I'm not convinced that the desire for a universal principal is simply the result of us wanting to shirk our responsibility or culpability. — Benj96

We do not want gravity to be a universal principal; it already is one. We want a rule about what is right to be like gravity, because then if we follow it, we could never be judged to be wrong. If a good act were like a science experiment, the results would always be the same, so it wouldn’t matter who did it.

That’s not to say shirking our duty is the only reason for wanting certainty. Cavell generalizes it as not wanting to have a voice—not be a singular limited human. Kant killed off our connection to what we find important in the world (in his terms, the thing-in-itself) because we didn’t meet his standard of certainty. But, as Wittgenstein shows, it is our interest in things that create the shared judgments and criteria that reveal what is essential to us about anything. Thus why someone like Emerson has us believe in ourselves, follow our whim, skate on the surface of “appearance”. If we recognize that we might err, we are less likely to doubt ourselves, but also not need to think of ourselves as infalible, thus able to be less dogmatic. So instead of an epistemological endeavor, we have virtues like trust, humility, openness, forgiveness, etc.

We should try to avoid harming ourselves and others as we stumble around in semi-darkness. We can learn to avoid some stumbling blocks, but even in avoidance we may encounter others. Whatever light we find leaves much else in darkness. As the old joke goes, you should not expect to find your keys by going round and round the lamppost at night because that is where the light is.

All too often answers serve to obscure the questions. One thing we should learn from reading books is the limits of what can be found in books. Another is that the ability to ask questions does not mean that there must be answers. One of the most important questions is whether we are asking the right questions.

What is the litmus test in the realm of discourse — Benj96

If the speaker is speaking in earnest*, who am I to judge? Why would I deny myself the opportunity to "play ball" with anyone who truly just wants to play ball?



*(I suppose, including if they are being earnestly comedic, satirical, absurd, etc. That is, "earnest" is related to "intention" not "delivery" )

We should try to avoid harming ourselves and others as we stumble around in semi-darkness — Fooloso4

Yes, especially for me, I realize how I am "harming" others when my language is reckless and imprecise. But everyone should be permitted to stumble in the darkness. We are all there anyway.

@Banno @Benj96

If the speaker is speaking in earnest, who am I to judge? [on a litmus test]… That is, "earnest" is related to "intention" — ENOAH

The irony is that we of course would have to judge whether they are being earnest (or not). But even if we are not determining whether the content is, say, true, there are means to judge, as it were, the person. However, I would argue that there is a false bar for “earnest” or “profound” or “serious”. It sets up a picture that there is always an “intention” or meaning that we add or give our words (not to say that we cannot choose our words deliberately). If we should trust in ourselves, we absolutely do trust others (what they say and do) in the ordinary course of business. Thus why we only ask what they “intended” when something doesn’t go as we would expect (“Did you intend to insult the Queen in thanking her?”). Regularly there is no need to discuss intention or meaning or “earnestness”. What we judge is the negative, when be betray our words. Lying, joking, being under compulsion, like making a promise and not keeping it (or deciding not to keep it ahead of time), these are what we judge. Imagining we are judging whether a speaker has some internal commitment (or not), is exactly what opens the door to allow them to say something like, “I didn’t mean it”, which is to want to slide out of the consequences of our acts (if not to say, “I said the wrong thing”). People should be taken at their words, so they can be held to them as well.

The irony is that we of course would have to judge whether they are being earnest (or not). — Antony Nickles

Hah! And so the thing writes on.

I would argue that there is a false bar for “earnest” or “profound” or “serious”. It sets up a picture that there is always an “intention” or meaning that we add or give our words — Antony Nickles

I can't disagree [assume my "position" above (if it even is a position; its melting under the heat lamp of your examination (gratitude)) was "self aware" that it was itself, alas, just another in an endless chain of speakers. But what? Am I not to speak? (smiling).]. In other words, save for the eloquence, I might have written the very statement*. But I may not have followed your path. And, I would "argue" there's a false bar for most, if not all words, not just earnest etc.

