When you say:

On the one hand, we have reality, and on the other we have our "picture" of reality. What bridges that gap? Well, I think Witt's answer is the logical relations. — 013zen

There is the assumption of inner and outer, things for ourselves versus things in themselves. That is not how logic works in the Tractatus. First of all, that assumption requires a duality to separate the realms or a monism to unite them.

4.18 Logical forms are without number.
Hence there are no pre-eminent numbers in logic, and hence there is no possibility of philosophical monism or dualism, etc — ibid.

Perhaps the scenario you have in mind is by means of:

5.5561 There cannot be a hierarchy of the forms of elementary propositions. We can foresee only what we ourselves construct.
Empirical reality is limited by the totality of objects. The limit also makes itself manifest in the totality of elementary propositions. — ibid

But this is said on the way to discussing solipsism. The rationalist/empiricist debate is excluded by:

5.61 Logic pervades the world: the limits of the world are also its limits.
So we cannot say in logic, ‘The world has this in it, and this, but not that.’
For that would appear to presuppose that we were excluding certain possibilities, and this cannot be the case, since it would require that logic should go beyond the limits of the world; for only in that way could it view those limits from the other side as well.
We cannot think what we cannot think; so what we cannot think we cannot say either.

5.62 This remark provides the key to the problem, how much truth there is in solipsism.
For what the solipsist means is quite correct; only it cannot be said, but makes itself manifest.
The world is my world: this is manifest in the fact that the limits of language (of that language which alone I understand) mean the limits of my world.

5.621 The world and life are one.

5.63 I am my world. (The microcosm.)

5.64 Here it can be seen that solipsism, when its implications are followed out strictly, coincides with pure realism. The self of solipsism shrinks to a point without extension, and there remains the reality co-ordinated with it. — ibid.

The discussion of experiences is established through a distance from logic:

6.363 The procedure of induction consists in accepting as true the simplest law that can be reconciled with our experiences.

6.6631 This procedure, however, has no logical justification but only a psychological one.
It is clear that there are no grounds for believing that the simplest eventuality will in fact be realized. — ibid.

These statements about what is and isn't logic do not provide a ready ground to situate your idea of two realms bridged by "logical" relations.

In order to conflate them there must be some pertinent distinction that is not understood. I do not see how or where Wittgenstein makes such a distinction. It is a distinction you impose on the text. — Fooloso4

Then what is the purpose of Witt saying:

"The total reality is the world" (2.063).

If there is no distinction being made, and he's using the expressions synonymously, this statement would make no sense.

Then what is the purpose of Witt saying:

"The total reality is the world" (2.063). — 013zen

Compare this to:

The totality of existing states of affairs is the world.

(2.04)

The purpose is, at least in part, to exclude ethical and aesthetic propositions from what is the case. They do not refer to how things are in the world. They do not depict reality.

Compare this to:

The totality of existing states of affairs is the world.
(2.04) — Fooloso4

Compare this to:

"The existence and non-existence of states of affairs is reality (2.06).

Even in the Pears version, there is a distinction between

1. Reality all existing and non-existing state of affairs
and
2. The world all existing states of affairs.

The existence and non-existence of states of affairs is reality.

(2.06)

To state the obvious, non-existing states of affairs do not exist. Reality does not contain non-existing facts.

2.06 includes the parenthetical remark:

(We call the existence of states of affairs a positive fact, and their non-existence a negative
fact.)

also:

The totality of existing states of affairs also determines which states of affairs do not exist.

(2.05)

If we could know the totality of states of affairs we would thereby also know those states of affairs that do not exist, that is, any state of affairs that contradicts those states of affairs that do exist.

I’ll try again...Witt says,

“The totality of existent atomic facts [(states of affairs)] is the world” (2.04).

in 2.06, he then goes on to say:

“The existence and non-existence of atomic facts [(states of affairs)] is the reality. (The existence of atomic facts we also call a positive fact, their non-existence a negative fact.)”

