An Analysis of Goodness and The Good

Bob Ross

Upon further contemplation, the following is my analysis of [the property of] goodness and The Good:

Goodness is identical to ‘having value’; for if it is not, then it completely loses its traditional meaning: it turns traditional studies—such as ethics, axiology, and pragmatism—into sciences of what is and not what should be. Valuebleness is not, however, identical to oughtness; but only by way of value does one determine what ought to be.

Goodness can be deployed in a twofold manner: in itself or for something else. The former is intrinsic (goodness), and the latter is extrinsic (goodness); and, as such, the former is intrinsic valuableness, and the latter is extrinsic valuableness. Intrinsic goodness is legitimately called moral goodness and is the subject matter (along with other related dilemmas and topics) of ethics proper: ethics, as a science, must be objective—for it cannot be a viable study if each member is studying something else than another (and this is exactly what happens if the study itself were subjective). Any moral anti-realist position, then, although it is an objective study, is not ethics proper because, as a study of psychology or nihilism, it is a study of what is and not what should be—i.e., moral anti-realism is about extrinsic goodness, which is a study that is itself objective insofar as it pertains to (objectively) how well a thing suits a (subjective) purpose (e.g., the clock is good if it sufficiently tells the time, etc.) but ‘good’, in this sense, is subjectively conditioned and thusly is not objective itself (e.g., the clock being good is, in the previous sense, relative to a subjective purpose of telling the time, etc.). Moral anti-realism only relates to morality insofar as it negates it.

What can be predicated as morally good, then, is what can be said to have intrinsic value; and intrinsic value is value a ‘thing’ has in itself. To determine extrinsic value, is a matter of tracing the value to the “thing’s” (inter-)subjective (literal or theoretical) source—e.g., if one needs/wants something to tell the time, then a clock is really good (for this [subjective] purpose); whereas, to determine intrinsic value is a matter of analyzing how much, if at all, a ‘thing’ demands value. Intrinsic value is value which is innately insisted upon by the (objective) ‘thing’, and is not mere value dependent on a subject’s interpretation of it.

Having intrinsic value should not be confused with treating something like it has intrinsic value: one can treat anything just like they would if it actually had value in itself, but this does not make it so. Similarly, it is common to conflate intrinsic value with that which is done for its own sake (e.g., aristotle thinks that ‘flourishing/happiness’ [i.e., eudamonia] is intrinsically valuable [i.e.., is morally good] because it is the ultimate good which we all strive for, and being such is not done for the sake of something else [but, rather, for its own sake]): one can do something for its own sake as a matter of a non-objective (conative or cognitive) disposition, which would have its source in extrinsic value—it cannot be intrinsic value if the value is dependent on a subject’s evaluation of it. Hence, it cannot be that ‘intrinsic value’ = ‘something done for its own sake’. For example, I can dedicate my whole life to the maximization of the creation of pizzas, and, as such, create pizzas for the sole sake of creating them (i.e., for their own sake); but this surely does not make the creation of pizzas intrinsically valuable.

Instead, intrinsic value is value demanded by the ‘thing’ in virtue of its nature (and not, I should be clear, its ability to voice itself). A great example is pain: pain has intrinsic value (in the sense of avoiding it) insofar as one can say or feel that “avoiding pain is not valuable” but when one is put in a state of serious pain there is an innate insistence, from the nature of pain, that demands its avoidance to be valued. It is hard, in an active state of pain, to actually believe that the avoidance of it has no value: this kind of demand from the nature of the ‘thing’ is what I mean by ‘intrinsic value’.

There are two types of intrinsic value: negative and positive. The former is value in its negation, whereas the latter is value in its presence. A good example of negative intrinsic value, is the avoidance of pain; and positive intrinsic value, is the obtainment of pleasure.

Pain and pleasure, however, are not the only intrinsically valuable states. So are emotions (e.g., anger, fear, happiness, joy, anxiety, etc.); states of peace, love, hate, beauty, etc.; and, ultimately, the state of eudamonia (i.e., a state of persistent and supreme flourishing and happiness) and decadence (i.e., its negatively, intrinsically valuable counter-part). Most intrinsically valuable states come in pairs (of negative and positive value), such as pain ↔ pleasure, but they are not real counter-parts; e.g., the absence of pain is not really pleasure and vice-versa, the absence of decadence is not itself a state of flourishing, etc. The positively, intrinsically valuable state is always more valuable because it is always more valuable then the bare state of the negation of the negatively, intrinsically valuable state (e.g., the bare absence of pain does not itself innately pressure as much as the positive state of pleasure).

The most positively, intrinsically valuable state is eudamonia because it demands, by its own nature, the most recognition in it being present. It is easy for anyone with sufficiently capable rational capacities to understand this, when they are in the state; but not so much when they are not. People often cannot see what lies beyond the pleasures they chase; but there is no real doubt in a rational mind when in a state of eudamonia (or something closely resembling it) that it innately pressures the person into positively valuing it—independently of what they may feel or believe about it.

Eudamonia is an interesting state, because it has communal, inter-dependencies which are required for one to achieve it in a maximal sense—e.g., a person cannot, no matter if they are a psychopath or ordinary citizen, achieve a maximal state of eudamonia if everyone else around them is tremendously degenerating. Thusly, the most (positively) intrinisically valuable state is universalized states of eudamonia (i.e., universal flourishing and deep happiness); and this is ‘The Good’.

180 Proof

Thusly, the most (positively) intrinisically valuable state is universalized states of eudamonia (i.e., universal flourishing and deep happiness); and this is ‘The Good’. — Bob Ross

Given this statement, what is your question?

Leontiskos

The end of human life, the human good, is happiness.* But happiness is the human good; it is not goodness simpliciter.

* Cf. Nicomachean Ethics I.iv; Summa Theologiae I-II.1 & 2

Bob Ross

↪180 Proof

Not all OP's are a question. I am just curious was people's thoughts are on my position. Do you have any thoughts? I am guessing a lot :wink:

Bob Ross

↪Leontiskos

What is, according to Aristotle, goodness simpliciter, then? I guess I didn't grasp that when I read it.

Unless by this you mean that the property of goodness is not identical to 'being in a state of eudamonia', which I completely agree with.

180 Proof

Do you have any thoughts? — Bob Ross

At this point only a few of my own ... from a 2023 thread Is "good" indefineable? ...

https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/comment/778879

and also from one our previous discussions:

some varied (modern) readings:

• On the Genealogy of Morals, F. Nietzsche
• Human Nature and Conduct, J. Dewey
• The Sovereignty of Good, I. Murdoch
• Reasons and Persons, D. Parfit
• Natural Goodness, P. Foot
• Creating Capabilities, M. Nussbaum — 180 Proof

Count Timothy von Icarus

↪Bob Ross

Goodness can be deployed in a twofold manner: in itself or for something else. The former is intrinsic (goodness), and the latter is extrinsic (goodness); and, as such, the former is intrinsic valuableness, and the latter is extrinsic valuableness. Intrinsic goodness is legitimately called moral goodness and is the subject matter (along with other related dilemmas and topics) of ethics proper: ethics, as a science, must be objective—for it cannot be a viable study if each member is studying something else than another (and this is exactly what happens if the study itself were subjective).

