The hard demarcation line doesn't show up until the after the Neolithic Revolution, with the advent of sophisticated urban societies. If a deliberate psychological threshold was set, I would date it to about 6,000 BC. — Vera Mont

The Neolithic Revolution, also called the Agricultural Revolution, marked the transition in human history from small, nomadic bands of hunter-gatherers to larger, agricultural settlements and early civilization. The Neolithic Revolution started around 10,000 B.C. — https://www.history.com/topics/pre-history/neolithic-revolution

For decades, researchers have regarded roughly 6,000-year-old Mesopotamian sites, in what’s now Iraq, Iran and Syria, as the world’s first cities. Those metropolises arose after agriculture made it possible to feed large numbers of people in year-round settlements. — https://www.sciencenews.org/article/ancient-urban-megasites-may-reshape-history-first-cities

:victory:

This aligns with Nicolai Hartmann's "ontological strata" approach also, for another perspective. — Pantagruel

Interesting, I'll look into it.

the priests are still there to set us straight: "just animals" have no souls. — Vera Mont

I'm more inclined to the Buddhist view, that all sentient beings suffer and deserve compassion. Buddhists also believe that humans may be reborn into the animal realm (presumably from behaving like animals, as plenty do :-) ) Nevertheless Buddhists still recognise that only in human form can one progress in dharma, as only humans have the required intelligence (notwithstanding that the Buddha appears as an animal in the Jataka tales his previous lives.) Like them, I don't think there is a hard-and-fast boundary between humans and other animals, but I do think that the distinction between animals and humans is a difference that makes a real difference. There are horizons of being open to humans that are invisible to animals (and amounting to considerably more than just 'quarreling and fighting' as you seem to say.)

One of the consequences of popular Darwinism is negation of those real differences, which are existential, spiritual, intellectual, and philosophical. I'm not in favour of intelligent design, other than with respect to the shortcomings of reductionism. But as far as biology is concerned, and as the evolutionary ideologues such as Dennett and Dawkins continually say, human life can be ultimately reduced to, and explained in terms of, the fundamental drives that characterise all other existence, summarised as 'the four F's' (Feeding, fighting, fleeing, and reproduction.) As I mentioned in another thread, that attitude effectively negates the possibility of philosophy at least as it was always understood by those who developed the tradition.

So what I am asking about your claim "that humans crossed a threshold with the advent of language, tool use, and so on", is to say whether this is objective or subjective. — Metaphysician Undercover

Objective - and obvious, isn't it? Again, actual language, as distinct from linear communication through calls or displays, is unique to h. sapiens. As is tool-making, philosophy, technology, art, science, mathematics, music, drama. As is the capacity to reflect on the nature of being and question the meaning of existence.

Hey even plenty of naturalists see this. Julian Huxley said:

Man is that part of reality in which and through which the cosmic process has become conscious and has begun to comprehend itself. His supreme task is to increase that conscious comprehension and to apply it as fully as possible to guide the course of events. In other words, his role is to discover his destiny as an agent of the evolutionary process, in order to fulfill it more adequately.

His brother Alduous, with whom he discussed these ideas all his life, agreed with that, but also added the spiritual dimension absent from Julian's account, in such books as The Perennial Philosophy, a modern spiritual classic.

I'm more inclined to the Buddhist view, that all sentient beings suffer and deserve compassion. — Wayfarer

Of course, that's much better. But the Christians have an out for that: things without souls are not sentient. And that brings us full circle to the behaviorists. Categorize, dismiss, ignore the evidence of your senses and reason, stick to the dogma, and you can do anything you want to rats, cats, monkeys and pigs.

Buddhists also believe that humans may be reborn into the animal realm — Wayfarer

Not for behaving like animals; for behaving like bad humans. And that - being reborn as a sparrow - may be what it would take to convince some anthrosupremacists that we all experience pretty much alike.

Nevertheless Buddhists still recognise that only in human form can one progress in dharma, — Wayfarer

What other animals needs it? They're already okay. They don't require enlightenment, salvation, transcendence or any other supernatural nonsense. They're content to live in the real world. Each and every one of the blessed creatures is a staunch atheist.

the fundamental drives that characterise all other existence, summarised as 'the four F's' (Feeding, fighting, fleeing, and reproduction.) As I mentioned in another thread, that attitude effectively negates the possibility of philosophy — Wayfarer

I don't see why. Just add another F - fantasizing. That includes telling stories, creating art and inventing religions. That story-making drive is very strong in humans. If you're looking for a single unique feature of the species, that's the one I'd recommend. Cats may act like prima donnas, but I don't believe they imagine themselves the star of a movie the way each of us does.

