We don't know exactly what Socrates positions are, because we cannot easily split Plato from Socrates.

How do we know that Socrates was JUST a dialectic mystic, and didn't have substantial positions on the questions?

We don't know exactly what Socrates positions are, because we cannot easily split Plato from Socrates. — schopenhauer1

Right. That is why I said:

Plato's Socrates — Fooloso4

How do we know that Socrates was JUST a dialectic mystic, and didn't have substantial positions on the questions? — schopenhauer1

I don't know what is implied by "JUST". Dialectical thinking takes as its starting point substantial positions. I do not know and have not claimed that Socrates was a mystic. Plato's Socrates does make extensive use of mythology and images of transcedence, but he distinguishes between mythos and logos. At the limits of logos he often turns to mythos, but I think he does so because myths are salutary, not because they reveal the truth of the matter.

I don't know what is implied by "JUST". Dialectical thinking takes as its starting point substantial positions. I do not know and have not claimed that Socrates was a mystic. Plato's Socrates does make extensive use of mythology and images of transcedence, but he distinguishes between mythos and logos. At the limits of logos he often turns to mythos, but I think he does so because myths are salutary, not because they reveal the truth of the matter. — Fooloso4

Presumably you are making a point about Socrates and Wittgenstein contra other philosophers, but I am not sure what it is.. There is mental floss and there is philosophy. Mental floss can be part of philosophy, but in the way that doing math exercises helps strengthen your math abilities.. You aren't really a mathematician unless you use some of those skills for constructing proofs, etc.

Presumably you are making a point about Socrates and Wittgenstein contra other philosophers ... — schopenhauer1

I have not addressed the extent to which they differ from other philosophers.

There is mental floss and there is philosophy. — schopenhauer1

If by mental floss you mean maieutics, then it is an essential part of what Socratic philosophy is.

Mental floss can be part of philosophy, but in the way that doing math exercises helps strengthen your math abilities. — schopenhauer1

Maieutics is not about mental exercises. It is about critical examination of beliefs, assumptions, opinions, and claims. Questioning takes priority over answers.

I have not addressed the extent to which they differ from other philosophers. — Fooloso4

Ok, so what are you pointing out? I see a bird..Isn't it lovely? And...

If by mental floss you mean maieutics, then it is an essential part of what Socratic philosophy is. — Fooloso4

Maieutics is not about mental exercises. It is about critical examination of beliefs, assumptions, opinions, and claims. Questioning takes priority over answers. — Fooloso4

Right, but my argument still stands, and just replace it with Maieutics, if that helps.

Ok, so what are you pointing out? — schopenhauer1

It is in the title - Wittgenstein is a Socratic philosopher.

my argument still stands — schopenhauer1

Your argument? A couple of misguided and unsubstantiated claims is not an argument.

just replace it with Maieutics — schopenhauer1

If mental floss is a mental exercise then it cannot be replaced by maieutics. Maieutics is not a mental exercise. It is a mode of inquiry, not preparation for "constructing proofs".

Maieutics is not a mental exercise. — Fooloso4

Amounts to the same thing. It’s supposed to lead to something or not. Plato for example took to constructing an answer. If it leads nowhere I don’t see how it’s not mental floss. Stupefying someone with a bunch of questions to show we should question our assumptions is a beginning…

Anscombe somewhere links LW to Plato (rather than Aristotle).

You know both much better than I do, but I just want to record my sympathy with this view.

In particular, I want to say that there is something about the experience of reading Wittgenstein, and thinking along with him, that is reminiscent of how it feels to read Plato. The excitement of exploration. It's quite rare.

Amounts to the same thing. — schopenhauer1

Going by what you said, it is not. Maieutics is not a matter of honing a set of skills through exercise. Maieutics is a matter of inquiry not solving problems with definitive answers as with math. Where such inquiry will lead is open ended.

Plato for example took to constructing an answer. — schopenhauer1

As fundamental to his dialogical way of doing philosophy, these hypotheses do not put an end to questioning. They lead to and guide further questioning.

You didn’t quote my last part…

I want to say that there is something about the experience of reading Wittgenstein, and thinking along with him, that is reminiscent of how it feels to read Plato. The excitement of exploration. It's quite rare. — Srap Tasmaner

Yes! That has been my experience as well.

You didn’t quire my last part… — schopenhauer1

I might have if I knew how to quire.