Since you seem to be building off Aristotle you might look closely at this part. The idea that "objectivity approaches truth at the limit," or that "x in-itself is what it is without relation to some knower," is a fairly modern invention. I don't think it is going to tend to play nicely with ancient and medieval ethics. For Aristotle and later Aristotlean's like St. Thomas, things are defined by their relations to one another, such that "in-itselfness" cannot be the gold standard for knowledge.

The ancients and medievals were concerned with absolute good, rather than what we would tend to think of as "objective good," today. The absolute, to be truly absolute, must include both appearances and reality, the relative and the in-itself. One reading of Plato is that only the Good is good "in-itself." When we move to applying the good to the world of appearances, wherein lies all human ethical decisions, we have moved to the realm of relative good (forms might also be said to be good in-themselves in a different, more complicated way).

So consider what Aristotle says about human telos in Book X of the Ethics. He seems to have a lot in common with Plato here. The highest human good is contemplation because it is human reason that is the most divine part of the person. This is a reaching out to the Absolute, rather than an attempt to locate the "in-itself goodness," of things, which is going to be impossible.

Only an undivided noetic grasp of the Good gets at the Good in-itself. Words, human discursive reasoning, etc. is essentially processual, meaning its subject is not present to us "all at once," and so grasping the Good in this way relativizes. Likewise, words point to relations, to appearances. Thus, we can only speak of relative good. This is why Plato points to the historical figure of Socrates, the good man, rather than attempting to answer Galucon's question about "why would we ever prefer to be the man who is truly just but who is punished and denigrated rather than the man who merely appears just and is rewarded and celebrated?" And I think this grounds Eckhart's view of the truly just man as "becoming justice itself."

However, this does not entail any sort of all encompassing moral relativism. Ethics certainly is relative, based on the role one is in, one's culture, etc. Yet the Good still grounds it. It's sort of like how one cannot point to the "objective," "in themselves differences" between men and women. Men and women always exist within a culture that shapes how any differences between the sexes manifests. The range of possible contexts for these differences to manifest in is essentially limitless. However, this doesn't mean there are no true differences either. The absolute view includes all such possible contexts, rather than trying to reduce them out of the equation.

For St. Thomas and later Aristotlean's only God (Being itself) has substantive Good. You can get this from readings of Plato as well. It's less clear in Aristotle but Book X seems to point in the same direction (Aquinas' commentary on book X is interesting).

Eudamonia is an interesting state, because it has communal, inter-dependencies which are required for one to achieve it in a maximal sense—e.g., a person cannot, no matter if they are a psychopath or ordinary citizen, achieve a maximal state of eudamonia if everyone else around them is tremendously degenerating. Thusly, the most (positively) intrinisically valuable state is universalized states of eudamonia (i.e., universal flourishing and deep happiness); and this is ‘The Good’.

The opening parts of Axel Honneth's Freedom's Right has a really good summary of this sort of social freedom and how it interacts with other sorts of freedom, and the connection between freedom and flourishing. This area is the core focus on Hegel's Philosophy of Right, which is actually fairly straightforward as far as Hegel's writing goes.

And if the good for man involved a social element, the individual cannot be the sole measure for even relative good.

Philosophim

Hello again Bob! Its good to see this theory put into one place. I wanted to give others a chance to reply to it before I dug in. I want to focus on what I see as the main question your theory needs to answer before anything else can be addressed.

Linking goodness with value seems straight forward. But then this leads to the question "What is value?" Normally it is living things that give 'value' to other things. For your purposes, this would be 'extrinsic' value. A great example would be the value of two diamonds. One is worth $50 while the other is worth $100 in a particular area. Of course, in a different area, they could be valued at different amounts. The way we determine value is 'evaluation'. In this case again, this is extrinsic, and clear.

But if value is determined by other living things, how do we find intrinsic value? What you're claiming is similar to the idea that that some diamond has an innate value of 25$, no matter what other people are willing to pay for it. That seems at odds with the notion of value. But you seem comfortable with the idea that people can evaluate the value of something differently from what its intrinsic value is. I'm not saying its not possible, but how can we measure intrinsic value and separate this from a measurement of extrinsic value?

You can do this with your example of a clock. Someone can value the clock because it tells time, while someone else could place zero value on the clock because its ugly, and they have a way to tell time already. Clearly this is extrinsic value. But then how do we objectively determine the intrinsic value of the clock? Finishing this example would be helpful.

to determine intrinsic value is a matter of analyzing how much, if at all, a ‘thing’ demands value. — Bob Ross

What is your meaning of 'demand'? How does a clock demand? Can this be described using a different set of words or phrases that avoids personification? I know we had these questions in another thread, and I was curious if given some time, you've been able to construct new answers or approaches. And if there is nothing new to add, I'll simply bow out and let you handle other questions. :)

Leontiskos

Unless by this you mean that the property of goodness is not identical to 'being in a state of eudamonia', which I completely agree with. — Bob Ross

Yes, that is the most important takeaway.

What is, according to Aristotle, goodness simpliciter, then? I guess I didn't grasp that when I read it. — Bob Ross

When thinking specifically about Aristotle, he rejected Plato's notion of The Good and tended to see goodness simpliciter as a logical, largely contentless predicate. He thought one always had to consider the context when using the word 'good', and that any usage which lacks a context is misguided.

Metaphysician Undercover

Goodness is identical to ‘having value’... — Bob Ross

The problem with this perspective can be found through reference to Aristotle, as the others have indicated. "Value" is relative, and it is determined in relation to a further end. So if something has value, it is apprehended as the means to an end. You go to work for the sake of earning money, for the sake of buying things, for the sake of this or that want, or need, etc., etc.. Aristotle noticed that this cannot go on as an infinite regress so he said that there must be an ultimate end. Therefore he proposed happiness as that ultimate end, which is desired only for the sake of itself.

To explain the problem now, the relative values, as means to ends, are validated in relation to the ends which they are needed for. Without the end which a thing is given value for, as the means to that end, the thing on its own cannot be said to have any value. Its value exists only in relation to the end which it is useful for. The ultimate end, proposed as happiness, has no such thing which it is useful for, or else it would not be the ultimate end. Therefore it cannot be validated as a value. If it has nothing which it is useful toward, it cannot have any value. So if goodness is defined in reference to the end, instead of the means, it must be defined by something other than "value", because value is what defines the means.

Bob Ross

↪180 Proof

The main point of disagreement (between us), then, would be that I don't think that the negatively, intrinsically valuable (such as 'harm' that you refer to) is more valuable, when comparing equal or unequal 'amounts', than the positively, intrinsically valuable; because the positive counter-part includes the absence of those which are negatively valuable and provide positive value itself.

The eradication of serious and significant pain or harm is implied in a state of persistent flourishing, for example.

I merely think that you stop too short with setting your ideal as the elimination of negatively valued 'things', when the ultimate goal should be to go beyond mere eradication thereof to positively valued 'things'.

Bob Ross

↪Count Timothy von Icarus

In terms of the invalidity of ‘in-itself’, I just don’t buy that we can’t understand what things are in-themselves conditionally: ‘phenomena’ as it was before Kant butchered it.

