Here specifically with regard to Wittgenstein while others are spared. — Fooloso4

Not quite.. But rather this would be a better formulation of the objectionable argumentation:
https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/comment/905765

In my opinion he should not. An author does not maintain control over how his words are understood or used by others. — Fooloso4

I think the beliefs of someone who is an adherent of a philosopher will be indebted to that philosopher, and therefore the philosopher will be to some extent responsible for those beliefs. This seems straightforwardly true. I don't see how a philosopher can be said to bear no responsibility for the beliefs of their adherents.

The same holds for methodology, for philosophers should understand that their methodology will be absorbed by those who read them. If, as some have argued, Wittgenstein is methodology-heavy, then the methodology of his adherents is all the more attributable to him.

So "Should Wittgenstein be faulted for what Wittgenstenians say and do?" Sometimes yes, sometimes no.

- Yes, good points. A different angle on the same issue. :up:

If the intent is to understand an author, then we should not impose rules and expectations on how they are to be read. Different authors write differently and should not all be read in the same way.

I think the beliefs of someone who is an adherent of a philosopher will be indebted to that philosopher, and therefore the philosopher will be to some extent responsible for those beliefs. — Leontiskos

To what extent? I do not think that Plato, for example, is responsible for the varied and contradictory ways is which he has been read over the centuries.

Wittgenstein too has been read and understood in different ways. Looking at the trends in interpreting him one thing that becomes evident is how much the education and concerns of the interpreter are read into their interpretation.

It's also occured to me that the thought you have previously imbibed and accepted will make it difficult (although by no means impossible) to see other thought clearly. This is perhaps not unlike optical illusions; if one has already seen the white and gold dress it becomes hard to see the black and blue one.

For instance, if you've read and accepted works like St. Maximus or the modern liturgical movement on prayer, then Wittgenstein's assessment of religious speech is going to seem very hard to swallow. Likewise, if you've imbibed Wittgenstein's view, it's going to be hard to get a good perspective on the aforementioned or perhaps to justify bothering to try.

Well, is this like optical illusions, where the rabbit and duck are both there for us to see? It depends. I have no problem saying some positions have some rather glaring flaws in some respects. There can be multiple good ways of photographing something, but this doesn't preclude that leaving your finger over the lens is a bad way.

many of the ‘analyticals’ are really pretty rigid in their concentration on ‘language games’ and the like and they often use the famous last words of the Tractatus to stifle discussion of what I consider significant philosophical questions. — Wayfarer

This is a shame. I do not find as important what he is telling us (nor what he might be “showing” us), but more the example he sets during his investigation. People tend to “use” Wittgenstein as if he solved skeptical doubt, or otherwise closed the issue, and thus as a normative tool to dictate behavior, which I think is the most egregious of what @schopenhauer1 is getting at.

Wittgenstein provides himself with no way to account for the knowing subject along with their intentions and locutions. Language becomes a fact, a given, which must be parsed according to "common use" and cannot be parsed vis-a-vis the intentions of individual subjects — Leontiskos

I don’t know if this would be helpful to you, but let’s compare two approaches to intentionality and language within cognitive psychology, Cogntivism and 4EA (embodied, embedded, extended and affective). The latter is also referred to as enactivism. One of the founders of enactivism described cognitivism as:

…the idea of a world or environment with extrinsic, pregiven features that are recovered through a process of representation. In some ways cognitivism is the strongest statement yet of the representational view of the mind inaugurated by Descartes and Locke. Indeed, Jerry Fodor, one of cognitivism's leading and most eloquent exponents, goes so far as to say that the only respect in which cognitivism is a major advance over eighteenth- and nineteenth-century representationism is in its use of the computer as a model of mind.

There are more recent adumbrarions of cogntivism that move away from the idea of the mind as mirror of nature, but they retain the idea of cognition and language as something that takes place inside of a brain via representational , symbolic processing. Enactivism rejects this inside-outside representational model in favor of an approach that draws from pragmatists like James and Dewey, hermeneutic philosophers like Gadamer and phenomenologists like Merleau-Ponty, who was also a child psychologist and wrote much on the psychology of perception. What enactivism learned from these thinkers is that mind, body and world are not separable
entities, but are inextricable aspects of an ecological
system that is based on dynamic sensory-motor coupling between the organism and its environment.

