There is no such thing as "going by pure logic", toward understanding the nature of reality. [/quore]
Agreed. But that does not justify using some means OTHER than logic to understand reality, and calling it logic! That's @Michael's fallacy. Saying something's a logical contradiction when it merely makes no sense to him. You agreed with me earlier that this is a fallacy. But you defend it when YOU do it.
To be clear: I have no objection to using extra-logical means of understanding reality. But then don't turn around and all it logic.
— Metaphysician Undercover
"Pure logic" would be form with no content, symbols which do not represent anything. All logic must proceed from premises, and the premises provide the content. And premises are often judged for truth or falsity. But as explained in the passage which ↪wonderer1 referenced, in the case of an "appeal to consequences", there is no fallacy if the premises are judged as good or bad, instead of true or false. That's why I said that this type of logic is very commonly employed in moral philosophy, religion, and metaphysical judgements of means, methods, and pragmatics in general. So for example, one can make a logically valid argument, with an appeal to consequences, which concludes that the scientific method is good. No fallacy there, just valid logic and good premises. — Metaphysician Undercover
Therefore it is not the case that the reasoning is "extra-logical", it employs logic just like any other reasoning. What is the case is that the premises are a different sort of premises, instead of looking for truth and falsity in the premises we look for good and bad. So this type of judgement, the judgement of good or bad, produces the content which the logic gets applied to. — Metaphysician Undercover
No, that is not the case, because there are two very distinct senses of "determined". One is the sense employed by determinism, to say that all the future is determined by the past. The other is the the sense in which a person determines something, through a free will choice. In this second sense, a choice may determine the future in a way which is not determined by the past. And, since it is a choice it cannot be said to be random. Therefore it is not true that if the world is not random then it's determined (in the sense of determinism), because we still have to account for freely willed acts which are neither determined in the sense of determinism, nor random.[/qouote]
You can't have determinism and free will. Frankly if the world is random and we have some kind of influence on it through our will, or spirit, I find that much more hopeful than a universe in which I'm just a pinball clanging around a well-oiled machine.
Determinism is the nihilistic outlook, not randomness. In randomness there is hope for freedom. Say that's a pretty catchy saying. The church of Kolmogorov. In randomness lies the hope of freedom.
— Metaphysician Undercover
As I said above, it is not a matter of transcending logic, the conclusions are logical, but the premises are judged as to good or bad rather than true or false. So from premises of what is judged as good (rejecting repugnant principles), God may follow as a logical conclusion. — Metaphysician Undercover
No I was not arguing that. In that case I was arguing that the idea ought not be accepted (ought to be rejected) unless it is justified. In the case of being repugnant, that in itself is, as I explained, justification for rejection. You appear unwilling to recognize what wonderer1's article said about the fallacy called "appeal to consequences". It is only a fallacy if we are looking for truth and falsity. If we are talking principles of "ought", it is valid logic. Therefore the argument that the assumption of randomness ought to be rejected because it is philosophically repugnant, cannot be said to be invalid by this fallacy, and so it may be considered as valid justification. — Metaphysician Undercover
But Michael did not show that supertasks are philosophically repugnant. — Metaphysician Undercover
He showed that they are inconsistent with empirical science, — Metaphysician Undercover
and his prejudice for what is known as "physical reality" (reality as understood by the empirical study of physics) influenced him to assert that supertasks are impossible. — Metaphysician Undercover
As I explained in the other thread, in philosophy we learn that the senses are apt to mislead us, so all empirical science must be subjected to the skeptic's doubt. So it is actually repugnant to accept the representation of physical reality given to us by the empirical sciences, over the reasoned reality which demonstrates the supertask. And this is why that type of paradox is philosophically significant. It inspires us to seek the true reasons for the incompatibility between what reason shows us, and what empirical evidence shows us. We ought not simply take for granted that empirical science delivers truth. — Metaphysician Undercover
As explained above, I am not taking a standpoint of determinism. There are two very distinct senses of "determine", one consistent with determinism, one opposed to determinism (as the person who has a very strong will is said to be determined). I allow for the reality of both. — Metaphysician Undercover
Says you. That is precisely the point at issue! — Wayfarer
Ontological randomness may be logically possible but it's philosophically repugnant. The problem being that if something is deemed as random, it is in that sense unintelligible. So if something is deemed as ontologically random, and it is considered to be unintelligible, then there is no will to attempt at figuring it out.