In terms of grounding “Good” in the Absolute, there’s quite a few things that grab my attention:

1. The Good is not the same thing as goodness. I think Aristotle didn’t even notice this, and that’s why the analysis is so muddy.

2. This would be tantamount to claiming that what can be predicated as (morally) ‘good’, is what exists; because ‘the absolute’ refers to what exists as it is beyond any change (or perhaps appearances, depending on the view): this says nothing about what ought to be. It transforms ethics into something it is not: a study of what is.

3. Saying the Absolute, God, “grounds The Good” is vague and unhelpful (without further elaboration). What is goodness? And why and how can God be predicated to have it? In virtue of what makes this predication valid?

Bob

Bob Ross

↪Philosophim

Great questions, Philosophim!

In light of our conversations, I have been trying to come up with different ways to express it; just to try to convey it to you, and I don’t think I have found a better way to explain it. Nevertheless, I will try again; and even if I don’t manage to get the point across to you, then it will still be beneficial to this thread to answer your questions.

Like I stated in our previous conversation, the concept of ‘value’ to me is primitive and absolutely simple—like ‘being’, ‘space’, ‘time’, ‘true’, ‘false’, etc.—and, consequently, has most of its meaning through intuition, experience, and action: NOT explication. The best I can say is that ‘value’ is ‘worth’, wholly admitting this is circular.

Now, because the concept of value is primitive, it does not follow that we cannot analyze how ‘things’ can be valued and what has value—but, merely, what the concept of value means is off limits to proper explication.

How things can be valued, in principle, is two-fold: either (1) the value of a thing is bestowed upon it by a subject or (2) it has it itself. You seem to think that only #1 is possible, but I think both are. The only real way to convey either is through example, so let me use the clock one you used:

You can do this with your example of a clock. Someone can value the clock because it tells time, while someone else could place zero value on the clock because its ugly, and they have a way to tell time already. Clearly this is extrinsic value. But then how do we objectively determine the intrinsic value of the clock? Finishing this example would be helpful.

You are right that this is a great example of extrinsic value, and note that ‘value’ did not need to be explicated here; as one would is sufficiently experienced will know exactly what is being conveyed here with the ‘value’ of this clock.

The problem is that I cannot ‘finish’ this example, by providing how the clock has intrinsic value, because it cannot have it. A clock simply does not have this kind of ability to ‘demand’ to be valued. A great example we have discussed before, is pain.

I think, upon closer examination, it seems as though only (metaphysically possible) states of a subject are capable of this sort of innate insistence; but I am open to the idea that there may be other things which possess it.

What is your meaning of 'demand'? How does a clock demand?

You are using a bad example for illustrating intrinsic value: that example only clearly demonstrates extrinsic value. A clock, just like a rock, cannot demand any sort of value.

The best example I can think of, of which none others will make sense if a person cannot grasp this one, is pain. Let me take one more jab at conveying it to you.

What I think you are saying, is that when in pain the valuing of the negation of that pain is solely the subject’s cognitive or conative evaluation of it—I think this is mistaken. Perhaps if I can break you out of that line of thinking, then you will catch at least a glimpse of what I am trying to convey (:

If a person completely believes and desires that pain has no value and you are right that value is purely subjective judgments, then even if they are in tremendous pain the pain will not be have any value; but, if you can envision a person which, in tremendous pain, still appreciates the value of avoiding pain despite not believing and desiring it to have no value, then you have contradicted your own point: the pain must have value independent of the desires and beliefs of the person.

That’s the best I can do to help you see what I mean.

Bob

Bob Ross

↪Leontiskos

I see. For me, I think that goodness is identical to 'having value'.

Bob Ross

↪Metaphysician Undercover

My analysis doesn't determine what has intrinsic value based off of what is done for its own sake:

Having intrinsic value should not be confused with treating something like it has intrinsic value: one can treat anything just like they would if it actually had value in itself, but this does not make it so. Similarly, it is common to conflate intrinsic value with that which is done for its own sake (e.g., aristotle thinks that ‘flourishing/happiness’ [i.e., eudamonia] is intrinsically valuable [i.e.., is morally good] because it is the ultimate good which we all strive for, and being such is not done for the sake of something else [but, rather, for its own sake]): one can do something for its own sake as a matter of a non-objective (conative or cognitive) disposition, which would have its source in extrinsic value—it cannot be intrinsic value if the value is dependent on a subject’s evaluation of it. Hence, it cannot be that ‘intrinsic value’ = ‘something done for its own sake’. For example, I can dedicate my whole life to the maximization of the creation of pizzas, and, as such, create pizzas for the sole sake of creating them (i.e., for their own sake); but this surely does not make the creation of pizzas intrinsically valuable.

180 Proof

I don't think that the negatively, intrinsically valuable (such as 'harm' that you refer to) is more valuable ... — Bob Ross

I neither claim nor imply this. How do you get that from my 'preventing or reducing disvalue'?

Philosophim

In light of our conversations, I have been trying to come up with different ways to express it; just to try to convey it to you, and I don’t think I have found a better way to explain it. Nevertheless, I will try again; — Bob Ross

Not a worry and I appreciate the attempt! I may also repeat myself a bit, so feel free at any of these points 'Agree to disagree".

Now, because the concept of value is primitive, it does not follow that we cannot analyze how ‘things’ can be valued and what has value—but, merely, what the concept of value means is off limits to proper explication. — Bob Ross

A job of philosophy is to take what cannot be yet explained, and put it into words that consistently make sense and can be used rationally. When we can't do so, its 'giving up'. Its no different to me then if people stated, "We can't know what knowledge is," or "We can't know morality". If value is goodness, and we can't know value, we can't know what goodness is.

Further, if a word is mostly understood in terms of "intuition, experience, and action" this is a subjective term. To be objective is to have a clear term that can be verified independently apart from personal experience. I know you claim that this idea of morality is objective, but I'm not seeing any evidence that this is the case.

Now, because the concept of value is primitive, it does not follow that we cannot analyze how ‘things’ can be valued and what has value—but, merely, what the concept of value means is off limits to proper explication. — Bob Ross

This is a claim that must be proven however. If someone said, "Here is my definition of value that is clearly explicated," do you have a proof that this is impossible? I'm not seeing your claim that value cannot be explicated as anything more than an opinion. Claiming to invalidate all possible definitions of value is a tall order that requires some major proof. There is no proof of this here, which means that someone who comes along and claims they have a definition, automatically competes with your claim at minimum, equally.

How things can be valued, in principle, is two-fold: either (1) the value of a thing is bestowed upon it by a subject or (2) it has it itself. You seem to think that only #1 is possible, but I think both are. — Bob Ross

Its not that I think only #1 is possible. Its that you have not demonstrated any way we can know that #2 is possible. We can't make the mistake that just because I can string two words together, that the concept necessarily exists. That's the unicorn problem. I take a horse, I take a horn, and combine the concepts and 'unicorn'. But does a unicorn actually exist? No. "Intrinsic value" is the combination of intrinsic, and value. We can combine the words, but there's no evidence such a thing exists. That's what you have to prove.

