I'm only saying that "I believe that aliens exist" is true iff I believe that aliens exist.

This is correct.

Therefore your conclusion that "a belief cannot make a proposition true or false" is false.

This is false; and does not follow from the former claim you made. I already explained this in great detail, so let's try a different way.

I would ask you: "what belief makes the proposition 'I believe that aliens exist' true or false?"
You would say: "that I believe that aliens exist".
I would say: "that you believe that aliens exist, is not a belief about the proposition: that "I believe that aliens exist" is not dependent on what we believe about it, so you have failed to demonstrate what belief makes the proposition true or false."

I am (obviously) not denying that a proposition can be about a belief but, rather, am denying that a proposition is true or false relative to a belief. That a proposition cannot be evaluated as true or false without determining a belief (or lack thereof) that one has, it does not follow that the proposition's truth is relative to that belief. E.g., I believe "aliens exist" != "I believe aliens exist": the former is invalid and a proposition that has its truth relative to a belief, the latter is valid and a proposition that is about a belief.

P1: A stance taken on the trueness or falseness of something, is independent of the trueness or falseness of that something.

Well, the whole idea behind moral subjectivism being internally inconsistent is that they take (1) beliefs (which are stances) to make propositions true or false, while conceding, in their own rewriting of the propositions, that (2) propositions cannot be made true or false by beliefs; which is self-evident when they rewrite "one ought not torture babies" as "I believe one ought not torture babies".

I don't think that begs the question, but I see why you would think that.

That is fair: a moral subjectivist could get out of this internal inconsistency by positing that moral judgments are propositions because they are just propositions about beliefs; but then moral propositions do not exist, which seems pretty absurd.

Likewise, in this version of the position, one can't say that the moral proposition "one ought not torture babies" is true for them: they would have to say that "I believe one ought not torture babies" is true for them. I think most moral subjectivists do not realize this, and fall into the (internally inconsistent) trap that I outlined in the OP.

They would no longer be discussing ethics, essentially.

This is false; and does not follow from the former claim you made. — Bob Ross

It does follow. My belief that aliens exist makes the proposition "I believe that aliens exist" true. Therefore, your claim that "a belief cannot make a proposition true or false" is false.

:roll:

Repeating yourself three times, while ignoring my responses, does not help further the conversation.

Repeating yourself three times, while ignoring my responses, does not help further the conversation. — Bob Ross

Your responses do not address my claim hence why I have to repeat it.

It has been addressed at length, but you refuse to engage in the conversation:

https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/comment/903115
https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/comment/903011

which is self-evident when they rewrite "one ought not torture babies" as "I believe one ought not torture babies" — Bob Ross

Do they though?

α: Within MS, the first seems to be the moral proposition and the second the justification, to me therefore they seem distinct but dependent.

β: But let's say they do rewrite it, to mean that "one ought not torture babies" is "I believe one ought not torture babies" — and it might as well be, as it is a A↔B relationship.

Being that "I believe one ought not torture babies" is "one ought not torture babies", "I believe one ought not torture babies" is a moral proposition (if it is not, there is no such thing as moral propositions, the moral nihilist position) — this is the matter you were approaching in the rejoinder. That being the case, what justifies "I believe one ought not torture babies" is that I believe in it. As you can see, that would end up in an infinite regress. By itself, that doesn't entail logical contradiction of the belief, but it is untenable and the MS will want to simply default back to α.

that "I believe that aliens exist" is not dependent on what we believe about it, so you have failed to demonstrate what belief makes the proposition true or false." — Bob Ross

I don't think Michael is saying that the the truth of the proposition is dependent on what "we" believe. He is saying that the truth is dependent on what the person referenced by "I" believes in that proposition.

"α" is an inconsistent position for a moral subjectivist to hold (and this is the main point of the OP): a proposition cannot be made true or false relative to a belief, and this is why they have to rewrite it as "I believe <...>" as they can't evaluate coherently "<...>" relative to a belief.

