our ultimate moral goals. — Mark S

What exactly are those "ultimate moral goals" and, since "moral science" is not prescriptive, what is the non-scientific basis for determining such "goals" and that they are "ours" (i.e. universal)?

I'm not a big fan of turning humanities into sciences.

“Philosophers” like Sam Harris are not engaging in ethics whatsoever in their suggested strategies of cooperation (e.g., “moral landscapes” as he puts it). Sadly, you are right that the mainstream influencers (such as Sam Harris) view morality as (essentially) the study of behavior, but, in doing so, they have stripped out ethics and swapped it for a science (which already exists): psychology and sociology.

To remove “moral ought claims” is to remove the fundamental aspect of the study of ethics: an investigation of what is intrinsically valuable, and subsequently how to act in accordance with it. You have removed, in your definition, any study of what is good from ethics; and thereby are no longer in ethical discourse. A description of how people generally behave is not an ethical judgment, nor is such a study ethics.

All you have described, is how best people can pragmatically achieve goals; and not what goals actually align with what is (morally) good. Thusly, your “ethics” is a phantom, withered and malnourished, of the study—it is a facade.

If you think that what one ought to do is not related to anything which is intrinsically good, then you are talking about a form of moral anti-realism which is the negation of ethics proper (e.g., moral nihilism).

Science cannot tell us what is ethical: morality is supervenient on physical properties.

Bob, Thanks for taking the time to comment.

I see Sam Harris as an embarrassment to the Science of Morality field. His science is minimal, and I (and many others including you) cannot follow his ‘ethical’ reasoning. I mentioned Harris only because he is well-known. Oliver Curry’s science is exemplary, but, again, his ethical reasoning is not respected among moral philosophers. I have no problem with scientists attempting to do moral philosophy, but Please keep such musings well separated from scientific claims, and don’t mix the two in one paper!

To remove “moral ought claims” is to remove the fundamental aspect of the study of ethics: an investigation of what is intrinsically valuable, and subsequently how to act in accordance with it. — Bob Ross

Are you interpreting the “Science of Morality” to refer to something like the “Science of Ethics”? I have no idea what a science of ethics would be. It certainly could NOT be a part of science as science is commonly understood.

My goal in this post is to argue for defining the Science of Morality as firmly within science’s domain. I have said nothing about what arguments should or should not be part of ethics. I advocate removing moral ought claims only from science, not from ethics. A clear boundary between the scientific and moral philosophy domains would benefit both.

By including moral ought claims, Wikipedia’s definition of the Science of Morality either removes the field from the domain of science or proposes that moral ought claims are a part of science. Neither seems sensible. It is a poorly thought-out definition.

A description of how people generally behave is not an ethical judgment — Bob Ross

We agree. We agree more than you realize.

All you have described, is how best people can pragmatically achieve goals; — Bob Ross

Right, I have described how understanding why our moral sense and cultural moral norms exist can be culturally useful in terms of instrumental oughts for achieving goals. How is that a facade?

you are talking about a form of moral anti-realism — Bob Ross

That depends on one's definition of moral realism - a separate topic. For example:

‘‘[M]oral facts are facts about cooperation, and the conditions and practices that support or undermine it” (Sterelny & Fraser, 2016).

The philosophers Sterelny and Fraser argue that understanding why morality exists provides an objective moral realism. Their paper could be a good topic for a future post. But first, let’s sort out how to define the “Science of Morality."

What exactly are those "ultimate moral goals" and, since "moral science" is not prescriptive, what is the non-scientific basis for determining such "goals" and that they are "ours" (i.e. universal)? — 180 Proof

What those ultimate moral goals are has been debated by philosophers for a long time and I expect that debate to continue. There may be no final, universal answer. But even if there is no final answer, the process of that philosophical debate is useful for people considering what ultimate moral goal they will use as a well-considered moral reference in their lives.

What is the philosophical basis for determining such “goals”? You know much more about that than I do.

If you can use scientific methods to determine ultimate moral goals – more power to you! But I don’t understand how it could be possible.

I'm not a big fan of turning humanities into sciences. — Vera Mont

How about understanding why our moral sense and cultural moral norms exist?
Are you an advocate of NOT knowing the simple principles that underly and explain the diversity, contradictions, and strangeness of our moral sense and past and present cultural moral norms? If so, why?