When we perceive a feature of our environment, we are not producing an internal representation of an outside, we are enacting a mode of interaction with our world oriented toward normative goals and purposes shaped on the basis of previous interactions. Perceptually, we construct the meaning of what our world ‘is’ on the basis of what we intend to do with it. These normative expectations and intentions are not just subjectively but equally intersubjectively formed. Language use, like perceptual and cognitive processes, is not just ‘in the head’,not the product of Chomsky-like grammatical modules, but emerges and has its meaning refreshed through actual contexts of social engagement. Enactivists are not denying that there is a certain autonomy to individual cognitive functioning, but it is never a compete autonomy. Enactivists like Shaun Gallagher incorporate notions of the good from Aristotelian phronesis in revealing the ethical nature of social interaction, such as in striking a balance between the needs of individual autonomy and group autonomy in concrete situations.

What enactivists find valuable about Wittgenstein is his recognition that linguistic meaning and intentionality cannot be fully understood via models that begin from the idea thatmentation is a matter of rational representation of a world performed inside a brain.

- Thanks, I will try to find time to return to this. Even if I don't, I will read and consider.

I do sense the fact that many of the ‘analyticals’ are really pretty rigid in their concentration on ‘language games’ and the like and they often use the famous last words of the Tractatus to stifle discussion of what I consider significant philosophical questions. But, you know, c’est la vie. One moves on to another thread — Wayfarer

None of the supporters of Wittgenstein’s later work I follow would be comfortable with the label of analytic philosopher. The ones whose work I resonate with ( Cavell, Rorty, Rouse, Lyotard) incorporate language games into thinking which tends to be hostile toward analytic concerns. And they also tend to either dismiss or reinterpret those words from the Tractatus on the basis of what they see as his radically different later approach.

How many times can one philosopher have the glory of being saved by Appeal to Misunderstanding? — schopenhauer1

In theory a philosopher could be reinterpreted almost endlessly. Whether this be considered 'saved' by an appeal to misunderstanding may depend on one's point of view

It's clear that Wittgenstein is a writer of complex ideas, expressed in an obscure style, with many potential meanings and uses. But I think the same holds for others, Nietzsche, Derrida, etc. People are often talking about someone having an inadequate reading of those thinkers too. I always imagined that the point of philosophy for many was to dismiss or pillory another's reading and then go on to demonstrate why one's own reading is superior. Is't that inherent in the activity?

I always imagined that the point of philosophy for many was to dismiss or pillory another's reading and then go on to demonstrate why one's own reading is superior. Is't that inherent in the activity? — Tom Storm

Eh, for some it seems to be solely about the author's perspective. Perhaps this comes from how I approach most philosophy, which is jumping off points for how one's own thinking relates, contends, or aligns with the author. Analysis is necessary and a good didactic exercise, but I see it as the starting point for later doing synthesis, comparison, and ultimately, evaluation. I guess that butts up against other, more static approaches to the primary text (or secondary literature that often is employed with those like Witt, Nietzsche, Derrida, Heidegger, and the like...).

Hey I just got to this paper you posted, thanks.. But this seems real ironic..as Tractatus baldly has various "technical terms" that he (doesn't clearly explain but starkly defines).. As the author asserts here about Witt:

Scientism takes many forms. In the humanities, it takes the form of pretending that philosophy, literature, history, music and art can be studied as if they were sciences, with "researchers" compelled to spell out their "methodologies"—a pretence which has led to huge quantities of bad academic writing, characterised by bogus theorising, spurious specialisation and the development of pseudo-technical vocabularies. — Ray Monk

How is Tractatus not composed of "pseudo-technical vocabularies"?? I mean, yeah, maybe not like Russell, but he invented/reused some for his own purposes, no? States of Affairs, propositions, facts, objects and all the rest...And yeah, if those aren't "technical", then we wouldn't still be discussing them...

And yeah, I realize he could be talking about the "Later Wittgenstein.." but it wasn't stated like that there...

And granted, the author might have a point about overbloated academic disciplines filled with drivel... but why is Wittgenstein thus exempt? Again, odd hero-worshipping, sui generis, etc.

@Wayfarer Monk says here:

Philosophy, he writes, "is not a theory but an activity." It strives, not after scientific truth, but after conceptual clarity. In the Tractatus, this clarity is achieved through a correct understanding of the logical form of language, which, once achieved, was destined to remain inexpressible, leading Wittgenstein to compare his own philosophical propositions with a ladder, which is thrown away once it has been used to climb up on.

