has unnecessary redundancy Bob. Lets simplify this to clearer language. Intrinsic value is what a thing demands. A things nature = a thing.

I blundered here before, by saying, at this point in my analysis, that only states which are associated with (sufficiently) living beings: I was confusing epistemology with ontology. — Bob Ross

No worry, you're with a friend. :) I'm not going for cheap gotchas. Feel free to correct, amend, or change anything at anytime, the issue is complicated.

A state which can demand (i.e., innately insistence on having) value is one which IF it were experienced by a subject, then it would compel that subject to value it to a degree equal to its insistence; but such a state could exist, of which no current subject has the capacity to experience it. — Bob Ross

How can a non-living state insist on having something? isn't that personification? I understand that you're talking about a state that could be experienced by a subject that subject has not yet experienced. But subjects are those that evaluate and determine value. Just because we evaluate something as positive, that does not mean the thing we are evaluating insisted on it. Our emotional initial judgement insisted on it. Same thing as if we judge something as not having value. Personifying states is just odd Bob, and I don't see the logic behind it. States simply are. At best you let living things decide their value.

So, how do we determine that a state has intrinsic value? By experience. — Bob Ross

We experience a state, such as pain, and it is clear (to any reasonably rational person with the proper capacities to produce pain [neurologically]) that it compels value in its avoidance. — Bob Ross

The state is not compelling anything. We are reacting to a state and have to make a decision. I don't understand the rationale behind the personification of states still.

Think about, Philosophim, from your own perspective: forget your parents, forget everyone else. Imagine you are in severe pain: you are seriously telling me you cannot fathom how the state of pain compels you to value its avoidance, all else being equal? — Bob Ross

First, the state of pain is a state of a living body. A living judgement allows the being to decide what to do about it. Normally, a moral decision would be, "How should I avoid the pain?" My father has constant back pain and was on opioids for pain relief for a time. He realized he was getting addicted to the pills, so stopped taking them despite having the back pain. Did my father make a moral decision? He accepted the pain despite his desire to avoid it. So in your view, it seems my Dad violated the intrinsic value of pain and committed an immoral act. And no, the 'insistence' to get off the pain pills was not stronger. He made a rational decision based on his experience with addiction to alcohol. So he worked through that stronger desire to pick the thing that 'insisted' he not pick, pain. Again, this is an odd way to speak as if states have demands. Its really just an emotional battle within an experience.

Second, "Imagine you are in severe anger: you are seriously telling me you cannot fathom how the state of anger compels you to value its acceptance, and stab that guy with a knife because he insulted you, all else being equal?" What you're doing here Bob is saying that whenever we are compelled to make a decision one way, that it is the state of the experience expressing its intrinsic value, or good. So whatever we are most compelled to do is good. Meaning if I'm strongly compelled to gas some people because I'm a Nazi and love my country, that's intrinsically good. There are some serious problems here.

Now, like all other empirical studies, our knowledge of intrinsic value as an institutionalized study would be a convergence of perspectives on empirical studies of states, such that we could sufficiently conclude that certain states do compel to be valued, and to a degree equal to its force of compelment. — Bob Ross

Yeah, that's kind of crazy Bob. You're saying that moral evaluation is to be done by majority vote of what people really want to do? We are compelled to make decisions when we are experiencing certain states of reality. Meaning that if the majority of people believe in Islam, Islam is intrinsically good while atheism is intrinsically bad. Meaning that killing the infidels is intrinsically good. Moral value is done by majority action, without question as to whether the majority is making the correct choices by rational analysis.

I don’t hold that valuableness, and subsequently goodness, is a natural property: you can’t scientifically investigate the property, because it is supervenient on the physical constitution of entities (viz., it is supervenient on the natural properties). — Bob Ross

But you basically say they're discovered by what people are most compelled to do. Isn't that in the realm of science? I can say, "70% of Americans are Christians, therefore being a Christian is intrinsic goodness while not being a Christian is intrinsic badness." Therefore science has discovered being a Christian is morally valuable while not being a Christian is not.

if it compels, simply from its own nature, to be valued (e.g., if I really like pizza being thrown across the room, that doesn’t make pizza being thrown across the room inrinsically valuable: whereas, whether I like it or not, being in pain, by its nature, compels me to avoid it — Bob Ross

But if 51% of people are really compelled to throw a pizza across the room, it is intrinsically valuable. Finally I can justify my secret urge! :D

Intrinsic value is factual, because it is value which is objective; and it is objective because its value is exists mind-independently and the truth of the matter whether it exists is stance-independent. — Bob Ross

No, its pretty clear at this point that its value rests on minds and is absolutely subjective. I'm not seeing the case at all that it exists independently of people's judgements. The matter whether moral value exists is very stance dependent. If I take 100 atheists and ask them if they are compelled not to believe in God, then not believing in God is intrinsically good. If we ask the majority of the world to prevent climate change and the majority say "No", then it is intrinsically good not to fight climate change.

Does that help? — Bob Ross

Its helped me to come to the above conclusions. Please correct me where I am wrong.

Goodness is ‘to have value’: so how can you say I haven’t answered what goodness is? You can disagree with what I claimed it was, but you certainly can’t say I didn’t answer. Likewise with valuableness: I said it is an unanalyzable property, like beingness, which is akin to beingness. That’s an answer. — Bob Ross

Because you basically said goodness is an unanalyzable property, then insisted that it could be objectively known, and as we discovered above, be analyzed. Further, you've said that some good is under moral consideration, while other good is not, which is again, a violation of the definition of morality.
I understand a bit better what you intended now, but it was was definitely confusing on a first pass.

