Goodness can be deployed in a twofold manner... — Bob Ross

I think this is a decent paragraph, and shows some improvement in your ideas and rhetoric.

What can be predicated as morally good, then, is what can be said to have intrinsic value; and intrinsic value is value a ‘thing’ has in itself. To determine extrinsic value, is a matter of tracing the value to the “thing’s” (inter-)subjective (literal or theoretical) source—e.g., if one needs/wants something to tell the time, then a clock is really good (for this [subjective] purpose); whereas, to determine intrinsic value is a matter of analyzing how much, if at all, a ‘thing’ demands value. Intrinsic value is value which is innately insisted upon by the (objective) ‘thing’, and is not mere value dependent on a subject’s interpretation of it. — Bob Ross

This is an interesting paragraph. A week ago Pope Francis released a document called Dignitas Infinita (infinite dignity). I'm not sure how it will be received, but it is trying to do something similar to what you are trying to do here, saying that the human being itself has infinite value.

it cannot be intrinsic value if the value is dependent on a subject’s evaluation of it — Bob Ross

Aristotle says that eudaimonia is the highest end because of its nature, not because subjects happen to value it. But Aristotle and Aquinas immediately address the most obvious objection, namely that different people are made happy by different things ().

Here is how Aquinas puts the quandary:

So, then, as to the aspect of last end, all agree in desiring the last end: since all desire the fulfilment of their perfection, and it is precisely this fulfilment in which the last end consists, as stated above. But as to the thing in which this aspect is realized, all men are not agreed as to their last end: since some desire riches as their consummate good; some, pleasure; others, something else. Thus to every taste the sweet is pleasant but to some, the sweetness of wine is most pleasant, to others, the sweetness of honey, or of something similar. — Thomas Aquinas

Aristotle says that eudaimonia is the highest end because of its nature, not because subjects happen to value it. But Aristotle and Aquinas immediately address the most obvious objection, namely that different people are made happy by different things (↪Leontiskos).

Here is how Aquinas puts the quandary:

So, then, as to the aspect of last end, all agree in desiring the last end: since all desire the fulfilment of their perfection, and it is precisely this fulfilment in which the last end consists, as stated above. But as to the thing in which this aspect is realized, all men are not agreed as to their last end: since some desire riches as their consummate good; some, pleasure; others, something else. Thus to every taste the sweet is pleasant but to some, the sweetness of wine is most pleasant, to others, the sweetness of honey, or of something similar.
— Thomas Aquinas — Leontiskos

Yes, this is a problem. If "last end" is defined as happiness, then we need a separate description of happiness or else the two words just become representative of each other. Then "happiness" means "last end", and "last end" means "happiness", and all we have is a vicious circle.

So if we look at the broader context, to get an understanding of exactly what happiness is, we see that it is something which is produced in a variety of different ways for the various different people. This appearance of a multitude of differences prevents that mode of inquiry from proceeding, and we are forced to look back at the more general, to find a description with a more universal application, instead of referring directly to all the specific differences.

Notice that Aquinas mentions "the fulfilment of their perfection". Developed from Aristotelian principles, the goal of "perfection" becomes the last end for Aquinas. Every existing thing, by the nature of its very own form, has a perfection which is proper to it, and it alone. So that is what could bring a person true happiness, the perfection of one's very own form, the unique form which is proper to oneself, and this becomes the last end, the goal of each individual.

So this defines "happiness" in "perfection", and leads us toward the need to understand this concept, "perfection" which is revealed as a sort of ideal form.

I always appreciate your thoughts!

Aristotle says that eudaimonia is the highest end because of its nature, not because subjects happen to value it.

Here's where I get a bit confused with Aristotle, because I agree that eudaimonia is the highest good because of its nature BUT I don't see how Aristotle is really arguing that; since his definition of intrinsic value is ~"that which is done for its own sake". It seems like something can be done for its own sake and be a matter of subjective disposition, no?

I think he would need to define intrinsic value not in terms of what is done for its own sake, but, rather, what can be assigned value in virtue of its innate (natural) insistence of being valued (e.g., pain is a great example, although not the ultimate good).

What am I missing?

I think I have identified one of the subtle issues with my theory, that may be causing you trouble (understanding it). That a thing demands or insists on being valued, does not mean it has value independently of a subject's determination or analysis of it (i.e., that it has value in-itself as I was referring). Either a thing has value in-itself, which I would have to explain how it is constituted into the being of the thing, or it is assigned value (by a subject).

Ok, let me break down more clearly what I do and do not mean. To your credit, value is always assigned but, to my credit, it is not always extrinsic value. Intrinsic value is value assigned to a thing because, and to the degree that, it innately insists (or demands) on being valued. Extrinsic value is value a thing has been assigned relative to how well it fulfills a (subjective) purpose.

Intrinsic value, unlike extrinsic value, is objective because, although we assign it, it is being assigned because the thing actually (mind-independently) motivates people to value it for its own sake and not for the sake of something else: a person is motivated, even if they overcome it, to value a thing with intrinsic value despite what they believe or desire to value it at. It is external motivation (for the subject) which they can not think or desire away.

Another way to put it, is that intrinsic value is value a thing has (1) for its own sake and (2) is attributable to the thing (which exists mind-independently) from its natural ability to motivate people of #1.

The intrinsic value a thing has, then, would be proportional to how motivational the thing is at demanding people to value it for its own sake (whether that be positively or negatively); and this is how we could compare them.

Obtaining pleasures, for example, would be less intrinsically valuable then a state of eudaimonia because the latter, when in that state, is more innately motivational towards valuing it for its own sake than the former (although it is not clear to a person who has not reached the latter state and is stuck in the former one).

Does that help?

Here's where I get a bit confused with Aristotle, because I agree that eudaimonia is the highest good because of its nature BUT I don't see how Aristotle is really arguing that; since his definition of intrinsic value is ~"that which is done for its own sake". It seems like something can be done for its own sake and be a matter of subjective disposition, no?