*(I already recocognize, to your surprise. Sorry. That's frustrating because it seems Im at best switching positions, but more seeming contradictory. And if thats the case, I suggest 1. I don't say this harshly, you're focused on the path. Obviously. That's a proper tool of philosophy. 2. I am discussing my thoughts approached at different "layers" and am poor at articulating that.)

If we should trust in ourselves, we absolutely do trust others (what they say and do) in the ordinary course of business. Thus why we only ask what they “intended” when something doesn’t go as we would expect (“Did you intend to insult the Queen in thanking her?”). — Antony Nickles

Ok. Yes. Completely agree. I was hasty, excited. I should pause. And the tragedy is, I still stand behind the "essence" of my thought. That's the crisis of being impatient as I am. Not with my thoughts mind you which simmer like a slow brew. My expression on this forum. Sorry. And thank you.

What we judge is the negative, when be betray our words. Lying, joking, being under compulsion, like making a promise and not keeping it (or deciding not to keep it ahead of time), these are what we judge. — Antony Nickles

Yes. Why disagree?

Imagining we are judging whether a speaker has some internal commitment (or not), is exactly what opens the door to allow them to say something like, “I didn’t mean it” — Antony Nickles

Ok. That too. It was dysfunctional, my statement. I agree! Nice. Wow. I was careless.

People should be taken at their words, so they can be held to them as well. — Antony Nickles

Beautiful. Listen. I'm not kidding. Funny thing is, I don't abandon my general thinking (and I tell you that not to hang on to some morsel of righteousness but to show you... hah! I did not plan this. I was just about to say, tovshow you my earnest.)

Anyway you're right, and that was well put. I appreciate it.

Whoops

There's an interesting case study here in trusting / mistrusting your own mind

https://www.reddit.com/r/DebateEvolution/comments/18lbtt9/how_do_i_as_a_layman_know_evolution_is_correct/

The guy who made the thread, somehow, came to distrust his own ability to reason and discern fact from fiction. I think many of the responses he gets are illuminating and contain at least some tidbits of wisdom.

Everyone can be rash, everyone can be stupid, misinformed or otherwise malpracticing adequate reason.

My question is how does one know when that is the case - ie they're chatting sh*t. And to the contrary, when they really do know what they're talking about.

What is the litmus test in the realm of discourse with others which may be either just as misinformed or very much astute and correct? — Benj96

You should NOT trust your mind, but you can gain trust in certain beliefs by applying critical thinking: seek out contrary opinions, test your beliefs through discussion with others (like on this forum), attempt to mitigate confirmation bias by trying to identify objective reasons to support or deny some presumption you may have. Learn at least some basics of epistemology (including the limits of each technique).

I can't disagree — ENOAH

And I did not mean to suggest that you were “wrong”, only to point out something overlooked generally in these cases.

I am discussing my thoughts approached at different "layers" and am poor at articulating that. — ENOAH

And this is exactly why the unfolding of discussion is important philosophically. We do state things “poorly” at times—without reflecting on all the considerations, or using language lazily (one word for another, or with a kind of “you-know-what-I’m-getting-at” vaguery), or “in-the-spirit-of” aspiration. In seeing that “meaning” is not something we put into words (or that is held only by them), or that is grasped immediately, we understand the possibility in discourse for clarification, learning, self-discovery. So I am not suggesting that we shouldn’t speak without having considered something from every angle, as if we could speak perfectly, completely. I would say that part of the goal of discussion is to give the other as much benefit as possible; not to look for the first logical error, but to develop their argument to be as “strong” as we can—as Socrates does (right before he kills it with his predetermined criteria)—to put ourselves in the other’s shoes intellectually, to consider every expression as possible of more intelligibility than on its face, or first glance. If we are able to read others and judge them by what they say (as language implies expectations, consequences, connotations, criteria for judgment), we can also, as it were, put better words in others’ mouths, make explicit those implications for them.