Moral goodness? What would immoral goodness be then?

Ah, I am not intending to use ‘moral’, as the adjective here, in the sense of ‘being good’—as that is circular—but, instead, to denote a sub-type of goodness which pertains to morality. — Bob Ross

Per your defintions, moral goodness would be moral value. Goodness would be a value, just not a moral one unless its intrinsic. And again, morality is the study of what is good. What rational reason do you have to say, "Except that good over there." Generally that which is not considered in morality is neither good nor evil. So why do you construct a contradiction between your terms? If there is 'good' that cannot be discussed morally, its not really 'good', and needs another term to not be a contradiction.

Even if I didn’t, it would not follow (from what I said) that alive beings are intrinsically valuable (which is what you said here). Rather, the state, which only an alive being could experience, would be intrinsically valuable. — Bob Ross

Right, living things aren't intrinsically valuable, its living things that decide whether something has value or not when they come across an experience. And if the majority of living beings think a particular state of living/experience/state is more valuable, then it is intrinsically valuable.

No, Kant isn't confused here.

I think Kant is, but I don’t think this is very important to what I am saying. By noting that a thing has value in-itself, I am noting that it has value intrinsic to its nature. — Bob Ross

As long as you aren't saying that intrinsic value is a thing in-itself. Because that is incoherent. It has value in its representation that most people experience.

Alright, if I understand your moral theory here, this is morality through majority judgement. There are a ton of problems here. First, many of your identities for situations don't fit. Intrinsic and extrinsic value can more easily be replaced with Majority value and Minority value. This makes things much more clear. What is value? What states people decide to be in. What is moral? Majority value. Is minority value immoral? No, but it certainly not 'good' then, meaning that the majority can refer to that minority value as not being moral.

What is good? Things that people value. But somehow its only a moral consideration of goodness when the majority is involved. So, its at best a confusing descriptive sense of morality, not normative. And this descriptive morality is 100% subjective. Even if a state has not been experienced yet, its value will only be found by majority judgement. Not to mention that there's nothing which rationally compels anyone for lemming morality.

There are so many problems with this, as there are in every subjective morality. What do we do when there's a conflict of cultures? What happens when the majority changes over time? If what the majority decides is moral, then what justification is there for a minority to choose otherwise or try to change the majority? Am I evil for trying to educate an ignorant populace? If the majority of people used drugs and were addicted, that's moral? I'm not asking you to answer these, because I've had these debates before and already know potential solutions and problems. Overall, I find these theories lacking.

In addition, what you're trying to say here has been said much clearer elsewhere in philosophy. Your construction of this is confusing Bob. Its riddled with at best, odd, and at worst, contradiction or incoherent word choices for concepts. Things need to be simple and as clear as possible. In the end, this is a subjective moral majority philosophy. That's it. And that has no chance in challenging my theory in any rational sense. Your claim that it is objective does not fit. You cannot have a theory that is determined by majority subjectivism and call that rationally objective. I have no reason to buy into what the majority values as moral. That's just an insistence by the majority, and that is not considered a rational request by anyone.

Finally, the death knell of any theory is if its own theory can contradict itself. Bob, what happens if the majority of people don't choose your state of morality? As in we don't find any value in it? Doesn't that mean your moral theory, isn't really a moral theory by the arguments giving within? Since most don't value this theory, It would mean the state of your theory has no intrinsic value. So again, by your own theory, this theory has no intrinsic value or moral worth. Since it has no moral worth, we can just ignore it.

Alright, that's enough from me for now! I do appreciate the time that went into constructing this theory and attempting to clear it up, but as i currently understand it, its just not making any new claims or contributions that haven't already been long considered and disregarded by most people.

With all due respect, there was a lot of straw manning going on in your reply; and I could tell that you responded by way of reacting to each paragraph in chronological order (instead of analyzing my response as a whole) because you raised objections to things which you then disregarded further along as you were reading (my response). Reading your response, was like witnessing a live reaction (:

In order to convey this theory to you, I ask that you read my responses in their entirety first; and then respond with the whole in mind.

The good news, amidst the straw mans, I did notice a glimmer of progression! I think you are at least one step closer to understanding the basics of the theory. So let me address what you got right first.

What you call ‘moral value’ is equivalent to ‘intrinsic value’, and ‘moral goodness’ is equivalent to ‘intrinsic goodness’. I was hesitant to concede any sort of ‘moral value’ distinction, but that’s fine. I am claiming that morality is the study of what is intrinsically good, and not generically good—and there is good reason for that. Traditionally, morality has always been about actual (i.e., intrinsic) goodness and not extrinsic goodness. For example, morality has never, ever, been the study of the utility of a thing, which is to assess how good a thing is relative to a subjective purpose. If you want to claim morality is the study of generically what is good, then you will have to include studies, like axiological pragmatism, which have never been included in the study before. I am not willing to do that: I want to keep morality the study of what it traditionally has been.

There are some interesting things to note in here as well:

In conclusion:
valuableness is more fundamental than goodness
Value = Goodness (What is goodness? Is value less fundamental than valuableness?)
Moral goodness = that which has intrinsic goodness.
Moral value = that which has intrinsic value.
Value = that which has extrinsic value

You are absolutely right that valuableness = goodness; and that valuableness is not more fundamental than goodness: I was thinking of ‘value’ when I said that, not valuableness.

It is worth noting a blunder I made: when I was claiming valuableness is unanalyzable and primitive, I was actually thinking of ‘value’. Valuableness is easily definable, and it is ‘to have value’ (duh!).