I think he would need to define intrinsic value not in terms of what is done for its own sake, but, rather, what can be assigned value in virtue of its innate (natural) insistence of being valued (e.g., pain is a great example, although not the ultimate good).

What am I missing? — Bob Ross

I think this is that question of goodness simpliciter vs. goodness for human beings. For example, you seem to be involved in the notion that "insisting on being valued" makes sense apart from agents who do the valuing. In your OP, rather than speaking about happiness "insisting on being valued," I would want to speak about the idea that happiness is (for humans) self-evidently valuable. The question is this: is eudaimonia valuable in itself, or is it valuable for humans beings? Or is it valuable in itself for human beings?*

rather, what can be assigned value in virtue of its innate (natural) insistence of being valued — Bob Ross

I would simply want to speak about what is correctly valued as opposed to what is incorrectly valued; or what is rightly done for its own sake as opposed to what is wrongly done for its own sake; or what is the highest good/end as opposed to what appears to be the highest good/end.

* This last sentence seems to represent Aristotle's thought. Plato, Augustine, Aquinas, and others go beyond Aristotle in this, but Aristotle's position is careful and easily defensible. He does not commit himself to goodness simpliciter in any substantial sense.

---

- :up:

Ok, let me break down more clearly what I do and do not mean. To your credit, value is always assigned but, to my credit, it is not always extrinsic value. Intrinsic value is value assigned to a thing because, and to the degree that, it innately insists (or demands) on being valued. Extrinsic value is value a thing has been assigned relative to how well it fulfills a (subjective) purpose.

Intrinsic value, unlike extrinsic value, is objective because, although we assign it, it is being assigned because the thing actually (mind-independently) motivates people to value it for its own sake and not for the sake of something else: a person is motivated, even if they overcome it, to value a thing with intrinsic value despite what they believe or desire to value it at. It is external motivation (for the subject) which they can not think or desire away.

Another way to put it, is that intrinsic value is value a thing has (1) for its own sake and (2) is attributable to the thing (which exists mind-independently) from its natural ability to motivate people of #1. — Bob Ross

I still do not see how this description of "intrinsic value" makes any sense. You seem to be saying that there are some things in the world, which demand of people, that the people want them, and they want them simply for the sake of having the thing, itself, and not for anything else. But doesn't this really just say something about people in general, that people exist in such a way that there are specific types of things which they will want, simply for the sake of having that thing.

Notice, that I say "specific types of things" that people want, but you portray particular things as having this intrinsic value, rather than types. If it is a type of thing which is valued in this way, then the value is not really intrinsic to the things themselves, but it is attributable to the type.

So take food for example, as such a type. Food appears to be valued for its own sake. This type of thing is inherently good. But what is the case, is that we make a category of things judged as good to eat, we name this category "food", and then we judge which things ought and ought not be placed in this category. So "good" is a defining feature of the category, and its definition is based on what is needed by the human being, it is not based on what is intrinsic to any particular thing.


We might say that nutrition is a good which is intrinsic to particular things, but it is only classed as "nutrition:, or "good", based on how it is received by human beings. It appears like the good is intrinsic to the thing, but it is really only "good" in its relation to humans. These chemical compounds are ones needed by humans. Isn't this very similar to pleasure and pain? These two are categories, one of good feelings, the other bad feelings. They are types of feelings, the good type and the bad type. Then particular instances of feelings need to be judged as to whether they fit one category or the other. So they are really only good or bad as a result of their relation to the conscious mind which does the judging.

I would simply want to speak about what is correctly valued as opposed to what is incorrectly valued; or what is rightly done for its own sake as opposed to what is wrongly done for its own sake; or what is the highest good/end as opposed to what appears to be the highest good/end.

* This last sentence seems to represent Aristotle's thought. Plato, Augustine, Aquinas, and others go beyond Aristotle in this, but Aristotle's position is careful and easily defensible. He does not commit himself to goodness simpliciter in any substantial sense. — Leontiskos

Yes, I think Aristotle was the first to distinguish between the apparent good, and the real good. Aquinas followed him on this distinction, and I believe Augustine did too, to a large degree. Plato was more vague on his notion of "the good".
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I guess I am not fully fathoming what you mean by subjective vs. objective definitions and arguments. I thought you were saying that 'subjective' refers to something which has its truth relative to mind-dependent dispositions (e.g., feelings, thoughts, beliefs, etc.) and that 'objective' refers to something which has its truth NOT relative to mind-dependent dispositions. Am I misunderstanding? — Bob Ross

I'm not intending to use the term truth, but arguments. I would not use 'mind-dependent' as a description for subjective or objective at all. This leads to the mistake in thinking that objectivity exists like some Platonic form. It does not. Objectivity is an approach to thinking that minds take to ensure that the subject of the self is not dependent for the argument. Subjectivity is an approach to thinking that minds take to ensure that the subject of the self is dependent for the argument.

Thus, things like logic, math, concepts, studies, and findings are used for objective arguments. Personal experiences, intuitions, and desires are all subjective arguments. Both are tools, have their strengths and weaknesses, and a complete thinker will be able to apply both effectively to an argument. After all, we are subjects that have personal experiences, and many discussions that involve personal experiences have no objective approach. A lack of understanding this distinction can easily allow confusion between the two.

Consciousness is a great example of this. There are objective ways to approach consciousness, and subjective ways to approach consciousness. Realistically, the only way we can measure consciousness in a human is by physiological measurements and behavior. Asserting a person's personal experience is outside of objectivity because we can never know what its like to be that person.

Subjective consciousness is our individual experience of reality. A person may not exhibit any physical signs of pain, but inside, its an undeniable reality. And it WANTS things. For example, it can want to be immortal, so it invents an idea that it can exist once its body dies. It wants to pretend its not tied to the brain, even though the objective reality is that this is so. It often tries to claim its experiences are objective reality, when they are just really strong feelings of desire that X should be real.