I still stand behind the "essence" of my thought…. I don't abandon my general thinking… to show you… [ I am ] earnest. — ENOAH

The “essence of your thought” can be pictured as a special object that you have, an “essence” apart from a gist, or crux, or point. To imagine meaning or thought are “things” that we put into words is to claim we always have ownership and control of language, which comes from the desire to be unknowable, to retain our feeling of being unique, “me”, without demonstration. And this is an occasion to explicate the ordinary workings of earnestness (rather than some imagined connection to philosophical intention). To say you did not articulate what you wanted to say is in one sense to ask to be forgiven for giving the impression of being flippant. And also, to desire to be understood, not dismissed, to ask for help in bettering ourselves. However, earnestness is not imbued into what we say, it is demonstrated; as you say, it is “shown”, by not “abandoning”. The whole nature of expression (as Wittgenstein uses it), is that it is by you (not of you), that you are expressed by what you say; so that in “standing behind” what you say, you are answerable for it. And so the testament of your earnestness is not to claim you are earnest, it is to take up what your have said, in earnest, i.e., with commitment, with resolve to get to the bottom of it, to work to articulate it better, fuller. In that spirit:

If the speaker is speaking in earnest*, who am I to judge? Why would I deny myself the opportunity to "play ball" with anyone who truly just wants to play ball? — ENOAH

I take this as a plea for leniency from criticism, as, per the analogy, before I even take the field. I think of the “denial” that Positivism determined about our ability to speak about ethics, or Kant’s setting aside our desire to understand what we find to be essential about the world, or Plato’s dissatisfaction with our ordinary understandings, all because of their requirements for knowledge before we even get underway. And also that we be allowed to “play”, speak provisionally, think creatively, outside the box of argument and conclusion even. And this open “opportunity” I also take as a call for collaboration rather than combative disagreement, as the game of discourse is always with the other, which is the possibility of the unknown, the different.

Separately:

I would "argue" there's a false bar for most, if not all words, not just earnest etc. — ENOAH

I take this as the imposed criteria philosophy creates for: appearing, thinking, being, knowing, believing, understanding, etc. But, if you would, then feel free to.

The guy who made the thread, somehow, came to distrust his own ability to reason and discern fact from fiction. — flannel jesus

But that is not a case of distrusting ourselves, but of not trusting science, specifically our ability to tell good science from bad. What makes a scientific conclusion a fact is not correspondence, but repeatability, that anyone could do the same experiment and reach the same answer. Science is contingent on: 1. that the experiment is done competently, and based on the scientific method, isolating the question, etc., and 2. that it is a matter that responds to such a method (science cannot answer every type of thing).

You should NOT trust your mind, but you can gain trust in certain beliefs by applying critical thinking: seek out contrary opinions, test your beliefs through discussion with others (like on this forum), attempt to mitigate confirmation bias by trying to identify objective reasons to support or deny some presumption you may have. Learn at least some basics of epistemology (including the limits of each technique). — Relativist

We of course have the ability to develop our skills of thinking things through, analyzing our opinions and assumptions, and considering other perspectives. But there is a difference between ensuring what you say is correct, and how you conduct yourself in and after saying it. So to say you should “not trust your mind” (yourself)—as I, and Emerson, argue against above—is perhaps different than saying you should not trust the opinions you have or inherited.

But that is not a case of distrusting ourselves, but of not trusting science, specifically our ability to tell good science from bad — Antony Nickles

That's... 100% a matter of trusting himself. He literally spells it out in his own words in the post and/or comments.

that essentially mean I have no ability to discern good science and conclusions from bad

"I have no ability"

Basically ive proven i can believe things with bad reasons and spin the story in my head.

My worry is that ill just keep reading things that confirm my current set of beliefs and keep taking them in as true or at least likely true and end up with a warped sense of reality

His talking about *himself* and his own ability to reason first and foremost.

We of course have the ability to develop our skills of thinking things through, analyzing our opinions and assumptions, and considering other perspectives. But there is a difference between ensuring what you say is correct, and how you conduct yourself in and after saying it. So to say you should “not trust your mind” (yourself)—as I, and Emerson, argue against above—is perhaps different than saying you should not trust the opinions you have or inherited. — Antony Nickles

Consider a devotee of Infowars, who routinely accepts conspiracy theories. Aren't you suggesting they should trust their opinions?

