In practise the math always refers to something. — Metaphysician Undercover

In application, math is used to refer to something. But math itself does not refer. This was the great philosophical insight that followed the discovery of the logical consistency of non-Euclidean geometry.

That's fair. I didn't actually think you were making an argument, it just didn't know where you were coming from. To me it looked like you had misunderstood the intention of my quote. — Apustimelogist

I was trying to be helpful, but I only ended up hijacking and essentially terminating the thread. Not my intention at all. Perhaps someone has something interesting to say about information, randomness, entropy, and murky Youtube videos. I've seen better work from Veritasium.

But math itself does not refer. — fishfry

Math is a field of study, it's not a symbol, sign, or even a group of such, so it's not used to refer to anything. But that's irrelevant. So this discussion is useless from the start

I don't believe all information in the universe is predictable because of heisenbergs uncertainty principle. Sure 99% of things can be non random but even if the fundamental 1% is that throws a huge spanner in the works — Benj96

I don't agree with the use of random here. Stochastic phenomena are just simply not precise (this is the word I was looking for) as an analysis. Commonly, (and I say erroneously) it is the precision upon which we judge whether something is random, or in the case of Heisenberg, uncertain. But to further judge a phenomena as undetermined is really troubling.

If randomness is born from the very fundamentals of physics (which quantum physics seems to suggest), then even if everything from that point onwards is deterministic, explicable and predictable, the underlying origin is still random and unpredictable.

In that case randomness would appear to trump the determined and explicable, the patterned. If we cannot know exactly where particles will appear or annihilate but only give a statistical wave function of the distribution of possible locations, that would entail a trickle up effect of integral chaos within the system. — Benj96

No. No one says that "random" (here I am speaking your language) occurrences are unanalyzable. The difficulty we face is with precision. All data are analyzable, but not all data can be analyzed with precision. That is the difference.

I don't agree with the use of random here. Stochastic phenomena are just simply not precise (this is the word I was looking for) as an analysis. Commonly, (and I say erroneously) it is the precision upon which we judge whether something is random, or in the case of Heisenberg, uncertain. But to further judge a phenomena as undetermined is really troubling. — L'éléphant

I agree with this. The appearance of randomness is created by the system which analyzes, it is not a feature of the thing being analyzed. That the analyzing system does not apprehend the patterns being searched for and produces the conclusion of "random", is an indication that the system is not properly formulated for the application it is put to.

The appearance of randomness is created by the system which analyzes, it is not a feature of the thing being analyzed. That the analyzing system does not apprehend the patterns being searched for and produces the conclusion of "random", is an indication that the system is not properly formulated for the application it is put to. — Metaphysician Undercover

I couldn't have said it better.
Randomness is not a feature of the thing being analyzed.

I agree with this. The appearance of randomness is created by the system which analyzes, it is not a feature of the thing being analyzed. — Metaphysician Undercover

It's possible that sometimes it is.

For example if we flip a coin, that's only epistemically random, in the sense that it's a purely mechanical procedure that could be predicted by Newtonian physics, if we only knew all the variables precisely enough we could predict the flip. Yet since we can't, it's random in a practical sense. It's random only relative to what we can know. Hence epistemically random.

Compare to something that's ontologically random -- inherently random in and of itself.

Some people think quantum events are ontologically random.

But perhaps the low order bit of the femtosecond timestamp of the next neutrino to hit your detector was determined at the moment of the big bang. If it was, that would mean the entire universe is determined. But if not ... then there are things that are ontologically random.

It's an open question, but ontological randomness is at least logically possible, as far as we know.

I don't believe this is correct. The random nature of the 'quantum leap' is what caused Einstein to say that he doesn't believe God plays dice. He always maintained that quantum theory must be incomplete, as a consequence of this and other aspects of it, but I think subsequent discoveries have not favoured his objections.

to further judge a phenomena as undetermined is really troubling. — L'éléphant

I think the popular idea is that the elementary particles are lurking in a kind of fuzzy cloud, awaiting measurement; when in reality, they have no definite location, and therefore no definite existence, until they’re measured. Until then there are only degrees of probability, there are not definite particles in the realistic sense generally understood. This is the subject of comments by John Wheeler, in one of his popular essays, Law Without Law. Here he is referring to interpretations of a particular experiment in quantum physics which is associated with the well-known 'observer problem':

The dependence of what is observed upon the choice of experimental arrangement made Einstein unhappy. It conflicts with the (realist) view that the Universe exists "out there" independent of all acts of observation. In contrast Neils Bohr stressed that we confront here an inescapable new feature of nature... In struggling to make clear to Einstein the central point as he saw it, Bohr found himself forced to introduce the word "phenomenon". In today's words Bohr's point - and the central point of quantum theory - can be put into a single, simple sentence. "No elementary phenomenon is a phenomenon until it is a registered (observed) phenomenon". It is wrong to speak of the "route" of the photon in the experiment of the beam splitter. It is wrong to attribute a tangibility to the photon in all its travel from the point of entry to its last instant of flight. A phenomenon is not yet a phenomenon until it has been brought to a cloase by an irreversible act of amplfification such as ...the triggering of a photodetector. In broader terms, we find that nature at the quantum level is not a machine that goes its inexorable way. Instead, what answer we get depends on the question we put, the experiment we arrange, the registering device we choose. We are inescapably involved in bringing about that which appears to happen.