Now the problem is that if something appears to be random there is no way of knowing whether it is epistemologically random, or ontologically random, because of the unintelligibility of it. So we won't know which until we figure it out, therefore we must assume it to be epistemologically random. And even if it is ontologically random, we will still never know that this is the case, so we will always have to assume that it is epistemologically random, and try to figure it out. The category of "ontological randomness" is absolutely useless. — Metaphysician Undercover
What do you think he means? I'm sure he doesn't mean that the indeterminate nature of quantum phenomena is simply due to gaps in our knowledge. — Wayfarer
Call it anything you like, but not logic! Logic means something else. That term is already taken. You are using extra-logic. Morality, right or wrong, productive/nonproductive. All well and good, but not logic. If logic is to mean anything, it has to mean something. — fishfry
If I'm choosing good versus bad I'm not using logic... — fishfry
Yes but the contrary proposition of determinism is even more repugnant, as I've noted. Shouldn't we (logically!) choose the lesser of two repugnancies? — fishfry
And you have not shown randomness philosophically repugnant. By the time I thought about it a little, I realized that randomness is our only hope for salvation. It's the only way we're not automatons. Clockwork oranges. So you haven't made your point here. I am a proud randomite. — fishfry
This is way past the lamp. The lamp is not a physical thing. These puzzles have no bearing on physical reality. That's a cognitive error everyone makes about them. — fishfry
You say randomness and determinism are compatible, and your justification is to use an alternate and unrelated meaning of the word determined? — fishfry
Yes, it was that "Realist Attitude" that I was referring to in my post above : "Yet, the general scientific attitude toward Nature is that nothing is left to Chance". I suppose the necessity for mixing subjective Metaphysics*1 with objective Quantum Physics is what Realists and Materialists most strenuously object to. By "chance" I refer, not to Luck or Fate, but to the free-wheeling randomness underlying the apparent mechanical determinism of macro reality.More broadly speaking, Einstein always stood for a realist attitude: that everything is determined by or subject to general laws. That's why he couldn't abide the implications of quantum physics - entanglement ('spooky action at a distance') and uncertainty being prime examples. — Wayfarer
What the baffling nature of quantum phenomena reveals to us, is that the reality of the world is very far outside of our current ability to understand it. "Indeterminate" means beyond our capacities to determine, and why he thinks that we ought to be "shocked by quantum physics" is that these "indeterminate" aspects are so significant, and have been shown to be so far outside our capacity to understand, that it reveals how shockingly minimal our current capacity to understand the reality of spatial temporal existence actually is. — Metaphysician Undercover
The problem being that if something is deemed as random, it is in that sense unintelligible. So if something is deemed as ontologically random, and it is considered to be unintelligible, then there is no will to attempt at figuring it out. — Metaphysician Undercover
Slow down, you are not taking the time to understand what I said. In the application of logic, there is two aspects to soundness, the truth or falsity of the premises, and the validity of the logical process. — Metaphysician Undercover
Therefore, we must respect the fact that moral arguments can proceed with valid logic, — Metaphysician Undercover
Bohr felt that his discovery of the 'principle of complementarity' resolved many of the apparent paradoxes implied in quantum physics. — Wayfarer
He said 'everything we call real is made of things that cannot be regarded as real' and 'Physics is not about how the world is, it is about what we can say about the world.' I think he accepted the limitations of knowledge, in a rather Kantian way. — Wayfarer
Isn't it possible that the world considered as a physical system is unintelligible (Plato's 'shadows on the cave wall')? — Wayfarer
So much the worse for it, many will say, but then Robert Jastrow did say, in God and the Astronomers,"For the scientist who has lived by his faith in the power of reason, the story ends like a bad dream. He has scaled the mountains of ignorance; he is about to conquer the highest peak; as he pulls himself over the final rock, he is greeted by a band of theologians who have been sitting there for centuries." — Wayfarer