For a moral subjectivist to be consistent, they will have to deny that "<...>" is a moral proposition and hold, instead, that "I believe <...>" is the moral proposition. At this point, "β", they have defeated their own position: they were supposed to demonstrating that "<...>" is true relative to a belief and NOT "I believe <...>".

Being that "I believe one ought not torture babies" is "one ought not torture babies"

Those can't be equal: they are obviously not the same proposition. A person who holds this, does not understand what propositions are. "1 + 1 = 2" != "I believe 1 + 1 = 2".

"I believe one ought not torture babies" is a moral proposition

Yes, if they do this, then, like I stated above, they have defeated they own position: they were supposed to be arguing that "one ought not torture babies" is a moral proposition and NOT "I believe <...>".

I would say: "that you believe that aliens exist, is not a belief about the proposition: that "I believe that aliens exist" is not dependent on what we believe about it, so you have failed to demonstrate what belief makes the proposition true or false." — Bob Ross

See:

P: "I believe that aliens exist"
P2: "I believe that I believe that aliens exist"

I would say that the truth of P is relative to a belief, namely my belief regarding aliens. However, I think you are right in saying that it is not necessarily relative to the belief expressed by P2. — Leontiskos

More simply:

1. "Aliens exist"
2. "I believe that aliens exist" — Leontiskos

(2) is a proposition about a belief about proposition (1). (2) is not a proposition about a belief about proposition (2). You and Michael seem to have been talking past one another on this point for the entire thread. I think you have the better part of this sub-argument, because Michael's point does not interact with C1 of your OP (although it does pretend to interact with it). On the other hand, C1 would have been more accurately written, "Therefore, a belief about the a proposition cannot make a that proposition true or false." The question is about whether a belief about (1) can make (1) true or false, not whether a belief about (1) can make (2) true or false. More generally, C1 asks whether a belief about a proposition can make that same proposition true or false.

The main point is that even though some propositions depend on beliefs, ethical propositions such as <Do not torture babies> do not depend on beliefs, and are therefore not made true or false in virtue of a belief. — Leontiskos

Yes, what he is noting is that "I believe <...>" is true or false depending on whether or not the person, being referenced by "I", has the belief. This is NOT the same thing as claiming that the proposition "I believe <...>" is true or false depending on our beliefs about it: this is the difference between a proposition being about a belief, and a proposition's truth being relative to a belief.

I admit it can be confusing, and this is why we have to be very careful: the proposition "I believe <...>" is about a belief of the subject-at-hand, but whether or not it is true is not dependent on any beliefs about it.

@Michael keeps overlooking this point I am making, and reverts back to insisting on a point that I agree with---i.e., that some propositions are about beliefs.

I completely agree with your assessment, and I think you understand what I am trying to convey. I have been trying to explain this to @Michael, but they seem to keep overlooking this point: I am not denying that a proposition be about a belief, and this can, thusly, require one to evaluate it relative to the subject-at-hand.

However, to be fair, I see how C1 was worded in a way that did provide the ambiguity necessary to birth this dispute; so I just re-worded it in the OP to better reflect what I am saying (and what I am not saying).

I completely agree with your assessment, and I think you understand what I am trying to convey. — Bob Ross

:up:

However, to be fair, I see how C1 was worded in a way that did provide the ambiguity necessary to birth this dispute; so I just re-worded it in the OP to better reflect what I am saying (and what I am not saying). — Bob Ross

Fair enough. I will say that an attentive reader of P1 would have been able to understand C1, because P1 is clear about the self-same identity of the two propositions, and the meaning of C1 derives from P1.

The only dispute we may have, is:

P: "I believe that aliens exist"
P2: "I believe that I believe that aliens exist"

I would say that the truth of P is relative to a belief

I would be wary to say that P has its truth relative to a belief; because this would mean that "I believe that aliens exist", P, is true or false depending on if I believe "I believe that aliens exist", P.