How about understanding why our moral sense and cultural moral norms exist? — Mark S

That's what Anthropology, Sociology, Psychology and History are for. They record, observe and analyze human behaviours and relationships over time, so that we may discern patterns and explain events.
The sciences observe, experiment, measure and formulate.
If you reduce "the diversity, contradictions, and strangeness of our moral sense and past and present cultural moral norms" to simple principles, you're far too likely to end up with facile categorization or a rigid ideology.

facile categorization or a rigid ideology. — Vera Mont

Rigid ideology implies imperative oughts or delusions. I advocate for scientific truth of the usual provisional kind.
Why do you call the principles that explain virtually everything we know about past and present cultural moral norms and our moral sense "Facile categorization"?

I advocate for scientific truth of the usual provisional kind. — Mark S

Yes, that's fine, insofar as the scientists go - assuming it's even possible to establish a scientific basis for the "truth" about moral precepts. But hand that scientific finding to a political ideologue, and it ends up like Social Darwinism and eugenics.

Why do you call the principles that explain virtually everything we know about past and present cultural moral norms and our moral sense — Mark S

I didn't. I said reducing diversity to simple principles can lead to facile categorization.

Due to advances in game theory in the last 50 years or so, it has become possible to reduce past and present cultural moral norms and our moral senses to two simple moral principles. Could that reduction lead to facile categorization? Perhaps, but refusing to try to reduce past and present cultural moral norms and our moral sense to simple moral principles would have left us ignorant of the core of what makes us human.

Perhaps, but refusing to try to reduce past and present cultural moral norms and our moral sense to simple moral principles would have left us ignorant of the core of what makes us human. — Mark S

I cannot agree that reduction leads to greater understanding. Even if it were so, reducing all moral norms and precepts to simple principles leaves a brand new science with nothing left to discover, and that would be a waste.
As to "the core of what makes us human" - assuming there is such a thing - everybody and his uncle Mose has come up with answers. But why do you care?

Excluding moral ought claims from the science of morality enables a more useful definition of what the science of morality studies with a clear demarcation of science’s and philosophy’s domains. — Mark S

The problem remains, as has long been pointed out, that a description of what is the case does not tell us what ought be the case.

Excluding "ought" claims from "moral science" renders it impotent.

A "moral science" that does not tell us what to do is of no use. You seem to think that it can tell us what to do without telling us what we ought to do. That appears absurd.

Bob, Thanks for taking the time to comment.

Absolutely! I appreciate you taking the time to respond (:

I see Sam Harris as an embarrassment to the Science of Morality field. His science is minimal...

:up:

Are you interpreting the “Science of Morality” to refer to something like the “Science of Ethics”?

I do not recognize any valid difference between morality and ethics.

My goal in this post is to argue for defining the Science of Morality as firmly within science’s domain. I have said nothing about what arguments should or should not be part of ethics. I advocate removing moral ought claims only from science, not from ethics. A clear boundary between the scientific and moral philosophy domains would benefit both.

Perhaps it would be helpful, if you defined what you mean by “morality”. I thought you meant:

“The study of why our moral sense and cultural moral norms exist".

P.S.: this definition is circular (see underlined).

By including moral ought claims, Wikipedia’s definition of the Science of Morality either removes the field from the domain of science or proposes that moral ought claims are a part of science. Neither seems sensible. It is a poorly thought-out definition.

I don’t see how one can validly call it a study of ‘morality’ if there is no consideration of what ought to be: again, it sounds like you are falling into the same trap—in stripping out morality from morality.

Right, I have described how understanding why our moral sense and cultural moral norms exist can be culturally useful in terms of instrumental oughts for achieving goals. How is that a facade?

Is this all you mean by “morality”? Because this is just a study of the pyschology and sociology of a person—and has nothing to do with morality.

:fire:

Hi Banno,

The problem remains, as has long been pointed out, that a description of what is the case does not tell us what ought be the case. — Banno

Right. As has long been pointed out, we have no disagreement there.

A "moral science" that does not tell us what to do is of no use. — Banno

Really? Excluding ought claims from the rest of science does not diminish its usefulness.

Like the rest of science, the science of morality, defined as “the study of why our moral sense and cultural moral norms exist”, provides instrumental oughts for achieving our otherwise defined goals. If we can use it to achieve our goals, it is not useless. For the science of morality, these otherwise defined goals can even include goals for moral systems.