We're just arguing about a word. If you want to claim that "I prefer chocolate to vanilla, and my preference is logical," what is the point of my arguing with you about a thing like that? — fishfry
The word is "logic", and I think it's pretty important to a discussion like this, to have good agreement as to what this word means. — Metaphysician Undercover
If I simply assert, as if a true proposition, "chocolate is better than vanilla", there is not logic here. But if I state my premises, I am allergic to vanilla, and to have an allergic reaction is bad, then my stated preference "i prefer chocolate to vanilla" is supported by logic and is logical. Do you agree? . — Metaphysician Undercover
It's not even predictable to the demon, if the demon is part of the world itself and has to interact with it.Note --- From the perspective of the all-knowing demon, the physical world is precisely determinate and predictable, but in the view of a mortal scientist, using imperfect machinery, the quantum realm is indeterminate & unpredictable, and perplexing. Which may be "troubling" for those who can't deal with ambiguity. — Gnomon
I understand your qualification of acceptance regarding absolute Subjectivism*1, which would be essentially Solipsism. We moderns avoid the slippery slope of solipsism by comparing our private personal point-of-view with the publicized perspectives of others (e.g. TPF), in order to find commonalities between them. Modern Scientists tend to treat those common denominators*2 as-if they are Objective facts about True Reality*3.↪Gnomon
I'll try and find time for that video, the first presenter, Beau Lotto, also figured in a video I attached to the Mind Created World OP. As for 'subjectivism', I almost accept that, with the crucial caveat that we are all subjects of similar kinds, and so the world occurs for each of us in similar ways. The subjective, so-called, is an ineliminable pole of reality, but there's no use looking for it, because it is what is doing the looking. — Wayfarer
Actually, the "other minds" I referred to are the perspectives of physically & mentally different people, who presumably have their own peculiar Solipsistic worldviews. Does Kastrup view his 'dissociated alters' as Other Minds in that sense?Those "Other Minds" may filter information about True Reality through their own private or communal prejudices. — Gnomon
Kastrup's 'dissociated alters'. — Wayfarer
By definition a metaphorical demon is not part of the real world, hence super-natural. It "interacts" only in hypothetical worlds. Hence, its predictions would be true only in the context of the metaphor. :joke:It's not even predictable to the demon, if the demon is part of the world itself and has to interact with it. — ssu
Does Kastrup view his 'dissociated alters' as Other Minds in that sense? — Gnomon
Henosis for Plotinus (204/5–270 CE) was defined in his works as a reversing of the ontological process of consciousness via meditation (or contemplation) toward no thought (nous or demiurge) and no division (dyad) within the individual (being). As is specified in the writings of Plotinus on Henology,[note 2] one can reach a tabula rasa, a blank state where the individual may grasp or merge with The One. This absolute simplicity means that the nous or the person is then dissolved, completely absorbed back into the Monad.
I'm not sure that Laplace himself thought so. His idea was this kind of idea of extrapolation to the extreme, if an entity would have all the information at hand and all the laws of nature. That idea is false, because it doesn't take into account that any entity is part of the world. This is usually referred to being part of the problem that Quantum physics brings to us, but surely the problem is far more general.By definition a metaphorical demon is not part of the real world, hence super-natural. It "interacts" only in hypothetical worlds. — Gnomon
As I was developing my own personal philosophical worldview, I was prejudiced against Intelligent Design arguments by the mainstream scientific accusations, that it required faith in the God of Genesis. But I had rejected that ancient hypothesis when I reached the age of Reason. Instead, I was impressed by emerging developments in various threads of scientific understanding in the 21st century, pointing toward Teleology or Teleonomy in evolution.Orthogenesis, on the other hand, is an evolutionary hypothesis suggesting that life has an inherent tendency to evolve in a unilinear direction towards some kind of predetermined goal or ideal form. This concept implies that evolution is guided by an internal or directional force rather than by random mutations and environmental pressures.