The world is the totality of positive facts, while reality is the totality of positive and negative facts.

Without going into it further, for the moment...consider that other comments in the text also seem to suggest that there must be a distinction between the world and reality. How else could the world of the happy man be different from the world of the sad man? On Witt account they are, despite them being pictures of the same reality.

“In brief, the world must thereby become quite another. It must so to speak wax or wane as a whole. The world of the happy is quite another than that of the unhappy” (6.43).

This is because I am my world. Which is why:

“...In death, too, the world does not change, but ceases” (6.431).

The world...my world, is in my mind and is made up of pictures of reality.

The world...my world, is in my mind and is made up of pictures of reality. — 013zen

For a guy who supposedly didn't like the fight between idealists and realists, he's really making an indirect realist case here.. @RussellA would smile :blush: :wink:

... while reality is the totality of positive and negative facts. — 013zen

The world and reality are not distinguished by the existence or non-existence of negative facts.

The propositions ‘p’ and ‘∼p’ have opposite sense, but there corresponds to them one and
the same reality.

(4.0621)

If 'p' exists in the world then 'not p' does not. If If 'p' exists in reality then 'not p' does not. That 'not p' does not exist is a negative fact. It is true that 'not p' does not exist.

How else could the world of the happy man be different from the world of the sad man? — 013zen

They do not differ with regard to the facts of the world. In both cases the facts remain the same.

The world...my world, is in my mind and is made up of pictures of reality. — 013zen

He makes a distinction between the world and my world. It should be obvious that when someone dies the world does not end. People die every day and the world goes on. The discussion of the happy man is part of his discussion of ethics and aesthetics. They are not found in the world.

The propositions ‘p’ and ‘∼p’ have opposite sense, but there corresponds to them one and the same reality.
(4.0621)

If 'p' exists in the world then 'not p' does not. If If 'p' exists in reality then 'not p' does not. That 'not p' does not exist is a negative fact. It is true that 'not p' does not exist. — Fooloso4

Okay, so a couple of things...

Your example is not so much an example of a negative fact, as simply a tautology...which is Witt's point.

But, a negative fact would be something like:

"The moon is not made of cheese".

This would still be portrayed as "P"

While, perhaps, seemingly silly, there was serious debate at the time regarding the status of negative facts. Like:

"There is not an elephant atop the Eiffel tower".

If traditionally how we think of a positive fact, like: "The earth is fairly round in shape" is that something obtains in this case. To this fact corresponds a reality. But, this got folks like Russell wondering, what exactly corresponds to negative facts?

Even supposing your example, despite being a tautology, we can see that

If P then not P and visa versa, depending on what obtains, either P or not P will have to be true at some point in many instances. Imagine the fact:

"It is raining in Manhattan"

If it turns out to not be raining, then not P is true. But, what exactly obtains here? Russell said a negative fact "It is not raining in Manhattan" is a negative fact which corresponds with reality in the true way or the false way if it turns out to be false.

This is what Witt is critiquing here...right before the part you quote, he says:

"One could then, for example, say that "p" signifies in the true way what "∼p" signifies in the false way, etc".

He's saying that the solution is found in applying Frege's notion of sense and refence. Both P and not P are pictures with different senses, but to each corresponds the same reality, regardless of whether true or false. If not P turns out true, then a negative fact does obtain, and its the same facts as the positive fact, just in opposite senses.

They do not differ with regard to the facts of the world. In both cases the facts remain the same. — Fooloso4

Correct - the same reality, despite the worlds being "quite another" entirely.

“In brief, the world must thereby become quite another. It must so to speak wax or wane as a whole. The world of the happy is quite another than that of the unhappy” (6.43). — 013zen

He makes a distinction between the world and my world. — Fooloso4

No, you do.

He says:

"The world and life are one" (5.621).

Which is why:

"As in death, too, the world does not change, but ceases" (6.431).