The Wikipedia entry suggests defining the science of morality as a mixture of scientific and ethical arguments about what we ought to do. This definition moves the field firmly outside the domain of science, which I see as a serious error.

Let’s let science, even the science of morality, do science and moral philosophers do ethics. A clear separation of their domains will benefit both disciplines.

How do you define “moral science”? I am not familiar with it.

How do you define “moral science”? I am not familiar with it. — Mark S

I don't. But "ethics" is working out what we should do. Now that is a difficult question, quite different to the simple one of what we have done.

Trouble is, you seem to think that addressing the latter is addressing the former. Somewhat blithely, as here:

Like the rest of science, the science of morality, defined as “the study of why our moral sense and cultural moral norms exist”, provides instrumental oughts for achieving our otherwise defined goals. — Mark S

Instrumental oughts are directed at some goal. But what ought our goal be? Try addressing that question.

Are you interpreting the “Science of Morality” to refer to something like the “Science of Ethics”?

I do not recognize any valid difference between morality and ethics. — Bob Ross

I don’t know what a “Science of Ethics” could usefully study and have never heard of anyone who claimed that as their field. I would have to be convinced that “the science of ethics” is a coherent concept.

The Science of Morality, as I propose it to be defined, is a field strictly within science’s domain.

From the OP, the Perplexity AI defines it as
“The science of morality studies the psychological, neurological, and cultural foundations of moral judgment and behavior”.

Or as you imply: a study of moral pyschology and sociology regarding cultural moral norms.

We can distinguish between descriptive and prescriptive morality. Distinguishing between descriptive and prescriptive metaethics, for example, seems incoherent. I consider ethics to be the study of prescriptive morality; they are not the same.

Consider the study of descriptive morality. Can ethics usefully study it? No. Traditional ethics can make no sense of the superficial chaos of past and present descriptively moral behaviors.

However, science’s tools are well suited to that study; hence, my proposed definition of the science of morality as " the study of why our moral sense and cultural moral norms exist.”

Or I could say “The science of morality studies why descriptively moral behaviors exist”.

Does that help?

Perhaps it would be helpful, if you defined what you mean by “morality”. I thought you meant:

“The study of why our moral sense and cultural moral norms exist".

P.S.: this definition is circular (see underlined). — Bob Ross

No, it is not circular. What our “moral sense” is and “cultural moral norms” are is established in all societies independent of how anyone defines or does not define morality.

I don’t see how one can validly call it a study of ‘morality’ if there is no consideration of what ought to be: — Bob Ross

Would saying “The science of morality studies why descriptively moral behaviors exist” help clarify why there is no consideration for what morally ought to be done?

Is this all you mean by “morality”? Because this is just a study of the pyschology and sociology of a person—and has nothing to do with morality. — Bob Ross

One could argue “The study of descriptively moral behaviors has nothing to do with ethics”. However, arguing that “our moral sense and cultural moral norms have nothing to do with morality” would require some truly tortured definitions.

I suspect that saying, “The science of morality studies descriptively moral behaviors” would better convey my point. I thought it was obvious that “our moral sense and cultural moral norms” are about descriptively moral behaviors, but perhaps not.

Like the rest of science, the science of morality, defined as “the study of why our moral sense and cultural moral norms exist”, provides instrumental oughts for achieving our otherwise defined goals.
— Mark S

Instrumental oughts are directed at some goal. But what ought our goal be? Try addressing that question. — Banno

The subject of this thread is "Defining What the Science of Morality Studies".

The science of morality, like the rest of science, is silent regarding what we ought to do or what our goals ought to be.

There is no reason to think that the study of descriptively moral behaviors (cultural, moral norms and our moral sense) could tell us what we morally ought to do or what our goals and values ought to be.

Can you explain why you keep thinking science should be able to tell us what we ought to do?

Science may be able to tell us how we are most likely to be able to achieve our moral goals, but it will be forever silent on what those goals ought to be.

However, I prefer to define the science of morality as:

“The study of why our moral sense and cultural moral norms exist". — Mark S

Wouldn't evolutionary psychology, sociology and anthropology be the relevant disciplines for such an enquiry? They're scientific, as far as the social sciences can be scientific, and I'm sure there are many relevant studies. You list some of them under Notes. What would be missing from those sources?

other suggestions for defining the science of morality studies are welcome. — Mark S

I would start by not categorising it as science in the first place. Science at least in the modern context relies on what is objectively, or better still, inter-subjectively observable and measurable. The thrust of the 'is/ought' problem is that what ought to be the case, or what one ought to do, cannot be subjected to quantitative measurement. Hopefully, all can agree on what is measurably the case, but what ought to be the case, is a different matter altogether. So how could it be a scientific matter, insofar as science relies on objective judgement?