The implication being, the Universe does not comprise independently-existing elementary particles which exist as a kind of material ultimate. That is no longer a new realisation, although the implications are still being debated.

It's an open question, but ontological randomness is at least logically possible, as far as we know. — fishfry

Ontological randomness may be logically possible but it's philosophically repugnant. The problem being that if something is deemed as random, it is in that sense unintelligible. So if something is deemed as ontologically random, and it is considered to be unintelligible, then there is no will to attempt at figuring it out.

Now the problem is that if something appears to be random there is no way of knowing whether it is epistemologically random, or ontologically random, because of the unintelligibility of it. So we won't know which until we figure it out, therefore we must assume it to be epistemologically random. And even if it is ontologically random, we will still never know that this is the case, so we will always have to assume that it is epistemologically random, and try to figure it out. The category of "ontological randomness" is absolutely useless.

Ontological randomness may be logically possible but it's philosophically repugnant. — Metaphysician Undercover

Is there a name for the logical fallacy that "P is repugnant, therefore not-P." That happened with non-Euclidean geometry. A priest worked out the implications of rejecting the parallel postulate, and derived results that he regarded as geometrically repugnant. So he rejected them.

Later mathematicians realized that although his conclusions were seemingly repugnant, they were nevertheless logically consistent; and perfectly true, in certain axiom systems.

Looked it up. Giovanni Girolamo Saccheri. He discovered non-Euclidean geometry in 1733 but rejected it because, "the hypothesis of the acute angle is absolutely false; because it is repugnant to the nature of straight lines".

Striking that he used the same word you used, repugnant. But repugnance is not a logically argument, and what's repugnant in 1733 may turn out to be exactly what's needed to model general relativity in 1915. You never know.

The problem being that if something is deemed as random, it is in that sense unintelligible. So if something is deemed as ontologically random, and it is considered to be unintelligible, then there is no will to attempt at figuring it out. — Metaphysician Undercover

This is the argument from despair. If the universe is random my life is meaningless so I might as well kill myself. Isn't this what the Existentialists try to figure out? The problem of living in a meaningless world.

So one can despair of the meaninglessness; or one can go to the beach. It's a personal choice. We're alive, we might as well make the most of it. We know that life can be extinguished in an instant, so we make the most of it. Either way you look at it, it's not an argument against the randomness of the universe. It's another argument from "feelings, nothing more than feelings ..."

Now the problem is that if something appears to be random there is no way of knowing whether it is epistemologically random, or ontologically random, because of the unintelligibility of it. — Metaphysician Undercover

I agree with this.

So we won't know which until we figure it out, therefore we must assume it to be epistemologically random. — Metaphysician Undercover

Fair enough.

And even if it is ontologically random, we will still never know that this is the case, so we will always have to assume that it is epistemologically random, and try to figure it out. The category of "ontological randomness" is absolutely useless. — Metaphysician Undercover

I agree. That's the existentialist solution, isn't it? I actually don't know the details of the philosophy. But if you are saying that, "We don't know what life is, but we might as well make the most of it," I perfectly well agree.

In this sense you are putting the idea of a random universe in the same category of solipsism. You can't prove it's false, but it's pointless to believe it because it leads nowhere. Therefore we should reject it on that basis. They're both essentially nihilistic ideas.

I think I might disagree with that. Solipsism really is nihilistic. But if the underlying physical reality is random, there's still the question of what it means to create and perceive order.

In any event, I conclude that it's still logically possible that the true nature of the universe, if there even is such a thing, is random. And then we can still wonder ... how does all this apparent order arise from underlying randomness? So the philosophers would still have something useful to do, even in a fully random world.

Striking that he used the same word you used, repugnant. But repugnance is not a logically argument, and what's repugnant in 1733 may turn out to be exactly what's needed to model general relativity in 1915. You never know. — fishfry

"Repugnant", is a commonly used word in philosophy. The argument I gave is logical, but what is concluded is that the assumption, "there is ontological randomness" is philosophically repugnant, because it would be counter-productive to the desire to know. Therefore it's more like a moral argument. The desire to know is good. The assumption of ontological randomness hinders the desire to know. Therefore that assumption is bad and one ought not accept it.