You mention the role of one's conduct, so are you suggesting that the conspiracy theorist just needs to conduct himself in a certain way? Is the right conduct going to lead to him correcting his errors, or are you just suggesting he ought to be polite about his irrational beliefs?

Yes, I worded that poorly. Of course they are doubting their ability to decide whether the science is done well. This is different though than the kind of doubt and trust that philosophy has traditionally struggled with, and that I am claiming is a doubt of ourselves that is projected into an epistemological problem.

this guy's post is also an epistemological problem. "Why should I accept any scientific conclusions?" it's a question of epistemology. If you, yourself, accept any scientific facts that you yourself haven't verified, you have epistemological reasons for doing so.

And I did not mean to suggest that you were “wrong”, only to point out something overlooked generally in these cases. — Antony Nickles

Yes, I understood you that way. My "I can't disagree," was not an expression of regret nor capitulation, more celebratory.

to put ourselves in the other’s shoes intellectually, to consider every expression as possible of more intelligibility than on its face, or first glance. — Antony Nickles

Yes. If only, right? Because out of that kind of marriage there will be the healthiest, least incestuous, offspring.

If we are able to read others and judge them by what they say (as language implies expectations, consequences, connotations, criteria for judgment), we can also, as it were, put better words in others’ mouths, make explicit those implications for them. — Antony Nickles

If one wishes to grow (that is, as in the action of growing (some)thing; not as in the selfish "act" of growing oneself) then how else

The “essence of your thought” can be pictured as a special object that you have — Antony Nickles

Oh. Wow. Right! My attachment. Ok. Thank you. I'm going to read on, but say no more.

To imagine — Antony Nickles

Yes. Yes. You've awakened me. (I know this may read one way.) Let me assure you, I'm being serious. The thing is, I still hold to the essence etc etc. But, just as you did, a few words back about my attachment, you've reminded me that, after all, my essence, too, is imagined. As Chet Hawkins would say, I'm going to read on.

earnestness is not imbued into what we say, it is demonstrated; as you say, it is “shown”, by not “abandoning”. — Antony Nickles

Ok, then is it, not in the speaker, but the receiver? The receiver interprets the committed "action" as earnest? Hence, speaker's intention is irrelevant?

Maybe that's not what you mean, or maybe, if it is, you're "right".

Where I'm currently settled is that (notwithstanding my previous "flippancy") "earnestness" is neither in the speaker (intent) nor in the receiver (interpretation) and (perhaps frustratingly to our conventional logic) it's in both. Why? Because it is imbued in the "word." But , reluctance to use up space, I'll move on. If there is interest in explanation, it will manifest autonomously as do "earnestness" and all other representations surfacing from time to time and structuring these experiences (such as, the cause and effect of "good words," whether it is in "earnestness" or not, etc.).

that you are expressed by what you say; — Antony Nickles

Yes, completely. The self-same "you", a device used to carry expressions into the Narrative. And I agree with you: you are (from your current angle, manifesting to others as) what you say. I just arrived there differently you are (from my current angle) what you say. Hence, to answer the OP, should we really ever judge whether one is talking crap or (within the rules of a strict system) "knows" what they're talking about? Isn't the safest thing to do ( outside of ignoring hate speech, trolling or clowning, for strictly functional purposes (I'm not denying that there are corresponding moral reasons, i just lump them together)) to listen to what anyone says, and then judge it as to its fitness for belief based upon the criteria applicable to the given locus; I.e., if logic is the Host, it better meet logic. If it's Art, creativity is the criteria, and so on.

The thing is, for a Philosophy Forum, I sense there are schools of thought on what the parameters are. I think that's what was likely getting at, wittingly, or not.

I take this as a plea for leniency from criticism, as, per the analogy, before I even take the field. — Antony Nickles

My strictly "philosophical" reasoning is my belief that great discoveries can arise out of a free as possible flow of ideas in forums like these. I'm very excited to be a witness to this. I hope I don't sound pretentious when I say it reminds me of the Salons of the French Enlightenment.