‘Value’ is a more fundamental building-block of goodness and valuableness, because it is used in their definitions—that’s what I was meaning to convey before, but muddied the waters with my explication. Likewise, my example of ‘beingness’ was a bit off too: the property of beingness is not unanalyzable but, rather, ‘being’ is. Same analogy holds though, for ‘value/good’ and ‘being’.

So:

1. Goodness = valuableness = to have value.
2. moral goodness = to have intrinsic value (or to be intrinsically good: take your pick, it doesn’t matter since they mean the same thing).
3. value != goodness. The former is not a property, and the latter is.
4. moral value = intrinsic value.
5. value = good = ? . Both are unanalyzable and primitive, like being.

Hopefully that clarifies the confusion on that part. Good point, Philosophim!

Now, let’s dive into all the things you misunderstood (and I say that with all due respect).

This statement has unnecessary redundancy Bob. Lets simplify this to clearer language. Intrinsic value is what a thing demands.

NO. Intrinsic value is value that a thing demands of is own accord (i.e., from its nature). Saying it is ‘what a thing demands’ leaves out what is being demanded: I don’t mean it that generically.

But subjects are those that evaluate and determine value

Epistemically, of course we determine value: just like we determine truth, what exists, etc. The question is whether or not what we deem is valuable, actually is. And it only actually can be, if it is intrinsic. Otherwise, one is talking about how well a thing sizes up to its subjective purpose, which clearly isn’t actual value.

The state is not compelling anything. We are reacting to a state and have to make a decision. I don't understand the rationale behind the personification of states still.

You don’t think the state of pain compels you to eradicate it? Come on, Philosophim, I find it hard to believe you don’t understand this example.

So in your view, it seems my Dad violated the intrinsic value of pain and committed an immoral act.

Philosophim, did I not say to forget your parents and think only about the state of severe pain you are (hypothetically) in?

The answer to this, though, is no: on the contrary, it would be immoral to be addicted to opioids insofar as it is a state with intrinsic negative value. Why? Because the state of addiction has a compelling to be avoided. Another way of thinking about it, is that it violates what is most intrinsically (positively) valuable: universal flourishing.

When I am using the example of pain, I am using it just to convey the idea of intrinsic value to you, because you don’t seem to be able to even grasp that, and not to say that avoiding pain has the most intrinsic value nor that one should strive, as The Good, to always void it. You are skipping steps: we are talking about lego blocks, and you want to skip to sky-scrapers.

And no, the 'insistence' to get off the pain pills was not stronger.

Of course not, because he was not in a state, such as flourishing, which compels stronger than a state of degeneracy (such as severe addiction). I am not claiming that a person in the state of pain nor addiction will experience (necessarily) a stronger compelment towards flourishing; but if they were placed in such a state, which is a state without addiction, they would surely recognize, if they are sufficiently cognizant and unbiased, that it has more (positive) intrinsic value than their opioid addiction.

You are having a hard thinking of the strength of a state in terms of itself because you are trying to compare it in a different state. When one is in a state of severe pain, they aren’t in a state of extreme flourishing; so obviously, from that state of pain, the pain is stronger because they aren’t in a state of flourishing. But when they are in a state of flourishing, true flourishing, it is stronger, and in a positive sense, than a state of severe pain. Do you see what I mean?

Imagine you are in severe anger: you are seriously telling me you cannot fathom how the state of anger compels you to value its acceptance, and stab that guy with a knife because he insulted you, all else being equal?

A couple things to note:

1. Perhaps I didn’t clarify this before, but there are two types of intrinsic value: negative and positive. The former is value in its negation, whereas the latter is value in its presence.

2. Anger itself has negative intrinsic value, and this is easily recognized when in a state of extreme anger: the emotion of anger is something which compels one to avoid and eradicate it, and that is what compels them to give in to whatever will help subsidize it. This is no different than pain: put a person in enough pain, and they commonly will do anything to eradicate it.

3. You are confusing whether or not anger has intrinsic value, with whether or not the thing which one does or strives towards due to their anger has intrinsic value. If I am really angry and I could subsidize it by punching someone in the face, then that wouldn’t make ‘punching someone in the face’ intrinsically valuable: the anger is intrinsically negatively valuable because it naturally compels one to value its avoidance and eradication.

What you're doing here Bob is saying that whenever we are compelled to make a decision one way, that it is the state of the experience expressing its intrinsic value, or good.

Not at all. I am saying that IF the state itself compels us to some degree, then to that degree it has intrinsic value; and whether or not it is negative or positive is dependent on whether it compels its avoidance/negation or its presence. See what I mean?

So whatever we are most compelled to do is good. Meaning if I'm strongly compelled to gas some people because I'm a Nazi and love my country, that's intrinsically good. There are some serious problems here.

This is beyond a straw man, and I am genuinely surprised you responded with this. Philosophim, when did I ever say “whatever we are most compelled to do is good”? What nonsense! What we are compelled to do, can be utterly subjective (such as a desire or cognitive approval).

You're saying that moral evaluation is to be done by majority vote of what people really want to do?

This was the most prominent straw man in your response, and I am disappointed in it.

As an institution, knowledge is preserved by way of majority vote of experts in the respective fields—e.g., that’s how peer-review studies work, Philosophim—but does that mean or even imply that truth is subjective? Of course not: what nonsense!

I am, and never was, claiming that what is intrinsically valuable—i.e., what is morally good—is contingent on our vote; I was saying that any institution we could create would preserve and gain knowledge of what is intrinsically valuable by way of convergence of experiences of states, as agreed upon by experts in the field.