As is tool-making — Wayfarer

Nope. I've mentioned this twice before. https://www.popularmechanics.com/science/animals/g39714258/animals-using-tools/

As is the capacity to reflect on the nature of being and question the meaning of existence. — Wayfarer

That one is a distinctly unique liability.

But as far as biology is concerned, and as the evolutionary ideologues such as Dennett and Dawkins continually say, human life can be ultimately reduced to, and explained in terms of, the fundamental drives that characterise all other existence, summarised as 'the four F's' (Feeding, fighting, fleeing, and reproduction.) — Wayfarer

Looks like misrepresentation to me. Citations?

Citations? — wonderer1

“We are survival machines – robot vehicles blindly programmed to preserve the selfish molecules known as genes. This is a truth which still fills me with astonishment.”
― Richard Dawkins, The Selfish Gene

“I’m a robot, and you’re a robot, but that doesn’t make us any less dignified or wonderful or lovable or responsible for our actions,” Daniel Dennett said. “Why does our dignity depend on our being scientifically inexplicable?”

Examples could be multiplied indefinitely.

I tried to introduce Thomas Nagel into the conversation months ago, as he's an analytic philosopher with no brief for religion, which was dismissed by you as an 'appeal to authority'. No, it wasn't an appeal to authority, I did so to provide an example of a philosophical critique of neo-darwinian materialism (his words). His book Mind and Cosmos: Why the Materialist Neo-Darwinian Conception of Nature is Almost Certainly False (2012) is about this topic. I don't expect that you would agree with it, but it is on-topic. There's a précis of the main argument in the NY Times (I don't think it's paywalled). I'm happy to discuss it further.

summarised as 'the four F's' (Feeding, fighting, fleeing, and reproduction.) — Wayfarer

Fecundating? Or fertilizing?

Fecundating? Or fertilizing? — hypericin

Come on now.

Interesting.
This bit

but such a description, however complete, will leave out the subjective essence of the experience – how it is from the point of view of its subject

is slightly out of date. There have recently been some quite convincing virtual reality attempts to help humans what cats see, hear what bats hear, etc. It's not the full experience - we will never really know what it's like to be a dolphin or hummingbird - but we can get an approximation.
The important point here is the effort. Still using scientific equipment, we're trying to see the world from another species' perspective, the better to understand. I think the key is to distance ourselves from rigid 'objectivity' - which is often another term for objectification - and let our other faculties participate in a quest for knowledge; accept the information we get from our senses.

If you can identify the yellow paint spot on your own nose in the mirror, you can also identify the distress of a robin defending her nest or the rage of an abused elephant or the sorrow of a donkey who has lost his friend.

here have recently been some quite convincing virtual reality attempts to help humans what cats see, hear what bats hear, etc. — Vera Mont

Oh? I work in the VR space, I'm interested in this. Do you have a link?

Of course, we can make a stab at mapping the sensory ranges of other species onto our own. But this doesn't truly give us the slightest idea of what it is actually, subjectively like to be another animal.

Come on now. — Lionino

Oh! :yikes: Of course, "father".

we can get an approximation. — Vera Mont

Sure. But you’re aware of David Chalmers distinction between the ‘easy’ and ‘hard’ problems? I would think approximations and simulations are the former.

F***king, of course, but as a rule I avoid profanity. :yikes:

. I think the key is to distance ourselves from rigid 'objectivity' - which is often another term for objectification - and let our other faculties participate in a quest for knowledge; accept the information we get from our senses. — Vera Mont

:100: But when it comes to the question of the nature of being, there might be more to consider than the empirical.

“We are survival machines – robot vehicles blindly programmed to preserve the selfish molecules known as genes. This is a truth which still fills me with astonishment.”
― Richard Dawkins, The Selfish Gene

“I’m a robot, and you’re a robot, but that doesn’t make us any less dignified or wonderful or lovable or responsible for our actions,” Daniel Dennett said. “Why does our dignity depend on our being scientifically inexplicable?” — Wayfarer

These are expressions of physicalist reductionism, but this doesn't entail the more drastic reduction to "the 4 Fs".