I understand what you are conveying and agree with it, but I think describing it as "truth relative to a belief" contributes to the confusion people are having: propositions that take the form "I believe <...>" are not "special" when it comes to the truth about them---truth is objective. This is what causes, in my opinion, people, including my past self, to conflate "aliens exist" being true or false relative to a belief with "I believe aliens exist" being true or false not relative to a belief.

:up:

In short, if a belief is a (cognitive) disposition towards whether or not a proposition is true or false; then it plainly follows that beliefs do not make propositions true or false. Thusly, moral propositions cannot be true or false relative to cognitive dispositions. — Bob Ross

Suppose someone believes that it's their disposition about a belief that makes a proposition true or false. In that case, it's akin to what I often say about convictions, viz., just because one holds to the conviction the X is true, that in itself means very little in terms of what's morally true or false. The difference is between knowledge (JTB) and mere opinion, or more precisely the difference is between using know as the expression of a conviction and using know as an epistemological point, i.e., being properly justified in one's moral belief.

Your point is an important epistemological statement, and I agree. It's not a matter of pointing to my inner subjectivity that makes a statement true or false, at least not in this example. There may be certain propositions that are dependent on our feelings or intuitions, but moral propositions are not of that ilk.

I would be wary to say that P has its truth relative to a belief; because this would mean that "I believe that aliens exist", P, is true or false depending on if I believe "I believe that aliens exist", P. — Bob Ross

So if we look at these two propositions:

1. "Aliens exist"
2. "I believe that aliens exist" — Leontiskos

I would say that the veracity of (2) is relative to my belief regarding the existence of aliens, and the veracity of (1) is not relative to that belief. Namely, if I believe (1) then (2) is true, and if I do not believe (1) then (2) is false. It seems to me that this "relativity to belief" is one of the primary differences between (1) and (2). Crucially, I want to say that if a proposition is not relative to beliefs or dependent upon beliefs, then we do not need to examine any beliefs in order to assess the veracity of that proposition. Because we do need to examine beliefs in order to assess the veracity of (2), it must therefore be relative to beliefs. Yet one does not need to examine beliefs in order to assess a moral proposition.

(@Michael,@Count Timothy von Icarus,@ChrisH)

I don't mind the underlying meaning you are referring to by "relativity to belief"; so here's a way I can express my view without getting into semantics.

A belief about a proposition cannot make it true or false (e.g., "aliens exist" cannot be made true or false relative to any belief formulated about it); but a proposition can be made true or false relative to a belief which it is about.

Put that way, the mistake a moral subjectivist makes is NOT the idea that a proposition can be made true or false relative to a belief which is contained in it; but that a belief about a proposition can make it true or false.

The internally inconsistent part, is that, in a nutshell, a moral subjectivist claims that moral propositions in the traditional sense (e.g., "one ought not torture babies for fun") can be true or false relative to a belief about it; and results in an inconsistent view, for the vast majority of moral subjectivists, of the nature of a belief and a proposition. The inconsistency is exemplified easily in the way that moral subjectivists readily convert moral propositions into propositions about beliefs while incoherently maintaining that the original moral proposition has been preserved.

I admit it can be confusing, and this is why we have to be very careful: the proposition "I believe <...>" is about a belief of the subject-at-hand, but whether or not it is true is not dependent on any beliefs about it. — Bob Ross

I think Michael's making a distinction between "beliefs about it" and "beliefs".

A claim that "john "believes X" is not dependent on any belief about John' s beliefs (your point) but it is dependent on John's beliefs (Michael's point). In other words the truth of the proposition is clearly dependent on an actual belief - something you appeared to deny when you wrote.

C1: Therefore, a belief cannot make a proposition true or false. — Bob Ross

I changed the OP to help dissolve this dispute:

C1: Therefore, a belief about a proposition cannot make that proposition true or false.

That is all I need to convey the original point.

In other words the truth of the proposition is clearly dependent on an actual belief - something you appeared to deny when you wrote.