Philosophim, this is no different than science. Our institutions safeguard and declare scientific knowledge by way of expert consensus. As humans, we have no other way of doing it (institutionally). Does that mean what exists is subjective? Of course not! What nonsense!

No, its pretty clear at this point that its value rests on minds and is absolutely subjective. I'm not seeing the case at all that it exists independently of people's judgements

Think of yourself in severe pain. Forget everything else.. Imagine you believe that the avoidance of pain is completely valueless: you will still behave like it has some value (in a negative sense). Why? Philosophim, if pain has no intrinsic value, then your belief or desire that it has no value should be enough to conclude it isn’t valuable; but it clearly isn’t enough, because pain, by its nature, compels you to value it.

Now, to clarify further, I get the sense sometime you think that by intrinsic value, I mean ~”anything that compels a subject to value it”. I, of course, don’t believe this; as other subjects can compel each other, and this is not an example of intrinsic value. The state of pain is objective, insofar as it is there irregardless of your feelings or approvals/disapprovals: states are objective in this manner—irregardless if one accepts the existence of qualia.

The rest of your response, was just a reiteration of the above misunderstands and straw mans, so I don’t feel the need to repeat myself in response.

I look forward to hearing from you,
Bob

Alright Bob, I've perused this whole thing. This is still one mess of a theory. If I had any suggestions it would be to go step by step in the proper order. For example you start with "goodness" before you define 'good'. Reverse that. Because if you do, you get this:

Good = value

What is value? Something primitive that cannot be analyzed.

Goodness = valuableness

What is valuableness? That which has value. So things can have goodness by having value. This order makes it much more clear what you're trying to say.

Second, you need to find and fix your contradictions.

But subjects are those that evaluate and determine value

Epistemically, of course we determine value: just like we determine truth, what exists, etc. The question is whether or not what we deem is valuable, actually is. And it only actually can be, if it is intrinsic. — Bob Ross

So value IS something that can be analyzed. It can be determined according to you in two ways:

1. By subjective human evaluation.
2. By something beyond human subjective evaluation.

And because there is a note that we can deem something valuable that actually isn't valuable, then real value is something beyond human subjective evaluation. To prove that such a thing exists, we must have an objective evaluation that proves what is valuable despite differences in subjective conclusions. Oh, and we'll make a phrase to shorten this. "Intrinsic value". So intrinsic value is objective value.

So the big question then is, "How do we objectively evaluate intrinsic value?" Your initial answer was by what the majority of us were compelled to do. But you made a clarification, which is fine, that

I am, and never was, claiming that what is intrinsically valuable—i.e., what is morally good—is contingent on our vote; I was saying that any institution we could create would preserve and gain knowledge of what is intrinsically valuable by way of convergence of experiences of states, as agreed upon by experts in the field. — Bob Ross

Ok, I can get behind this! But that leaves a massive question. How do our experts determine intrinsic value?

For example, the morality of the bible was once determined by a gathering of priests. They would hand out to the public how to interpret the bible, and what things were good and not good. The catholic church at one point sold indulgences, which let you pay money to be absolved of your sins. Now a person who studied the bible would wonder how they arrived at that conclusion when its clear that Jesus died to pay everyone's sin off. We could just go with the experts, but if we're going to be objective, we need to know how the experts arrived at their conclusion.

Philosophim, this is no different than science. Our institutions safeguard and declare scientific knowledge by way of expert consensus. As humans, we have no other way of doing it (institutionally). Does that mean what exists is subjective? Of course not! What nonsense! — Bob Ross

Yes, but we know science is objective because of the scientific method. What method are we using to find intrinsic value?

No, its pretty clear at this point that its value rests on minds and is absolutely subjective. I'm not seeing the case at all that it exists independently of people's judgements

Think of yourself in severe pain. Forget everything else.. Imagine you believe that the avoidance of pain is completely valueless: you will still behave like it has some value (in a negative sense). Why? Philosophim, if pain has no intrinsic value, then your belief or desire that it has no value should be enough to conclude it isn’t valuable; but it clearly isn’t enough, because pain, by its nature, compels you to value it. — Bob Ross

You are confusing the fact that I evaluate what to do about a state as if the state has value apart from my evaluation. Your insistence that I find value in it, is insistence that I evaluate it. That in no rational way, implies it has some innate value. If of course you're going to say that negative value exists, then everything that can be evaluated has value. This makes sense, because value is relative. But that's just noting conscious beings can evaluate any situation they're in. Of course. This isn't anything noteworthy. The question is how to objectively evaluate something and find its 'intrinsic value'. How much is it? How does it compare to other things of intrinsic value?

I think this is enough for now. Instead of going line by line I've tried to get the overall concept and issues I see.

I think we have made progress! (:

For example you start with "goodness" before you define 'good'. Reverse that. Because if you do, you get this:

Good = value

What is value? Something primitive that cannot be analyzed.

The reason I don’t start with it, is because I don’t feel the need, when initially explaining the theory, to explain what ‘value’ is itself: I just use it. Every theory starts with something presupposed; and I find it satisfactory to start with ‘goodness is identical to “having value”’: this is generally, immediately understood by common folk.

Which leads me to:

So value IS something that can be analyzed.

I think we are referring to two different things by ‘value’ here. When I say ‘value’ is unanalyzable, I mean it is the sense of ‘what does it mean to be valued or have value?’ (i.e., what is value itself?); whereas you talking about ‘what has value, and how much?’. I totally agree, as is clear in my responses, that we can answer the latter, just not the former. If you ask me ‘what has value?’, I can answer; but if you ask me ‘what does it mean for something to be valuable?’, my answer is just a reiteration (such as ‘it means that something has worth’). See what I mean?