F***king, of course, but as a rule I avoid profanity. — Wayfarer

Aw, I had a few more Fs lined up.

Looks like misrepresentation to me. Citations? — wonderer1

“We are survival machines – robot vehicles blindly programmed to preserve the selfish molecules known as genes. This is a truth which still fills me with astonishment.”
― Richard Dawkins, The Selfish Gene

“I’m a robot, and you’re a robot, but that doesn’t make us any less dignified or wonderful or lovable or responsible for our actions,” Daniel Dennett said. “Why does our dignity depend on our being scientifically inexplicable?”

Examples could be multiplied indefinitely. — Wayfarer

Yes, per Dawkins, chickens are literally nothing more than an egg’s way of replicating itself. Hence, all phenotypes (both physical and psychological) are utterly unimportant biologically other than for their capacity to replicate genotypes—more specifically, the immortal selfish genes from which genotypes are constituted.

And this, then, seems to me too to essentially result in an exceedingly biased valuing of the four “Fs” addressed in terms of biology. Which, btw, I often hear echoed in many a layperson who proclaims that the sole purpose to human sexual intercourse can only be that of reproduction (to me utter BS, but this would be a different topic).

That said, it is however to be acknowledged that Dawkins also tells us:

“We, alone on earth, can rebel against the tyranny of the selfish replicators.”
― Richard Dawkins, The Selfish Gene

… Which to me, sure as the earth I walk on, directly entails there occurring some form of Cartesian dualism between biology and the biology-resultant human … ego(?). This being something that no monist would accept.

-------

Personally, while I fully acknowledge the exceedingly large gulf between humanity and all other, hence, “lesser” lifeforms, biological evolution necessitates that all life is constituted of the same stuff but in different ways and in different measures (here specifically thinking of humans' capacity for sapience)—this irrespective of whether this stuff of life is understood to be in any way spiritual (such as Buddhism and Hinduism can, for example, uphold) or else strictly material. Hence, if our highly evolved consciousness is contingent on the workings of our complex CNS, then animals with less complex CNSs would necessarily be endowed with less evolved forms of consciousness. … For example, such that dogs are more sapient than are ants.

Not quite. All kinds of sciences deal with 'different kinds of entities'. Ontology strictly speaking is about kinds of beings. It might be considered obsolete by some. I'm not appealing to Schumacher as an authority, simply as an example of what I consider a valid ontological schema. — Wayfarer

What's the difference between "kinds of entities" and "kinds of beings"?

Why do you consider this obviously anthropocentric 'great chain of being" idea a valid ontological schema? I mean on what logical, conceptual or empirical grounds apart from simply preferring it because it accords with how you would like things to be.

Objective - and obvious, isn't it? Again, actual language, as distinct from linear communication through calls or displays, is unique to h. sapiens. As is tool-making, philosophy, technology, art, science, mathematics, music, drama. As is the capacity to reflect on the nature of being and question the meaning of existence. — Wayfarer

Well Vera Mont clearly doesn't think that it is objective and obvious, and I'm not convinced either way. Let me see if I can put this in another way.

Look at the difference between plants and animals. If there is such a thing as a "highly significant difference" which marks a threshold in evolving life forms, wouldn't this qualify as such a threshold? Plants are rooted in the ground, whereas animals are free to move around and sense things. Now, look at the difference between human beings and other mammals. Human beings communicate, socialize, cooperate, and build things. So we might also say that this is a highly significant difference which marks a threshold. But how many other things can we look at as highly significant differences which mark a threshold? do the development of a heart, lungs, brain, legs, wings, hands, not qualify as highly significant differences? It appears to me like we may call the difference between human beings and other mammals a "highly significant difference", but that's just one in a multitude highly significant differences we observe between life forms. Therefore, in reality life is rife with "highly significant differences" and "thresholds". But this makes that one specific difference or threshold, just another difference, and nothing special.

Neither of those say, "human life can be ultimately reduced to, and explained in terms of, the fundamental drives that characterise all other existence, summarised as 'the four F's'".

So it still looks like were misrepresenting Dennett and Dawkins to me.

Oh? I work in the VR space, I'm interested in this. Do you have a link? — hypericin

Sorry. I saw it on "The Nature of Things" a couple of years ago, but don't recall which episode. There have been quite a few, since about 2018 dealing with animal intelligence, perception and behaviour.