Most normative moral systems in civilized cultures originated with the truths of revealed religion (Semitic, Indic, Chinese) or some other form of sapiential insight (e.g. those of the pre-socratic philosophers), which characterised the 'axial age' of philosophy. In the absence of such sources, which are generally deprecated in secular philosophy, how do you arrive at a moral good, beyond a utilitarian definition of 'the greatest good for the greatest number'? (and leaving aside questions of what 'the greatest good' might constitute, beyond an equitable distribution of resources.)

This is why I think the articulation of moral norms is such an intractable philosophical question - because when you introduce religious considerations then you face the intractable conflicts between competing truth-claims, conflicts which generally have no objectively measurable means of adjuticating. But then you've also set aside many of the sources of morality, reflected in the setting aside of the questions you say are fundamental to any proposed 'science' (e.g. 'what is good'? etc).

Seems to me very hard to escape 'Hume's fork'. So is the point of the title of the OP that there can't be a definition of the subject matter of a purported 'science of morality'?

Many sources talk about the science of morality, but I find no agreement on how to define what it studies. Not finding anything succinct in more authoritative sources (suggestions are welcome) I turned to Wikipedia. Wikipedia describes the science of morality as a mixture of descriptive science and moral philosophy:

“The science of morality may refer to various forms of ethical naturalism grounding morality in rational, empirical consideration of the natural world. It is sometimes framed as using the scientific approach to determine what is right and wrong” (Their main reference is Lenman’s 2008 Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy article Moral Naturalism.)

Consistent with Wikipedia’s definition, two well-known investigators, Oliver Curry (2019) and Sam Harris (2010), propose what people morally ought to do as a legitimate part of science. They are outliers. I will argue this Wikipedia definition is inaccurate and confusing regarding mainstream science of morality.

Contrary to Wikipedia’s definition, the state of the science of morality (see Note) is that almost all mainstream investigators limit their claims to what morality descriptively ‘is’. Their agreement is that morality regarding interactions with other people ‘is’ cooperation strategies. (Note that the larger ethical questions such as “What is good?”, ‘How should I live?”, and “What are my obligations?” are generally avoided.) — Mark S

So, I am within reason, hesitant to post here as you seem to be a more dyed-in-the-wool academic or academic adjacent type of intellectual. But everyone deserves a chance ...

So, THE problem with science in general and academia in general, is that the whole lot of it is a fear only approach to wisdom, morality, and life. I have my own model I am writing a book on that discusses this issue much more deeply, but, in brief, there are only three emotions, fear, anger, and desire. Together, maximized and in balance they are the GOOD, defining at once, perfectly, all that is wisdom and morality. The system, the natural state of the universe, is Love, which is another name for God or truth or 'All'. Every single bit of all of that is only those three emotions. In other words to me, consciousness is reality. I say all this briefly to set the stage for my later comments so that you can have them make some sense for you.

Fear as an emotion is redefined or MORE PROPERLY defined to me as 'an excitable state that arises as a result of matching a pattern from one's past.' Notice the 1:1 relationship between the temporal sector referred to as the past and fear. Fear is thus all about patterns. Fear is effectively the same thing as the meta-emotional concept of order.

As such all structure, all limits, all boundaries, all categories, all patterns, all thought, all logic, is only and always will only be fear manifested. Keep in mind, everything is only fear, anger, and desire. But these manifestations in reality, what Ken Wilber refers to as the Noosphere, are all only fear-side. It's ONLY hilarious to me that Data and so many others, academics, etc, consider logic to be emotionless. It is ONLY fear. And last time I checked, fear is an emotion. The colloquial definition of fear is weak and foolish.

So, where am I going with all this?

There are three approaches to truth corresponding to each of the emotions. Fear is only one. And it has zero percent more value than the approach of anger, being; and the approach of desire, chaos. Each of those others is EQUALLY valuable and must be integrated in to wisdom or that which is being discussed IS NOT wisdom. It is a fake delusional sort of anti-wisdom instead of wisdom.