A good thinker can marry the two. You cannot discuss consciousness only in objective, nor only in subjective terms. A good thinker can find the strength in each side, and uses it for its particular tool in the argument. Am I master at this? No. But it is something I and many philosophers who strive to do well will do.

When I point out that you have subjective arguments in your ethical theory, it is not that you should never use subjective arguments. You should be aware of their strengths and weaknesses and use them effectively. People are rarely persuaded by math. They are persuaded by feelings. Feelings without math may be fun, but can lead to alcoholics losing everything they have. Math without feelings may be brilliant, but can die in a dusty book that no one will ever read.

Is intrinsic value objective or subjective?

Is the argument you are giving for intrinsic value subjective or objective? This is determined by what you are using to determine whether something is intrisicly valuable. If your reliance is on the feelings and desires of people, its subjective, plain and simple. "I've smoked every day until 90 years old and never gotten cancer" is subjective. "Smokers have a X% higher chance of getting lung cancer is objective". When you appeal to me to recognize a feeling of value that you call intrinsic value, you are appealing to subjective notions. There can be good reasons for that. But it is not objective.

Is the claim that things can motivate minds objective or subjective?

How could it possibly be subjective? — Bob Ross

Again, is your argument for why things can motivate minds a subjective, or objective one? Do we have evidence of rays that emit from objects, interact with brains, and compel them to do things? Or do we have some people who really WANT that thing over there, therefore believe its not their fault, it must be compelling them? Do you see which argument is objective vs subjective?

To your credit, value is always assigned but, to my credit, it is not always extrinsic value. — Bob Ross

I'm not saying this isn't possible. But you would need something like a 'value atom' or a proof that demonstrated X had value that could be confirmed logically.

Intrinsic value, unlike extrinsic value, is objective because, although we assign it, it is being assigned because the thing actually (mind-independently) motivates people to value it for its own sake and not for the sake of something else: a person is motivated, even if they overcome it, to value a thing with intrinsic value despite what they believe or desire to value it at. It is external motivation (for the subject) which they can not think or desire away. — Bob Ross

This is a run on sentence, so lets break it up into something that goes step by step and we can walk through.

1. There exist things which can compel people to value it.
2. This value is something which does not benefit the person. The person may even hate the thing. But innate to their experience, they still value it.
3. The value is a consistent and undeniable reality within a person's mind, and this is because of the object itself.

An example I would give is, "The Grand Canyon". Such a feeling is usually described as 'awe'. Some might hate the Grand Canyon, but still feel awe, or value. Still, this is a subjective claim. Saying "The Canyon" is causing this is a feeling/belief. There is nothing here that we can measure or evaluate beyond a person's individual feelings about something.

What would an objective claim for this look like? As I noted before, perhaps a wave that extended from things that would provably interact with the mind and cause consistent physiological interactions. Perhaps a massive study that could quantify value and demonstrate how it affects people with researched statistics.

If you wanted to objectively demonstrate that eudaimonia had more value, you would of course have to clearly define value, and then demonstrate that societies with eudaimonia had generated more of this defined value then societies that did not have this.

I hope you can see the difference now. Let me know what you think.

I think your use of the terms is incoherent with your definitions.

If:

OBJECTIVE arguments are often those that have to do with logos, that is, reason, evidence and logic, generally dealing with material questions (things that can be sensed or measured and have to do with the real outside world, outside of oneself).

Then ‘objectivity’ is fundamentally about anything which is not relative to subjective dispositions—that’s the difference between reason, logic, “the real outside world”, etc. and desires, beliefs, etc.

Making this sort of distinction, is inevitably to distinguish between two different dependency relations: one being a dependency on subjective dispositions, and the other not—objectivity, in your sense, is defined negatively in relation to subjectivity.

I'm not intending to use the term truth, but arguments.

An argument is about truth: you can’t separate them in any way that would be meaningful for this discussion. The premises, which are propositions, are expressing something objective if they can be evaluated (as true or false) independently of what any person feels or believes about it—and this is what your definition entails (quoted above).

This is no way implies that objectivity or truth are platonic forms.

You actually (sort of) recognized this in your own counter-point:

Objectivity is an approach to thinking that minds take to ensure that the subject of the self is not dependent for the argument

If this is true, then a premise is objective (or expressing something objective) IFF whether or not it is true or false is NOT dependent on any given subjective disposition.

“Food tastes delicious” is a proposition which does NOT express something objective, because one has to evaluate the truth of this sentence relative to the given subject at hand (since how a thing tastes is directly dependent on who is tasting it).

“I've smoked every day until 90 years old and never gotten cancer" IS expressing something objective, because the evaluation of its truth (or falsity) IS NOT dependent on any subjective disposition: either “I” really did smoke every day for 90 years and didn’t get cancer, or “I” didn’t—this is not dependent on how anyone feels or believes about it.


What you are trying to explicate with your example of smoking, is NOT that the proposition is subjective but, rather, that it is anecdotal and thusly cannot be used to demonstrate a statistic on the effects of smoking on the human body. That is cannot be used validly to prove anything related to a proposition like "Smokers have a X% higher chance of getting lung cancer is objective" has no relation to whether it is subjective or objective...by your own definitions. “I’ve smoked every day...” is a proposition based on reason, valid logic, and is independent of desires/beliefs which obviously meets the definition you gave (quoted above previously). That’s what it means to evaluate something “outside of oneself” (to take from your definition): on the contrary, “I’ve smoked every day and didn’t get cancer” is true because “I want it to be true” is subjective, by your definitions.

Do we have evidence of rays that emit from objects, interact with brains, and compel them to do things? Or do we have some people who really WANT that thing over there, therefore believe its not their fault, it must be compelling them? Do you see which argument is objective vs subjective?

That you asked for some sort of measurable entity in reality, as opposed to a phenomenal quality, demonstrates sufficiently to me that you are using your definitions incoherently; and that you think that an argument is only objective if it references some scientifically measurable ‘entity’...which is nonsense, even by your own definitions. If the argument’s premises expound propositions which can be evaluated “outside of oneself”, independently of desire/belief, with reason, with logic, etc. then it is ‘objective’. It isn’t valid to tack on “and it has to be about some sort of instrumentally measurable concrete entity”...nah.