But this doesn't truly give us the slightest idea of what it is actually, subjectively like to be another animal. — hypericin

It does give us the slightest idea. Nobody can ever truly know another's subjective experience - that's a constant. But it's not important to be a rat or a marlin; what's important is to put yourself in their place, as any compassionate human being would put himself in the place of another human being who has different capabilities, experiences and world-view from ones' own, to recognize the feelings, impulses and motivations as being similar to our own.

But you’re aware of David Chalmers distinction between the ‘easy’ and ‘hard’ problems? — Wayfarer

Not really. I'm not terribly interested in solving the "problem" of consciousness, because I don't consider it any more of a problem than sunlight. It just is. And ain't we lucky to have it?

But when it comes to the question of the nature of being, there might be more to consider than the empirical. — Wayfarer

Like what?

I'm not terribly interested in solving the "problem" of consciousness, because I don't consider any more of a problem than sunlight. — Vera Mont

It's a question in philosophy of mind, and one I'm interested in.

Like what? — Vera Mont

Philosophical questions, such as the one above, and the one we're discussing.

“We, alone on earth, can rebel against the tyranny of the selfish replicators.”
― Richard Dawkins, The Selfish Gene — javra

I do give credit to Dawkins for at least recognising the issue. I saw him in a TV debate once, and an audience member asked him if we should live according to evolutionary principles, and he said heavens no, it is a terrible way to try and live. But he seems completely unaware that his polemics, as distinct from his science writing, are aimed at methodically destroying any idea of there being a higher purpose or higher life. Like, he recognizes that the selfish gene gives no basis for ethics, but then what does? Science has no inherent moral orientation, it is concerned with facts, not oughts (as per Hume and the is/ought division.)

Look at the difference between plants and animals. If there is such a thing as a "highly significant difference" which marks a threshold in evolving life forms, wouldn't this qualify as such a threshold? — Metaphysician Undercover

Sure, I already acknowledged that in the post above about Schumacher's ontology. You know perfectly well that Aristotle said reason marked the difference between humans and animals.

While the term Rational Animal itself originates in scholasticism, it reflects the Aristotelian view of man as a creature distinguished by a rational principle. In the Nicomachean Ethics I.13, Aristotle states that the human being has a rational principle (Greek: λόγον ἔχον), on top of the nutritive life shared with plants, and the instinctual life shared with other animals, i. e., the ability to carry out rationally formulated projects.[2] That capacity for deliberative imagination was equally singled out as man's defining feature in De anima III.11.[3] While seen by Aristotle as a universal human feature, the definition applied to wise and foolish alike, and did not in any way imply necessarily the making of rational choices, as opposed to the ability to make them. — Wiki

You can see the Platonic lineage in the distinction between the rational and appetitive parts of the soul.

What's the difference between "kinds of entities" and "kinds of beings"? — Janus

Ontology is concerned with classification of types, not the enumeration of all the different kinds of things. Anyway, the point is only that I'm arguing for the ontological distinctions between inorganic, organic, sentient, and rational. That while h. sapiens is clearly descended from a common ancestory with simians, reason, language, self-consciousness, and so on, make us different from other animals. Why this point has to be laboured, why it is controversial or needs argument, I confess that I don't understand.

//

I would have thought an obvious difference between humans and animals, is that we're capable of moral choice (unless you accept determinism, which I don't.) As philosopher Richard Polt puts it:

People can perform extraordinary acts of altruism, including kindness toward other species — or they can utterly fail to be altruistic, even toward their own children. So whatever tendencies we may have inherited leave ample room for variation; our choices will determine which end of the spectrum we approach. This is where ethical discourse comes in — not in explaining how we’re “built,” but in deliberating on our own future acts.Should I cheat on this test? Should I give this stranger a ride? Knowing how my selfish and altruistic feelings evolved doesn’t help me decide at all. Most, though not all, moral codes advise me to cultivate altruism. But since the human race has evolved to be capable of a wide range of both selfish and altruistic behavior, there is no reason to say that altruism is superior to selfishness in any biological sense.

In fact, the very idea of an “ought” is foreign to evolutionary theory. It makes no sense for a biologist to say that some particular animal should be more cooperative, much less to claim that an entire species ought to aim for some degree of altruism. If we decide that we should neither “dissolve society” through extreme selfishness..nor become “angelic robots” like ants, we are making an ethical judgment, not a biological one. Likewise, from a biological perspective it has no significance to claim that Ishould be more generous than I usually am, or that a tyrant ought to be deposed and tried.