Nice. We might look to differences as well as similarities. One difference is that Wittgenstein's writing leads less to aporia than to a change in gestalt, a reconsidering of the way in which something is to be understood.

Presumably, there are folk who cannot see the duck, only the rabbit. It's not a surprise that they feel excluded.

quire — Fooloso4

To fold four sheets of paper into eight leaves. Apparently.

Stupefying someone with a bunch of questions to show we should question our assumptions is a beginning…[/quote]

In some cases one must first become aware that their assumptions are questionable in order to begin questioning them. For others, however, the questioning begins within. For the philosopher compelled by inquiry, the questioning does not end.

One difference is that Wittgenstein's writing leads less to aporia than to a change in gestalt, a reconsidering of the way in which something is to be understood. — Banno

Good point.

Aporia, however, is not simply the end point. Aporia can compel us to go back and rethink things and to come regard them differently.

I've always found the parallels between Socrates' treatment of "the good" and Wittgenstein's fascinating; it's actually what got me interested in Wittgenstein in the first place.

Both consider the term indefinable, but not to say irrelevant or unimportant in any sense of the word.

We know that historically, Wittgenstein read very few philosophers, but he was said to have read and enjoyed Plato.

Yep.

Reaching aporia, methodologically, can be an indication that the picture one has been exploring is unclear, confused... nonsense?

I prefer toothpicks to floss. Is that the right understanding of the metaphor? Or is maieutic practice like the comfort of a silk cocoon?

We might look to differences as well as similarities. One difference is that Wittgenstein's writing leads less to aporia than to a change in gestalt, a reconsidering of the way in which something is to be understood.

Presumably, there are folk who cannot see the duck, only the rabbit. It's not a surprise that they feel excluded. — Banno

Nice. I like the 'change in gestalt' frame here.

There is mental floss and there is philosophy. Mental floss can be part of philosophy, but in the way that doing math exercises helps strengthen your math abilities.. You aren't really a mathematician unless you use some of those skills for constructing proofs, etc. — schopenhauer1

:up: :up:

Questioning takes priority over answers. — Fooloso4

a matter of inquiry not solving problems with definitive answers — Fooloso4

... these hypotheses do not put an end to questioning. They lead to and guide further questioning. — Fooloso4

:fire:

Mental floss can be part of philosophy, but in the way that doing math exercises helps strengthen your math abilities.. You aren't really a mathematician unless you use some of those skills for constructing proofs, etc. — schopenhauer1

It depends on how you understand the practice of philosophy. @Fooloso4 will correct me if I have misunderstood; I understand the dialectic to be, not a series of exercises, but a series of enquiries, the aim of which would be to understand just where we might be leading ourselves astray by thinking that terms have essential meanings; and that we possess, or even could possess, some absolute and unimpeachable knowledge.

What could the value of metaphysical speculation consist in if not to show us that metaphysics is undecidable, and not a matter of reaching some theorem which is guaranteed to be correct by rigorously following the rules? The analogy with mathematical exercises seems quite weak to me.

I prefer toothpicks to floss. Is that the right understanding of the metaphor? Or is maieutic practice like the comfort of a silk cocoon? — Banno

I can think of none better than Socrates own 'midwife':

Now, my skill of midwifery is, in general, similar in character to theirs, but it differs by delivering men and not women, and by looking after their souls rather than their bodies when in labour. But the greatest thing about my skill is that it is able to test, in every respect, whether the mind of the young man is bringing forth an image and a lie, or something genuine and true.

Now, I do have this in common with the female midwives: I bring to birth no wisdom. And many people reproach me for this, since I ask questions of others while I myself proclaim nothing about anything, because I have no wisdom. Their reproach is true, but the reason is that the god compels me to act as a midwife and has prevented me from giving birth.

So of course, I myself am not at all wise nor have I any invention that is born of my own soul. However, it is different for those who associate with me. Some of them also appear quite ignorant at first, but as our relationship proceeds, all whom the god allows, progress to a wonderful degree. Such is their own belief and that of others, and it is obvious that they have never learned anything from me; rather, they have discovered, from themselves, much that is beautiful and have brought it to birth. However, both I and the god are responsible for the delivery. The proof is that over the years, many who were ignorant of this regarded themselves as responsible, despised me, and went away sooner than they should, persuaded either by themselves or by others. But once they had left me, they miscarried whatever remained within them through bad company, and destroyed whatever fruits I had delivered from them, through improper care. Placing more value on images and lies than upon the truth, they ended up being regarded as ignorant, both by themselves and by everyone else.