Since the argument concerns an attitude, the philosophical attitude, or desire to know, you're right to say that it is an argument concerning "feelings". But that's what morality consists of, and having the right attitude toward knowledge of the universe is a very important aspect of morality. This is where "God" enters the context, "God" is assumed to account for the intelligibility of things which appear to us to be unintelligible, thereby encouraging us to maintain faith in the universe's ability to be understood. Notice how faith is not certainty, and the assumption that the universe is intelligible is believed as probable, through faith

In this sense you are putting the idea of a random universe in the same category of solipsism. You can't prove it's false, but it's pointless to believe it because it leads nowhere. Therefore we should reject it on that basis. They're both essentially nihilistic ideas. — fishfry

Not only is it pointless to believe it, but I would say it is actually negative. Choosing the direction that leads nowhere is actually bad when there are good places to be going to.

In any event, I conclude that it's still logically possible that the true nature of the universe, if there even is such a thing, is random. And then we can still wonder ... how does all this apparent order arise from underlying randomness? So the philosophers would still have something useful to do, even in a fully random world. — fishfry

I agree that it is very important to leave as undecided, anything which is logically possible, until it is demonstrated as impossible. Notice what I argue against is the assumption of real randomness, that is completely different from the possibility of real randomness. That we ought to leave logical possibilities undecided was the point I argued Michael on the infinite staircase thread. Michael argued that sort of supertask is impossible, but I told him the impossibility needed to be demonstrated, and his assumption of impossibility was based in prejudice.

I believe that paradoxes such as Zeno's demonstrate an incompatibility between empirical knowledge, and what is logically possible. Most people will accept the conventions of empirical knowledge, and argue that the logically possible which is inconsistent with empirical knowledge is really impossible, based on that prejudice. But I've learned through philosophy to be skeptical of what the senses show us, therefore empirical knowledge in general, and to put more faith and trust in reason. So, to deal with the logical possibility presented in that thread, we must develop a greater intellectual understanding of the fundamental principles, space and time, rather than appeal to empirical knowledge. Likewise, here, to show that the logical possibility of ontological randomness is really impossible, requires a greater understanding of the universe in general.

information" in this case, so that the unintelligible is adequately hidden within what is proposed as intelligible, and it will appear like you are saying something intelligent. — Metaphysician Undercover

I'm not convinced this is the case for people that use seemingly ambiguous words. There is nuance and often careful selection in the language used to express an idea. And many time the popular terms are so heavily loaded with assumptions that people prefer to use newer or more alternative ones to approach the topic with less baggage.

For example: I often avoid the word God and use "entity" or "being" with X, Y or Z characteristics if im approaching a theological or cosmological discussion. So I don't end up in a death spiral debate about "fairy sky daddy" or "walking on water" or get instantly labelled as a theologist or an atheist due to my choice of language.

I use the term "information" myself because I think it is useful and has its own flavour of characteristics outside of just energy transfer or material arrangements.

Perhaps it's better to ask someone to clarify how they use a seemingly ambiguous term- because the ambiguity rarely comes from the user of the word. They usually know exactly how they're using it. Therefore ambiguity is more based on the interpreter which may not be sure what thr details of their definition are.

Is there a name for the logical fallacy that "P is repugnant, therefore not-P." — fishfry

Appeal to consequences?

I use the term "information" myself because I think it is useful and has its own flavour of characteristics outside of just energy transfer or material arrangements. — Benj96

That "flavour of characteristics" is what I call ambiguity. Your use of this word conflicts with the idea you expressed above, about using well defined words with less baggage.

Perhaps it's better to ask someone to clarify how they use a seemingly ambiguous term- because the ambiguity rarely comes from the user of the word. They usually know exactly how they're using it. Therefore ambiguity is more based on the interpreter which may not be sure what thr details of their definition are. — Benj96

I flatly disagree with this. In a place such as this, TPF, the use of ambiguous words is more often than not an indication that the person does not know what they are talking about. It's like a child, just learning to talk, who uses big words to sound proficient, but really doesn't say anything with those words.

Notice, in your referred article, that when the argument's conclusion concerns good and bad, rather than true or false, it is not considered to be a fallacy.

That "flavour of characteristics" is what I call ambiguity. Your use of this word conflicts with the idea you expressed above, about using well defined words with less baggage. — Metaphysician Undercover

Your whole argument for less ambiguity is based on an impractical desire for words to be absolutely concrete and defined.

That's simply not how human languages work. This isn't binary code nor mathematics. Poetry isn't based on exacting definitions.

More so, no one uses the same words in the same personal context. They have nuanced differences in meaning for literally everyone. So my suggestion would be to accept that language is and always has been inherently flexible in meaning and definitions and instead just try to understand how another person uses the words rather than complaining about ambiguity.