Would you agree that an omniscient entity is preternatural? Non-omniscient human observers of quantum events cannot be as objective & well-informed as a metaphorical demon seeing the world from a privileged perspective. Hence, the Quantum Observer Effect. :smile:By definition a metaphorical demon is not part of the real world, hence super-natural. It "interacts" only in hypothetical worlds. — Gnomon
I'm not sure that Laplace himself thought so. His idea was this kind of idea of extrapolation to the extreme, if an entity would have all the information at hand and all the laws of nature. That idea is false, because it doesn't take into account that any entity is part of the world. This is usually referred to being part of the problem that Quantum physics brings to us, but surely the problem is far more general. — ssu
Well, that's basically my point. And do note that Laplace really didn't make this point at all. Yet notice, that isn't actually something that has been told earlier when discussing Laplace's demon. The link you gave gives it in one way. But notice that this is actually a very important thing.The demon must be an outside observer of the deterministic universe. — Gnomon
Omniscient?Would you agree that an omniscient entity is preternatural? — Gnomon
Yes. That's why Laplace postulated a preternatural "demon" instead of a natural scientist, to keep track of all positions and motions in the world, from his objective observatory outside the universe.Would you agree that an omniscient entity is preternatural? — Gnomon
Omniscient?
You can turn that other way: anything part of the university cannot be omniscient. — ssu
This is what Laplace thought is "all" that needed. But Laplace really missed the point that a forecast of the future can have an effect on the future, the subjectivity of this entity. It's simply negative self reference, just as the trick is in all incompleteness results. You simply cannot "just assume" something to get rid of this problem in science. In religion, you simply can start with the axiom of God being omniscient and omnipotent.Yet, his argument for determinism used a god-substitute to make his point that natural laws leave no gaps for divine intervention. Ironically, the demonic entity would need to know all natural laws and all physical properties in order to predetermine the future development of the whole universe. — Gnomon
I don't know that Laplace "missed the point". Perhaps, in order to keep his metaphor simple, he avoided getting into the open-ended question : "is foreknowledge deterministic?" :smile:But Laplace really missed the point that a forecast of the future can have an effect on the future, the subjectivity of this entity — ssu
I'm not sure what "this" refers to : a> foreknowledge = determinism? b> omniscience = omnipotence? c> randomness = incompleteness?Why is this important? My view is that people think this is some kind of "problem" that needs to be fixed, averted or bypassed by some method. In fact it's a very important limitation itself, especially when you think just what something "random" should be. — ssu
At least you are open-minded on the question of origins. Some posters on TPF are self-labeled Absurdists*1. For them, asking about Origins & Causes is irrelevant to their meaningless life. But I suspect that most of us on this forum are not quite so apprehensive or pessimistic about open-ended philosophical questions. We humans seem to be innately curious*2 about the causal history prior to important observed events and processes : i.e. a Reason for Being. Rather than using contemporary humanoid gods to explain the existence & operation of our world, Plato and Aristotle postulated descriptive abstract labels such as First Cause and Prime Mover.I'm not a deist, but I don't see that the position that something created the universe any more or any less problematic than to say that the universe was uncaused. The deist needn't posit anything to do with intent or purpose either. He need only say the universe was caused by some cause. As to what caused the deistic god to come into being, the deist lays the mystery there, in the god, the thing that defies causation. — Hanover
Do notice the time when Laplace lived: the Scientific world view was quite Newtonian and causal determinism was quite mainstream. And notice that he doesn't at all refer to any "demon" to the issue:I don't know that Laplace "missed the point". Perhaps, in order to keep his metaphor simple, he avoided getting into the open-ended question : "is foreknowledge deterministic?" — Gnomon
We may regard the present state of the universe as the effect of its past and the cause of its future. An intellect which at a certain moment would know all forces that set nature in motion, and all positions of all items of which nature is composed, if this intellect were also vast enough to submit these data to analysis, it would embrace in a single formula the movements of the greatest bodies of the universe and those of the tiniest atom; for such an intellect nothing would be uncertain and the future just like the past would be the present to it.