No, this seems just wrong too. This makes Wittgenstein sound like a neutral figure regarding how to use language, but it is clear he favored (in Tractatus) empirical claims to "Facts of the world" over language that he thought could (SHOULD) not be expressed (nonsense).. This just obfuscates his more critical aspects of his philosophy.. that he was criticizing not scientists for scientism per se, but other philosophers. It doesn't matter whether he thought playing the flute or reading a koan was "real" expression, what matters is he thought various metaphysicians as not "really" expressing anything of sense.. they were expressing (in his/early analytic use of the vocabulary) "nonsense".

I may be wrong, but you started this thread shortly after the response I gave you in my thread on Wittgenstein, so I assume that by "Asshole Tendencies" you were, partly at least, referring to me. I should be flattered that you would do such a thing, and I am.

All kidding aside, I've read much of this thread, and as usual, I agree with some of it and disagree with other parts. For me, Wittgenstein is extremely important in terms of what we can learn, not so much from the Tractatus, but from his method of linguistic analysis in his later philosophy, starting around 1933. I've always admired his thinking, not only in philosophy but in other areas of his life. The two areas of his philosophy that interested me, were his method of analysis as presented in the PI, and his thoughts on epistemology in his final notes (On Certainty). Epistemology is such an important part of philosophy that to ignore On Certainty is to miss an important advance in epistemological thinking.

That said, I disagree with much that was written in the Tractatus (as do many other philosophers, including Wittgenstein), and I disagree with Wittgenstein's views on metaphysics, which he carried into his later philosophy.

In terms of gatekeeping, I hope that my views have not slammed the door on others. I certainly don't consider myself a gatekeeper. I'm still learning and have found myself wrong when interpreting this or that passage. We often can't interpret correctly what we say to one another, let alone interpret Wittgenstein's passages correctly.

I don't have much patience for people who pretend to know what they don't know. What I mean is this, if you haven't seriously studied a subject, then you shouldn't be dogmatic about your views on the subject. If you are, then that seems to be more about one's ego than getting at the truth. I don't know about the rest of you, but my observation has been that most people in here are more interested in winning their argument, at any cost, than trying to ascertain what's true.

So, do I have "asshole tendencies?" Maybe here and there, but I try.

Sincerely,
Sam

This makes Wittgenstein sound like a neutral figure regarding how to use language, but it is clear he favored (in Tractatus) empirical claims to "Facts of the world" over language that he thought could (SHOULD) not be expressed (nonsense).. — schopenhauer1

But (and forgive my fragmentary knowledge of the text) I had rather thought that the final sections of the Tractatus (from about 6.371 on) were conclusions of the work as a whole. The Vienna Circle positivists interpreted them to support their contention that metaphysics is nonsensical, but Wittgenstein never attended their meetings or expressed support for them. As another review mentions - and this one was originally published by the British Wittgenstein Association, so is bona fide:

The declared aim of the Vienna Circle was to make philosophy either subservient to or somehow akin to the natural sciences. As Ray Monk says in his superb biography Ludwig Wittgenstein: The Duty of Genius (1990), “the anti-metaphysical stance that united them [was] the basis for a kind of manifesto which was published under the title The Scientific View of the World: The Vienna Circle.” Yet as Wittgenstein himself protested again and again in the Tractatus, the propositions of natural science “have nothing to do with philosophy” (6.53); “Philosophy is not one of the natural sciences” (4.111); “It is not problems of natural science which have to be solved” (6.4312); “even if all possible scientific questions be answered, the problems of life have still not been touched at all” (6.52); “There is indeed the inexpressible. This shows itself; it is the mystical” (6.522). None of these sayings could possibly be interpreted as the views of a man who had renounced metaphysics. The Logical Positivists of the Vienna Circle had got Wittgenstein wrong, and in so doing had discredited themselves.

The phrases I've often pointed to in that concluding section were these:

6.4.1 The meaning of the world must lie outside of it. In the world everything is as it is and everything happens as it happens; there is no value in it - and if there were, it would have no value.

If there is a value that has value, it must lie outside everything that happens and is. Because everything that happens and exists is accidental.

What makes it non-random cannot be in the world, otherwise it would be random again.

It must be outside the world.

And that is metaphysics as a matter of definition, as is the nearby (6.4312) 'The solution to the riddle of life in space and time lies outside of space and time.'

Of course, this leads directly to section 7, which are the famous last words: Whereof one can not speak, thereof one must be silent. And that is the phrase which is often invoked to dismiss what is considered to be metaphysically speculative.