I disagree with your characterization of it as "truth of a proposition is clearly dependent on an actual belief": truth is objective. Again, this is a rather moot point with respect to the OP, though.

What you are really saying, is that the truth of the proposition is dependent on whether or not someone has the belief; and not that it is dependent on a belief.

E.g.,

A claim that "john "believes X" is not dependent on any belief about John' s beliefs (your point) but it is dependent on whether John's has that beliefs about X (Michael's point)

Well written Bob!

I think the below hammers it home.

The problem with this sort of rectification, is that the moral judgment is no longer a proposition: the indexical statement is the proposition. Therefore, the moral subjectivist is no longer accepting (implicitly) moral cognitivism. — Bob Ross

I think we are historically/culturally/linguistically situated — Fooloso4

I am on board with that part.

but not thereby determined. — Fooloso4

Then--unless I misunderstanding--

1. Whence history/culture/language?
2. What/what process/who situate(s)/(d) us "there"?

Are these "things" H/C/L, at least at "source", immutable, preexisting, inevitable? By design?

And note, while I recognize our real beings, our bodies, are not directly determined by HCL, our Minds, are both the source of and determined by HCL.

However, no need to debate this further unless you feel it compelling. I'm already enriched by your comments, comfortable with what I view as minor divergence in our paths, and look forward to the next time they cross.

A belief about a proposition cannot make it true or false (e.g., "aliens exist" cannot be made true or false relative to any belief formulated about it); but a proposition can be made true or false relative to a belief which it is about. — Bob Ross

:up:

I don't understand what you mean by saying:

but then moral propositions do not exist, which seems pretty absurd. — Bob Ross

Can you explain?

Likewise, in this version of the position, one can't say that the moral proposition "one ought not torture babies" is true for them: they would have to say that "I believe one ought not torture babies" is true for them. I think most moral subjectivists do not realize this, and fall into the (internally inconsistent) trap that I outlined in the OP.

They would no longer be discussing ethics, essentially.

If torturing babies is morally repugnant to me, then why can I not say that it is truly morally wrong for me? I may feel that others should also see it as morally wrong, but if I am a consistent moral subjectivist I cannot justify that feeling. Does that matter?

I distinguish ethics from moral philosophy as I see it as being concerned with the question as to how I should live. It doesn't necessarily concern how others should live although whether it does or not might depend on one's starting assumptions. Moral philosophy concerns how I think I should treat others and perhaps also how I think others should treat others,

I changed the OP to help dissolve this dispute:

C1: Therefore, a belief about a proposition cannot make that proposition true or false. — Bob Ross

Yes that more accurately reflects what you're attempting to say. The original was open to Michael's criticism.

I think that within these constraints there is still some degree of play and freedom. There are from time to time those who are able to see beyond the limits of their time. Those who are not products of their time but who influence how those who follow will see and think.

Agreed. Time will tell is almost always a reliable proposition.

"α" is an inconsistent position for a moral subjectivist to hold (and this is the main point of the OP): a proposition cannot be made true or false relative to a belief, and this is why they have to rewrite it as "I believe <...>" as they can't evaluate coherently "<...>" relative to a belief.

For a moral subjectivist to be consistent, they will have to deny that "<...>" is a moral proposition and hold, instead, that "I believe <...>" is the moral proposition. At this point, "β", they have defeated their own position: they were supposed to demonstrating that "<...>" is true relative to a belief and NOT "I believe <...>".

Being that "I believe one ought not torture babies" is "one ought not torture babies"

Those can't be equal: they are obviously not the same proposition. A person who holds this, does not understand what propositions are. "1 + 1 = 2" != "I believe 1 + 1 = 2".