How do our experts determine intrinsic value?
…
Yes, but we know science is objective because of the scientific method. What method are we using to find intrinsic value?

This is a good point: I actually think now that valuableness being a non-natural property does not entail that it is not capable of scientific investigation.

I think we can investigate intrinsic value, by means of the scientific method, as it would pertain to the study of discerning value which is derived from a person’s (conative or cognitive) dispositions vs. what mind-independently pressures, by its own nature, a person into valuing it. I think that answers your question pretty well.

You are confusing the fact that I evaluate what to do about a state as if the state has value apart from my evaluation

No. Take the same pain example, but imagine you genuinely believe, while in that state, that pain has no value: your body will betray you. You can only deny its value superficially. See what I mean? Your ‘evaluation’ of the state is irrelevant to the value it has, insofar as we are talking about the value it has innately.

I think this is enough for now. Instead of going line by line I've tried to get the overall concept and issues I see.

I appreciate that! (:

Bob

I have been thinking about how to express my view differently, in light of your currently way of thinking about it, so as to hopefully provide more clarity. I came up with one more way to express it.

"Intrinsic motivation" is anything which is its own source of motivation; whereas "extrinsic motivation" is anything which depends on something else (as a source of motivation) to motivate anything else about it.

An example of intrinsic motivation, that you can agree with in your current mode of thought, is subjects--specifically their psychologies. I can very well become motivated to do something, because of my interpretation or (subjective) disposition towards it; and, thusly, I am a source of motivation for myself, and so I am an example of intrinsic motivation.

An example of extrinsic motivation, that you can agree with in your current mode of thought, is one being motivated to play basketball because they like the sport. Basketball itself is not motivating anyone, but, rather, the subject's interpretation (or subjective disposition) towards it motivates them; and so this motivation to do basketball is extrinsic to basketball itself.

Now, something which has intrinsic value, has a (1) mind(stance)-independent source of (2) intrinsic motivation. This is a combination that you currently haven't completely incorporated into your mode of thought and is why, I think, you are having a hard time understanding what intrinsic value would even be.

So, I devised a simple test, for all intents and purposes, that will get my point across. We can test if something is intrinsically motivating by asking: "if all other sources of motivation are removed which are not from X, does X still motivate?".

For example, if we ask "if all other sources of motivation are removed which are not from basketball (itself), does (playing or what not) basketball still motivate?", then the answer is clearly "no"; because if we remove our own motivation, then there is no motivation left. If I remove my own subjective disposition about basketball, then I am no longer motivated to play it; because all my reasons for doing it were from my own preferences about it. So basketball is not intrinsically motivating.

Now, let's contrast pain to basketball. "If all other sources of motivation are removed which are not from pain (itself), does pain still motivate?". The answer is 'yes'. If I remove my own subjective disposition towards pain, which could be a subjective understanding that it is worthless or valuable, I am still motivated, in a state of pain, to avoid it. Thusly pain is intrinsically motivating. Since it exists stance-independently--insofar as the state of pain is not dependent on our feelings, preferences, or cognitive approval/disapprovals--and it is intrinsically motivating, it has intrinsic value.

What you are having a hard time understanding, I think, is that every mind-independent state is NOT analogous to the basketball example because some states, per their nature, motivate independently of our own internal motivations about them.

Hopefully that helps.

Bob

The reason I don’t start with it, is because I don’t feel the need, when initially explaining the theory, to explain what ‘value’ is itself: I just use it. Every theory starts with something presupposed; and I find it satisfactory to start with ‘goodness is identical to “having value”’: this is generally, immediately understood by common folk. — Bob Ross

Bob, most philosophers are going to ask, "If good is what we're trying to define, and value it what is good, then what is value?" If you say you can't define it, then it means you can't define good either. Feel free to push that good is equal to value, but if you can't define value, then you have a subjective theory that depends on some amorphous poorly defined word.

I think we are referring to two different things by ‘value’ here. When I say ‘value’ is unanalyzable, I mean it is the sense of ‘what does it mean to be valued or have value?’ (i.e., what is value itself?); whereas you talking about ‘what has value, and how much?’. — Bob Ross

There are several definitions of value already in the philosophical space. If you're not going to use any of them, you'll have to explain why to your reader right? It just comes across as not having a fully fleshed out theory yet. Which its fine if its not, but its a key foundation of your theory and needs some type of explanation.

Comparing this to my own theory, I explain what morality is, and how to evaluate it. Meaning I have definitions of moral value and why there's moral value.

For example:
Value: A designation of importance. If quantified, this importance can be compared.
Moral value: A designation of moral importance. This can be quantified into existing and potential identities over time.

And when people ask, "Why are existing and potential identities valuable?" I can go back to demonstrating what rationally must be if objective good exists. Here of course is my assumption, "That objective good exists." But its clearly defined why its an assumption and why we've reached a limitation.

Since I have noted and backed definitions, and yours doesn't, why would anyone rationally choose the incomplete theory? You have too many competing definitions of value that already exist. If you state its unanalyzable, when several theories already have, its going to need to counter all those other theories that have analyzed it.

I think we can investigate intrinsic value, by means of the scientific method, as it would pertain to the study of discerning value which is derived from a person’s (conative or cognitive) dispositions vs. what mind-independently pressures, by its own nature, a person into valuing it. I think that answers your question pretty well. — Bob Ross

This means you don't currently have an answer for how we can objectively know intrinsic value. I'm not saying you're wrong, its just incomplete. If you want to use the scientific method, you'll need to generate an example of how we could go about determining the intrinsic value out of something using that method. There should be clear steps. As it is now, this is just an admittance that you don't know. Which is fine, it just needs improvement.