If I were to psychoanalyse my mind, the last representations (thoughts) concerning that plea for leniency, the ones which finally tipped the scale, triggering that plea to "leave my mind," and enter the world upon these pages, was that I have noted with discomfort sometimes at how frustration emerges like a virus until some seemingly decent posts become infected.

But maybe if I dig deeper, what you observed is true. But my surface thinks the contrary, I thirst for criticism. My apologetic tone relates more to my gratitude. Being a new immigrant to this forum, already enriched by its great
people, it's important to me not to carelessly frustrate anyone.

this guy's post is also an epistemological problem. — flannel jesus

Well, yes, it is a matter of knowledge, though I’m not sure it is a problem with knowledge. I wouldn’t say we have an issue with our criteria to tell good science from bad, though we might politicize its relevance. All I am claiming is that the OP is more a matter of recognizing (acknowledging) error than ensuring certainty because knowledge does fail us, and then we are left with the conduct of our discourse with each other.

I really don't know what you're on about anymore. This thread is about trusting your own mind, trusting your own judgment, trusting your own ability to reason - the thread I linked is about a guy who says he can't trust his own ability to reason. It's entirely on point.

Ok, then is [earnestness], not in the speaker, but the receiver? The receiver interprets the committed "action" as earnest? Hence, speaker's intention is irrelevant? Where I'm currently settled is that (notwithstanding my previous "flippancy") "earnestness" is neither in the speaker (intent) nor in the receiver (interpretation) and (perhaps frustratingly to our conventional logic) it's in both. Why? Because it is imbued in the "word." — ENOAH

The other does not “interpret” earnestness, as if it were a matter of confusion or seeing correctly. Because of the way earnestness works, the other judges whether my words and actions are evidence that meet the ordinary (but usually implicit) criteria of what we count as being earnest (commitment, followthrough, not giving up, doing a “deep dive”, etc.) and acknowledges that I have made a showing of earnestness, or whether I am still faking, putting on a show, etc. So it is a rational determination, but towards instilling faith and trust. The act or word does not have an “air” of earnestness (it is not imbued in them); I make a demonstration of rising to the level that proves** (to you) that I am not inconstant, etc. (**Now of course when I say “rational”, I mean subject to discussion and settlement, but the outcome is uncertain, as it is a matter of our relationship—so perhaps I won’t be fooled again, that nothing you could do or say could make me see you as serious when you, say, still refuse to choose allegiances, etc.)

This thread is about trusting your own mind, trusting your own judgment, trusting your own ability to reason - the thread I linked is about a guy who says he can't trust his own ability to reason. It's entirely on point. — flannel jesus

If we aren’t going to call determining good science from bad a skill—say, that anyone competent could perform—and we take it as a matter of instilling “trust”, as in “belief”—which in philosophy is code for something we might be uncertain about, or that rests on uncertain grounds—then I would say that is politicizing epistemology. And so it is not that he doesn’t trust his (own) ability to reason, but he (secretly?) doubts the (all of our) ability to rationally be certain about our knowledge through science at all.

All I am claiming separately is that there is a distinction between the kinds of things we can be certain of, and those which may lead to an outcome that falls apart (politics, moral acts, etc.), and that philosophy sometimes wants to treat the second like the first (or relegate it to irrationality).

And so it is not that he doesn’t trust his (own) ability to reason, but he (secretly?) doubts the (all of our) ability to rationally be certain about our knowledge through science at all. — Antony Nickles

If he doubts his own ability to reason, and his own ability to reason leads him to think he should trust science, then OF COURSE he's going to doubt if he should trust science. Just read his words. He spells it out, I'm not speculating. He literally says he doesnt trust his own reasoning abilities.

the other judges — Antony Nickles

Ok, sure. I used "interpret" carelessly.

So it is a rational determination, but towards instilling faith and trust — Antony Nickles

Ok, I follow that. I say that "rational determjnation" though seemingly not, is an autonomous dialectic. And the "instilling faith," if achieved, is the (temporary and temporal) settlement of that dialectic, commonly called belief and confused for not being knowledge.

