Ontology is choosing between languages. It consist in no more than stipulating the domain, the nouns of the language. — Banno
I started a thread here a while back that might be of interest. — J
Davidson is just the ubiquitous On the very idea of a conceptual scheme. — Banno
There's a prima facie disagreement here, but I think it is on the surface only, that Midgley is espousing something not too dissimilar to Davidson's anomalism of the mental. — Banno
What is Davidson's summary of the very idea of a conceptual scheme?
Davidson attacks the intelligibility of conceptual relativism, i.e. of truth relative to a conceptual scheme. He defines the notion of a conceptual scheme as something ordering, organizing, and rendering intelligible empirical content, and calls the position that employs both notions scheme‐content dualism.
↪J Oh, that thread dropped off my list. I didn't see your last reply. Still the most annoying question on the forums. — Banno
↪Wayfarer's is not just a "terminological question". It's (potentially) a choice between grammars, between languages. Which implies quantifier variance. Which I think we (you and I) are inclined here to deny. — Banno
Respect.Do I get a prize? :halo: — J
There's a real problem with this view. If "seven" is a structure in your brain, then your "seven" is not the same as my "seven", which would be a distinct structure in my brain.Along the same line of thought, a number (and any other mathematical entity) is a set of neurons that form a specific structure in my brain. — bioByron
If this description is accurate, could this result in a mathematical realism that is not platonic but physicalistic? — bioByron
There's a real problem with this view. If "seven" is a structure in your brain, then your "seven" is not the same as my "seven", which would be a distinct structure in my brain. — Banno
For an actually physicalist ontology of mathematics, see immanent realism. — Lionino
my “seven” is a real object (from materials existing in space and time) inside my brain — bioByron
In connection with numbers, one strategy is to take numbers to be universals of some sort — e.g., one might take them to be properties of piles of physical objects, so that, for instance, the number 3 would be a property of, e.g., a pile of three books — and to take an immanent realist view of universals. (This sort of view has been defended by Armstrong (1978).) But views of this kind have not been very influential in the philosophy of mathematics. A more prominent strategy for taking number talk to be about the physical world is to take it to be about actual piles of physical objects, rather than properties of piles. Thus, for instance, one might maintain that to say that 2 + 3 = 5 is not really to say something about specific entities (numbers); rather, it is to say that whenever we push a pile of two objects together with a pile of three objects, we will wind up with a pile of five objects — or something along these lines. Thus, on this view, arithmetic is just a very general natural science.
so that, for instance, the number 3 would be a property of, e.g., a pile of three books — and to take an immanent realist view of universals. (This sort of view has been defended by Armstrong (1978).)
to say that 2 + 3 = 5 is not really to say something about specific entities (numbers); rather, it is to say that whenever we push a pile of two objects together with a pile of three objects, we will wind up with a pile of five objects
Get involved in philosophical discussions about knowledge, truth, language, consciousness, science, politics, religion, logic and mathematics, art, history, and lots more. No ads, no clutter, and very little agreement — just fascinating conversations.