This is Wittgenstein's mystical side ('However, there are unspeakable things. This shows itself, it is the mystical.') I see it as a form of apophaticism, the via negativa, albeit expressed in a non-religious idiom, unlike the traditional form, which was expressed in the idiom of pre-modern theology. in 6.53 he says:

The correct method of philosophy would actually be this: to say nothing other than what can be said, i.e. propositions of natural science - something that has nothing to do with philosophy - and then whenever someone else wanted to say something metaphysical, to prove it to him that he gave no meaning to certain characters in his sentences. This method would be unsatisfactory for the other person - he would not have the feeling that we were teaching him philosophy - but it would be the only strictly correct one.

Presumably, this is the section the logical positivists seized on to support their scientism. But they overlook the significance of what cannot be said. It's beyond reason, not irrational, and there's a world of difference. The point of this whole section, seems to me, is to arrive at a kind of apophatic silence, to realise what is beyond words. I thoroughly appreciate that, but it is easily misunderstood, seems to me.

Ok, I will say, you have been a good sport, and even gracious in this reply, being the title of this thread.... I think you have some valid points.. In effect, it this is not the gatekeeping and curtness I appeared to see in the other thread...

However I do want to examine this crucial last paragraph:

I don't have much patience for people who pretend to know what they don't know. What I mean is this, if you haven't seriously studied a subject, then you shouldn't be dogmatic about your views on the subject. If you are, then that seems to be more about one's ego than getting at the truth. I don't know about the rest of you, but my observation has been that most people in here are more interested in winning their argument, at any cost, than trying to ascertain what's true. — Sam26

Why is it that Wittgenstein can have a pass to riff off his own thoughts, but others cannot in relation to Wittgenstein? Odd. Being how ahistorical Wittgenstein was, I would think even the reading of Wittgenstein would invite more caprice than that of a more systemic philosopher.. But I digress..

As for most people on here just want to win an argument, absolutely agree! That is a lot of how people operate on here. Point scoring. But to turn this around a bit.. Can showing off how much of a devotee you are to the writings of a particular philosopher also turn into a pissing contest?

I don't have much patience for people who pretend to know what they don't know. What I mean is this, if you haven't seriously studied a subject, then you shouldn't be dogmatic about your views on the subject. — Sam26

I tend to agree. Of course there is some interpretation involved in what counts as 'serious study' of a subject. It seems to me that most members here are autodidacts and hobbyist philosophers.

I do not think that Plato, for example, is responsible for the varied and contradictory ways is which he has been read over the centuries. — Fooloso4

Yes, interesting you raise this. I have sat at tables where there was furious, indeed acrimonious disagreement about Plato's meaning in exactly the kinds of terms has been deriding. There has often been an elitist dimension to academic philosophy, a reverence for one's own interpretive credentials, often as part of a cognoscenti, who are closer to truth than the rest of the academic riffraff. I imagine this a common in many fields.

Why is it that Wittgenstein can have a pass to riff off his own thoughts, but others cannot in relation to Wittgenstein? Odd. Being how ahistorical Wittgenstein was, I would think even the reading of Wittgenstein would invite more caprice than that of a more systemic philosopher. — schopenhauer1

Where do you think Wittgenstein has gotten a pass? Because, again, mostly we're just trying to understand what he's saying. Some of us who have studied W. for many years do have more hardened ideas about what he's saying, but that doesn't mean that he gets a pass. Maybe if you could give an e.g.

It's not as though we don't know anything about what he's saying, and where there is general agreement there tends to be more hardened views.

I tend to agree. Of course there is some interpretation involved in what counts as 'serious study' of a subject. it seems to me that most members here autodidacts and hobbyist philosophers. — Tom Storm

When I speak of "serious study" I'm referring to reading and studying his many writings (primary source material), and writing about it yourself, including reading other interpretations. I don't consider myself an expert, but I do think I've seriously studied Wittgenstein's early and later thinking.

The declared aim of the Vienna Circle was to make philosophy either subservient to or somehow akin to the natural sciences. As Ray Monk says in his superb biography Ludwig Wittgenstein: The Duty of Genius (1990), “the anti-metaphysical stance that united them [was] the basis for a kind of manifesto which was published under the title The Scientific View of the World: The Vienna Circle.” Yet as Wittgenstein himself protested again and again in the Tractatus, the propositions of natural science “have nothing to do with philosophy” (6.53); “Philosophy is not one of the natural sciences” (4.111); “It is not problems of natural science which have to be solved” (6.4312); “even if all possible scientific questions be answered, the problems of life have still not been touched at all” (6.52); “There is indeed the inexpressible. This shows itself; it is the mystical” (6.522). None of these sayings could possibly be interpreted as the views of a man who had renounced metaphysics. The Logical Positivists of the Vienna Circle had got Wittgenstein wrong, and in so doing had discredited themselves.

