I am differentiating this from what used to be called 'intelligible objects' - logical principles, numbers, conventions, qualifiers and so on. For example, if I were to say to you, 'show me the law of the excluded middle', you would have to explain it to me. — Wayfarer
All of these can only be grasped by a rational intelligence. I could not demonstrate or explain them to a cow or a dog. — Wayfarer
As I said at the outset, in regular speech it is quite clear to say 'the number 7 exists'. But when you ask what it is, then you are not pointing to a sensable object - that is the symbol - but a rational act. (That's the sense in which I mean that 'counting is an act', but it doesn't mean that the demonstrations of rudimentary reasoning in higher animals amounts to reason per se.) — Wayfarer
In Plato these levels or kinds of knowledge were distinguished per the Analogy of the Divided Line . Those distinctions are what have been forgotten, abandoned or lost in the intervening millenia due to the dominance of nominalism and empiricism. But In reality, thought itself, the rational mind, operates through a process of synthesis which blends and binds the phenomenal and noumenal into synthetic judgements (per Kant). — Wayfarer
From this it does not follow that animals are not rational. — Janus
you appeal to Plato as someone who thought as you do. But there is no argument to support that way of thinking — Janus
I should say that while debates about universals—mathematical or otherwise—are interesting, I don’t want to enter that fray given my time constraints. — Leontiskos
Thomists and other critics of Ockham have tended to present traditional realism, with its forms or natures, as the solution to the modern problem of knowledge. It seems to me that it does not quite get to the heart of the matter. A genuine realist should see “forms” not merely as a solution to a distinctly modern problem of knowledge, but as part of an alternative conception of knowledge, a conception that is not so much desired and awaiting defense, as forgotten and so no longer desired. Characterized by forms, reality had an intrinsic intelligibility, not just in each of its parts but as a whole. With forms as causes, there are interconnections between different parts of an intelligible world, indeed there are overlapping matrices of intelligibility in the world, making possible an ascent from the more particular, posterior, and mundane to the more universal, primary, and noble.
In short, the appeal to forms or natures does not just help account for the possibility of trustworthy access to facts, it makes possible a notion of wisdom, traditionally conceived as an ordering grasp of reality. Preoccupied with overcoming Cartesian skepticism, it often seems as if philosophy’s highest aspiration is merely to secure some veridical cognitive events. Rarely sought is a more robust goal: an authoritative and life-altering wisdom.
but I don't agree that it amounts to reason in the sense that h.sapiens demonstrates it. — Wayfarer
I refer to it as historical background. I'm simply making the point that Plato's epistemology differentiated between different levels or kinds of knowledge in a way that modern philosophy does not. — Wayfarer
The last paragraph is a reference to Kant's idea of synthesis and synthetic a priori judgements. I think there's an important point here, which you've gone from objecting to, to seeing nothing significant about (although I'm hesitant to explain why I think it's important). — Wayfarer
That it’s the kind of thing a Parmenides would say?
I don't see any reason to think that we carve up the world arbitrarily, but rather I see many good reasons to think that we are constrained by its actual structures.
The real problem I see with saying that universals are mind-independently existent or real is that no one has the foggiest notion of what kind of reality or existence they could enjoy.
By calling what we experience with our senses less real than the Forms, Plato is not saying that what we experience with our senses is simply illusion. The “reality” that the Forms have more of is not simply their not being illusions. If that’s not what their extra reality is, what is it? The easiest place to see how one could suppose that something that isn’t an illusion, is nevertheless less real than something else, is in our experience of ourselves.