Correct - the same reality, despite the worlds being "quite another" entirely. — 013zen

The facts of the world are the facts of reality, the world and reality are the same. There are not my facts or your facts, they are the facts. They remain as they are when I die. They do not cease to be.

The logical relationships within the world are not the only relationships. There is also the relationship between the "I' and the world.

Here is a long post on Wittgenstein's discussion of solipsism and "my world",







.

I can see you no longer want to focus on the quotes wherein Witt does not make a distinction between the world, and "my world". Where he literally says, when death occurs THE world ceases to exist. As well as where despite reality being the same, THE world is quite another - waxing and waning, as he says.

I appreciate you directing me to another post, but truthfully if you can't admit how your interpretation requires you to supplant what's literally said with slight modifications in order to maintain it, that's indicative that - while you might be right in many regards - that your theory needs reworking.

An interpretation is only viable if it can account for what is said...this is why the positivistic interpretation fell to the way side, because while in isolation some quotes seem to suggest a pro-positivism inclination, but taken as a whole, it runs into difficulties.

Again, I'd like to reiterate that it seems that you and I agree on many of the salient points, and I think draw similar conclusions, so when I say I don't see the "work" your interpretation of this area of the text does, what I mean is, it's hard for me to see how it isn't superfluous to try and maintain the point given the fact that I can maintain seemingly similar views to yours despite disagreeing on this point.

I can see you no longer want to focus on the quotes wherein Witt does not make a distinction between the world, and "my world". — 013zen

Where he does not make a distinction must be looked at in light of where he does. The text hangs together as a whole.

Where he literally says, when death occurs THE world ceases to exist. — 013zen

How are we to understand this? Clearly the world does not literally cease to exist. Wittgenstein is dead. The world has not ceased to exist. There is more to this than can be seen by focusing on a part to the exclusion of the whole.

I appreciate you directing me to another post, but truthfully if you can't admit how your interpretation requires you to supplant what's literally said with slight modifications in order to maintain it, that's indicative that - while you might be right in many regards - that your theory needs reworking. — 013zen

It does not supplant what is said, it attempts to explain it in light of what else is said, that is, with regard to its place in the whole of the text. It is not as if he is rejecting what he said previously about the world being the totality of facts.

Thus there really is a sense in which philosophy can talk about the self in a non-psychological way.

What brings the self into philosophy is the fact that ‘the world is my world’.

The philosophical self is not the human being, not the human body, or the human soul, with which psychology deals, but rather the metaphysical subject, the limit of the world not a part of it.

(5.641)

That "the world is my world" means that the world of the metaphysical subject ends when the metaphysical subject does. My world is the world I see, the world I experience, the life I lead. My limits are its limits. It comes to an end.

The subject does not belong to the world: rather, it is a limit of the world.

(5.632)

It is like the eye and the visual field. It does not alter what is in the world, but rather the ability of the metaphysical subject to see it, to experience it, to live it.

Where he does not make a distinction must be looked at in light of where he does. The text hangs together as a whole. — Fooloso4

While, I agree with the second part...the first part I don't catch your meaning. I have cited several examples where it does seem as though Witt is making a distinction.

How are we to understand this? Clearly the world does not literally cease to exist. Wittgenstein is dead. The world has not ceased to exist. There is more to this than can be seen by focusing on a part to the exclusion of the whole. — Fooloso4

Exactly right - how are we to understand this? Was Witt an idiot? I think not. By pointing out that Witt is using the word "world" in a stipulative sense which sets itself apart from how he's using the word "reality", and justifying it by citing examples where we see him say one thing about the world and another about reality, the confusion vanishes. No longer is it something which seems contradictory.

One way, which I am advocating for is that insofar as the world is made up of pictures that furnish the playing field of logical space in my mind, the world does cease when I die, despite reality continuing.

It does not supplant what is said, it attempts to explain it in light of what else is said, that is, with regard to its place in the whole of the text. It is not as if he is rejecting what he said previously about the world being the totality of facts. — Fooloso4

Certainly not, and I'd hope that it wouldn't supplant what you'll eventually say. I don't take him to be rejecting it, I take him to be building on and clarifying it with latter statements.