We cannot ignore that some words are inherently more ambiguous than others and many of those ill defined terms reside in metaphysics.

Ambiguity is the product of 2 different people using a common language.

I can even reduce all this wordy response above to a simple, well defined rebuttal: Ambiguity exists. Get over it.

Appeal to consequences — wonderer1

Thanks.

Your whole argument for less ambiguity is based on an impractical desire for words to be absolutely concrete and defined. — Benj96

No, it's not based on such a desire at all. I recognize that to be impossible. My desire is that the writer of the material which I am reading, would have a good understanding of what they are saying, so that they can express themselves with clarity, instead of using ambiguous words to coverup the fact they know very little about the subject that they pretend to be knowledgeable of.

I don't believe all information in the universe is predictable because of heisenbergs uncertainty principle. Sure 99% of things can be non random but even if the fundamental 1% is that throws a huge spanner in the works — Benj96
I don't agree with the use of random here. Stochastic phenomena are just simply not precise (this is the word I was looking for) as an analysis. Commonly, (and I say erroneously) it is the precision upon which we judge whether something is random, or in the case of Heisenberg, uncertain. But to further judge a phenomena as undetermined is really troubling. — L'éléphant

Both of you may be correct. You're just focusing on different aspects of the Uncertainty problem. seems to be assuming that the world itself is fundamentally stochastic, while seems to be saying that the uncertainty is an observer problem. In truth, the answer to the "troubling" emotion caused by the random appearance of quantum phenomena may be to do as the quantum pioneers did : accept the inherent limitations of both observer and object.

As long as scientists were observing macro scale objects, their assumption of predictable mechanical determinism was pragmatic. But now, as we delve into levels of reality that the human mind and eye were not adapted to, for all practical scientific applications, non-classical sub-atomic physics is indeterminate & uncertain. Hence, for theoretical philosophical purposes we must accept the ambiguity of our knowledge (measurements) of reality at the fringes of technological precision and human decision. :nerd:



Is reality fundamentally random? :
The answer is that yes, as far as we can test, all quantum interactions that rely on a statistical or stochastic effect are random, as far as we can measure. The less helpful answer is that we don't know, because there is fundamentally no way to know if something is truly random just by its output.
https://arstechnica.com/civis/threads/does-true-randomness-exist-quantum-physics-question.1497773/

Is anything in nature truly random? :
This is a problem about the philosophy of physics; it's sometimes known as Laplace's demon. Our current best theories of the fundamental laws of nature are quantum mechanical in nature. In this theory, the outcome of measurements is truly random; however, whether this implies that nature contains fundamental randomness depends on how you think the measurement problem should be solved.
https://www.reddit.com/r/AskPhysics/comments/lls1tk/is_anything_in_nature_truly_random/

Laplace's Demon :
The future is determined. This is known as scientific determinism. Laplace expanded this idea to the entire universe – if some {omniscient} creature knew everything's position and motion at one moment, then the {mathematical} laws of physics would give it complete knowledge of the future. That creature is Laplace's demon. {my brackets}
https://elements.lbl.gov/news/spooky-science-laplaces-demon/
Note --- From the perspective of the all-knowing demon, the physical world is precisely determinate and predictable, but in the view of a mortal scientist, using imperfect machinery, the quantum realm is indeterminate & unpredictable, and perplexing. Which may be "troubling" for those who can't deal with ambiguity.

Surely a lot of these problems go away if you concede that nature contains an element of spontaneity, as well as patterns which we characterise as "laws".

The philosophical point about sub-atomic physics is mainly that it torpedoed the notion of an ultimately-existing material point-particle - 'the atom' of classical thought. C S Pierce, with his 'tychism', would have been perfectly comfortable with the uncertainty principle. But for those seeking the atom as a kind of bedrock foundation of reality - no joy. And it is amazingly difficult for a lot of people to cope with that.

By the way, I love Zizek's take on this. He says that when God was programming the universe, like when programmers create background scenery on a video game, he thought 'why should I bother programming the atom? People are too stupid to see down to that level'. He left it undetermined. But then we out-smarted God - we caught 'God with his pants down', so to speak.

Surely a lot of these problems go away if you concede that nature contains an element of spontaneity, as well as patterns which we characterise as "laws". — Wayfarer

It is not useful to assume spontaneity, just like it is not useful to assume randomness. Are you familiar with the theory of "spontaneous generation"? It used to be the accepted "scientific" theory for how tiny organisms like maggots come into existence. They just kind of pop out from inanimate matter. Of course the theory has been disproven, I think by Louis Pasteur. However, old habits die hard, and now we have the very similar "scientific" theory of abiogenesis and other things like spontaneous symmetry breaking. In general spontaneity does not serve as a good explanatory principle.