Most academics and scientists engage mostly the fear approach and fail quite horridly at the anger and desire approaches to truth. Pragmatism itself is the fear side philosophical base approach as an ism and is thus highly immoral. Likewise, Idealism is the desire side philosophical approach as an ism and is thus highly immoral. Anger is so little understood that it is hard to qualify its ism, but its place is understood or at least theorized as understood in my model.

So, the point of all that is that these 'science' approaches are necessarily doomed to over-emphasize order and like even Jordan Peterson, the result is order-apology, in other words conflating order as a goal with the GOOD. The GOOD is equal parts order, chaos, and the neutral force of balance (anger). So, of course, rigorous order will always fall short of truth until the end of time. But we can do BETTER if we understand the three paths and integrate them in these pursuits.

Some investigators avoid even the mention of “moral” or “morality” and describe their subjects only as, for example, The Complexities of Cooperation (Axelrod 1997), “the evolution of altruism” (Fletcher 2009), or “cross-cultural norms that solve cooperation problems”(Ostrum 2000). They pointedly avoid stating the obvious, that they are talking about aspects of our moral sense and cultural moral norms. Perhaps they take this approach to avoid nuisance misunderstandings based on definitions such as Wikipedia’s. — Mark S

This avoidance of truth is exactly correct. You are RIGHT to point it out. But now and later you seem to then side with the idea of avoidance. Avoidance is lazy, the 'sin' of anger. If it doesn't fit, heck, just toss it aside and discard it.

Nope. We have to deal with every problem to be correct. You have well educated idiots like Marx intentionally and laboriously removing the word and concepts of morality from their theories and ideas and thus failing, effectively. There is no escape from morality. You cannot avoid it.

It is my belief, if you don't realize it by now that morality is objective. That means it existed as a law of the universe before time began. It provides for time. The perfectly balanced forces of fear, anger, and desire provide for the central truth of the universe, free will, and its active element, choice.

These fear side cowards (bear with me as all fear side immoral failure is roughly called cowardice) like to pretend that fear and logic and reasoning is better than desire or anger. They are wrong. Each emotion carries precisely equal moral value.

Fear controls awareness and preparedness as well as joy oddly. I can explain why, but, for right now let that stand as an unsupported assertion. Why break a trend? It stands to reason that reason is overly proud of itself. It works by definition with high probability born out by the patterns of the past. And this offers fear its delusional worthiness.

Desire has the reverse issue. The idealists are well aware, all too aware, of how failing they are. The many paths of desire often yield suffering instead of growth. But the higher energy of that 'spirit' allows for so many tries. The consequences are predictable to the stuffy fear types. They see this and think 'no wonder' when the delusional worthlessness happens to the desire types. It's also why they turn on each other so easily when the fear types often support one another in orderly lockstep.

Anger is a much-maligned solution for both of these errors, although it has laziness to contend with. Anger stands to all. Anger denies fear and gets loud and big, using confidence to handle impact with mystery. And anger denies desire saying instead that the self is already sufficient (intrinsically worthy as part of it all) and needs nothing. Anger is the wellspring of compassion and unity.

That is just a brief overview of why I agree with your suggestion that too many academics avoid ethics and morality. In my opinion they do so because they cannot 'prove' it and they would rather use fear side Pragmatism to 'get er done' like the cowards of efficiency they are. This DOES NOT serve humanity really as wisdom. Fear is a cold trap leading to death when over-expressed. It is a logical stagnation of truth, and not truth itself.

Perplexity (https://www.perplexity.ai/) is a new, user-friendly AI program. I was curious how it would define the science of morality. In its reply, it said:

“The science of morality studies the psychological, neurological, and cultural foundations of moral judgment and behavior”. — Mark S

To me that is more like moral history or the history of morality. Even saying the words, 'the science of morality' is TRYING and bound to fail at a fear-side only approach to truth, dangerous in both its aims and its means.

As with the rest of science, claims about what people imperatively ought to do were not included. This definition is consistent with the mainstream science of morality. This consistency is what we should expect since the science of morality literature, plus relevant philosophical literature, is the basis of this AI’s answer. Of course, any output of AI programs must be viewed with skepticism, but this example appears sensible. — Mark S

Yes, although, again, it's more like 'a history of morality amid humanity'.

However, I prefer to define the science of morality as:

“The study of why our moral sense and cultural moral norms exist". — Mark S

I like your definition, but, I am not sure you really mean that. It seems unlikely that you do. I will explain later.