"I believe one ought not torture babies" is a moral proposition

Yes, if they do this, then, like I stated above, they have defeated they own position: they were supposed to be arguing that "one ought not torture babies" is a moral proposition and NOT "I believe <...>". — Bob Ross

The internally inconsistent part, is that, in a nutshell, a moral subjectivist claims that moral propositions in the traditional sense (e.g., "one ought not torture babies for fun") can be true or false relative to a belief about it; and results in an inconsistent view, for the vast majority of moral subjectivists, of the nature of a belief and a proposition. The inconsistency is exemplified easily in the way that moral subjectivists readily convert moral propositions into propositions about beliefs while incoherently maintaining that the original moral proposition has been preserved. — Bob Ross

Under moral subjectivism, the following is true:

1. A belief is a (cognitive) stance taken on the trueness or falseness of a proposition; and
2. Beliefs make moral propositions true or false.

These two statements are inconsistent with each other, and here’s a quick syllogistic demonstration of why:

P1: A stance taken on the trueness or falseness of something, is independent of the trueness or falseness of that something.
P2: A belief is a (cognitive) stance taken on the trueness or falseness of a proposition.
C1: Therefore, a belief about a proposition cannot make that proposition true or false.

P3: Beliefs make moral propositions true or false.
P4: C1 and P3 being true are logically contradictory.
C2: Therefore, moral subjectivism is internally inconsistent.

In short, if a belief is a (cognitive) disposition towards whether or not a proposition is true or false; then it plainly follows that beliefs do not make propositions true or false. Thusly, moral propositions cannot be true or false relative to cognitive dispositions. — Bob Ross

Well, the whole idea behind moral subjectivism being internally inconsistent is that they take (1) beliefs (which are stances) to make propositions true or false, while conceding, in their own rewriting of the propositions, that (2) propositions cannot be made true or false by beliefs; which is self-evident when they rewrite "one ought not torture babies" as "I believe one ought not torture babies".

I don't think that begs the question, but I see why you would think that. — Bob Ross

OK, I have a better idea of what you're saying now -- it's not begging the question, but this is your explicit interpretation of Moral Subjectivism, and you are drawing out implications of these two beliefs which Moral Subjectivists hold to show how they are contradictory.

I think the easier rejoinder might be to let go of one or the other belief, if they agree with the argument, but redefine Moral Subjectivism in a palatable way -- for instance, a Moral Subjectivist will often say that it's not beliefs about the Moral Proposition which make it true, but our sentiments which make it true -- there's not a cognitive justification so much as a cognitive expression of feeling. What makes "One ought not murder the innocent" true is that when a person says

(1) "One ought not murder the innocent",

that statements means

(2) "I feel like murdering the innocent is abhorrent"

where the cognitivist is being confused by the shape of the sentence being in subject-predicate form, the non-cognitivist will insist that these sentences, though they look like statements about oughts, they are statements about feelings, and so the feelings -- the subjectivism -- are what make morals true.

I think the easier rejoinder might be to let go of one or the other belief, if they agree with the argument, but redefine Moral Subjectivism in a palatable way -- for instance, a Moral Subjectivist will often say that it's not beliefs about the Moral Proposition which make it true, but our sentiments which make it true -- there's not a cognitive justification so much as a cognitive expression of feeling. What makes "One ought not murder the innocent" true is that when a person says

(1) "One ought not murder the innocent",

that statements means

(2) "I feel like murdering the innocent is abhorrent" — Moliere

According to Wikipedia ethical subjectivism is cognitive-propositional, and I have found this to be the case among self-professed subjectivists. I don't think you are disputing this even though your thesis draws near to emotivism, but here is the problem I see with subjectivism and emotivism:

1. Moral propositions are (meant to be) binding upon oneself and others
2. Subjectivist and emotivist propositions are in no way binding upon oneself and others
3. Therefore, subjectivist and emotivist propositions are not moral propositions

(I.e. Subjectivism and emotivism are therefore not moral theories, because they fail to achieve normativity.)

"I feel like murdering is abhorrent" (subjectivism) and "Boo murder!" (emotivism) are in no way binding on others, and they are arguably not even binding on oneself. Feelings do not seem to be adequate to justify moral propositions. Going back to the OP, I would say that it is not only beliefs that are inadequate to justify moral propositions, but that feelings are also inadequate.