The act or word does not have an “air” of earnestness (it is not imbued in them); — Antony Nickles

Not an "air" as if "magical". The word has an evolved (in both each individual and History) function of triggering the movements/arrangements of other words which eventually trigger conditioned Feelings which eventually trigger actions
(more mental/or physical) .

All of this process seems to contain
"intent" "deliberation" a "self". Hence these discussions etc. But there is no "trusting your own mind" directed by that "you". It is all just the movements of that mind

Because of the way earnestness works — Antony Nickles

Sorry if I am belabouring. Note, we "know" the word acts autonomously. It is latent in your sentence above. "Earnestness" the word is not (as though) magically imbued with some Platonic ideal of Earnestness. Earnestness, the word is Earnestness. Whatever effect it has when it surfaces, is its only "purpose," otherwise it's empty and fleeting and has no reality.

If he doubts his own ability to reason, and his own ability to reason leads him to think he should trust science, then OF COURSE he's going to doubt if he should trust science. Just read his words. He spells it out, I'm not speculating. He literally says he doesnt trust his own reasoning abilities. — flannel jesus

I’m not suggesting you are speculating, but this is a categorical issue—a matter of the type of reasons we use in different cases. Sometimes we “trust” an impersonal process, science; and sometimes we have to make our own way, as in a moral situation, and I am saying he is confusing the two here.

“that essentially means I have no ability to discern good science and conclusions from bad

Basically ive proven i can believe things with bad reasons and spin the story in my head.

My worry is that I’ll just keep reading things that confirm my current set of beliefs and keep taking them in as true or at least likely true and end up with a warped sense of reality.”
— quotation of 83franks by @flannel jesus

Starting with the first sentence: either they are simply wrong (I assume that we can agree that we can have/gain the skill to tell good science from bad), or they are calling that into question, which, yes, on the face of it, they attribute to an “inability to reason”. But I am claiming that they are avoiding that a political/moral decision is (despite accurate science) always about aligning ourselves with a story, a community (and here I do not mean with or against science, or the science; i.e., it is more than a matter of reason, knowledge). For example, we trust the democratic process, not because it is perfect, but because its nature is (it calls for) allegiance, or disloyalty. We either give ourselves (our country) to it, or are, as Dewey puts it, treacherous. Those are our choices in that world—“knowledge”, as in certainty, is not how it works (though the process can be corrupted and bettered). The political and moral fields are not simply a matter of knowledge (absolving us of our part in, say, the social contract), but what we are willing to be responsible for. To fixate on the possibility that we can have “bad reasons”, or “spin” or “warp” ourselves, is to desire to find something certain, impersonal, say, “reality”, that would ensure we are never bad, wrong, or lost. The desire for certainty in the moral/political realm is a fantasy that knowledge could take the place of me—the necessity of putting ourselves (trusting ourselves as I have put it) in the position of answering for our reasons and, if appropriate, for our reliance on a particular scientific finding. But he wants to “trust” science, not to be accurate, but to resolve our need to live the stories we choose to accept, which means we may be wrong (leaving us where I started, not with just belief compared to knowledge—epistemology—but with the processes of error, forgiveness, learning, etc.). But we have no recourse (other than avoidance) than to entrust ourselves with the responsibility for our opinions, stances, etc., and in this sense, to “trust” ourselves.

much of what you're saying here just comes across like a complete non sequitur to me. I have no idea how a guy saying he doesn't trust his own reasoning could be interpreted as "political", I have no idea how you're thrusting that interpretation upon those words. I feel we're just speaking entirely different languages at this point.

I have no idea how a guy saying he doesn't trust his own reasoning could be interpreted as "political" — flannel jesus

I’m not saying he doesn’t trust his own reasoning, I’m saying that there is more involved than “reasoning”. The “stories” he is talking about are things up for debate, and because of that, are political/moral, which are the types of things we may not be able to resolve. But we could say he is politicizing his doubt in making it a reason to hold the opinions he does, or avoid being responsible to answer for them. Basically, I’m calling this (his) BS, though I take it as a misunderstanding of the nature of fact compared to our political/moral lives. He is mixing up apples and oranges. Not being certain about our positions is not resolved by trust or doubt in science, or knowledge. It is a matter of bucking up and being responsible for what we decide to claim as our own, as these things are not a matter of certainty; they are not resolved as a claim of knowledge would be.

yeah that just sounds like nonsense to me.