You are right that this is a great example of extrinsic value, and note that ‘value’ did not need to be explicated here; as one would is sufficiently experienced will know exactly what is being conveyed here with the ‘value’ of this clock. — Bob Ross

It doesn't have to be explicated because we know what external value is. We can explicate it easily as well. "External value is the attribute a living being gives something else that confers some benefit to the living being and its wants and/or needs." But here's the thing. If "internal" value isn't real, then "external" value is redundant. Meaning that 'external value' just becomes value, and once again, we've explicated value clearly.

What I think you are saying, is that when in pain the valuing of the negation of that pain is solely the subject’s cognitive or conative evaluation of it—I think this is mistaken. — Bob Ross

This is because it is a knowable example we have of determining value. If there is an alternative way of determining value intrinsically, we need that method for me to be able to think in those terms.

If a person completely believes and desires that pain has no value and you are right that value is purely subjective judgments, then even if they are in tremendous pain the pain will not be have any value; but, if you can envision a person which, in tremendous pain, still appreciates the value of avoiding pain despite not believing and desiring it to have no value, then you have contradicted your own point: the pain must have value independent of the desires and beliefs of the person. — Bob Ross

I'm going to break this down a bit.

Assume that value is subjective.
If a person thinks an emotional state does not have value, then it will not have any value no matter how strong of an emotional state it is.
If however there is a person in tremendous pain who values pain, despite not valuing pain, its a contradiction.

I don't see how the above argument revokes that its subjective. Your conclusion is not a conclusion, but a premise which contradicts itself. Now if you meant, "They value avoiding pain, but don't value pain itself," this is not a contradiction, nor does it revoke the assumption that value is subjective.

Alright Bob, I hope I was able to clearly communicate my points here as well. Feel free to answer what you wish.

Bob Ross

↪180 Proof

In ethics, I think 'X is less harmful than Y' (or 'X is least harmful of all') is much less vague or arbitrary, therefore more reliably actionable, than "X is good"
...
Rather than "good", less bad – minimize ill-being (re: disvalues) for its own sake (like medicine or ecology) rather than tilting at the windmill of "well-being" (re: value, ideal)

It seems like you are anchoring your ethics in reducing harm, and not progressing towards flourishing.

Bob Ross

↪Philosophim

A job of philosophy is to take what cannot be yet explained, and put it into words that consistently make sense and can be used rationally. When we can't do so, its 'giving up'.

The job of philosophy is no doubt to provide analytical explication of things, but it is not meant to incessantly attempt at explicating things. If something has been determined, by analysis, as inexplicable (i.e., explicated as inexplicable), then one should not continue to try to explicate it (unless new evidence arises). Philosophy is not the study of delusionally trying to run through a concrete wall.

Its no different to me then if people stated, "We can't know what knowledge is," or "We can't know morality". If value is goodness, and we can't know value, we can't know what goodness is.

Not at all. There are good reasons to believe that some concepts are inexplicable, which is not to say we can’t know them.

Knowledge is not merely information which has been explicated: it is also the range of information implicated. You reject the idea of implicit knowledge: I don’t.

I think we can know just fine what ‘being’, ‘value’, etc. are even though we cannot explicate them properly.

Further, if a word is mostly understood in terms of "intuition, experience, and action" this is a subjective term.

I don’t know why you would believe this. We convey concepts to each other all the time implicitly (through action, experience, and intuition) and they are clearly not subjective. A 5 year old cannot explicate clearly a definition of a triangle, but definitely knows notionally what a triangle is.

To be objective is to have a clear term that can be verified independently apart from personal experience.

1. You can’t verify independently of your experience any terms—that’s impossible.

2. That definition includes inter-subjectivity in it, which demonstrates it is false.

3. The meaning of words are inter-subjectively defined, and are thusly not objective.

4. Concepts are objective, not words.

5. Objectivity is that which exists mind-independently.

I know you claim that this idea of morality is objective, but I'm not seeing any evidence that this is the case

What has intrinsic value, is a matter of objective inquiry: the truth of the matter is stance-independent. If I feel or believe as though something is intriniscally valuable, that doesn’t make it so. Intrinsic value is objective. Even if you don’t agree that anything has intrinsic value, I think you can appreciate that the inquiry would be objective.

If someone said, "Here is my definition of value that is clearly explicated," do you have a proof that this is impossible?

It isn’t going to be actually or logically impossible, and there is no definitive way to determine whether a concept is simple or simply misunderstood. Abductively, through the attempts to define it and failing to do so, one slowly understands better how primitive the concept is by way of how entrenched it is into all the other concepts one deploys to try and define it.

For example, how do you properly explicate the color green to a blind person? You can’t. “It’s a particular wavelength in light that one’s eyes interpret a particular way”: how does that explain what the color green looks like? It doesn’t.

The (phenomenal) color of green is not explicable whatsoever: it is shared conceptual through experience. You cannot give a definition of green that will adequately convey what it looks like. Does that mean the concept of green doesn’t make sense, or that you can’t know what green looks like (just because you can’t explicate it)? I would say no.

For you, either you (1) explicate the phenomenal color of green, or (2) you have to reject that you know what the color green looks like. There’s no definite proof that the color green can’t be explicated, but for those who know (implicitly) what it is (in terms of what it looks like), they understand what I mean.

Claiming to invalidate all possible definitions of value is a tall order that requires some major proof

It’s inductive: I don’t have to provide a proof such that it is impossible. Inductions don’t work like that.

There is no proof of this here, which means that someone who comes along and claims they have a definition, automatically competes with your claim at minimum, equally.

Prima facie, this is true. I would then demonstrate that either (1) they begged the question or (2) did not convey properly the concept. If you say “well, Bob, I can explicate what the color green looks like”. I would say “ok, let’s hear it”. You say “X”. Now, either X does define it (and I am wrong), X begs the question, or X doesn’t define what it looks like. Upon investigating and attempting to define what the color green looks like, coupled with my understanding of what it is (from experience), I eventually abductively conclude it cannot be properly defined (explicitly), and I am willing to bet that X is going to fall under one of the latter two options (and not the first).

Its that you have not demonstrated any way we can know that #2 is possible. We can't make the mistake that just because I can string two words together, that the concept necessarily exists. That's the unicorn problem. I take a horse, I take a horn, and combine the concepts and 'unicorn'. But does a unicorn actually exist? No. "Intrinsic value" is the combination of intrinsic, and value. We can combine the words, but there's no evidence such a thing exists. That's what you have to prove.

I have, with my pain example. That’s why I keep trying to get you to explain your take on the example. If we can’t converge on that, then there’s no hope.

Just like if we can’t converge on what the color green is, by way of our experience, then there’s no hope in coming to a conclusion on whether we can define it fully (explicitly).

"External value is the attribute a living being gives something else that confers some benefit to the living being and its wants and/or needs.”

I don’t find this to be an accurate definition, but that’s a minor quibble at this point.

If there is an alternative way of determining value intrinsically, we need that method for me to be able to think in those terms.

The other way, in addition to what I have already explained, is the idea that it is extrinsically motivating for subjects and does not arise out of a subject itself: https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/comment/894861 .

Assume that value is subjective.
If a person thinks an emotional state does not have value, then it will not have any value no matter how strong of an emotional state it is.
If however there is a person in tremendous pain who values pain, despite not valuing pain, its a contradiction.

I don't see how the above argument revokes that its subjective.