In Republic book iv, Plato’s examination of the different "parts of the soul” leads him to the conclusion that only the rational part can integrate the soul into one, and thus make it truly “just.” Here is his description of the effect of a person’s being governed by his rational part, and therefore “just”:
Justice . . . is concerned with what is truly himself and his own. . . . [The person who is just] binds together [his] parts . . . and from having been many things he becomes entirely one, moderate, and harmonious. Only then does he act. (Republic 443d-e)
Our interest here (I’ll discuss the “justice” issue later) is that by “binding together his parts” and “becoming entirely one,” this person is “truly himself.” That is, as I put it in earlier chapters, a person who is governed by his rational part is real not merely as a collection of various ingredients or “parts,” but as himself. A person who acts purely out of appetite, without any examination of whether that appetite is for something that will actually be “good,” is enacting his appetite, rather than anything that can appropriately be called “himself.” Likewise for a person who acts purely out of anger, without examining whether the anger is justified by what’s genuinely good. Whereas a person who thinks about these issues before acting “becomes entirely one” and acts, therefore, in a way that expresses something that can appropriately be called “himself.”
In this way, rational self-governance brings into being an additional kind of reality, which we might describe as more fully real than what was there before, because it integrates those parts in a way that the parts themselves are not integrated. A person who acts “as one,” is more real as himself than a person who merely enacts some part or parts of himself. He is present and functioning as himself, rather than just as a collection of ingredients or inputs.
We all from time to time experience periods of distraction, absence of mind, or depression, in which we aren’t fully present as ourselves. Considering these periods from a vantage point at which we are fully present and functioning as ourselves, we can see what Plato means by saying that some non-illusory things are more real than other non-illusory things. There are times when we ourselves are more real as ourselves than we are at other times.
Indeed, we can see nature as a whole as illustrating this issue of how fully integrated and “real as itself ” a being can be. Plants are more integrated than rocks, in that they’re able to process nutrients and reproduce themselves, and thus they’re less at the mercy of their environment. So we could say that plants are more effectively focused on being themselves than rocks are, and in that sense they’re more real as themselves. Rocks may be less vulnerable than plants are, but what’s the use of invulnerability if what’s invulnerable isn’t you?
Animals, in turn, are more integrated than plants are, in that animals’ senses allow them to learn about their environment and navigate through it in ways that plants can’t. So animals are still more effectively focused on being themselves than plants are, and thus more real as themselves.
Humans, in turn, can be more effectively focused on being themselves than many animals are, insofar as humans can determine for themselves what’s good, rather than having this be determined for them by their genetic heritage and their environment. Nutrition and reproduction, motility and sensation, and a thinking pursuit of the Good each bring into being a more intensive reality as oneself than is present without them.
Now, what all of this has to do with the Forms and their supposedly greater reality than our sense experience is that it’s by virtue of its pursuit of knowledge of what’s really good, that the rational part of the soul distinguishes itself from the soul’s appetites and anger and so forth. The Form of the Good is the embodiment of what’s really good. So pursuing knowledge of the Form of the Good is what enables the rational part of the soul to govern us, and thus makes us fully present, fully real, as ourselves. In this way, the Form of the Good is a precondition of our being fully real, as ourselves.
But presumably something that’s a precondition of our being fully real must be at least as real as we are when we are fully real. It’s at least as real as we are, because we can’t deny its reality without denying our own functioning as creatures who are guided by it or are trying to be guided by it.13 And since it’s at least as real as we are, it’s more (fully) real than the material things that aren’t guided by it and thus aren’t real as themselves.
So where would causation fit here? I don't see that it does
I don't think we are any more justified in saying this than we are in saying the world is full of distinct objects. All we have is signal processing. Is the source one signal? Two? Two trillion? How can you tell when you're receiving and analysing them all at once? It makes a difference in your metaphysics, but in nothing else at all that I can see.
Your claim that "Ǝ never actually changes its meaning" is refuted by the simple fact that there are different forms of quantification available in different kinds of logic; thus falls the first, univocal horn of the dilemma. — Leontiskos
Oh, and this bit is salient:
What all of this illustrates, is that in tying quantification to existence, two distinct roles are ultimately conflated:
(a) The quantificational role specifies whether all objects in the domain of quantification are being quantified over or whether only some objects are.
(b) The ontological role specifies that the objects quantified over exist.