No. Take the same pain example, but imagine you genuinely believe, while in that state, that pain has no value — Bob Ross

Bob, one reason why you're having a hard time getting the answer you want is because you have no real definition of value. As such, mine and your definitions are personal, and thus probably don't line up. Do this with 100 people and you're going to get several different answers. Without a clear definition of value, this theory just won't work in a group setting.

I did review your second reply, but again, you're running into the same problem. Value is not objectively defined, therefore it is personally defined by whoever is using it. There's really no point in discussing value when its so subjective. Until that's fixed, this theory is dead.

My definition of value, is Moorean—not subjective.

What value is itself, is not something contingent on subjective dispositions: it is to have worth. Just like being is itself not something contingent on subjective dispositions: it is to be.

By your reasoning, being is also subject; which is clearly false.

Value: A designation of importance.

This is no different than defining it as ‘value: a designation of worth’. Philosophim, you haven’t done anything here but use a (rough) synonym for value: you have done nothing to expound the idea of value. Rather, you have pushed the question back, just the same as if you would have said ‘worth’ instead of ‘importance’.

Likewise, value isn’t a designation: it would be, by your definition here, equal to importance. Something designates value, value is not some sort of designation itself; just like how someone can designate tasks, but a task isn’t defined as a designation <of something>.

Irregardless, I am confused why you are insisting on disregarding the whole theory, in the sense of not even granting my definition of value for the sake of the conversation, when you clearly understand that my use of ‘value’ is ‘to have worth’; and you know darn well what ‘to have worth’ means, and that it is not itself subjective.

You are playing word games and trying to win on technicalities.

In terms of competing definitions of value, I have never heard a satisfying one other than one’s which reiterate the primitive meaning (such as ‘to have worth’ or ‘to be important’). People use the term ‘value’ exactly, by-at-large, how I am using it: I am not using it in some toto genere different way, so I am confused why you ignored the real content of my responses.

My definition of value, is Moorean—not subjective. — Bob Ross

Its not Moorean, its incomplete and ill defined. As such its left up to the subject to fill in what value means. Pointing to being does not absolve you from the fact that value is clearly defined in many theories, including in my theory.

By your reasoning, being is also subject; which is clearly false. — Bob Ross

No, its not. Being is a slice of existence. The primitiveness is in describing 'existence' vs 'non-existence'. Its an abstract of something you experience, therefore you must experience it to know it. How you experience 'being' is subjective, but the term is not.

Value: A designation of importance.

This is no different than defining it as ‘value: a designation of worth’. — Bob Ross

No, its very different. Because I proceed to explain that it can be quantified in a moral sense. Moral value is a moral designation of worth. I feel you're just being stubborn here Bob.

Likewise, value isn’t a designation: it would be, by your definition here, equal to importance. Something designates value, value is not some sort of designation itself; just like how someone can designate tasks, but a task isn’t defined as a designation <of something>. — Bob Ross

Sure, if designation bothers you, replace the word with 'attribute'. We can adjust this until we find something that objectively satisifies. Value is a way to ascribe importance to something. I demonstrate in the moral sense what is more important; more existence. And when I can measure existence, I can measure which state of existence has more value. Its a complete set of definitions all the way down. If you want to hash out word choices in the definitions, we can have that discussion. I can with my theory. We can't with yours because there's nothing but a circular reference of words without non-referenced meaning.

Irregardless, I am confused why you are insisting on disregarding the whole theory, in the sense of not even granting my definition of value for the sake of the conversation, when you clearly understand that my use of ‘value’ is ‘to have worth’; and you know darn well what ‘to have worth’ means, and that it is not itself subjective. — Bob Ross

No Bob, I don't know what it means to 'have worth' besides a reference to value and good, both of which have no other meaning then a reference back to each other. Clearly defining your term so I can understand what it is, is your job in your theory. Define an objective term that does not depend on my innately knowing its meaning. I sympathize with its difficulty greatly. I've tried to assist by giving definitions of value, and trying to ask for clarification where I see it lacking. At the end of the day, if you see something and others don't, you have to keep trying different words and definitions until it can convey an accurate and rational meaning for others to clearly understand. I will always attempt my best to give you a fair analysis and am always open to any changes needed to make it work. But you have to trust me when I say, "I don't know what it means." after all of these attempts.

Try to see it from my viewpoint. You've done this: good = value = worth. And when I've asked you to give an objective definition of any of them, you just refer to another word that has no objective definition. When I ask you to try, you tell me its unanalyzable. Meaning we're just saying noises in the air without any meaning. As such, I'm left to fit in my own subjective idea of what good, value, and worth is, because we have no objective designation.

Without a clear objective definition to value, worth, or good, there's no point moving on to the rest of the theory. Its Gandalfian philosophy at that point. We can continue to talk about what Gandalf would do in a situation, but its pointless because Gandalf at his core, is a fictional character. More importantly, because your meaning of value is so central to your theory, I can't rationally discuss anything higher that uses value. Its a key part of your theory that needs fixing.

People use the term ‘value’ exactly, by-at-large, how I am using it: I am not using it in some generic different way, so I am confused why you ignored the real content of my responses. — Bob Ross

Bob, you're using is subjectively because I still, after all we've discussed, honestly, without playing games, have no idea what it means. If you have to tell me, "I know you know it," and the other person is honestly telling you, "No I don't", then you need to clarify your definition.