An example I would give is, "The Grand Canyon". Such a feeling is usually described as 'awe'

I am glad you gave this example, so I can clarify how it is not analogous to my examples and is not an example of something which has intrinsic value.

If one removes the beliefs and desires they have about the Grand Canyon and views it, they will no longer feel any awe about it; thusly, the Grand Canyon itself is not innately motivating them. This is just extrinsic value, like when a person is motivated to workout or play basketball, because the thing itself is not, per its nature, a source of motivation.

Now, in colloquial speech, we may say things like “I was motivated to workout because of the documentary I saw about body-building”, but this is mistaken if taken literally: if the desires and beliefs that the person has about everything relevant to the documentary on body-building and then they watched it, then they would certainly not be motivated to workout (because of it). It is their interpretation of the documentary, of the Grand Canyon, that is the source of motivation; and so this is a form of extrinsic value, because the value one assigns the Grand Canyon is relative to some subjective purpose that the person has for it (e.g., one is motivated to value to the grand canyon because, for example, they like the feeling of being in awe).

Now, to provide ample clarification, the feeling of awe does have intrinsic value, although the Grand Canyon does not, because if one removes all the desires and beliefs a person has about the feeling of awe while they are having it, the feeling of awe, as per its nature, will motivate them, to some degree, to value it.

Bob

I would also like to mention that even with the idea of 'objectivity' requiring publicity of the empirical content, it is still possible to analyze what mind-independent 'things' motivate subjects---by study of the brain, psychology, sociology, the nature of the mind-independent thing, etc. ... none of this is dependent on subjective experience, although it is entirely possible to acquire the same knowledge from the "subjective side" as you put it.

Making this sort of distinction, is inevitably to distinguish between two different dependency relations: one being a dependency on subjective dispositions, and the other not—objectivity, in your sense, is defined negatively in relation to subjectivity. — Bob Ross

Logically this is equivalent to noting that subjectivity is defined negatively in relation to objectivity. Objectivity and subjectivity in the general sense are binary. If you're being objective, you're not beings subjective and vice-versa. I'm not sure how this point is anything new, its part of the fundamental relationship between the two concepts.

I'm not intending to use the term truth, but arguments.
— Bob Ross

An argument is about truth: you can’t separate them in any way that would be meaningful for this discussion. The premises, which are propositions, are expressing something objective if they can be evaluated (as true or false) independently of what any person feels or believes about it—and this is what your definition entails (quoted above). — Bob Ross

Are you saying that whatever type of premises we stick inside of a syllogism, are now objective because the structure of a syllogism is objective? That's fundamentally wrong. If I have as a premise, "I believe the color blue is the best color in the world," its true, but still a subjective belief. Subjective and objective premises can be evaluated as true or false. That doesn't change the fact they are subjective or objective.

Same with the structure of what a premise or syllogism is. These are objective structures. That does not suddenly make what the premises contain objective. If I understand what you're saying, you're claiming that anything within a syllogism is objective because the structure of a syllogism or premise is itself objective. If true, that's simply incorrect. Let me know if I have the correct understanding of this.

Objectivity is an approach to thinking that minds take to ensure that the subject of the self is not dependent for the argument

If this is true, then a premise is objective (or expressing something objective) IFF whether or not it is true or false is NOT dependent on any given subjective disposition. — Bob Ross

Incorrect. The truth or falsity of subjectivity and objectivity are irrelevant to what they are. The contents of a premise can be objective or subjective based on what they are claiming.

What you are trying to explicate with your example of smoking, is NOT that the proposition is subjective but, rather, that it is anecdotal and thusly cannot be used to demonstrate a statistic on the effects of smoking on the human body. — Bob Ross

Partially Correct. Upon reviewing that paragraph I neglected to include the conclusion. The old man concludes that smoking is safe for people based on his own experiences. Yes, it is objectively true that the old man has never gotten cancer, but it is his conclusion that is subjective because it relies on the old mans' personal experience, or anecdote. Therefore the argument is a subjective argument, not an objective one.

That you asked for some sort of measurable entity in reality, as opposed to a phenomenal quality, demonstrates sufficiently to me that you are using your definitions incoherently — Bob Ross

You are drawing an incorrect conclusion from my example. If a phenomenal quality can be confirmed independently of one's subjective experience, it is objective. If I claim, "I like the color blue," you know its true, but no one else can get inside of your head to confirm that you actually have the experience of liking it. If you say, "That color is blue," we can confirm it independently of our own subjective experience of 'blue'.

Same with me claiming "Because my favorite color is blue, everyone's favorite color is blue." The conclusion is drawn from a purely subjective experience. Whether its true or not is irrelevant. The argument is drawn and concluded from a subjective viewpoint, not an objective viewpoint. Therefore the argument is a subjective argument.

Now, to provide ample clarification, the feeling of awe does have intrinsic value, although the Grand Canyon does not, because if one removes all the desires and beliefs a person has about the feeling of awe while they are having it, the feeling of awe, as per its nature, will motivate them, to some degree, to value it. — Bob Ross

At this point it seems like all states of intrinsic value are simply what we feel. I'm going to make two requests for your next post.

1. What's an example of an object that has intrinsic value? Not our emotional states. Most of your core examples seem to do with pain, awe, etc., or our personal emotions. I'm having a hard time seeing how you're not simply describing personal emotions demanding attention and action instead of the objects themselves.