I was saying that IF you think that it is possible for the person to understand that the pain has value despite having no belief or desire that it is; then we have found common ground. If you do not, then it doesn’t help our conversation.

I am trying to dance our way into giving you the intuition. This is similar to debates between people about internal vs. external theories of motivation: one guy can’t see how someone can be motivated to do something without having a desire to do it, and the other can—they then spend days having the former convey the intuition to the latter, and usually to no avail.

Here’s the key question: can you see how pain an motivate someone to negate it despite them having any desire or belief to negate it? Or is that not something you can see happening?

They value avoiding pain, but don't value pain itself

To value avoiding pain, is to negatively value pain. Either way, I was talking about avoiding pain (if I have to choose).

Bob

Philosophim

If something has been determined, by analysis, as inexplicable (i.e., explicated as inexplicable), then one should not continue to try to explicate it — Bob Ross

No doubt, but you have not done this. And that's my issue. There's a lot of assertions and opinions, and inductions. That's not a solid analysis. If you're happy with this, that's fine, but as a philosophical proposal, its weak.

You reject the idea of implicit knowledge: I don’t. — Bob Ross

No. I don't reject this notion. We're talking about value, and you keep changing the subject. Why?

I don’t know why you would believe this. We convey concepts to each other all the time implicitly (through action, experience, and intuition) and they are clearly not subjective. A 5 year old cannot explicate clearly a definition of a triangle, but definitely knows notionally what a triangle is. — Bob Ross

No, that's not proven objective knowledge. Its assumed. You seem to be confusing assumptions, inductions, and general inclinations as proof. We can only put the 5 year old through tests to show that they can prove a triangle, because a triangle has very clearly explained rules. A triangle is 3 straight lines that connect at their ends. And if the 5 year old can't explicate it doesn't mean it can't be explicated. You seem to be saying that because you can't explicate value, it doesn't prove that others can't. That doesn't prove anything.

Claiming to invalidate all possible definitions of value is a tall order that requires some major proof

It’s inductive: I don’t have to provide a proof such that it is impossible. Inductions don’t work like that. — Bob Ross

Then the first person that shows a proof that it can be explicated wins. Or if they don't someone else creates a competing induction and we just decide to do based on which one we like more. That's again, subjective. There is no reason for anyone to accept your premises unless they feel like it.

You seem to confuse the idea that 'mind independent' means 'independent of minds'. No, it means that there is a rationality that holds true despite what other minds may feel. There is nothing rational that allows you rise above emotional feelings on this. 1+1=2 despite what we feel about it, or even if we agree with it because its a solid logical concept from beginning to end. Your whole argument feels like its a matter of faith instead of rationality.

If someone said, "Here is my definition of value that is clearly explicated," do you have a proof that this is impossible?

It isn’t going to be actually or logically impossible, and there is no definitive way to determine whether a concept is simple or simply misunderstood. Abductively, through the attempts to define it and failing to do so, one slowly understands better how primitive the concept is by way of how entrenched it is into all the other concepts one deploys to try and define it. — Bob Ross

So no. :)

There is no proof of this here, which means that someone who comes along and claims they have a definition, automatically competes with your claim at minimum, equally.

Prima facie, this is true. I would then demonstrate that either (1) they begged the question or (2) did not convey properly the concept. If you say “well, Bob, I can explicate what the color green looks like”. I would say “ok, let’s hear it”. — Bob Ross

But we're not talking about the color green. We're talking about value. And I did come along and give you a competing definition. So no hypotheticals are needed, why is my definition logically wrong?

If there is an alternative way of determining value intrinsically, we need that method for me to be able to think in those terms.

The other way, in addition to what I have already explained, is the idea that it is extrinsically motivating for subjects and does not arise out of a subject itself: — Bob Ross

Yeah, that's an odd way to remove desires from yourself and imprint them on other things. Things don't motivate us Bob. We motivate ourselves for things. Its why we all have different values for different feelings, states, and things.

I was saying that IF you think that it is possible for the person to understand that the pain has value despite having no belief or desire that it is; then we have found common ground. If you do not, then it doesn’t help our conversation. — Bob Ross

If the whole proof for intrinsic values rests on what I think, then this is not objective. This is just a conflict of opinions. I have no idea what you mean by a person valuing something and not valuing it at the same time beyond an colloquial expression. People value relief Bob. They value a life free of pain. Pain is only valuable if it helps us avoid and/or heal from injuries. A Masochist might actually value pain in itself, and purposefully injure themselves for it. The idea that we're all going to have the same outlook and value about pain doesn't work out in practice, and thus we have no common ground for intrinsic value.

Finally, pain can be defined objectively. If your nerves fire with a particular signal up to the brain, that's pain. How your brain interprets it and values it may be different. But the only thing intrinsic to pain, is the nerve interplay.

I am trying to dance our way into giving you the intuition. This is similar to debates between people about internal vs. external theories of motivation: one guy can’t see how someone can be motivated to do something without having a desire to do it, and the other can—they then spend days having the former convey the intuition to the latter, and usually to no avail. — Bob Ross

Again, this is all based on subjective experience then. An objective argument wouldn't need my understanding of the intuition. Using your example of green, there is a set wavelength of light that is green. That's the objective wavelength of light for green. How we see or interpret it is subjective, but that right there, is the intrinsic color of green. If you can put forward something similar for value, you'll have an objective argument. Until then, this is just a nice thought experiment but not a strong philosophical argument.

Bob Ross

↪Philosophim

I don’t see any way for our conversation to progress, because we keep dead-ending at the same spots, so I will just respond to the parts where I think I am adding to the conversation (instead of reiterating).

You use the term ‘objective’ in really nonsensical ways—e.g., ‘objective knowledge’, ‘objective definition’, ‘objective wavelength’, ‘objective argument’, etc. Sometimes its use is straight up incoherent, and other times it adds nothing to what you are saying.

I have already explicated clearly what objectivity is, and I think your position on it is wrong and confused.

Again, this is all based on subjective experience then. An objective argument wouldn't need my understanding of the intuition

An argument is an evidence-based proof; and can absolutely include intuitions in it. Arguments are not objective; but are hopefully rational. Likewise, experience is always used in arguments: there’s no such thing as an argument that is devoid of a posteriori content.

No, that's not proven objective knowledge.

“objective knowledge” is something you can say, but that doesn’t make it coherent. Knowledge is about information minds have, and has three main components: justification, belief, and truth. Refactor and create whatever epistemological theory you want (to accommodate for gettier cases and what not), but it will include these three (including yours that I remember from before). Truth is objective, the other two aren’t.

You are saying “mind-independently existent (or stance-independently true) [viz., objective] information that a mind has [viz., knowledge]”.

Using your example of green, there is a set wavelength of light that is green. That's the objective wavelength of light for green. How we see or interpret it is subjective, but that right there, is the intrinsic color of green.

You completely missed the point of the example, and failed to explicate what green looks like.

No. I don't reject this notion. We're talking about value, and you keep changing the subject. Why?

You rejected it many times in our older conversations about epistemology; and it was relevant to what you said, because by saying a concept is simple (and indefinable) is NOT to say that they cannot be known.

Finally, pain can be defined objectively. If your nerves fire with a particular signal up to the brain, that's pain.