In short, a purely evolutionary ethics makes ethical discourse meaningless. — Anything but Human

These are expressions of physicalist reductionism, but this doesn't entail the more drastic reduction to "the 4 Fs". — hypericin

The point is, as far as a purely biological theory is concerned, what else can there be? We forget that On the Origin of Species is exactly that - an account of the origin of species. One can completely accept the evolutionary account of human origins, as I do, without accepting that, therefore, evolutionary biology explains everything about us, as the 'ultra-Darwinists' seem to want to do. It has the effect of depicting all our faculties and attributes in terms of the way they 'contribute to survival' (or not.) As such, it results in a kind of biologically-oriented pragmatism.

It's a question in philosophy of mind, and one I'm interested in. — Wayfarer

I get that there is a question, or maybe more than one. What I'm asking is, what do you have to consider? What information do you have to work with beyond the empirical?

I would have thought an obvious difference between humans and animals, is that we're capable of moral choice — Wayfarer

Once again, classifying degrees as distinct and different categories. Wolves and groundhogs have rules of behaviour - they just don't make a big verbose fuss about it: if somebody misbehaves, they snarl or snap at him; they don't put him on the rack or cut out his tongue.
However, I agree that we are unique in inventing the notion of sin and taboo. So that's two exclusive characteristics of the human animal.

What information do you have to work with beyond the empirical? — Vera Mont

What can be inferred, what it means that something is the way it is.

Wolves and groundhogs have rules of behaviour - they just don't make a big verbose fuss about it: if somebody misbehaves, they snarl or snap at him; they don't put him on the rack or cut out his tongue. — Vera Mont

Right! They're not moral, nor immoral. They don't consider the consequences or weigh up their decisions. They act; they don't bear the burden of self-consciousness. Sin and taboo are more than just 'inventions' - they arise from the fact that we can sense right and wrong. That's what I meant before about humans being 'existential animals' - we can ask, what does existence mean, why am I here?

But he seems completely unaware that his polemics, as distinct from his science writing, are aimed at methodically destroying any idea of there being a higher purpose or higher life. — Wayfarer

Having read much, if not most, of Darwin’s works, I judge that just as Darwin was opposed to the notion of what become known as Social Darwinism, he would have also been staunchly opposed to the notion of the selfish gene. I’ve mentioned this before on the forum: there are very well argued (both empirically and rationally) opposing views, with The Genial Gene being one such example.

As to “a higher purpose or higher life”—to fan the flames a bit—we all live by this credo as undoubtedly as we all know in our heart of hearts that solipsism is frigging joke (if it even warrants laughing at). All evolutionary biologists know that, when objectively addressed, all life without exception is equally evolved from predecessors. But no evolutionary biologist thereby holds that the eating of lesser lifeforms somehow equates to a form of cannibalism, or that the killing of weeds equates to the killing of humans. We all (sanely speaking) know that the value of a human life far exceeds the value of chickens’ life, to not even mention that of grass as a lifeform. We all sanely know that humans are more evolved than chickens, which are more evolved than weeds or grass. And we thereby hold more compassion for chickens than we hold for grass. Yet, unlike in the first sense of evolution wherein all coexisting life’s intrinsic value is identical, in the second here mentioned sense of evolution—wherein some lifeforms are more evolved than others—we as a sapient species appraise the value of a chicken’s life to be of greater worth than that of a weed’s. Not because we dislike weeds per se, but because we recognize that the chicken’s degree of awareness is far more advanced than that of the weed’s. This second sense of evolution—without which we might starve to death or else might become more depraved than any lesser lifeform has ever been—directly speaks of an evolution toward greater sapience.

This evolution toward greater sapience, then, to me directly speaks of the “chain of being” you are making mention of. Something we, again, innately acknowledge in our day to day living of life but which physicalism/materialism cannot easily, if at all, account for—other than, maybe, by the proclaiming of absolute relativity when it comes to values … the very same values by which physicalism/materialism is upheld … making the physicalist’s position sort’a self-defeating. Something like the notion of "the Good", on the other hand, can account for this very type of evolution toward greater sapience.