A lot to unpack there.. nice post.. but looking at the quotes there, I see a subtle shift of focus from Wittgenstein's argument which is not about philosophy as the target (it is more the consequence of his target), but about language:

The book deals with the problems of philosophy and shows, as I
believe, that the method of formulating these problems rests on the misunderstanding of the logic of our language. Its whole meaning could be
summed up somewhat as follows: What can be said at all can be said
clearly; and whereof one cannot speak thereof one must be silent.
The book will, therefore, draw a limit to thinking, or rathernot to
thinking, but to the expression of thoughts; for, in order to draw a limit
to thinking we should have to be able to think both sides of this limit
(we should therefore have to be able to think what cannot be thought).
The limit can, therefore, only be drawn in language and what lies on
the other side of the limit will be simply nonsense. — TLP Intro

That is to say, this is admonishing folks like Schopenhauer and others for trying to write what he thinks cannot be written about in any linguistic attempts.. Sensical language only deals with propositions about true states of affairs (which presumably is understood by scientific/empirical means).

So I get that at the end of it, he kind of says.."Look I deem these metaphysicans nonsensical, but you can understand them as poets!".. But this is more critical than at first blush..

It is his, at least seemingly insidious way he uses nonsense, that is not as all-embracing as he sounds at the end.. in TLP, he seems an elitist on what "sense" MUST MEAN.. He drew his line in the sand.. but on what authority?

Is this a response to me?

Is this a response to me? — Sam26

No, you can answer if you'd like, but it was quoting @Wayfarer but the way the quoting works, I quoted from a quote he quoted, and so it only referenced the reference of the quote, and not the person quoting the reference of the quote :smile:

Whether or not that is the case, instead of wasting time telling me that so and so is misunderstanding him, let’s reveal the difference in underlying metaphysical commitments that separate your reading from mine. — Joshs

In my various disagreements, they have mostly been made as understanding the text differently than what was offered by others.

Your approach of placing x in a context before discussing x is itself a proposition. And open to challenge, like other propositions.

I readily admit my view is the confluence of education, experience, and personal preferences.

I think it might be fair to say of the "anti-metaphysical movement," more broadly that it was the most dogmatic since late scholasticism, or at least that it had the greatest combination of ability and desire to enforce its dogma. People weren't put on trial for heresy, but people in the natural sciences were hounded out of their careers or threatened with this fate for violating the established orthodoxy. You see this in the history of quantum foundations up through the late 1990s and you still see it today with the Extended Evolutionary Synthesis controversy in biology. — Count Timothy von Icarus

It was, and its precisely under this climate that Wittgenstein grew up. The second wave of positivism as characterized by Ernst Mach would eventually influence the Vienna circle and the logical positivists/empiricists, with Russell adopting Mach's position coined as neutral monism.

But, there was a tension between Mach and his contemporary Ludwig Boltzmann, who defended the use of the atomic model within science, despite it being a metaphysical claim. Boltzmann appealed to another thinker, Heinrich Hertz that articulated what was called a "picture theory", which essentially said that science can provide understanding, and furnish a cohesive picture of the world, despite being speculative, or metaphysical. Boltzmann ultimately committed suicide, in a climate wholly hostile to his explaining the expansion of gases by appealing to an atomic model. It's unfortunate, because not long after the atomic principle would ultimately be adopted.

Wittgenstein knew of Boltzmann and Hertz from their work on mechanics (They wrote the books on mechanics) which Witt studied when he was an engineering student, before he met Frege and Russell. He is quoted as saying his work was highly derived from Hertz, Boltzmann, and Frege (and a few others...i'll have to find the quote).

So, I find it interesting that Witt's own writings involve a picture theory in the same spirit of Hertz and Boltzmann, but borrows heavily from Frege's work to develop the logic.