This doesn’t completely define pain, because it does not define how it feels (phenomenologically). You can’t completely strip out the subject, Philosophim: it doesn’t work.

A Masochist might actually value pain in itself, and purposefully injure themselves for it.

Sure. We can talk about that, but it doesn’t negate the idea that pain has intrinsic value. There are fine lines between pleasure and pain for sure.

Yeah, that's an odd way to remove desires from yourself and imprint them on other things. Things don't motivate us Bob

I believe in external motivation; so I deny this. I think we can have reason which motivate us without us having any desire towards it. You are clearly a Humean, and there’s no easy way to find common ground on that.

And I did come along and give you a competing definition. So no hypotheticals are needed, why is my definition logically wrong?

With respect to #1, it is obvious that valuableness is not identical to ‘to ought to be’ by way of examples (of its valid use). For example, when one says “that diamond is worth $1500”, they are not commenting on whether it should exist per se but, rather, that it has a specific, quantitative worth. In short, it is impossible to convert quantitative values to the property of ‘to ought to be’. Only after a comparison of value, can one determine which things out of the things which have value should exist and, thusly, the two properties are not identical. — Bob Ross

You seem to confuse the idea that 'mind independent' means 'independent of minds'.

???

Cancer-independent is not identical to being independent of cancer?

No, it means that there is a rationality that holds true despite what other minds may feel.

Your “rationality” presupposes my use of objectivity; and that it is independent of desires is not enough: just because one believes something is the case, does not make it so.

Or if they don't someone else creates a competing induction and we just decide to do based on which one we like more

No, it is based off of what seems more correct—which one is more convincing. Just because you are not convinced, does not make this endeavor subjective: you have a tendency to do that.

Bob

180 Proof

It seems like you are anchoring your ethics in reducing harm, and not progressing towards flourishing. — Bob Ross

On the contrary, I propose that moral agents flourish to the degree effectively 'preventing and reducing harm and/or injustice' become habits. This form of moral naturalism I call aretaic disutilitarianism (i.e. agency-cultivating active opposition to both (agency-disabling) harms and injustices).

Metaphysician Undercover

My analysis doesn't determine what has intrinsic value based off of what is done for its own sake: — Bob Ross

Since value is relative, in the way I described, your discussion of "intrinsic value" doesn't make any sense. It's an oxymoron. Things like pain and pleasure do not have value, they would be better described as "invaluable", meaning beyond valuation, or impossible to value.

Do you see that "value" implies the ability to scale the worth of a thing relative to the worth of other things? The idea that things have "intrinsic value" would negate the idea that the thing's value is determined by the scale of worth. So this, "intrinsic value" cannot be "value" as we know it.

Philosophim

I don’t see any way for our conversation to progress, because we keep dead-ending at the same spots, so I will just respond to the parts where I think I am adding to the conversation (instead of reiterating). — Bob Ross

Probably true. We have some fundamental differences on certain topics, and they may be irreconsilable. No harm in noting that and agreeing to disagree after giving our sides again.

You use the term ‘objective’ in really nonsensical ways—e.g., ‘objective knowledge’, ‘objective definition’, ‘objective wavelength’, ‘objective argument’, etc. Sometimes its use is straight up incoherent, and other times it adds nothing to what you are saying. — Bob Ross

Bob, I use objective in the common sense. We've discussed this before and you have a very unique way of looking at subjective and objective. Generally this is how I use objective and subjective, so it is not incoherent:

OBJECTIVE arguments are often those that have to do with logos, that is, reason, evidence and logic, generally dealing with material questions (things that can be sensed or measured and have to do with the real outside world, outside of oneself).

SUBJECTIVE arguments are most often those dealing with the personal situation, feelings or experiences of a particular individual, family or group, and are usually arguments from ethos or pathos (though material subjective factors may involve arguments from logos as well).
https://utminers.utep.edu/omwilliamson/engl1312/subjective.htm#:~:text=SUBJECTIVE%20arguments%20are%20most%20often,arguments%20from%20logos%20as%20well).

I have already explicated clearly what objectivity is, and I think your position on it is wrong and confused. — Bob Ross

I have never once heard your explanation of objectivity and thought it made any rational sense. That is your personal definition, but the common definition which people use is as I noted above. Generally I try to avoid the subject directly because it seems to be more of an emotional spot for you. Just in this case its unavoidable.

An argument is an evidence-based proof; and can absolutely include intuitions in it. Arguments are not objective; but are hopefully rational. — Bob Ross

Arguments can be objective or subjective. Intuitions are subjective viewpoints. Objective arguments work to eliminate parts the require a subjective viewpoint. Per my example, the experience of green is subjective and the wavelength of green is objective.

Using your example of green, there is a set wavelength of light that is green. That's the objective wavelength of light for green. How we see or interpret it is subjective, but that right there, is the intrinsic color of green.

You completely missed the point of the example, and failed to explicate what green looks like. — Bob Ross

I'll be more direct in my point then. The personal subjective experience of green cannot be explicated. The objective wavelength can. The personal subjective experience of value cannot be explicated. But if there is an objective intrinsic value, it can.

No. I don't reject this notion. We're talking about value, and you keep changing the subject. Why?

You rejected it many times in our older conversations about epistemology; and it was relevant to what you said, because by saying a concept is simple (and indefinable) is NOT to say that they cannot be known. — Bob Ross

This is still not an answer. Bob, I agree that that a concept can be simple, indefinable, and known subjectively by that one person experiencing it. I'm not challenging that. I'm challenging you to demonstrate that value is simple, indefinable, and can be known objectively by people because it is intrinsic to an object. Pain is an example, but not a breakdown or system we can use.

Personally, why I think you keep going to 'being' or 'green' is because you can't do it with value. The only argument you have given is the subjective experience of pain, and whether we value it or not. I'm not disagreeing with you there that we all have our own subjective experience of pain, and value of it. I'm disagreeing that this somehow reveals objective value intrinsic to a state or object.

Finally, pain can be defined objectively. If your nerves fire with a particular signal up to the brain, that's pain.

This doesn’t completely define pain, because it does not define how it feels (phenomenologically). You can’t completely strip out the subject, Philosophim: it doesn’t work. — Bob Ross

We strip out the subject where possible when we are talking about objectivity. There is a subjective part to pain, and an objective part to pain. I am not denying the subjectivity of pain. I am denying that because you or I place a personal value on pain, that its objective proof that pain has intrinsic value. You have yet to show an objective value that all people, regardless of their subjective experience, can rationally agree represents intrinsic value.

And I did come along and give you a competing definition. So no hypotheticals are needed, why is my definition logically wrong?

I did not mean in the other thread, but in this one. I am not referencing the other thread where possible as this is a fresh take with a different context. This is what I was referring to:

"We can explicate it easily as well. "External value is the attribute a living being gives something else that confers some benefit to the living being and its wants and/or needs." But here's the thing. If "internal" value isn't real, then "external" value is redundant. Meaning that 'external value' just becomes value, and once again, we've explicated value clearly."

Why is this wrong?