There are only a few reasons why a person cannot clearly define a term. 1. They don't know how. In which case, it needs work. 2. They know that if they clearly define a term, it will expose a weakness in their overall argument. Poorly defined words are the haven of weak philosophies. Again, this means it needs work. It does not mean that the other person who is reading and asking for an objective and clear definition of your term is at fault.

Please try again Bob. And if after trying again you cannot refine your definition any further, then I have the rational justification to say its incomplete and move on.

Let’s take a different approach, because I think our heads are in totally different spaces; and that’s fine, but we need to converge somewhere if we want to progress. So, let’s talk about being.

My challenge to you is simple: (I want you to) define ‘being’ without circularly referencing it. Fair enough?

No, its not. Being is a slice of existence.

Do you see how you just circularly defined ‘being’ by referencing it as ‘existence’ in its definition? So this fails to beat my challenge.

Besides that, there’s just a couple clarification questions I have about your response.

No, its very different. Because I proceed to explain that it can be quantified in a moral sense.

1. That value can be quantified, does not entail any sort of definition of value itself. Are you asking for how, in my theory, we quantify value, or what value actually is itself?

2. When you say it is ‘very different’, are you referring to that you explain how to quantify value, or that you don’t think ‘importance’ and ‘worth’ are circular references to ‘value’?

Its not Moorean, its incomplete and ill defined

Moore held that goodness, and ‘good’, is undefinable, unanalyzable, and primitive. Your objections to my view, hold the same to Moore’s arguments. I am just noting that it is not uncommon in metaethics for moral realists to consider goodness primitive in this sense without conceding it is subjective.

I am going to stop here, because I want to see how you define ‘being’ without circularly referencing (: , and we will go from there.

Bob

I don't like how I've made some key points about your theory, and this seems to have been ignored and turned back around to me. This is your theory Bob. I'm not the reason why its not working.

My challenge to you is simple: (I want you to) define ‘being’ without circularly referencing it. Fair enough? — Bob Ross

I'll try, but its irrelevant to our conversation. Even if we cannot define being without circularity, that does not mean this applies to value. There are clear definitions of value that are out there, including my own. You'll need to first demonstrate why each of these clearly defined terms of value fail before you have a reason to declare its unanalyzable.

No, its not. Being is a slice of existence.

Do you see how you just circular defined ‘being’ referencing ‘existence’ in its definition? So this fails to beat my challenge. — Bob Ross

This isn't circular at all. A slice of existence is a discrete section of existence. Circular would be if I said 'being' is defined as 'narsh' and when you asked what narsh is, I replied with 'being'. That's what your definitions are coming across as right now to me. good = value = worth, with no other explanation.

There are several other philosophers who have also defined being. https://www.britannica.com/topic/Being

But once again, this is irrelevant and coming across as a dodge. You need to define value. You need to demonstrate why value is unanalyzable when other people clearly don't think this is the case. 'Being' is not going to help with that.

Are you asking for how, in my theory, we quantify value, or what value actually is itself? — Bob Ross

I'm asking you what moral value is, and how we can objectively determine it. And yes, if its an objective value, then some things are going to have more moral value than others. Murdering a baby vs saving a baby for example. This is not complicated, and I feel like you're trying to make it so because you're realizing you don't have an answer.

When you say it is ‘very different’, are you referring to that you explain how to quantify value, or that you don’t think ‘importance’ and ‘worth’ are circular references to ‘value’? — Bob Ross

Read the entire reply again please. I'm pointing out how I define value, morality, then quantify moral value. Good is 'what should be', more existence is more good, or moral value. This allows us to compare two potential states of existence, and determine which one we should pick, which is essentially a moral evaluation and value selection.

Moore held that goodness, and ‘good’, is undefinable, unanalyzable, and primitive. — Bob Ross

Well mine and several other theories of morality don't. To prove this is true, they need to explain why other moral attempts to do so are wrong. At the least, mine.

I am just noting that it is not uncommon in metaethics for moral realists to consider goodness primitive in this sense without conceding it is subjective. — Bob Ross

Its irrelevant if its common. That doesn't make it right. Your argument devolves into subjective morality because your only answer so far as to how we can objectively determine it is through majority rule, or expert rule. Arguments by majority or authority are not objective, they're just passed down from on high. We need the method. If you don't have a method, that's fine. But say so and lets be done with it.

Bob, I feel like you dodged trying to define value again, and I've felt like you've been doing this the entire time. Enough. Tell me you have a definition we can objectively verify, or that we don't. Explain to me why your definitions and moral theory demonstrate that my definitions and moral theory are wrong.

Philosophim, I know you think you are providing key counter-points to my theory: but you are not at all. You don’t understand the theory completely yet, and this the source of your counter-points. I think you appreciate, even if you disagree, this, because I have, from your perspective, done the same with your theory.

Minds are like ship docks/ports, ideas are like barrels of merchandise, and explanations are like ships that carry those barrels to another ship dock.

We may completely understand our own theory, but sometimes it is difficult to get those barrels to another dock. I have sent all my finest ships, and none of docked at your shores. Therefore, I need to try different avenues of explanation, because I know you aren’t quite getting the theory.

Forget about value for now. Let’s talk about being. Why?

Because you accept that being is unanalyzable and primitive; but you just don’t completely realize it yet. I think I can convey the idea of a primitive concept with being, if I am allowed to smooth out some of the wrinkles in your analysis of being. Then, I think I can at least convey how value is analogous. That’s the vessel I am going to try, because nothing else has worked.

So I want to emphasize that I am not ignoring your responses: they are just completely missing the mark; and we need to take things more systematically and try other ways of explanation.

So, let’s talk about your definition of being: “a slice of existence”. Philosophim, are you telling me ‘existence’ is different than ‘being’?