2. You claim your value morality is objective. As you've noted, I've been giving both subjective and objective examples of arguments. Now its your turn. Write me an argument for your value morality that is subjective under your view. This will help me to see how you view subjectivity and objectivity beyond the abstract. There should be no barrier to this.

it is still possible to analyze what mind-independent 'things' motivate subjects---by study of the brain, psychology, sociology, the nature of the mind-independent thing, etc. — Bob Ross

I'm not saying its not. But you need to give a specific example and not just a claim that we can. I've given some examples that would fit this, but it doesn't mean they work for your theory. How do you specifically evaluate the intrinsic value of things without requiring subjective viewpoints? How would a psychologist objectively conclude that X has intrinsic value?

Are you saying that whatever type of premises we stick inside of a syllogism, are now objective because the structure of a syllogism is objective?

No.

By “structure of a syllogism is [being] objective”, you are referring to the form of the syllogism being valid (i.e., that it is logically consistent, has a minor and major premise, and the conclusion is necessitated by the premises) but that the premise itself is expressing something objective is to say that its truthity is NOT relative to subjective dispositions (e.g., “this is green” as opposed to “I think this is green”).

An argument is objective if all of its premises express something objective.

1. What's an example of an object that has intrinsic value? Not our emotional states. Most of your core examples seem to do with pain, awe, etc., or our personal emotions. I'm having a hard time seeing how you're not simply describing personal emotions demanding attention and action instead of the objects themselves.

1. No objects have intrinsic value that I am aware of, although they may exist (I guess, since I cannot technically eliminate their possibility).

2. Not all states that have intrinsic value are constituted of emotions—e.g., a state of indifference.

2. You claim your value morality is objective. As you've noted, I've been giving both subjective and objective examples of arguments. Now its your turn. Write me an argument for your value morality that is subjective under your view. This will help me to see how you view subjectivity and objectivity beyond the abstract. There should be no barrier to this.

An example of an argument that contains two premises that express something objective (and thusly is objective itself):

P1: A thing that is not a mind and motivates a mind to avoid or acquire it (despite that mind's conative or cognitive disposition towards it) has intrinsic value.

P2: The state of pain is not a mind and motivates a mind to avoid it (despite that mind's conative or cognitive disposition towards it).

C: Therefore, the state of pain has intrinsic value.


An example of an argument that contains two premises that express something subjective (and thusly is subjective itself):

P1: A thing that I desire to have intrinsic value has it.

P2: I desire that the state of pain has intrinsic value.

C: Therefore, the state of pain has intrinsic value.


An example of an argument that contains one premise that expresses something objective and one that expresses something subjective (and thusly is a subjective argument):

P1: If I believe that a unicorn exists, then it exists. [Expresses something objective]

P2: I believe that a unicorn exists. [Expresses something subjective]

C: Therefore, a unicorn exists.

Yes, it is objectively true that the old man has never gotten cancer, but it is his conclusion that is subjective because it relies on the old mans' personal experience, or anecdote. Therefore the argument is a subjective argument, not an objective one

That’s fine, as long as it is noted that the claim itself was objective (that he had not gotten cancer from smoking).

How do you specifically evaluate the intrinsic value of things without requiring subjective viewpoints?

One would evaluate whether or not the thing is a source of motivation and is not itself a subject; and this can be done by analyzing other people than oneself OR oneself through an unbiased lens.

How would a psychologist objectively conclude that X has intrinsic value?

This would not be specifically a psychologist’s job, as this endeavor would require knowledge from multiple different sciences—such as sociology, biology, etc.

One would need to understand people’s general psychologies, sociology, and biology to better distinguish something which one is motivated towards due to their disposition vs. what is externally motivating. E.g., one person may have an extreme dispositional towards a thing, a society may view a thing as extremely important, etc.

Bob

the premise itself is expressing something objective is to say that its truthity is NOT relative to subjective dispositions (e.g., “this is green” as opposed to “I think this is green”). — Bob Ross

Ok, we might be getting closer here. I think I might finally be understanding what you're implying, but as always, correct me where needed. :) "This is green" is only objective if we know there are objective ways to determine that 'that' is 'green'. There is an implicit understanding in that sentence. The problem with your argument is we don't know if there is an objective way to say, 'This has implicit value." I think what you're saying is if you can craft an argument that's worded without addressing this question.

Let me put it another way.

1. An evil demon exists.
2. Evil demons always compel people to do wrong.
3. Therefore if people do wrong, it might be an evil demon.

As I noted with your argument earlier, this argument is incomplete. The first thing I would ask is, "What's an evil demon?" Then, "How do we know an evil demon exists?" Those need answers, and I would not be able to call this argument objective or subjective until I got them. If you're crafting an incomplete argument and calling it objective while having incompletely defined words, or refusing to answer questions which would let us know whether the premises are concluded by objective or subjective means, its objectivity or subjectivity is not really assessable.

I (hopefully) see our differences now. This reminds me of a similar problem I ran into when learning and teaching math. Let me see if I can show you.

Solve for X: 2X + 1 = 3
2x = 2
2x/2 = 2/2
Conclusion x = 1

The answer is correct, and to a mind who knows that you get 2x = 2 by doing the implicit step of:
2x + 1 -1 = 3 -1, this is a full and logical argument. The problem I would run into in math tutorials was often times implicit steps like this were skipped. My students would note this, and I would have to adapt and make these implicit steps explicit for them to understand.

For a person who knows how 2x=2 happened, the implicit step does not need to be made explicit. Lets go one step further. None of us need a primer to know what 2X is. We've already learned that. Its an implicit step that if listed, would be redundant and a waste of time for both of us. But if you introduced this to a person who said, "I don't know what 2X is," your argument is incomplete for them.

Now, imagine that the person asks, "What does X mean?" and you replied, "It can't quite be defined, its a fundamental that we simply understand," I would be scratching my head because, "But at the end x = 1. Isn't that a number?" If you replied "No, you just have to understand it" then I am right in saying, "Then this is a subjective argument.".

I'm posting it this way because the argument to solve for X is correct and objective if we know all the other objective implicit information that goes along with it. So lets assume that your argument is correct Bob. Its missing steps for me as a reader to see how you arrive at your conclusion. How can we say value is objective when it can't be defined apart from our 'innate understanding? How do you claim that this is objective when every example given so far has been about subjective feelings?