I see my definition as encompassing, but more fundamental than, Perplexity’s while similarly avoiding any awkward implications about what people imperatively ought to do or value. — Mark S

So, no, not at all. In fact, what you say here NEGATES your definition. The study of WHY our moral sense exists is indeed the study of morality itself that implies ALL OUGHTS. There is nothing about it BUT oughts.

You left that word in your definition, WHY. Why is the central question of all philosophy. That one word contains all philosophy.

The norms and cultural interpretations exist because SOMETHING is there to provoke that feeling, that belief. And that something maintains for us a set of OUGHTS. It is finally only the OUGHTS that matter at all. Everything else is just choices that are in error about what the OUGHTS are. That is to say when we discuss opinions on morality, all we are talking about is the degree of error from the objective moral truth. Opinions are errors. Subjective experience can only ATTEMPT to understand objective morality. It cannot ever really succeed 100%.

Again, other suggestions for defining the science of morality studies are welcome. — Mark S

I like yours, but, that is because your definition DOES include the OUGHTS as stated, even if you maybe believe it does not. I believe you wanted to focus on the observable cultural constructs as all there is, rather than morality being an objective law of the universe predating mankind's hubris. Is that correct? That would be wrong.

What are the advantages of excluding philosophical moral ought claims from the science of morality? — Mark S

Sleazy easy approaches to truth ARE NOT advantages, but cowardice encourages Nihilism and conceit both. Fear causes delusional worthiness, just like desire causes delusional worthlessness. Then anger must come in and balance them and they it.

First, combining claims about objective scientific truth (the normal provisional kind) and claims about what we morally ought to do (which may forever be subjective) can be confusing for both scientists and philosophers. Where does objective science end and philosophizing begin? — Mark S

Philosophy can describe science and the reverse is not true, so far.

Second, excluding moral ought arguments from science can help make the same science useful for a wide variety of moral systems. — Mark S

Yes, this is the ultimately cowardly Pragmatism. 'Get er done!'

For example, consequentialist philosophers might propose moral system goals of “living according to nature” or maximizing happiness and flourishing (however those might be defined) for one’s group, for everyone, or for all conscious creatures. But by what moral ‘means’ regarding interactions with other people ought these hypothetical moral ‘ends’ be achieved? — Mark S

Real wisdom, like morality which it describes and supports, shows us that suffering must increase for wise action to be in progress. That is to say, a moral act is the single hardest act one can do or even believe in. Perfection is the goal. That is not easy. Ease of all kinds is immorality. So, Pragmatism is immoral. It stresses that which is 'useful' or 'efficient' only, and thus fails to account for anger and desire.

The science of morality, by both my and Perplexity AI’s definitions, provides an attractive, mind-independent option for moral means: achieving those ends by solving cooperation problems. — Mark S

I know what you mean, but mind-independent is actually impossible. As a concept mind, e.g. fear predates and suffuses the entire multiverse. It is order itself, all of it. So there is NOTHING in reality and never has been, that is truly mind-independent.

That delusion will not assist you in reaching real wisdom.

As mentioned above, solving cooperation problems is the generally recognized function (the reason they exist) of our moral sense and cultural moral norms. — Mark S

How predictable is this? You leave out the desire side truth of competition as moral, and perhaps the balancing requirements of conflict between the two, which anger is fine with. I'm ok with it. 'Let truth and falsehood grapple, truth is strong.' - Milton was right!

Choosing to advocate and enforce moral ‘means’ as strategies for solving cooperation problems can be attractive because 1) these means can be innately harmonious with our moral intuitions since they are what shaped them, 2) they are the well-tested primary means by which humans became the incredibly successful social species we are, and 3) the subset of those cooperation strategies that do not exploit others can be shown to be universal (the subject of past and perhaps future posts). — Mark S

Anger is aware that harmony is overrated. Peace is delusional. Conflict is ubiquitous and eternal. We do need or OUGHT to require that suffering is restricted to what is necessary, but that is the real debate. What suffering is necessary and what is not? The wise suffer exquisitely more than others by definition. Greater awareness is greater suffering. Greater sets of fear side restrictions is greater suffering. Greater confidence in the face of mystery is greater suffering. And greater wishing for the ideals to be realized, for the GOOD, is greater suffering.