It is not useful to assume spontaneity, just like it is not useful to assume randomness. — Metaphysician Undercover

'I cannot believe that God plays dice', said Einstein, in response to the discovery of the so-called 'quantum leap'. (Bohr used to say 'stop trying to tell God how to manage the Universe'.) But it is a known fact, as is the stochastic nature of radioactive decay. That doesn't mean that maggots spring fully formed from damp cloth, of course, but that there is an inherent element of unpredictability at the most basic strata of nature.

there is an inherent element of unpredictability at the most basic strata of nature. — Wayfarer

At the lowest strata of the bedrock of All, where the bucks stops, we can deduce total randomness, given that there can't be any certain direction supplied to it at its most basic level. The same if it always was (eternal). The same if it somehow had a beginning for no reason.

"Repugnant", is a commonly used word in philosophy. The argument I gave is logical, but what is concluded is that the assumption, "there is ontological randomness" is philosophically repugnant, because it would be counter-productive to the desire to know. Therefore it's more like a moral argument. The desire to know is good. The assumption of ontological randomness hinders the desire to know. Therefore that assumption is bad and one ought not accept it. — Metaphysician Undercover

I can agree with your reasoning that one "ought" not to accept it, but the reason is extra-logical. That is, if we are going by pure logic, you have not argued against it. It's like solipsism. Can't refute but pointless to believe it.

But consider: If the world is not random, then it's determined. And is that not equally repugnant? Nothing matters because we have no choice.

What do you say to that? It's repugnant either way. Either there's no meaning or ... there's no meaning. Is there a way out?

Since the argument concerns an attitude, the philosophical attitude, or desire to know, you're right to say that it is an argument concerning "feelings". But that's what morality consists of, and having the right attitude toward knowledge of the universe is a very important aspect of morality. This is where "God" enters the context, "God" is assumed to account for the intelligibility of things which appear to us to be unintelligible, thereby encouraging us to maintain faith in the universe's ability to be understood. Notice how faith is not certainty, and the assumption that the universe is intelligible is believed as probable, through faith — Metaphysician Undercover

God transcends logic, fair enough. But again, that's not a logical argument.

Not only is it pointless to believe it, but I would say it is actually negative. Choosing the direction that leads nowhere is actually bad when there are good places to be going to. — Metaphysician Undercover

Determinism is worse.

I agree that it is very important to leave as undecided, anything which is logically possible, until it is demonstrated as impossible. Notice what I argue against is the assumption of real randomness, that is completely different from the possibility of real randomness. — Metaphysician Undercover

In that case we are entirely in agreement. I never pretend to know the ultimate nature of the world. It may be random, it may be determined, it may be a combination of both, or it may be something entirely else such that the random/determined dichotomy is rendered meaningless.

That we ought to leave logical possibilities undecided was the point I argued Michael on the infinite staircase thread. Michael argued that sort of supertask is impossible, but I told him the impossibility needed to be demonstrated, and his assumption of impossibility was based in prejudice. — Metaphysician Undercover

But yes!! Here you are arguing that just because an idea is repugnant is no logical reason to reject it! So you should apply the same reasoning to randomness.

I believe that paradoxes such as Zeno's demonstrate an incompatibility between empirical knowledge, and what is logically possible. — Metaphysician Undercover

I think it's highly unlikely that the world will turn out to be a mathematical continuum like the real numbers. The real numbers are far too strange.

Most people will accept the conventions of empirical knowledge, and argue that the logically possible which is inconsistent with empirical knowledge is really impossible, based on that prejudice. But I've learned through philosophy to be skeptical of what the senses show us, therefore empirical knowledge in general, and to put more faith and trust in reason. So, to deal with the logical possibility presented in that thread, we must develop a greater intellectual understanding of the fundamental principles, space and time, rather than appeal to empirical knowledge. Likewise, here, to show that the logical possibility of ontological randomness is really impossible, requires a greater understanding of the universe in general. — Metaphysician Undercover

I agree with you there. I agree with most of what you wrote. Still I do want to understand why you see that @Michael is wrong to say that supertasks are logically impossible, when they are merely repugnant; yet you seem to reject that same reasoning when applied to randomness.

Also, don't you think determinism is at least as repugnant as randomness?

The philosophical point about sub-atomic physics is mainly that it torpedoed the notion of an ultimately-existing material point-particle - 'the atom' of classical thought. C S Pierce, with his 'tychism', would have been perfectly comfortable with the uncertainty principle. But for those seeking the atom as a kind of bedrock foundation of reality - no joy. And it is amazingly difficult for a lot of people to cope with that.