So from your viewpoint, maybe you're seeing something implicit and obvious that doesn't need to be explicated. Either that, or you're unaware there is something implicit underlying your argument that you have not realized. Your readers will help you see that. Remember that this is your idea, and its your job to convince the readers that it makes sense. You could have the perfect idea, but if its implicit steps are not fully explored, a reader is going to think its faulty or subjective. And from their viewpoint? They are going to be right.

I want you to recall some of past conversations over my own writing. Not that I am perfect, but I always intended to follow certain rules. Nothing you asked was too small or stupid. Maybe a question was too complex or out of order, and another concept had to be explained first, but I tried to never shelve a question or point and not come back to it later. If I tried explaining it to you one way and it didn't make sense to you, I tried another example or approach. Because sometimes the writer doesn't understand the implicit step that they're missing as well. A good conversation allows both the writer and reader to catch steps like this and hopefully makes the argument better. If the reader is trying to understand, and cannot despite your explanations, in extremely rare cases its the limitations of the student. 99 times out of 100 its the teaching.

Looking at your example of an objective and subjective argument, all you did was repeat your definition of implicit vs explicit. That didn't answer my question. I asked you to create a claim for intrinsic value that contained the same result, but was from a subjective viewpoint. Just like, "I know green because I experience green," (turns out they are colorblind) vs "I know this is green because of the wavelength." So the examples didn't help me. Its like if I asked, "How did you go from 2X + 1 = 3 to 2x = 2", and all you did was repeat the steps I already have in front of me. It doesn't help.

You cannot overexplain a new concept or theory, but you can very much under explain it. My discussion with you has never even gotten to 'flourishing', because there are steps from my view point that are necessary for me to even start thinking about your conclusion.

Look at when I asked this as well:

How do you specifically evaluate the intrinsic value of things without requiring subjective viewpoints?

One would evaluate whether or not the thing is a source of motivation and is not itself a subject; and this can be done by analyzing other people than oneself OR oneself through an unbiased lens. — Bob Ross

The answer is underexplained. How are we analyzing other people? Are we analyzing them through their subjective feelings about the source of motivation? Are we measuring things like people actions when faced with the source of intrinsic value? What process are we using to determine that someone is viewing oneself through an unbiased lens? You're missing steps that need answering for this to be a complete explanation if you're going to claim this is objective.

How would a psychologist objectively conclude that X has intrinsic value?

This would not be specifically a psychologist’s job, as this endeavor would require knowledge from multiple different sciences—such as sociology, biology, etc. — Bob Ross

This answer essentially says, "I don't know." This is a supposition. We need at least one example from you that a psychologist could at least start with. For example: "Here's the method I propose which works with this one individual. Now we would need to repeat this method thousands of times to make sure that the results stay consistent, and that is out of the scope of what I can do here." Otherwise you don't know, which is fine to admit in an argument.

Finally lets look at this question and reply:

1. What's an example of an object that has intrinsic value? Not our emotional states. Most of your core examples seem to do with pain, awe, etc., or our personal emotions. I'm having a hard time seeing how you're not simply describing personal emotions demanding attention and action instead of the objects themselves.

1. No objects have intrinsic value that I am aware of, although they may exist (I guess, since I cannot technically eliminate their possibility).

2. Not all states that have intrinsic value are constituted of emotions—e.g., a state of indifference. — Bob Ross

Point one is incomplete. How can we not eliminate their possibility? If this is an objective argument, you should demonstrate a situation in which there would be a doubt, vs the times when we're certain it does not have objective value.

Point 2 doesn't counter my point that I'm just seeing this as an analysis of our emotions, and whether they compel us to action. Indifference does not compel us to action, (or does it compel us not to act?) and fits within the point I made. This would be a good time to dig in and demonstrate how this is not merely an analysis of emotions and how we are most likely to respond to them. Because you did not, I as the reader am going to view my interpretation as unchallenged.

I hope you know how much I respect you Bob, and I can tell that emotionally, there's something you really value and see here. If you still see some value on it, keep working on it. Currently your explanation and walkthrough is unclear and incomplete to me. If you want to keep trying to make it clearer through other examples and explanations, we can keep trying. If you feel you've reached your end and you can't explain it any other way, that's also fine. My personal agreement is not contingent on your argument, and I will end this with a salute your way whenever you are ready. :)

I would like to disclaim that, as always, I appreciate your feedback and critiques! It is rare on this forum to find a person that is willingly think about an idea in depth, and give thoughtful responses; and you are one them (:

I think that your use of the more colloquial meanings of ‘objective’ and ‘subjective’ is causing you to fall into a muddied trap; which is why you are incapable of understanding why an analysis of these sort of states (which only alive beings can have) is an objective analysis. I say that with all due respect, and assuming fully that you completely disagree (; , and hopefully I can help expound my thoughts on this.

I greatly appreciate your elaboration on your idea of “incompleteness” with respect to arguments, because it allowed me to understand better where your head is it. There’s some things worth noting.

1. You must remember that by “argument” we are discussing a formal argument in the strictest sense of the word: a syllogism. We are not talking about informal arguments (or at least I wasn’t).

2. Formal arguments (i.e., syllogisms) are not subjective because they are “incomplete” (in the sense that you mean: that they are not a full account of exactly why a conclusion is true): they are subjective if a premise’s truthity is relative to subjective dispositions. I outlined this in my examples before, so please bring them up if you need clarification on what I mean here.

3. A formal argument (i.e., a syllogism) is not itself incomplete because it is “incomplete” (in the sense that you mean). This is a common mistake outside of philosophy that people make: it is not valid to claim a syllogism—which is logically sound, consists of a major and minor premise and a conclusion, and has its conclusion necessitated if the premises are true—is invalid because the reader, or recipient, requires further elaboration on a premise to understand it. A complete syllogism is comprised of a major premise, minor premise, and a conclusion that is necessitated therefrom.