Antony Nickles yeah that just sounds like nonsense to me. — flannel jesus

Well, that might be because of the historical picture of belief as a lesser version of knowledge, but I take it as a lack of interest (not a lack of ability) as you appear to just be saying the same thing over and over (which is fine). But without anything more than that, it’s hard to know what or how to explain.

I just think you've interpreted a bunch of stuff into it that isn't in there. The guy is saying something very straight forward and there's nothing political about it, and you've managed to invent an entire universe into his words, a universe a stuff he didn't say

’instilling faith’ if achieved, is the (temporary and temporal) settlement of that dialectic, commonly called belief and confused for not being knowledge. — ENOAH

I made this confusing. When I said my determination of whether you are in earnest “instilled faith”, I did not mean faith, as in: belief, as if blindly (nor as if it were an opinion). When I am considering whether you are earnest, I am making a judgment, based on evidence (your acts and words), as to whether they meet the ordinary ways someone demonstrates earnestness (criteria, which are “autonomous”, if I understand how you meant that). So my conclusion is not “belief”, nor “a belief”—I am convinced. I do not have faith in my judgment; I have faith in you. I have now given you my trust; I treat you as genuine.

The word [earnest] has an evolved (in both each individual and History) function of triggering the movements/arrangements of other words which eventually trigger conditioned Feelings which eventually trigger actions (more mental/or physical) . — ENOAH

I would say that these “movements” and “feelings” and “actions” do not follow from the word (as if “I am earnest” were a report of something in me, and not just in the sense of a promise, though only believed as much as “I’m not lying”). Everything follows from my being convinced, my judging that you are earnest, which conclusion is “triggered” by the standards, or criteria, that we associate with earnestness—the actions and words that demonstrate you are in earnest.

All of this process seems to contain "intent" "deliberation" a "self". Hence these discussions etc. But there is no "trusting your own mind" directed by that "you". It is all just the movements of that mind — ENOAH

I would say that judging whether someone is earnest does take “deliberation”. And we are, in a sense, judging their “intent”, not as if to see in their mind, but (even stranger) to see into the future: whether they will trick us or fulfill the commitment that is made in claiming they are (will continue to be) earnest. To be taken as earnest is an expectation, and so does not involve the “self” in the sense of: a state, like dazed; or: a feeling, like sad. These are the version of “self” as in: my person. But a claim to be earnest does involve my “self” in the sense of: my character; who I am asking to be seen as, taken for, what I stake as collateral.

So we may even claim we are in earnest to ourselves, as we can make a promise to ourselves. It would seem we should know best if we intend to trick ourselves, or whether we are faking, but what is “being earnest”, or to “really mean it”, if not the further future demonstration of that commitment. It’s not never feeling like a fake or like giving up or like we were deluded at the outset, but that we continue on, try harder, follow through.

So then what is “trusting your own mind”? If it is “all just movements of [our] mind” then we are left with the fact @Benj96 started with: “Everyone can be rash, everyone can be stupid, misinformed or otherwise malpracticing adequate reason.” Which is to say, how can we trust our self? as in: our brain, our habits, our weakness, our limitations? And this is trust in the sense of: be certain of, as in: that we aren’t deluded, tricked, wrong. But perhaps all this talk of earnestness helps us to see that our relation to ourself is not one of certainty. Not that it is blind belief that everything we think is right, but a matter of loyalty, not entrusting our self—as in our character—to others, to apathy, to knowledge, abandoning our judgment, relinquishing our voice, letting our consent be assumed. We may be rash, stupid, ignorant, irrational (@flannel jesus), but it’s a start. If we are asking, as @Banno framed it, “What is true?”, in this sense, we are true to ourselves; our trust is our not giving up.