In the Principles of Mechanics, Hertz says very little saying pretty much that a picture in the manner he is thinking is a permissible only insofar as it is logically possible. I get the sense that Witt was defending this view, and therefore is against this antimetaphysical movement. Hence, why he admonished Russell's and the LP camp's interpretation of the work.

can Witt be wrong, even just in principle? Because the way you describe it, he can’t be wrong, because he’s not making claims.. — schopenhauer1

I’m not sure if this is meant to mean my description (then, where) but I would not say he is not making claims, just claims about the implications of what we say in a situation, such as that with: “I believe it is raining”, that it is in the sense of a hypothesis. Now of course he could be wrong. As Austin could be wrong about the functioning of an excuse in connection with an action. But, given the acceptance of those claims, his conclusions (more, the import he draws from the example) are meant to have you realize something, see something in a new way, so claiming it is “wrong” might be missing the point. You might already admit it without seeing any importance, not be moved to change your attitude (perspective), deny that you (must) see it that way (despite the evidence, and even without providing any countering evidence), but “wrong” would imply he’s claiming he is “right”, when what he is doing is, “Hey, did you notice this?”

I guess the question needing answered here is: where does he say something that is wrong? (Perhaps you are right.)

What enactivists find valuable about Wittgenstein is his recognition that linguistic meaning and intentionality cannot be fully understood via models that begin from the idea thatmentation is a matter of rational representation of a world performed inside a brain. — Joshs

Sure, and I agree, but my concern is that Wittgenstein is falling off the other side of the mean, and that this has implications for the topic of the OP. Although I should note that, according to Simpson, Wittgenstein began rectifying these problems in his later work.

People weren't put on trial for heresy, but people in the natural sciences were hounded out of their careers or threatened with this fate for violating the established orthodoxy. — Count Timothy von Icarus

This was a cartoon of Thomas Nagel post publication of Mind and Cosmos and its critique of neo-Darwinist orthodoxy

What can be said at all can be said
clearly; and whereof one cannot speak thereof one must be silent. — TLP Intro

Well, and apropos of the comparisons of Wittgenstein and Buddhism, consider this example of an apophatic teaching from the Pali texts. 'The wanderer Vacchagotta' is a figure in these texts who customarily raises philosophical questions. Here the Buddha maintains 'a noble silence' to a question to which neither 'yes' or 'no' hits the mark.

Then the wanderer Vacchagotta went to the Blessed One and, on arrival, exchanged courteous greetings with him. After an exchange of friendly greetings & courtesies, he sat to one side. As he was sitting there he asked the Blessed One: "Now then, Venerable Gotama, is there a self?"

When this was said, the Blessed One was silent.

"Then is there no self?"

A second time, the Blessed One was silent.

Then Vacchagotta the wanderer got up from his seat and left.

Think also of the many instances of aporia in the dialogues of Plato. There, the participants are wrestling with difficult, and often insoluble questions, which frequently don't come to a conclusion. There are hints, maybes, 'could be's' and so on. Maybe Wittgenstein is saying 'now go off and wrestle with them. Don't try and wrap them up in nice neat syllogisms and repeating dogmas that you really don't understand.'

The book will, therefore, draw a limit to thinking, or rather not to
thinking, but to the expression of thoughts; for, in order to draw a limit
to thinking we should have to be able to think both sides of this limit
(we should therefore have to be able to think what cannot be thought). — TLP Intro

The limits, or rather limitations, of discursive thinking are likewise well understood in esoteric traditions. e.g. The Twilight Language, by Rod Bucknell, 'the notion of "twilight language" is a supposed polysemic language and communication system associated with tantric traditions. It includes visual communication, verbal communication and nonverbal communication.'

More to all this than meets the ‘I’.

Your reading would certainly fit with the notion of apophatic silence. I wonder how @joshs would see this point in relation to a postmodern or phenomenological reading of W. I guess I'm asking if there's a third option, perhaps somewhere between mysticism and scientism?

Wittgenstein himself warns in the preface that PI isn't a very good book and not the book he intended to write. The unfortunate consequence of it not being a good book, and yet being a book of tremendous importance for analytic philosophy, is the necessity of gatekeeping and elitist assholes, partly in order to rectify commonplace misunderstandings of Wittgenstein that were promulgated in the secondary literature by a significant proportion of the previous generation of gatekeeping and elitist assholes.

Such behavior would never be tolerated by Kant scholars!

;) :D


Honestly I think it comes with the territory of reading "the greats" -- they are great because they inspire thought, and you don't really have much of a choice on how much charity or skepticism you want to apply to the greats on a first reading, especially when their idiom isn't easy to comprehend. It's enough of a feat to make it explicitly coherent that criticism of the idea becomes less interesting than what the writing can inspire or which interpretation is better.