A slice of existence is a discrete section of existence.

This is a circular definition, because you are using the term to define it. I can swap ‘existence’ with ‘being’ and lose no meaning: “a slice of being is a discrete section of being”.

Circular would be if I said 'being' is defined as 'narsh' and when you asked what narsh is, I replied with 'being'.

That is exactly what you just did!!!! You just said “being” is “a slice of being”. Unless you are really about to tell me that “existence” is different than “being”, which is obviously isn’t, then you are using the term in its definition.

We need to address your definition here, because if we cannot agree that you are defining it circularly, insofar as it circularly references itself in its own definition, then we are hopeless for any discussion about value.

There are several other philosophers who have also defined being

No philosopher has ever been able to define being validly: it is the grand-daddy of primitive concepts; and the vast majority of philosophers understand this.

Your link didn’t contain any definition of being that was not circular; and some of them weren’t even definitions, but an analysis of different ways we can separate being.

Ok, so either give me (1) a different definition which actually defines 'being' without circularly referencing it, (2) explain how 'existence' is different than 'being', or (3) concede it is undefinable without circular reference. This isn't a gotcha, by the way: I need us to get on this common ground if we are to have any hope of progressing our conversation.

I look forward to you responding,
Bob

That is exactly what you just did!!!! You just said “being” is “a slice of being”. Unless you are really about to tell me that “existence” is different than “being”, which is obviously isn’t, then you are using the term in its definition. — Bob Ross

No, I didn't say that being was a slice of being. I said it was a slice of existence. Existence being defined as 'everything' and being as 'a part'. Its the difference between amorphous existence, and discrete existence. Being = discrete existence. Amorphous and indiscrete existence isn't being. That's at least how I define it.

Thus it is not circular. You cannot define being as a slice of being. While being can have a further slice of being, that fact doesn't explain what being actually is. You can only use such a sentence after you understand that being = discrete existence, not before.

Alright Bob, if you genuinely think your theory has legs, keep trying. I'll give it a fair shake if you think I'm missing something.

I see where the confusion lies: you don’t think ‘being’ = ‘existence’.

I disagree, but that is despite the point. My challenge needs to be semantically refurbished, then: I challenge you to define ‘existence’ (i.e., ‘to exist’) without using it in its own definition. Fair enough?

You took a jab at it here:

Existence being defined as 'everything' and being as 'a part'.

Ok, so you define ‘existence’ as ‘everything’. This doesn’t work and is circular.

If ‘existence’ = ‘everything’, then:

1. ‘to be’ = ‘to exist’ = ‘to be everything’. the latter presupposes a concept of ‘to be’, ‘to exist’, which was supposed to be being defined.
2. “this exists” = “this is everything”. Same problem as #1, and it makes no sense.
2. “that should not exist” = “that should not be everything”. this clearly makes no sense, and same problem as #1.
3. “discrete existence” = “everything that exists discreetly”. Same problem as #1.
4. “amorphous existence” = “everything that exists amorphously”. Same problem as #1.
5. etc…

Remember, if you say X = Y, then I can substitute Y for X. If I say that ‘to be flub’ = ‘to be red’, then ‘this is red’ = ‘this is flub’. Of course, to be charitable, one may have to linguistically refurbish a bit of the language to make it grammatical; but that doesn’t help your case here.

If ‘to be’ = ‘to be everything’, which is what you are claiming by ‘existence’ = ‘everything’, then we can abstract this to a definition:

‘X’ = ‘X + Y’.

See how it is circular? And how you provided no clarification nor definition of what it means ‘to be’ or ‘to exist’ by noting ‘existence’ = ‘everything’?

Bob

You took a jab at it here:

Existence being defined as 'everything' and being as 'a part'.

Ok, so you define ‘existence’ as ‘everything’. This doesn’t work and is circular. — Bob Ross

No, that was not a formal definition. If you wish that, I will.

We observe the world in discrete identities. A discrete identity which is confirmed to match our perceptions (I claim that is an apple, and that is actually apple), is being. Existence as a whole, is the sum of all discrete identities observed and unobserved. As such, it is an abstract logical concept.

This requires me to amend being, as I had not formally defined existence. So a discrete identity is existence, but unless it is confirmed that the perceived identity is not contradicted by real application, it is not being.

My point is I can construct being as a definition without circularity if I really want to do so. If you need circularity for your definitions, its a fallacy and an indicator that your logic isn't on the correct path. Words represent concepts, not other words. If you have a synonym, there's still an underlying concept the two words are representing. If there is no concept, the word means nothing.

Philosophim, that's the challenge: can you provide a definition of 'existence' (of 'to exist', 'to be', etc.) which is not circular?

So far, you have failed to do so: you saying "I can" doesn't beat the challenge: you have to provide the definition.

Your entire schema that uses 'existence' is circular with respect to the definition of that word: nothing you have provided in your analysis has amended the issues I spoke of in my response.

I am going to tell you right now, you can't do it. That's why I am challenging you to do it, so I can break you out of this illusion that only concepts with analyzable definitions are valid definitions. Some concepts are primitive, and are not non-circularly definable; and they still valid.

So, what is your definition of 'existence' (i.e., 'to exist')?

So far, you have failed to do so: you saying "I can" doesn't beat the challenge: you have to provide the definition. — Bob Ross

I did. I also gave the definition of 'existence' up above. Did you read through the whole thing carefully? If you believe I've committed circularity please point out specifically where. And circular reasoning is never valid Bob. If the only way we can define the word being is with circular reasoning, then we throw it out. We don't just use a fallacious definition.