By the way, I love Zizek's take on this. He says that when God was programming the universe, like when programmers create background scenery on a video game, he thought 'why should I bother programming the atom? People are too stupid to see down to that level'. He left it undetermined. But then we out-smarted God - we caught 'God with his pants down', so to speak. — Wayfarer

Yes. Pierce seemed to be comfortable with flexible fundamental Chance, working in opposition to mechanical cause/effect Necessity*1. Yet, the general scientific attitude toward Nature is that nothing is left to Chance. Although some might prefer that nothing is certain. Anyway, that may be why Einstein thought Quantum theory was missing some hidden variables*2, that would cancel-out undetermined Randomness (essential uncertainty) and justify absolute Determinism (mathematical certainty).

In my own musing about the vagaries of Nature, and of moral freedom, I concluded that the Program for evolution must have included opposing YinYang forces of accidental Chance and intentional Destiny. Hence, all changes in the world can be either Positive or Negative, but average-out to Neutral (balanced). An ethical or religious reason for allowing exceptions to determinism, might be to include gaps in the chain of Destiny (necessity) for moral Choice (freedom). If so, we didn't "outsmart G*D", but belatedly discovered that, in making the rules (natural laws), S/He had made allowances for He/r not-so-stupid little gods to make free (unforced) choices, using the willpower of moral agency. :smile:


*1. Tychism (Greek: τύχη, lit. 'chance') is a thesis proposed by the American philosopher Charles Sanders Peirce that holds that absolute chance, or indeterminism, is a real factor operative in the universe. This doctrine forms a central part of Peirce's comprehensive evolutionary cosmology. It may be considered both the direct opposite of Albert Einstein's oft quoted dictum that: "God does not play dice with the universe" and an early philosophical anticipation of Werner Heisenberg's uncertainty principle.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tychism

*2. God Plays with loaded Dice :
Einstein described his "private opinion" of quantum physics in one of the 1945 letters by referencing a phrase that he had already made famous: "God does not play dice with the universe." In the letter, he wrote: "God tirelessly plays dice under laws which he has himself prescribed."
https://www.livescience.com/65697-einstein-letters-quantum-physics.html

Paradox of FreeWill :
Consequently, Unwin concluded that Quantum Theory indicates that “At the bottom of everything, the smallest particles that exist are ruled by chance. Nothing is predestined.” I happen to agree. But I added a slight twist from my own musings on fatalism :“Or, everything is probably predestined”. Like him, I found reasons for assuming free-agency in the paradoxical probabilistic underpinnings of our seemingly certain cosmos. It’s true that science can rely on the same effect following the same cause, to an accuracy of several decimal points of probability – but not always to the point of certainty. So, it seems that any self-determination or freedom-from-causation we humans possess must be found in that tiny statistical gap between cause & effect. You might call that an “odds of the gaps” argument.
https://bothandblog5.enformationism.info/page13.html

That "flavour of characteristics" is what I call ambiguity. Your use of this word conflicts with the idea you expressed above, about using well defined words with less baggage. — Metaphysician Undercover
Your whole argument for less ambiguity is based on an impractical desire for words to be absolutely concrete and defined. — Benj96

Although I assumed I knew what you were referring to in the OP, I also think has a good point. Perhaps most of the never-ending argumentation on this forum hinges on ambiguity in language. That's why Voltaire challenged, "If you want to converse with me, first define your terms". Verbal precision is difficult, but not "impractical".

It's true that the term "information" has spawned many new shades of meaning*1 since Shannon redefined it for his data engineering purposes. So, broadly referring to that inherent ambiguity as "the flavour of characteristics" does not pin down the particular Flavour of Information you are connecting to Randomness in the OP.

That's why my Information-based blog has attempted to define the term, as I use it in the blog posts. Unfortunately, some ambiguity is unavoidable, since it is a "shapeshifter" with many ordinary and exotic "flavours". The links below are just two of several attempts to clarify the various ways the term is now used in scientific & philosophical discussions. Terrence Deacon, author of Incomplete Nature, may have touched on MU's need for either/or information on both/and Information*2. :smile:


*1. The many faces of Information :
Colloquial info = Predicate; a noun: what it's about; the meaning; what is gained; the referent.
Shannon info = Quantified; a verb; what it does; gain vs loss; energy.
Boltzmann info = Randomized, absent, what was lost; entropy.
Deacon info = Referential; statistical; pointing to an absent future state.
Teleodynamic info = Semiotic; symbols; words that point to absent things; indicate future possibilities.
http://bothandblog4.enformationism.info/page29.html

*2. The Many Forms of Information :
He points out an unintended consequence of the statistical definition of Information, “By stripping the concept of its links to reference, meaning, and significance . . . The result is that the technical use of the term information is now roughly synonymous with difference, order, pattern, or the opposite of physical entropy. . . . This redefinition of the concept of information as a measure of order has, in effect, cemented the Cartesian cut into the foundation of physics. . . . implicitly support the claims of both eliminativism and panpsychism.”
http://bothandblog4.enformationism.info/page29.html

What is Information? :
So, in answer to a request for a general definition, as it “pertains to inorganic (physical), organic (biological), and semantic types of information”, I have defined “Information” in the context of various real-world instances of ubiquitous enforming power.
https://bothandblog6.enformationism.info/page16.html

Yet, the general scientific attitude toward Nature is that nothing is left to Chance. — Gnomon

That's metaphysics not science.