Science has no inherent moral orientation, it is concerned with facts, not oughts (as per Hume and the is/ought division.) — Wayfarer

Here addressing pure empirical science--rather than scientism: I find that science and scientists in general are at times voraciously interested in discovering the ever-truer nature of reality and that, just as with the best of philosophy and philosophers, this interest is deemed to be a good in itself, i.e. of intrinsic value. As such, it is not facts per se that are of concern but greater and deeper understanding regarding the nature of reality, maybe ultimately of being itself ... which to me again speaks to an evolution toward greater sapience, this via desire to so become.

Wolves and groundhogs have rules of behaviour - they just don't make a big verbose fuss about it: if somebody misbehaves, they snarl or snap at him; they don't put him on the rack or cut out his tongue. — Vera Mont

Right! They're not moral, nor immoral. — Wayfarer

I'll try no to belabor this issue much. We humans are on average far more familiar with domesticated animals than with wild ones. As such, anyone who has had a dog will know that dogs give good enough indications of experiencing shame and guilt at things they know they ought not have done (according to their owners). And some dogs have been known to be quite altruistic. This isn't any proof of lesser animals having some awareness of right and wrong (and, hence, a far less evolved sense of moral judgment by comparison to the average human) ... but then, neither is there any definitive proof of lesser animals being anything else but automata. :wink:

This evolution toward greater sapience, then, to me directly speaks of the “chain of being” you are making mention of. Something we, again, innately acknowledge in our day to day living of life but which physicalism/materialism cannot easily, if at all, account for—other than, maybe, by the proclaiming of absolute relativity when it comes to values … the very same values by which physicalism/materialism is upheld … making the physicalist’s position sort’a self-defeating. — javra

Couldn't have said it better. And yes, and there are notable acts of animal bravery and even self-sacrifice. There are service dogs (even service pidgeons!) of extraordinary courage and fortitude.

:blush: Cheers!

Sure, I already acknowledged that in the post above about Schumacher's ontology. — Wayfarer

"Mineral" = m
"Plant" = m + x
"Animal" = m + x + y
"Human" = m + x + y + z

In his theory, these three factors (x, y and z) represent ontological discontinuities — Wikipedia

This is what I think is not at all objective and obvious, and I also disagree with it. I see an ontological discontinuity between inanimate and alive. That discontinuity (signified as x above) is what Aristotle explained with his concept of "soul", and which forms the basis of vitalism. And, it is this ontological discontinuity which renders the common notion of abiogenesis as inadequate.

The other differences mentioned above as y and z display no such discontinuity. In fact, there is very much evidence for a continuity between them, as demonstrated by Darwin in support of his evolutionary theory. Furthermore, the continuity between them is described by Aristotle in "On the Soul". He describes all the powers of living beings as potentials, capacities, the powers of self-nutrition, self-movement, sensation, and intellection. Notice that intellection is classed with the others.

Each of these various potentials, are dependent on the material body, matter as potential, but they are properly attributed to the soul which is the active principle that activates and operates them. So there is a continuity between all the powers of the soul (intellection included), as shown by Darwin, each being dependent on the material body which provides the specific potency/act relation, as described by Aristotle, and these are all understood through their similarity.

However, there is a distinct discontinuity between living and inanimate, and this is understood through a principle of actuality, the active principle responsible for the causation of the material body which provides the potential, and this is known as the soul.

What can be inferred, what it means that something is the way it is. — Wayfarer

That's not information; that's conjecture. AFAICS, there is no reliable source of information on what it means to be what it is. Who assumes there has to be a meaning?

They don't consider the consequences or weigh up their decisions — Wayfarer

Of course they do! They have strategy and method and rules and consequences. Less convoluted ones than in human societies, but that's degree again, not kind.

Sin and taboo are more than just 'inventions' - they arise from the fact that we can sense right and wrong. — Wayfarer

Then why do these concepts change from culture to culture, age to age?

Here is the contradiction:
Humans attribute rationality to mankind (ignoring evidence of gross irrationality on the part of individual specimens as well as mobs and nations). Humans claim exclusive possession of this rationality (ignoring the rational behaviour of other species). Humans assume that a sophisticated intelligence and communication system makes us superior to all other life on earth (ignoring exclusive capabilities that other species have and we lack). Humans declare that no other species is sentient, because we can't conclusively prove that they are (ignoring the evidence of our own interaction with them). Humans deny that other animals have a subjective experience, because it's not measurable by scientific means nor directly experiencable by human beings.
At the same time this complex intelligence and communication skill, tool making and skyscraper building ability and complex hierarchical thinking is presumed to exist in every single member of the human species (I don't always see it in my fellow humans). All humans are credited with subjective experience and sentience, even though it's not measurable by scientific means nor experienced from outside the individual experiencer.