Yeah, that's an odd way to remove desires from yourself and imprint them on other things. Things don't motivate us Bob

I believe in external motivation; so I deny this. I think we can have reason which motivate us without us having any desire towards it. You are clearly a Humean, and there’s no easy way to find common ground on that. — Bob Ross

As a belief, this is fine. But a belief is not an objective argument. If someone said they believed in God, therefore he's real, would you think that was objective? Also, I'm not Humean, just human. :)

You seem to confuse the idea that 'mind independent' means 'independent of minds'.

???

Cancer-independent is not identical to being independent of cancer? — Bob Ross

No, my point is that it is subjects who create subjective and objective arguments. I've said this before, and it will be one more time. Objective doesn't mean, 'an object' and subjective doesn't mean, 'a subject'. Objectivity and subjectivity are claims that subjects make. It is independent of one mind, but not independent of minds.

Or if they don't someone else creates a competing induction and we just decide to do based on which one we like more

No, it is based off of what seems more correct—which one is more convincing. Just because you are not convinced, does not make this endeavor subjective: you have a tendency to do that. — Bob Ross

It genuinely isn't because I'm not convinced of the argument. Bob, in my own moral theory, I believe everything has intrinsic value by the fact of its existence. The difference between you and I is mine has a rational foundation that can be measured against other existences. I can explain and justify what good and value are from a place of reason. Even your idea of flourishing fits in my theory nicely. You've taken this the wrong way. My point is you claim objectivity, but clearly cannot back that claim.

You're missing a fundamental step that can elevate your moral theory from, "Just another theory," into something that people can rationally hold in high regard. Don't be angry that I'm pointing out a flaw. Listen to it, give it a fair consideration in your head, and maybe you'll be able to come back with something better.

So, there's my take. This is your thread Bob, so anytime you feel the discussion has met its end or you would like the final say, I will grant it with a bow and let you continue with others.

Metaphysician Undercover

Bob, in my own moral theory, I believe everything has intrinsic value by the fact of its existence. — Philosophim

This is a fair proposal. It bases value in existence, allowing for "intrinsic value" by the very fact that a thing's existence is intrinsic to it. The problem now would be how to scale different values. By what principles would you say that one type of existence is higher or lower than another type of existence?

Philosophim

↪Metaphysician Undercover

I appreciate the good question, its in reference to my Measurable Morality thread. I'm planning on rewriting it to start smaller and be tighter in its initial argument due to my discussion with Bob over it, but if you want to read it as is, its here: https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/14834/a-measurable-morality/p1

My fault for referencing an outside thread. This is Bob's thread and the context should be kept to it.

Bob Ross

↪Philosophim

I appreciate your response! Since we have no common ground, I would like to take things step-by-step. First, I want to address your idea that my argument is not 'objective', in your sense of the word.

For now, I am going to use 'objective' and 'subjective' in your sense of the terms.

Consider the below argument:

P1: A thing that is not a mind and motivates a mind to avoid or acquire it (despite that mind's conative or cognitive disposition towards it) has intrinsic value.

P2: The state of pain is not a mind and motivates a mind to avoid it (despite that mind's conative or cognitive disposition towards it).

C: Therefore, the state of pain has intrinsic value.

Now, I don't want you, right now, to contend with the premises in the sense of what you merely disagree with; but, rather, I want you to tell me if this syllogism meets your requirements for being an 'objective argument'.

I think it does, because the premises and conclusion are formatted rationally and logically consistently; and none of it is true in virtue of my or someone else's subjective disposition towards the subject. Do you agree?

Philosophim

Now, I don't want you, right now, to contend with the premises in the sense of what you merely disagree with; but, rather, I want you to tell me if this syllogism meets your requirements for being an 'objective argument'. — Bob Ross

This is a good start. As written, the argument is incomplete. I'll point out why, and then point out how based on the answers, this can end up being a subjective or an objective argument.

P1: A thing that is not a mind and motivates a mind to avoid or acquire it (despite that mind's conative or cognitive disposition towards it) has intrinsic value. — Bob Ross

How do we determine that it is a thing which motivates a mind? Can it rationally compete with and invalidate the idea that a mind that is motivated towards goals simply uses things to obtain its goals? Is it that the food in front of me has an internal compulsion that expels outward towards my mind demanding that I eat it? Or is it that my mind desires food, and seeing the food triggers my mind to want it for what it wants/needs?

If the answer is, "

I believe in external motivation — Bob Ross

, then this is a subjective answer to the question because belief alone is entirely subjective. Because you have a subjective answer as part of a major foundation of your argument, any part of your argument that relies on this foundation is now a subjective argument.

If the answer is, "Here is the proof that external motivation exists, and we can see this proof holds up despite differences in our feelings or personal experiences", then you have an objective foundation, and any part of your argument that relies on this foundation without including subjectivity is now an objective argument.

As a quick aside, I like that this is a much more straight forward definition of intrinsic value. It might be incomplete from my view, but it gives a much clearer picture of the definition of intrinsic value in one sentence.

P2: The state of pain is not a mind and motivates a mind to avoid it (despite that mind's conative or cognitive disposition towards it). — Bob Ross

My second question would be, "How have you proven that a state of pain is not a mind?" I'll give you a faux example that seems reasonable. "The mind is defined as the aspect of consciousness which analyzes its own states and make decisions based on those states. Pain is a state that the mind decides to act on or react to, therefore it is not the mind itself, just a state that the mind considers."

If we both agree that this is a clear and provable definition that can be accurately applied despite differing states of human subjective experience, then we have something objective to reference. If however we defined it like, "A mind is unique to every person and cannot be explicated," then we have a subjective definition of mind, and thus a subjective argument at its foundation.

A subjective argument is not necessarily wrong, nor is an objective argument necessarily correct. It is about the type of concepts presented and being analyzed. An objective argument can have its definitions challenged as new information comes along. A subjective argument may be the best argument we can present with limited information. So having a subjective argument is not a death knell based on what we know, but it is important that it not claim to be an objective argument. In the case of moral theories, there are countless subjective moral theories out there, so another subjective argument has a high bar to reach to out compete every other theory. The problem is most subjective arguments boil down to subjective preference at their core, meaning people just do what they want and call it moral. And if that's the end case, why bother with a theory at all? Escaping that end result is incredibly difficult, but maybe you can do it.

I hope that was a clear answer to the question!

Bob Ross

↪Philosophim

As written, the argument is incomplete.

It is not valid to argue that a syllogism is incomplete because each premise needs to be questioned and expounded—that is the nature of all syllogisms.

A valid and complete syllogism (i.e., formal argument) is one which has:

1. A major premise.
2. A minor premise.
3. A conclusion.
4. A logically sound form.

My syllogism meets these demands, and is thusly complete and valid.

What you move on to note, is exactly what I was asking you to refrain from noting: various issues you have with accepting the premises. A person not accepting the premises of a syllogism does not make the syllogism invalid.

On a similar note, your definition of an ‘objective’ argument was:

OBJECTIVE arguments are often those that have to do with logos, that is, reason, evidence and logic, generally dealing with material questions (things that can be sensed or measured and have to do with the real outside world, outside of oneself).

My premises fit this description: they are not themselves appeals to subjective dispositions. So:

If the answer is, "
I believe in external motivation — Bob Ross
, then this is a subjective answer to the question because belief alone is entirely subjective.

This, even if it were true (which it is not), does not make the argument subjective, by your definition, because the premises I expounded are claims which are not dependent on beliefs.