These attractive eases you propose are immoral aims in many ways. I understand that you mean them to help, but, unless balanced, they will not help, but harm.

In summary, solving cooperation problems as moral means for groups is an attractive choice because, among available options, it is arguably the means most likely to help us achieve our ultimate moral goals. — Mark S

No, as mentioned, the fear-side only path is not finally wise. More balance is needed and that means redirecting the understanding to include chaos (desire) and anger (balance) as moral forces equal to fear in importance.

Excluding moral ought claims from the science of morality enables a more useful definition of what the science of morality studies with a clear demarcation of science’s and philosophy’s domains. — Mark S

More useful as in short-cut fiat. No, that is not moral.

“The study of why our moral sense and cultural moral norms exist".

Interestingly, for Hegel, this historical question is central the ethics proper. Both what we "have done," and what we "ought to do," are ultimately driven by reason's propelling humanity towards the accomplishment of human freedom.

I appreciate the elaboration!

I understand you separate ‘morality’ from ‘ethics’, but this is superficial and nonsensical. What you really conveyed in your response (here), was that the difference between a science of morality and morality itself: you are distinguishing a psychological, sociological, etc. analysis of moral dispositions from morality itself, and trying to claim that the former is “morality” and the latter is “ethics” when this distinction, in fact, affords no such distinction—rather it is a distinction between a science of morality as opposed to morality itself.

“The science of morality studies the psychological, neurological, and cultural foundations of moral judgment and behavior”.
…
No, it is not circular. What our “moral sense” is and “cultural moral norms” are is established in all societies independent of how anyone defines or does not define morality.

If you are attempting to define morality, which you seem to be still doing, then this is absolutely circular—although I understand what you are trying to convey, it is not being conveyed properly by defining this science as morality.

If you define morality with any terms that refers to morality, then you are have defined it circularly because one has to understand first what morality is to parse the definition of morality of which you have presented.

Instead, I think what you are defining is the “science of morality” and not morality, and this is certainly not circular; and makes sense with your definition. BUT, it makes no difference if you call it “science of ethics”, because this would just be, by your own definition, “the study of why our ethical sense and cultural ethical norms exist”. Your distinction between ethics and morality is superfluous, and confuses things.

Would saying “The science of morality studies why descriptively moral behaviors exist” help clarify why there is no consideration for what morally ought to be done?

Yes, but it is important to note that you are in no way engaging in morality, even with respect to your own definitions, with this “science of morality”. The science you describe, would be distinct from morality itself and would amount to a psychological and sociological account of morality—which is useless for the actual study of morality.

One could argue “The study of descriptively moral behaviors has nothing to do with ethics”. However, arguing that “our moral sense and cultural moral norms have nothing to do with morality” would require some truly tortured definitions.

It has nothing to do with morality, insofar as it isn’t relevant to the study of morality itself; but, obviously, it is related to morality insofar as you are trying to give a psychological account of it, as opposed to diving into the moral discourse about it.

Bob

Descartes wanted to achieve a scientific moral code. Due to the fact he couldn't, he came up with a provisional morality whose maxims, more or less based on common sense, are given in the Discourse. But I take it that you already knew that.

Many sources talk about the science of morality, but I find no agreement on how to define what it studies. — Mark S

The relationship between cause and effect.

Descartes wanted to achieve a scientific moral code. Due to the fact he couldn't, he came up with a provisional morality whose maxims, more or less based on common sense, are given in the Discourse. — Lionino

"God's law is 'right reason.' When perfectly understood it is called 'wisdom.' When applied by government in regulating human relations it is called 'justice." Cicero

Interestingly, for Hegel, this historical question is central the ethics proper. Both what we "have done," and what we "ought to do," are ultimately driven by reason's propelling humanity towards the accomplishment of human freedom. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Freedom from what?

I for one, would rather have a sense of duty than freedom. I want a life based on principles, not a life without them. And I want a society that values virtues, duty, principles, and an understanding of being part of something much bigger than myself.

I forgot to say I want liberty that is curbed with morals.

So "our ultimate moral goals" is just an empty phrase, mere rhetoric, and your "science of morality" "determines" that. :ok: Mere scientism ...

Freedom from what?

For Hegel, it's more of a "freedom to..." In a great deal of modern philosophy, freedom is thought of in terms of potentiality. This is freedom as the ability to "choose between." The potential to "do anything."