And the cherry on top of the whipped cream of our tippy-toppery is a 'moral sense' that can't be located, measured or verified by scientific means, but is presumed to exist (without evolutionary antecedents) and humans to have a monopoly on it. This unproven assertion proves our categorical distinction from other animals.

My belief in some level of consciousness among the various species is that brains evolved their capacities over geologic time scales, and our brains are only a recent iteration. Perception, memory, organized behavior, "thinking"*** and so forth are present in both birds and bees and in us--at levels more or less appropriate to the species. Except for us -- we have way too much brain function which we need to defend ourselves from excessive abilities.

Do the various species possess consciousness? It seems to be difficult to explain consciousness in ourselves (how it works, where it is located, and so on), so it will be difficult to explain how the dog laying at my feet is conscious, or the squirrels cleaning out the fire feeder, or the crows collecting in the trees... possess consciousness. Maybe it isn't explainable by us, paragons of animals, and if so our inability to explain it doesn't deprive us of consciousness. I think but I can't witness myself producing thought from many billions of neurons.

I'm late to this discussion, so somebody has probably said this already.

*** A science fiction writer spoke these words through a character: "You have to stay alert! In the jungle, everybody is thinking." 'Everybody' being all the predator and prey species.

Ontology is concerned with classification of types, not the enumeration of all the different kinds of things. — Wayfarer

As I understand it ontology is concerned with the nature of being and with the different kinds of entities. — Janus

How is "classification of types" not equivalent to being concerned with the different kinds of entities?

That while h. sapiens is clearly descended from a common ancestory with simians, reason, language, self-consciousness, and so on, make us different from other animals. Why this point has to be laboured, why it is controversial or needs argument, I confess that I don't understand. — Wayfarer

I believe other animals are capable of reasoning and presymbolic language. The only difference I see is the advent of symbolic language with humans. I also think this is pretty much the standard view, so I'm not sure why you seem to think it isn't the standard view.

The other point is that all kinds of animals are different to the other kinds, more or less. Human ability to use symbolic language does make us unique, but I see no reason to think that signals any kind of supernatural influence, if that is what you think is missing in the modern view.

I would have thought an obvious difference between humans and animals, is that we're capable of moral choice (unless you accept determinism, which I don't.) — Wayfarer

Symbolic language allows us to reflect on our experiences, actions, lives and deaths. This is where the idea of moral responsibility comes into play. I see no reason to believe in any libertarian idea of free will—as Schopenhauer puts it " "A man can do what he wants, but not want what he wants", which I take to mean that, apart from external constraints, you are free to do whatever you want but you are not free to choose what it is that you want.

.

That's not information; that's conjecture. — Vera Mont

Not so. Reasoned inference enables discoveries of facts impossible to obtain by observation alone. Science relies on it, not to mention everyday rational thought.

And the cherry on top of the whipped cream of our tippy-toppery is a 'moral sense' that can't be located, measured or verified by scientific means — Vera Mont

Those very means you call into question in your initial response. And here, you're verging on positivism.

I think humans need to take responsibility for the fact of their difference to other species. We hold their lives in our hand - something which, of course, many dedicated biologists and environmental scientists are highly aware of.

Do the various species possess consciousness? It seems to be difficult to explain consciousness in ourselves (how it works, where it is located, and so on), so it will be difficult to explain how the dog laying at my feet is conscious, or the squirrels cleaning out the fire feeder, or the crows collecting in the trees... possess consciousness. — BC

I don't find it difficult. Sure, I don't know what it's like to be a dog, but it's also not something entirely remote or alien from human experience. I mentioned before the Buddhist categorisation of 'sentient beings', which casts a pretty wide net, covering basically any organism with senses. There's vast diversity amongst them but also something in common. (Mind you I also don't believe that consciousness as such is something that can or should be explained, but that's another argument.)

I also think this is pretty much the standard view, so I'm not sure why you seem to think it isn't the standard view. — Janus

I agree that h. sapiens evolved and that language also evolved but my argument is that we've crossed an evolutionary threshold which sets us apart from other animals. We are able, among many other things, to interrogate the nature of being through philosophy, or the size and age of the Universe, through science.