I have been describing a three-cornered debate. In one corner are the natu-ralists, who want to get past the linguistic turn. In another are the prag-matic Wittgensteinians, who think that replacing Kantian talk about ex-perience, thought, and consciousness with Wittgensteinian talk about the uses of linguistic expressions helps us replace worse philosophical theories with better ones. In a third are the Wittgensteinian therapists, for whom the importance of the linguistic turn lies in helping us realize that philosophers have failed to give meaning to the words they utter. The people in the first 6 Minar 1995, 413.
7corner do not read Wittgenstein at all, and those in the other two read him very differently. I want now to describe the differences between these two readings in more detail. The two camps disagree about the relation between early and later Wittgenstein. The therapists take the last pages of the Tractatus very seri-ously indeed. They do their best to tie them in with the metaphilosophical portions of Philosophical Investigations. In sharp contrast, the pragmatists tacitly dismiss the final passages of the Tractatus as an undigested residue of Schopenhauer. They regard sections 89-133 of the Investigations as an unfortunate left-over from Wittgenstein’s early, positivistic period—the period in which he thought that “The totality of true propositions is the whole of natural science” (4.11). They have no more use for the claim that “The results of philosophy are the uncovering of one or another piece of plain nonsense” (PI 129) than for the earlier claim that “Most of the propo-sitions and questions to be found in philosophical works are not false but nonsensical” (4.003). — Wittgenstein and the Linguistic Turn- Richard Rorty
Dang, this Rorty essay is the gift that keeps on giving... — schopenhauer1
This is more of a meta-thread on HOW PEOPLE debate Wittgenstein.. — schopenhauer1
Wittgenstein refers to many of his contemporaries in his writings. He does not mention studying others. I think the Count's point about the depth of 'classical education' is germane. But it is a matter impossible to settle from text alone. — Paine
For example, you have the three uses of "is." The "is of predication," the "is of identity," and the "is of existence." But in the history of philosophy, there is plenty of debate that might make one question how discrete these really are. — Count Timothy von Icarus
It's also the notion that if one just really parses out Wittgenstein's Koans (aphorisms or propositions), one will "get it".. One just has to interpret Wittgenstein to the best ability..
One can always chastise oneself for not knowing enough, and by not knowing enough, one is not "getting it fully".. But why wouldn't that same thing be for any other philosopher? — schopenhauer1
Ironically (and why he admitted the nonsense) what I see happens when people gatekeep arguments against Wittgenstein or Nietzsche, in a raw simplified sense, they turn Wittgenstein’s or Nietzsche’s position into a sort of gospel truth - where the meaning objectively is - which is the opposite of what either was purporting to demonstrate. (They forget to throw away the ladder when they point to the words, which points to maybe a reason the words need more investigation.) — Fire Ologist
self-referential and largely incapable of interacting with the large number of alternative views. — Leontiskos
Where does an opposing view start? A rebuttal of a narrative? A different frame of reference? — Paine
He also believed early on that any philosophy that wasn’t linguistic analysis to be a criminal waste of effort but here he was wrong as he later softened his position. — kindred
I'll leave you with this for now.. (I'll be back though).. Is there any other philosopher, who you can quite do this sort of "You cannot refuteth thus, without using the Prophets own methods/ideas!".. I don't think so, I don't think you can get away with doing that without being called a dogmatist.. But oddly, because Witt is seen as an "anti-dogmatist par excellance" one can thus hide behind this notion to actually become a Wittgensteinian dogmatist.. I don't know, just an idea.
I think it might be fair to say of the "anti-metaphysical movement," more broadly that it was the most dogmatic since late scholasticism, or at least that it had the greatest combined ability and desire to enforce its dogma. — Count Timothy von Icarus
But it seems just as plausible that language evolved in such a way as to be vague and confusing precisely because it's being generated by people facing a world full of vague and confusing metaphysical and epistemological conundrums. — Count Timothy von Icarus
Are you proposing that is a self evident component of the text?
6.4 All propositions are of equal value.
6.41 The sense of the world must lie outside the world. In the world everything is as it is, and everything happens as it does happen: in it no value exists—and if it did exist, it would have no value.
If there is any value that does have value, it must lie outside the whole sphere of what happens and is the case. For all that happens and is the case is accidental.
What makes it non-accidental cannot lie within the world, since if it did it would itself be accidental — ibid.
Language evolved to be efficient for the purpose of mundane communication, that's why it's vague and ambiguous. We learn the minimum number of words required to make ourselves understood in a maximum number of different circumstances. Accordingly, it's not well suited for metaphysical and epistemological problems, and it's confusing when applied in this way.
6.4 All propositions are of equal value.
6.41 The sense of the world must lie outside the world. In the world everything is as it is, and everything happens as it does happen: in it no value exists — ibid.
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