Yet, the general scientific attitude toward Nature is that nothing is left to Chance. — Gnomon
That's metaphysics not science. — Wayfarer

Historically, Luck does play a role in scientific discoveries. But, I assume the pragmatic scientists don't like (metaphysical attitude) to depend on fickle Luck or capricious Serendipity.

Perhaps I should have limited my scientific attitude assessment to Einstein's "god doesn't play dice" remark. Could that general/universal assertion apply to both physics and metaphysics? :joke:

'I cannot believe that God plays dice', said Einstein, in response to the discovery of the so-called 'quantum leap'. (Bohr used to say 'stop trying to tell God how to manage the Universe'.) But it is a known fact, as is the stochastic nature of radioactive decay. That doesn't mean that maggots spring fully formed from damp cloth, of course, but that there is an inherent element of unpredictability at the most basic strata of nature. — Wayfarer

As already argued in this thread, above, the so-called "stochastic nature" of radioactive decay, is best understood as a feature of the means employed to understand it, rather than as a feature of the named activity itself. In other words, it is better to assume that the appearance of randomness is due to the deficiencies of the theories and methods used to understand the object, rather than to assume that the randomness inheres within the object.

I can agree with your reasoning that one "ought" not to accept it, but the reason is extra-logical. That is, if we are going by pure logic, you have not argued against it. It's like solipsism. Can't refute but pointless to believe it. — fishfry

There is no such thing as "going by pure logic", toward understanding the nature of reality. "Pure logic" would be form with no content, symbols which do not represent anything. All logic must proceed from premises, and the premises provide the content. And premises are often judged for truth or falsity. But as explained in the passage which referenced, in the case of an "appeal to consequences", there is no fallacy if the premises are judged as good or bad, instead of true or false. That's why I said that this type of logic is very commonly employed in moral philosophy, religion, and metaphysical judgements of means, methods, and pragmatics in general. So for example, one can make a logically valid argument, with an appeal to consequences, which concludes that the scientific method is good. No fallacy there, just valid logic and good premises.

Therefore it is not the case that the reasoning is "extra-logical", it employs logic just like any other reasoning. What is the case is that the premises are a different sort of premises, instead of looking for truth and falsity in the premises we look for good and bad. So this type of judgement, the judgement of good or bad, produces the content which the logic gets applied to.

But consider: If the world is not random, then it's determined. And is that not equally repugnant? Nothing matters because we have no choice. — fishfry

No, that is not the case, because there are two very distinct senses of "determined". One is the sense employed by determinism, to say that all the future is determined by the past. The other is the the sense in which a person determines something, through a free will choice. In this second sense, a choice may determine the future in a way which is not determined by the past. And, since it is a choice it cannot be said to be random. Therefore it is not true that if the world is not random then it's determined (in the sense of determinism), because we still have to account for freely willed acts which are neither determined in the sense of determinism, nor random.

God transcends logic, fair enough. But again, that's not a logical argument. — fishfry

As I said above, it is not a matter of transcending logic, the conclusions are logical, but the premises are judged as to good or bad rather than true or false. So from premises of what is judged as good (rejecting repugnant principles), God may follow as a logical conclusion.

Here you are arguing that just because an idea is repugnant is no logical reason to reject it! So you should apply the same reasoning to randomness. — fishfry

No I was not arguing that. In that case I was arguing that the idea ought not be accepted (ought to be rejected) unless it is justified. In the case of being repugnant, that in itself is, as I explained, justification for rejection. You appear unwilling to recognize what wonderer1's article said about the fallacy called "appeal to consequences". It is only a fallacy if we are looking for truth and falsity. If we are talking principles of "ought", it is valid logic. Therefore the argument that the assumption of randomness ought to be rejected because it is philosophically repugnant, cannot be said to be invalid by this fallacy, and so it may be considered as valid justification.

I agree with you there. I agree with most of what you wrote. Still I do want to understand why you see that Michael is wrong to say that supertasks are logically impossible, when they are merely repugnant; yet you seem to reject that same reasoning when applied to randomness. — fishfry

But Michael did not show that supertasks are philosophically repugnant. He showed that they are inconsistent with empirical science, and his prejudice for what is known as "physical reality" (reality as understood by the empirical study of physics) influenced him to assert that supertasks are impossible. As I explained in the other thread, in philosophy we learn that the senses are apt to mislead us, so all empirical science must be subjected to the skeptic's doubt. So it is actually repugnant to accept the representation of physical reality given to us by the empirical sciences, over the reasoned reality which demonstrates the supertask. And this is why that type of paradox is philosophically significant. It inspires us to seek the true reasons for the incompatibility between what reason shows us, and what empirical evidence shows us. We ought not simply take for granted that empirical science delivers truth.