You are questioning the justification for the premise itself, which would require another, separate syllogism. I am asking if this syllogism itself is objective—not whether some subsequent one is or not. P1 is a claim which is expressing something objective: it is not saying ~”Something has intrinsic value if I want it to”.

You asking for justification for external motivation theory, which is not provided in the syllogism itself; and wasn’t intended to. Even if a syllogism produced for such justification were based solely on beliefs, and thusly is subjective, it wouldn’t negate the fact that P1 is expressing something objective.

How do we determine that it is a thing which motivates a mind? Can it rationally compete with and invalidate the idea that a mind that is motivated towards goals simply uses things to obtain its goals? Is it that the food in front of me has an internal compulsion that expels outward towards my mind demanding that I eat it? Or is it that my mind desires food, and seeing the food triggers my mind to want it for what it wants/needs?
…
My second question would be, "How have you proven that a state of pain is not a mind?" I'll give you a faux example that seems reasonable. "The mind is defined as the aspect of consciousness which analyzes its own states and make decisions based on those states. Pain is a state that the mind decides to act on or react to, therefore it is not the mind itself, just a state that the mind considers."

I am going to disregard all of these parts, because I am asking you a specific question: do you think that the premises + conclusion constitute an ‘objective argument’. I am not asking for an analysis of how plausibly true you find the premises.

The question is whether the syllogism is (1) valid (as per explicated above) and (2) meets your definition of ‘objective argument’ (which is to say it’s premises and conclusion can be said to be rationally constituted, logically sound, and independent of subjective dispositions).

Because you have a subjective answer as part of a major foundation of your argument, any part of your argument that relies on this foundation is now a subjective argument.

If, by this, you are claiming that an argument is subjective if the fully expounded list of syllogisms (required to prove it)(which would be infinite, by the way) anywhere contains a subjective element; then, my friend, there are not objective arguments. You can’t prove ‘1+1=2’ with an ‘objective argument’ if you are that absurdly strict with your definition of ‘objective argument’.

As a quick aside, I like that this is a much more straight forward definition of intrinsic value.

P1 is not a definition of intrinsic value: it is a claim about what has it.

"A mind is unique to every person and cannot be explicated," then we have a subjective definition of mind

Do you mean to say that, in this hypothetical, the term ‘mind’ is defined as something of which its meaning is relative to the given subject-at-hand? The fact it is inexplicable, in this scenario, has nothing to do with it being subjective.

In short, you are confusing an analysis of why the premises are true/false, with whether they are purporting something objective; and by your definition of an ‘objective argument’, this syllogism would suffice to meet that standard.

Bob

Philosophim

Maybe we're getting closer here Bob. I think you're confusing that a syllogism is itself objective when we're talking about the definitions and concepts within the syllogism. A syllogism's validity is not the focus here. It is the evidence the syllogism uses that determines whether the argument is objective or subjective. When I said it was incomplete, its incomplete to call its arguments subjective or objective.

If you'll read it again, it was not an issue with the premise, it was a request to flesh out your definitions so we could see whether they were objective or subjective. As it was initially written, it was impossible to classify the argument as objective or subjective because I simply don't understand what you mean. Its fine if you wish to write it that way, but then you can't claim its objective either. If a reader needs aspect of your syllogism fleshed out or explained, its a syllogism that needs more work to have the proper rigor. That in itself is not a claim as to whether its arguments are subjective or objective.

I made a point not to dispute your definitions, I only noted what it would take to classify them as subjective or objective. That's why I gave you examples for both sides.

My premises fit this description: they are not themselves appeals to subjective dispositions. — Bob Ross

If you use definitions, it must be known what concepts those definitions represent. Do they represent subjective definitions and concepts, or objective definitions and concepts? Its a fact of language, and not something that you appeal to. Even if they cannot be explicated, is that claim based on subjective or objective premises? It is unavoidable in any discussion, especially when you actively claim they are objective.

I am asking if this syllogism itself is objective—not whether some subsequent one is or not. P1 is a claim which is expressing something objective: it is not saying ~”Something has intrinsic value if I want it to”. — Bob Ross

P1: A thing that is not a mind and motivates a mind to avoid or acquire it (despite that mind's conative or cognitive disposition towards it) has intrinsic value. — Bob Ross

No, the argument is not objective, nor can I tell if its subjective at this point. This is an assertion. How you justify the assertion is what makes it objective or subjective. Is intrinsic value objective or subjective? Is the claim that things can motivate minds objective or subjective? Those are the questions that need answers.

If, by this, you are claiming that an argument is subjective if the fully expounded list of syllogisms (required to prove it)(which would be infinite, by the way) anywhere contains a subjective element; then, my friend, there are not objective arguments. You can’t prove ‘1+1=2’ with an ‘objective argument’ if you are that absurdly strict with your definition of ‘objective argument’. — Bob Ross

No, I'm not asking you to infinitely expand syllogisms. That's silly. Also you cannot objectively claim

"A mind is unique to every person and cannot be explicated," then we have a subjective definition of mind

Do you mean to say that, in this hypothetical, the term ‘mind’ is defined as something of which its meaning is relative to the given subject-at-hand? The fact it is inexplicable, in this scenario, has nothing to do with it being subjective. — Bob Ross

Correct. A claim that something is inexplicable can be founded on objective or subjective premises. In this example, it is a subjective premise.

In sum, I'm not questioning whether the premises are true or false, I'm demonstrating how we can determine if they are subjective or objective. Let me repost part of my conclusion in the last post once again: "A subjective argument is not necessarily wrong, nor is an objective argument necessarily correct. It is about the type of concepts presented and being analyzed." It seems my points were taken as an attack on your theories truth or falsity, when they are simply examples that point out why some of your arguments are subjective, and also examples of how you could make them objective. Address those examples specifically without regards to the truth or falsity of the premises and I think we'll be able to reconcile on subjectivity vs objectivity.

Bob Ross

↪Philosophim

I guess I am not fully fathoming what you mean by subjective vs. objective definitions and arguments. I thought you were saying that 'subjective' refers to something which has its truth relative to mind-dependent dispositions (e.g., feelings, thoughts, beliefs, etc.) and that 'objective' refers to something which has its truth NOT relative to mind-dependent dispositions. Am I misunderstanding?

It seems obvious to me that the premises are not appealing to being true relative to mind-dependent dispositions, what would make you think otherwise?

Is intrinsic value objective or subjective?

The definition or the underlying meaning?

The definition is subjective, because all definitions are subjective. I don't know what it would mean to define something objectively. We choose what sets of symbols (i.e., words) to associate with what underlying meanings (i.e., ideas/concepts): I don't see how it could be otherwise.

The underlying meaning is objective, because it is the idea/concept of having value in-itself. If this is not understood, then one doesn't understand what 'in-itself' means. Again, just to sidestep your Kantian ties, what I mean by 'in-itself' is the nature, the essence, of the thing and not what it exists as independently of all experience of it.

Is the claim that things can motivate minds objective or subjective?

How could it possibly be subjective? I don't understand where you are coming from here, unfortunately. Either a thing motivates a mind or it doesn't: this isn't relative to what anyone believes or feels about it.

Bob

An Analysis of Goodness and The Good

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