To the point that causal determinism as defined by Laplace has trouble with logic, when the intellect is part of the universe.I'm not sure what "this" — Gnomon
Ok, when similar problems have been stated, for example in economics in the 1930's that there's this problem when the forecaster has an effect on what is forecasted, there might not be any way to give the correct forecast, people (or in this case) economists don't like this. Hence this was just sidelined by saying that "there has to be a correct forecast" and perhaps later we'll understand how to find it. (And btw, the exchange was between two later nobel prize winning economists) People just assume some dynamic model can take into account the effect of the forecaster. Well, the problem with negative self reference is that there's no dynamic modelling way to counter it.I'm also not sure of what the "problem" is that needs to be fixed — Gnomon
Just first think about what Laplace's idea holds: if you have total information and understanding the laws of nature, then by Laplace's argumentation, forecasting is really an extrapolation of the present / past to the future. Extrapolation of this is simply computation, you can calculate what the future is.What does "this" have to do with Laplace's demon or the OP question about the equation of randomness and information? — Gnomon
Your quote is exactly the "open-ended question" I referred to. Is it possible to calculate the future position and momentum of multiple particles accurately enough to predestine the end of the world? The "intellect" he postulated is not any known entity in the physical world, so others labeled it a "demon" or "daimon". For the ancient Greeks, a daemon was a lesser deity with limited powers. But for Enlightenment Age philosophers & scientists, the term "demon" was an oblique reference to an omniscient being, which for Christians would be the unlimited deity known as "God".When you read that, I don't see any reference to any open ended question rather than perhaps the difficulty of knowing "all forces that set nature in motion" and obviously "all positions of all items of which nature is composed". — ssu
Yes. That's why natural evolution must harmonize Random Mutations with specific Selection Criteria. Working together, these complementary factors combine freedom for exploration of solutions with limitations on the combinations that will survive into the next generation. But who does the selecting? A math Demon? :smile:The next question is that can randomness be defined also with this phenomenon in mathematics? After all, if you have an random string, you cannot extrapolate how it's going to continue from what it has been. — ssu
But do notice that Laplace isn't using the metaphor demon/daimon!Laplace's hypothetical metaphor — Gnomon
Has he said that? Please give a reference, I'm genuinely surprised if he said so and I'm interested to know that quote. I didn't know that, as obviously Gödel was extremely careful of what actually his incompleteness theorems mean. He had even difficulties to accept that Turing's Halting Problem was similar to his theorems.and eventually Goedel concluded that human mathematics will never be able to predict world events (e.g. weather) beyond a few days in advance. — Gnomon
Is it actually so incredibly complex? It can be a very simple example where the model, that actually has an effect itself what it should model at the first place, can be very simple.Laplace's mere "difficulty" for a far-sighted daemon, would be "impossible" for a natural being, living within the incredibly complex system he's modeling. — Gnomon
The next question is that can randomness be defined also with this phenomenon in mathematics? After all, if you have an random string, you cannot extrapolate how it's going to continue from what it has been. — ssu
Here I think Laplace himself has the best answer to this: He (Laplaca) doesn't need a math Demon or God. Because there is no selection done. Let me explain,Yes. That's why natural evolution must harmonize Random Mutations with specific Selection Criteria. Working together, these complementary factors combine freedom for exploration of solutions with limitations on the combinations that will survive into the next generation. But who does the selecting? A math Demon? :smile: — Gnomon
I'm afraid you're getting way over my head, since I know nothing about Laplace, except for a couple of famous quotes. I assume you're referring to Laplacian Scores (I Googled "Laplace Selection"), but I won't be able to follow your reasoning on that "score".He (Laplaca) doesn't need a math Demon or God. Because there is no selection done. — ssu
I doubt that Einstein intended for his as-if Block Universe metaphor to be taken literally. But, as you noted, such a world would be completely predestined, and unlike the probabilistic (partly randomized) reality*2 that us humans have to deal with. Perhaps you are arguing against Causal Determinism*3, as an argument against human Choice & FreeWill. If so, I'd have to agree with you. :smile:If you define the future being that will truly happen in reality, you do have determinism: no chance, no choice, no uncertainty. It's really the block universe, everything is predetermined, like this discussion with you and others. It will go only one way and that's it. — ssu
I'm not very familiar with Wolpert or Cantor, so "diagonalization" doesn't mean much to me. I suppose our "limitation on modeling" means that, pace Einstein, most of us parts-of-the-whole are not even close to omniscient. What does "negative self-reference" mean to you? In layman's terms, please. :wink:But then there is the real twist: this understanding of the universe is useless for us. We cannot model it, we cannot extrapolate from it because we are part of the universe and thus we have this limitation on modelling. — ssu
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