4. There are good reasons philosophers stick to syllogisms, or pseudo-syllogism, and do not attempt an elaborate expounding of the position they are arguing for. Firstly, what you are noting is a deficiency in the understanding of the reader and not the syllogism itself; and, thusly, it is impractical to provide the exact amount of elaboration needed to expound the view because the knowledge a person comes in with, as a reader, varies. Secondly, to have a “complete” argument, in the sense you described, is impossible; and I can demonstrate it. For every premise I give, a person can validly ask for clarification; thusly, there is no end to the length of an argument that is fully “complete”. To take your math example, even if you added the implicit step of “2x + 1 – 1 = 3 – 1”, they can still ask for a proof of that as well (and are perfectly within their rights to)(but more on that example later, because I don’t think that is what you are trying to convey with that example).

Solve for X: 2X + 1 = 3
2x = 2
2x/2 = 2/2
Conclusion x = 1

I think what you are trying to convey is that there are implicit steps in this proof: but there aren’t any in my syllogism I gave you. Asking “what is intrinsic value?” in the proof that pain has intrinsic value is not an demonstration of an implicit step being skipped. If there were an implicit step in the syllogism, then you would be able to demonstrate that the syllogism is not logically valid; that’s how you know.

So, in short, I think you are confusing the need for further clarification (for a particular learner) with having implicit steps in an argument. An implicit step is in the logic, not the content, of the argument.

1. An evil demon exists.
2. Evil demons always compel people to do wrong.
3. Therefore if people do wrong, it might be an evil demon.

As I noted with your argument earlier, this argument is incomplete. The first thing I would ask is, "What's an evil demon?"

Some things worth noting:

1. That argument, unlike mine, is not a valid syllogism; so I surprised you used it. What you said is:

P1: p.
P2: q.
C: z → t

The logic is incredibly unsound. Here’s an example of your example that is a valid syllogism:

P1: If an evil demon exists and evil demons always compel people to do wrong, then “if a person does something wrong, then it could be an evil demon that compelled them to do it”. [p → q]

P2: An evil demon exists and evil demons always compel people to do wrong. [p]

C: Therefore, if a person does something wrong, it could be an evil demon that compelled them to do it. [q]{ Modus Ponens }

2. What makes your example argument incomplete, is not that you don’t understand what an evil demon is: that’s just a limitation you happen to have in terms of your knowledge. It is not the arguers job, when explicating a general argument, to write out a book on everything that a person may not understand: there job is to provide a quick and dirty argument, that is logically sound, for a particular conclusion. Syllogisms are entry-arguments into discussions. That you don’t understand what an evil demon is, has no bearing on if the argument provided was objective nor complete itself.

The last thing I would like to note for now, is that an analysis of emotions is not subjective when one is analyzing their natures. The nature of an emotion is objective, because it is not dependent on what a subject desires or believes about it. For example, I can strongly hate the idea of what hate is, but that doesn’t change what hate actually is. I don’t get to say: “I hate it, so now hate is really joy because I like joy”. Nope. So I hope you can see how the study of emotions is not subjective.

Secondly, not all states are emotions—not even the one’s I have given you up to this point. For example, the state of flourishing is clearly not an emotion.

I know you have a philosophical background, so I would like to say that if you are familiar with Aristotelian ethics, then it is worth mentioning that my view has many similarities to it (and of course many differences). If you are familiar with it, then it may make sense to you when I say that a state of eudamonia (1) is not a state of emotion and (2) is not subjective. If you aren’t familiar with Aristotle, then no worries...just thought you may be since you have such a background.

Bob

Hi Bob, sorry for the delay on this reply. I've started a new job and been much busier lately. Lets go ahead and wrap this one up as I think we're nearing the end. Feel free to take the last reply. :)

Firstly, what you are noting is a deficiency in the understanding of the reader and not the syllogism itself; and, thusly, it is impractical to provide the exact amount of elaboration needed to expound the view because the knowledge a person comes in with, as a reader, varies. — Bob Ross

True, but this isn't a formal philosophy paper. Its a discussion forum where you have a reader asking for elaboration. And prior to publication, there's usually high levels of review with potentially months of rewrites and careful citations. Its just you and me Bob!

From my view a syllogism is a tool to formalize an argument, but it is not the argument itself, especially on an informal philosophy board. The argument is what I'm addressing.

Secondly, to have a “complete” argument, in the sense you described, is impossible; and I can demonstrate it. For every premise I give, a person can validly ask for clarification; thusly, there is no end to the length of an argument that is fully “complete”. — Bob Ross

I'm not claiming you need an infinite set of validation. I've noted your argument is not complete enough for me to understand the logic that you're undertaking, and I'm not trying to needle in on any gotchas. Again, if you're unable to reach me or convey the idea you see accurately, it doesn't mean the argument is wrong. But from my point, what I do see is subjective to me, and I'm not seeing clear arguments that show otherwise.

Asking “what is intrinsic value?” in the proof that pain has intrinsic value is not an demonstration of an implicit step being skipped. If there were an implicit step in the syllogism, then you would be able to demonstrate that the syllogism is not logically valid; that’s how you know. — Bob Ross

I see it as vague and seems to be a blend of words without underlying concepts. Pointing out you may be missing implicit steps is just something to think about. As your student of your philosophy here, its not adding up to me, but I'm trying to help you show me otherwise.

The nature of an emotion is objective, because it is not dependent on what a subject desires or believes about it. — Bob Ross

If it is spoken about objectively, yes. If we would say, "Hate feels like this objectively," it would be wrong. If we say, "Hate is intense feeling of wanting to destroy something without remorse," then it can be seen as objective. We aren't describing the personal intensity or feeling of experiencing hate, but describing hate in terms of actions that a person will take.

The "nature" of a thing is a bit outdated of a term, and again, something I would want fully detailed in a good conversation. By nature you could mean, "reality" which just 'is'. What just 'is' could be, but often is not the same as what is known. Objective and subjective arguments are not about what 'is', but about the approach we take to claims of belief and knowledge. I prefer the 'definition' of the thing to its 'nature'.