The totality of facts determine the world, but only insofar as the world is made up of pictures of facts.

That "the world is my world" means that the world of the metaphysical subject ends when the metaphysical subject does. — Fooloso4

That the metaphysical subjects ends...when it ends? I'm guessing this is a typo, because, well, yea.

It is like the eye and the visual field. It does not alter what is in the world, but rather the ability of the metaphysical subject to see it, to experience it, to live it. — Fooloso4

See, this is what I mean when I say:

Again, I'd like to reiterate that it seems that you and I agree on many of the salient points, and I think draw similar conclusions — 013zen

This I agree with, but the only change I would make is that I would say:

It is like the eye and the visual field. It does not alter what is in [reality], but rather the ability of the metaphysical subject to see it...[which determines the world they see] — Fooloso4

As Witt says:

"(A proposition can, indeed, be an incomplete picture of a certain state of affairs, but it is always a complete picture)" (5156).

and insofar as:

"In the proposition the thought is expressed..." (3.1).

The sum total of our thoughts, which are pictures of the facts we have acquired, despite being incomplete insofar as we are limited in what we can experience, still form a cohesive whole "world". When Witt says that the world is determined by the facts and by them being all the facts, what he means is those are all the facts we have access to. Each instance of a world is a limited but complete picture of reality. Everything still makes sense to us according to our world. If this wasn't the case, we couldn't make sense of anything unless we had every piece of the puzzle already given to us by reality.

I see this quote: 'Of time we cannot have any external intuition, any more than we can have an internal intuition of space.'
— Kant- Critique of Pure Reason

The reply was this: 'Why? Because Kant says so?'

I note that 'we' includes you, and I take it that you know what time is as well as Kant does. It hardly seems controversial to assert, then, that basically, if a system is unchanging, it is timeless. Time is one of the few things we regard as regular and unchanging. That we have an incredibly complex topic is the largest part of Kant's point -- to see this much, is to become more Kantian in your view -- it's not some hypothesis that might or might not be true -- Kant's 'doctrine' that his fanboys imbibe without questioning it. It's a question. Or, call it a change of emphasis. While we are considering what is not, actually, controversial, what you believe yourself, consider that in the 17th century, physicist Isaac Newton saw time as an arrow fired from a bow, traveling in a direct, straight line and never deviating from its path. By applying this theory, he was able to assume that if the speed of light could vary, then time must be constant. This is something that it's easy to think is true. But we know of, so to speak, Einstein's theory that time fluctuates throughout the universe. I'm not trying to say anything controversial about it, so much as just to hint that it seems relevant. After all, the old definition of a second was based on the rotation of Earth. What -- the 'old' definition? Time remains a complex topic. Consider then, this not-so-constant universal constant and such. Start with what you yourself think -- Kant doesn't know anything you don't know about 'time'. How do you know what you know about it?

Of course the thread is a Wittgenstein thread not a Kant thread -- 'Trying to clarify objects in Wittgenstein's Tractatus'. I don't ask too much of this project, given that Wittgenstein himself grew disillusioned about trying to 'clarify objects in Wittgenstein's Tractatus'.

Kant doesn't know anything you don't know about 'time'. How do you know what you know about it? — Dan Langlois

Firstly,

It's nice to meet you. Secondly, I appreciate this sentiment, in particular. Thirdly, I read the entire post three times now, and while I find it interesting, I can't make heads or tails about what you're trying to get at lol that could be on me, however.

Wittgenstein himself grew disillusioned about trying to 'clarify objects in Wittgenstein's Tractatus'. — Dan Langlois

While I'm familiar with the belief, I have yet to find any hard textual or historical evidence for it. Counter to some popular belief, Witt does clarify what he means by "objects" in his Tractatus. Refer to 4.24 of the work.