These are fundamentally different roles, which are best kept apart. By distinguishing them and letting quantifiers only implement the quantificational role, one obtains an ontologically neutral quantification. Ontological neutrality applies to both the universal and the particular quantifier (that is, the existential quantifier without any existential, ontological import).
— Quantifier Variance Dissolved — Banno
Is this really right? I haven't worked with modal logic deeply enough to say. Certainly I had in mind the standard use of Ǝ in non-modal logic, and I was under the impression that 'Ǝx' means 'Ǝx' no matter what may then be done to it in terms of possibility and necessity. But I'd welcome any help with this, as it's germane to the QV issue. (Is there a reason Finn and Bueno don't cite modal logic as an instance of QV?) — J
Yes, good spotting. "Ontologically neutral quantification" (which I bolded, above) is exactly what we want. It's a good way of describing the difference between the "exists" of quantification and the "exists" of ontology. — J
Another point that seems to need reinforcing is the nature of quantification. If our domain is {a,b,c} then "U(x)fx" is just "fa & fb & fc"; and "∃(x)fx" is just "fa v fb v fc". If the domain changes to {a',b',c'} then "U(x)fx" is just "fa' & fb' & fc'"; and "∃(x)fx" is just "fa' v fb' v fc'". That is, the definition of each quantification doesn't change with the change in domain; but remains a conjunct or disjunct of every item in the domain. — Banno
...quantifier variance is not meant to entail a multiplicity of logical systems, each with its own quantifiers and conception of validity, but rather it requires that, within a single logic, there should be multiple (existential) quantifiers operating differently. And so, logical pluralism should not be equated with quantifier variance, as having a choice between logical systems is not the same as having a choice of quantifier meaning within a system of logic. — Quantifier Variance Dissolved
Logic gives us a variety of ways in which we might talk about how things are. It does not commit us to this or that ontology. — Banno
If you want to say "nouns are a human invention," that seems like fair game. But there has to be some sort of explanation of their usefulness and development across disparate, isolated societies.Now, if you want to say "numbers are a human invention," that seems like fair game. But there has to be some sort of explanation of their usefulness and development across disparate, isolated societies. — Count Timothy von Icarus
Logic gives us a variety of ways in which we might talk about how things are. It does not commit us to this or that ontology. — Banno
For Gillespie, the epochal question that gave birth to modernity arose out of a metaphysical and theological crisis within late medieval Christianity and became manifested in the nominalist revolution. Prior to nominalism, Christianity was defined by scholastic philosophy, which posited the real existence of universals: reality was ultimately not composed of particulars but of universal categories of divine reason. The experience of the world as universal categories became articulated in syllogistic logic that corresponded to divine reason, and man was believed to be created as a rational animal in the image of God and guided by a natural goal and divinely revealed supernatural one.
Contrary to the scholastics, the nominalists believed reality was composed not of universal categories but of particulars. Language did not point to universal categories but was merely signs useful for human understanding; creation was particular and therefore not teleological; and God could not be understood by human reason but only through Biblical revelation or mystical experience. Nominalism challenged and eventually destroyed the great synthesis that started with the Church Fathers that combined the reason of Greek philosophy with the Christian revelation. — Religious Modernity
Will we say that the world consists of objects, and we just give them names? Or will we say that the names are arbitrary, we just invent them? — Banno
God could not be understood by human reason but only through Biblical revelation or mystical experience — Religious Modernity
6.5.2.1 The solution of the problem of life is seen in the vanishing of this problem.
(Is not this the reason why men to whom after long doubting the sense of life became clear, could not then say wherein this sense consisted?)