But we're not studying emotions, we're studying 'value'. How you define value is through other people's emotional evaluation of something. That is by definition, subjective. If you defined value something like, "The emotion, rational decision, or societal context that causes humans to preserve, protect, or promote actions or states of being relative to other actions or states of being," then we would have something we could start with that we could objectively evaluate. Stating, "Value is an indefinable concept, we just know it innately" means its a subjectively defined word.

Secondly, not all states are emotions—not even the one’s I have given you up to this point. For example, the state of flourishing is clearly not an emotion. — Bob Ross

True, but to get to flourishing you first need the steps of defining value, then intrinsic value, and showing how we can objectively determine it. It seems like flourishing is a step you consider after establishing all of those basics. I mean, we all like flourishing. We all want flourishing to be good. But feelings are not objective proof.

I know you have a philosophical background, so I would like to say that if you are familiar with Aristotelian ethics, then it is worth mentioning that my view has many similarities to it — Bob Ross

I read Aristotle a very long time ago now. Let me tell you what I learned overall by reading many different philosophies. Any philosophy that was considered good enough for objective measure has been turned into a science. What you are reading are the leftovers, the failures. They are fantastic references to see where humanity has already explored and found to be a dead end. If you want to use some aspect of them that you still think are valuable (after all, its the end that's a failure, not some of the parts necessarily) then its best to make it your own and clearly explain to the audience what you mean.

You've seen this as well in your past posts. You reference one part of an older philosopher's work, and suddenly everyone has their opinion of that philosopher's end work, when you just want to talk about the part. Not explicitly telling people that these are often old, outdated, and ultimately philosophies that could not take the step to science, is in my opinion, philosophies' greatest failure as a study. It elevates the wrong points to discuss, does not explicitly teach the lessons it has learned, and does not clearly tell its students, "You are studying our failures."

So, one of the reasons why I engage so much (thank you by the way, you do as well!) is that I do not apply outside philosophical work to your work, I apply logic and discussions to your ideas. Its your definitions, your thoughts, and your outlook, not Aristotle's. Everything that can be said about Aristotle has likely already been said. But not everything about your idea has been said. :) Good discussion Bob, feel free to cap it.

Hi Bob, sorry for the delay on this reply. I've started a new job and been much busier lately. Lets go ahead and wrap this one up as I think we're nearing the end. Feel free to take the last reply.

No worries and sounds good!

From my view a syllogism is a tool to formalize an argument, but it is not the argument itself, especially on an informal philosophy board. The argument is what I'm addressing.

I don’t know what you mean by ‘argument’: it seems like you are just using it as a catch-all term for whatever a position entails.

I'm not claiming you need an infinite set of validation. I've noted your argument is not complete enough for me to understand the logic that you're undertaking, and I'm not trying to needle in on any gotchas.

That you need more information to understand it, does not make it incomplete—that’s all I was noting before.

If there’s more from me that you require, then I am more than happy to give it: just ask!

But from my point, what I do see is subjective to me, and I'm not seeing clear arguments that show otherwise.

That’s because, with all due respect, you don’t have a clear understanding of what an argument is. You have just been using it as a vague term for “what the position is expounding”.

Because you are using the term so vacuously, I cannot respond adequately to the critique. If there’s something specifically subjective about my “argument”, then please elaborate on it.

If it is spoken about objectively, yes. If we would say, "Hate feels like this objectively," it would be wrong. If we say, "Hate is intense feeling of wanting to destroy something without remorse," then it can be seen as objective. We aren't describing the personal intensity or feeling of experiencing hate, but describing hate in terms of actions that a person will take.

Do you now see how a study of the natures of emotion is objective, then?

The "nature" of a thing is a bit outdated of a term, and again, something I would want fully detailed in a good conversation.

By “nature”, I mean the essence of a thing; and this is surely not outdated at all.

. How you define value is through other people's emotional evaluation of something.

Are you claiming this, or thinking I am claiming this?

Stating, "Value is an indefinable concept, we just know it innately" means its a subjectively defined word.

Another issue I think you are having, is that you are not grasping the difference between a concept and its use. Determining whether or not something has value, and to what degree, has no relevance to whether or not we can verbally explicate the concept of value.

Moreover, that a concept is indefinable (in the sense of properly, verbally, explicating its meaning) does not entail it has no meaning; nor that that meaning is subjective. You are using “subjective” way too liberally (and vaguely) here.

True, but to get to flourishing you first need the steps of defining value, then intrinsic value, and showing how we can objectively determine it

Value is to have worth. Subjects assign value (worth) to things. Intrinsic value is value assigned to a thing in proportion to how intrinsically motivating it is. The state of flourishing is intrinsically valuable, because it motivates, as per its nature, towards its acquisition and preservation. We can determine this through (1) experience of the state (or similar ones) and (2) observance of other people in different states: we observe, based off of our knowledge of beings, how likely it is that the said ‘thing’ is motivational independently of any subjective disposition about it and which are not. Other than expounding more how to differentiate the two, I cannot be any clearer; because it cannot possibly be any clearer than this.

What you are reading are the leftovers, the failures. They are fantastic references to see where humanity has already explored and found to be a dead end

You are right insofar as there are always improvements to be made to any position, and wrong insofar as most of the most influential (and long-lastingly true) ideas were written long ago. It is a mistake to think that everything done in the past is a failure.

You've seen this as well in your past posts. You reference one part of an older philosopher's work, and suddenly everyone has their opinion of that philosopher's end work, when you just want to talk about the part.

True.

Not explicitly telling people that these are often old, outdated, and ultimately philosophies that could not take the step to science, is in my opinion, philosophies' greatest failure as a study.

I don’t think it is possible to turn most of philosophy into a science, because it is that which is predicated for science in the first place. Scientism never worked, nor will it ever work. Most of the fundamental studies are by necessity non-scientific.

Bob