But Hegel is far more in line with the ancient/medieval tradition, which sees freedom primarily in terms of actuality—the ability to actualize what one sees as good (and, crucially, to know what is truly good). The ability to choose, potency, is certainly a factor in this conception of freedom, but the perfection of freedom lies in actualization.

So, if I think it would be good to shovel my elderly neighbors walkway, but I instead give in to my desire to be warm and watch TV, there is a sense in which I am not totally free. I am like St. Paul in Romans 7, at war with myself, unable to actualize what I truly think is best. Likewise, when I act in ignorance, I am in a way constrained.

I for one, would rather have a sense of duty than freedom.

Hegel doesn't think these two are in contradiction. Duty is essential to freedom because freedom has a social element. Man is the "political animal." By nature, we want to live in communities. Living in communities also increased our freedom, e.g. we don't have to spend all our time finding food because people specialize in agriculture; we can "learn how to do," all sorts of things because people can teach us, etc. Knowledge and arts, which are developed as a social project, enhance our causal powers, and so our freedom.

But people can also act as a constriction on each other's freedom. How is this overcome? Through identification with the other and with one's duties. For instance, I don't want to get up in the middle of the night to change diapers. However, I want to "be a good father and a good husband," and this entails certain duties. Thus, I identify with my obligations, and am happy to do them, even if they aren't pleasant. Likewise, the ER doctor doesn't always like staying up long hours, but they identify with their role and so desire it at a higher level. But one isn't free to "become a good doctor," or "become a good fire fighter," without being free to take on certain obligations. Duty then, is a perfection of freedom in actualization.

But then liberty doesn't have to be "curbed by morals." Liberty is living according to morals. Hence why the classical philosopher is normally saint-like, even before the rise of the Christian tradition (e.g. Appolonius, Prophyry's Pythagoras, Socrates, etc.) Whereas in the modern context, the saint is more likely to be seen as in some way "tyrannized by values," rather than the highest actualization of freedom.

We disagree if ethics refers to the same thing as morality. To avoid confusion, let’s just use the word morality and avoid the word ethics.

The heart of my proposal is that the science of morality studies what is descriptively moral (our moral sense and past and present cultural moral norms), NOT what is prescriptively moral.

If you define morality with any terms that refers to morality, then you are have defined it circularly because one has to understand first what morality is to parse the definition of morality of which you have presented. — Bob Ross

First, the definition is for the science of morality, not morality itself. Is it circular? No.

Ask the most philosophically ignorant person you can find “what is right and wrong”. They will cheerfully tell you what is right and wrong by their moral sense and cultural moral norms. No more of a ‘definition’ of morality is required. My definition generates no “circularity” issues.

Further, defining morality beyond what is “right and wrong”, for example as Kant’s categorical imperatives, would make the definition nonsense. You could have the scientific study of cultural Kantian norms or Kantian sense motivations - incoherent nonsense.

you are in no way engaging in morality, even with respect to your own definitions, with this “science of morality”. The science you describe, would be distinct from morality itself and would amount to a psychological and sociological account of morality—which is useless for the actual study of morality. — Bob Ross

What is your basis for claiming that what descriptively moral behavior ‘is’ has zero relevance for what morality imperatively ‘ought’ to be?

The principles that underlie descriptively moral behaviors are what people have thought of as moral (because it has been encoded into the biology underlying our moral sense) for as long as we have lived in cooperative societies. Any proposed imperative moral system that is not harmonious with the principles encoded into our moral sense will be rejected as “not what morality is about”. So one application of understanding what descriptively moral behaviors are will be as a check on the cultural utility of any proposed imperative moral system.

Also, remember there is no agreement and there may never be agreement on what morality imperatively ought to be. In the perhaps permanent absence of imperative moral oughts, the universal principle “Behaviors that solve cooperation problems without exploiting others” is the most effective and useful definition of descriptively moral behavior I am aware of.

Do you have a better suggestion for moral guidance?

↪Mark S So "our ultimate moral goals" is just an empty phrase, mere rhetoric, and your "science of morality" "determines" that. :ok: — 180 Proof

In no way does the science of morality (as the study of what is and has been descriptively moral) make our ultimate moral goals an empty phrase. Rather the opposite, I advocate for science to be silent on our ultimate moral goals just as the rest of science is silent on what our other goals ought to be.
Science leaves the field open for you to argue for your preferred ultimate moral goal or goals.