6.522 There is indeed the inexpressible. This shows itself; it is the mystical. — TLP
But, there is a good argument to be made that these discrete things don't exist "outside minds," even if it is the case that minds do not create these identities ex nihilo or at all arbitrarily. To my mind, this should call into question the idea that "the view from nowhere/anywhere," should be the gold standard of knowledge. Rather, things most "are what they are," when known. — Count Timothy von Icarus
Other than positing some hidden connection between all minds, there is no way to explain the commonality of human experience, a commonality that extends even to some animals. — Janus
How would that work? — Janus
It is worth noting that even if we concede that difference in domain entails difference in quantifier meaning, the quantifier-variance theorist is still not in a secure position. . . — Quantifier Variance Dissolved, p. 293
There are, however, a number of difficulties with this response. . . Second, even if the maximalist is inclined to rule out dialetheism by fiat, it is still unclear what the maximal domain ultimately is. After all, there is widespread disagreement about what exists. Just within philosophical theorizing, it is contentious as to whether any of the following items exist or not: mathematical entities, universals, possible worlds, subatomic particles, and even tables. For each of these items, arguments have been devised for their existence as well as for their nonexistence. Thus, to the extent that there is disagreement about what exists, the maximalist response ends up begging the question against all of those who deny the existence of any contentious entity that the unrestricted-quantification theorist intends to include in the maximalist ontology.
If the maximal domain is not a set, but some sort of (non-set-theoretic) collection of existent objects, the same concern will emerge in light of the controversial nature of what exists. In fact, it is unclear how exactly the maximal domain is supposed to be specified. In order to determine which objects are in such a domain, one needs to specify what exists. But it is unclear how to determine what exists, given that the specification of an ontology ultimately depends on the background theory that provides the identity and persistence conditions for the relevant objects. And typically, a difference in background theory leads to a difference in the specification of the ontology. — Quantifier Variance Dissolved, pp. 295-6
The problem here is that quantification derives from the meaning of 'being' or 'exists', and this is one of the most elusive and foundational concepts, inextricably bound up with one's fundamental intellectual stance. — Leontiskos
Borrowing an example from Sider, let’s say I am a non-native English speaker who has recently learned the language. I mistakenly believe that the word for “number” is “fish”. You and I have a conversation in which we discover we’re both nominalists. You say, correctly from our shared point of view, “numbers do not exist”. I agree with you, saying “fish do not exist”. Sider claims, I think rightly, that this is not a “verbal dispute” in the classic sense of two people talking past each other because they use words differently. You and I both mean the same thing – we are each thinking the same thing about numbers – but I have made a verbal mistake. Presumably, genuine disagreements between languages can’t be analyzed and resolved in this way. And what about disagreements about quantifiers? (This is me now, not Sider.) If I say “mereological composites exist” and you say “there is no such thing as a mereological composite”, which kind of dispute is going on? Are we disagreeing about concepts, while using the same words? Or are we holding the concept of “existence” steady, while (someone is) making a mistake in terminology? How could we know which of us is making the mistake?! — J
There's a lot here, and in your recent previous posts. — J
I would have thought "first-order equivocation" would be "the classic sense of two people talking past each other because they use [the same] words differently," but maybe that's not what you mean. — J
In logic, equivocation ("calling two different things by the same name") is an informal fallacy resulting from the use of a particular word/expression in multiple senses within an argument.
[...]
Since only man [human] is rational.
And no woman is a man [male].
Therefore, no woman is rational. — Wikipedia | Equivocation
<Banks contain money; the river has banks; therefore the river contains money> — Leontiskos
Is there any "second-order equivocation" going on in the example I originally gave from Sider? — J
If I say “mereological composites exist” and you say “there is no such thing as a mereological composite”, which kind of dispute is going on? Are we disagreeing about concepts, while using the same words? Or are we holding the concept of “existence” steady, while (someone is) making a mistake in terminology? — J
To simply assume that disagreements of fact are impossible is to have begged the question in favor of pluralism or Sider's, “in essence, quantifier variance.” — Leontiskos
I'm sure you're not saying that there is a plain fact of the matter as to whether mereological items or universals exist, but I admit that I'm not sure just what you are saying. — J
(And for the record, this isn't about skepticism concerning everyday objects. It's about how to divvy up metaphysical structure.) — J
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