Also, don't you think determinism is at least as repugnant as randomness? — fishfry

As explained above, I am not taking a standpoint of determinism. There are two very distinct senses of "determine", one consistent with determinism, one opposed to determinism (as the person who has a very strong will is said to be determined). I allow for the reality of both.

the point about strictly scientific hypotheses is that they can be falsified (per Karl Popper). But a statement such as 'everything is determined' is difficult to falsify. Although, that said, this is at the heart of the debates over the interpretation of quantum physics. The effect known as entanglement, verified by experimental results, seems to indicate an a-causal relationship between two objects or states. But the 'hidden variables' interpretation, championed by David Bohm, sought to preserve causal determination (i.e one action here influences an outcome there), through the supposition of 'hidden variables' that haven't yet been discerned by science. (I understand Bohm's is a minority view. PBS Spacetime has an excellent presentation on this topic.)

More broadly speaking, Einstein always stood for a realist attitude: that everything is determined by or subject to general laws. That's why he couldn't abide the implications of quantum physics - entanglement ('spooky action at a distance') and uncertainty being prime examples.

I've read two good popular books on this subject - Quantum: Einstein, Bohr, and the Great Debate About the Nature of Reality, Manjit Kumar, and also Uncertainty: Einstein, Heisenberg, Bohr, and the Struggle for the Soul of Science David Lindley - and note the similarities between the book titles, published five years apart.

What Heisenberg had done....was to come up with an idea too sexy to stay confined to the physics world. As Mr. Lindley points out, the Heisenberg uncertainty principle is now freely bandied about in nonscientific contexts, from literary theory to television dialogue. He cites an instance when Heisenberg was glibly name-dropped on “The West Wing,” in an anecdote about a film crew’s changing an event simply by observing it.

If Heisenberg’s idea “has become a touchstone, a badge of authority, for a certain class of ideas and speculations,” Mr. Lindley says, perhaps that is because it can be used to make scientific truth sound less than all-powerful. Treated that way, “the uncertainty principle makes scientific knowledge itself less daunting to the nonscientists and more like the slippery, elusive kind of knowing we daily grapple with.”

But the real uncertainty principle is more precise than that. It states that while some phenomena produce a definable range of possible outcomes, it is impossible to infer from the outcome which single unique event actually produced it. This has evolved, Mr. Lindley says, into “a practical, workaday definition of the uncertainty principle that most physicists continue to find convenient and at least moderately comprehensible — as long as they choose not to think too hard about the still unresolved philosophical or metaphysical difficulties it throws up.” — NY Times Review of Lindley

My heuristic is that 'the modern period' is book-ended roughly by the publication of Newton's Principia Mathematica at the beginning, and the publication of Einstein's Special Theory of Relativity at the other. That, and the discovery of the indeterminate nature of sub-atomic particles, marks the advent of the post-modern period, with the abandonment of the idea of absolute objectivity that characterised the previous period. And notice, those two book titles, the reference to 'debates' and 'struggles' over the nature of reality. Even though Heisenberg's uncertainty is really quite specific in its application, it
is as metaphor that it really captures the zeitgeist, in my view.*

As already argued in this thread, above, the so-called "stochastic nature" of radioactive decay, is best understood as a feature of the means employed to understand it, rather than as a feature of the named activity itself. — Metaphysician Undercover

Says you. That is precisely the point at issue! Why do you think Neils Bohr, after presenting a lecture to a sanguine group of positivists, on the radical implications of quantum physics, and receiving only polite applause, said 'if you're not shocked by quantum physics then you can't possibly have understood it!' What do you think he means? I'm sure he doesn't mean that the indeterminate nature of quantum phenomena is simply due to gaps in our knowledge. There is a genuine indeterminacy, ontological as much as epistemological, which is something that a positivist audience, of course, was duty bound to ignore.

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* 'Freud remarked that ‘the self-love of mankind has been three times wounded by science’, referring to the Copernican revolution, Darwin’s discovery of evolution, and Nietszche’s declaration of the Death of God. Maybe the 'Copenhagen Interpretation' of quantum physics gave back to humanity what the European Enlightenment had taken away, by placing consciousness in a pivotal role in the observation of the fundamental constituents of reality. While this is fiercely contested by what Heisenberg termed ‘dogmatic realism’ it has nevertheless become an influential theme in modern cultural discourse.'