(Theaetetus 150b-e)

What could the value of metaphysical speculation consist in if not to show us that metaphysics is undecidable, and not a matter of reaching some theorem which is guaranteed to be correct by rigorously following the rules? The analogy with mathematical exercises seems quite weak to me. — Janus

Why are you making this a "one or the other" scenario? Some of philosophy is to critique a position, and some is to construct it. However, I am just saying "critiquing" a position (whether in an argument or open-ended question) is just one part of the process. At some point it is good to construct one's own views.. "Know thyself!".

Also Socratic Method is good as teaching tool, but if it is done as some "method" of indirectly expressing your (constructive) views, this to me seems to be a bit of bad faith. What if all philosophers spoke in this "indirect" way such that every time you read a Russell or a Kant or a Kripke, instead of the author intending you to understand him (and maybe failing with their writing style), they MEANT to MYSTIFY you.. I think that would be ridiculous as far as how humans should communicate in good faith to each other.. A little is ok.. but if all your philosophy is meant for YOU to de-mystify MY philosophy, without ME being the one with the burden of explaining MY philosophy, I think that is arrogant.

See here: https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/comment/906391

And if you say, "Mystification?? No dear sir, it is a STYLE and METHOD.. You just have to "get it".. the same thing applies.. It's not up to the reader to understand YOU, but for YOU to communicate to the reader. However much you think you are a sage worth deconstructing.

In the Republic Socrates presents an inspiring image of dialectic:

Well, then, go on to understand that by the other segment of the intelligible I mean that which argument itself grasps with the power of dialectic, making the hypotheses not beginnings but really hypotheses—that is, steppingstones and springboards—in order to reach what is free from hypothesis at the beginning of the whole.

(511b)

We are, however, never free from hypotheses. We remain in the realm of opinion. We never attain knowledge of the beginning (arche) of the whole. Descartes attempts to build a science of the whole by beginning with something he is certain of. Hegel held that dialectic is the movement of thought that completes itself as the realization of the whole. Wittgenstein returns us to our place in the midst of things.

When you are philosophizing you have to descend into primeval chaos and feel at home there.

(Culture and Value)

That is to say, in the midst of opinion.

Philosophy is not a body of doctrine but an activity.

(T 4.112)

A philosophical problem always has the form: “I simply don’t know my way about".

(PI 123)

We begin from where we are. As Socrates says:

... we must follow the argument wherever, like a wind, it may lead us

(Republic 394d).

Wittgenstein's writing leads less to aporia than to a change in gestalt, a reconsidering of the way in which something is to be understood. — Banno

There's an interesting recent essay by Michael Campbell here which argues for a parallelism between how Wertheimer developed gestalt thinking in education - how children for example make progress by developing new structured perspectives - and Wittgenstein's approach.

Interesting.

The Gestalt approach might provide a way of understanding Kripke's skeptical argument. Kripke has us being unable to account for why adding 57 and 68 gives 125. Kripke's argument is perhaps based on particular cases, and shows us that no number of individual cases is sufficient to explain what we do in the next case. But there is a way of understanding a rule that is not exemplified in individual cases but understood as applying to all cases... "now I know how to go on!"

Why are you making this a "one or the other" scenario? Some of philosophy is to critique a position, and some is to construct it. — schopenhauer1

I like to think more in terms of insights than in terms of views. (Metaphysical) system building I see as a strange for of poetry, and exercise of the imagination, a game not to be taken seriously once you realize that a metaphysical view can never be the truth but is rather just a possible way of imagining things to be.

At some point it is good to construct one's own views.. "Know thyself!". — schopenhauer1

I don't understand knowing yourself as a matter of "constructing views"...quite the opposite; I think it is a matter of relinquishing views, and the need for certainty that motivates them.

I think that would be ridiculous as far as how humans should communicate in good faith to each other.. A little is ok.. but if all your philosophy is meant for YOU to de-mystify MY philosophy, without ME being the one with the burden of explaining MY philosophy, I think that is arrogant. — schopenhauer1

I don't know what you are referring to. None of what you are saying in that post seems to have any bearing on what I had said. If you care to explain how it relates to specific things I wrote, that might help.

I like to think more in terms of insights than in terms of views. (Metaphysical) system building I see as a strange for of poetry, and exercise of the imagination, a game not to be taken seriously once you realize that a metaphysical view can never be the truth but is rather just a possible way of imagining things to be. — Janus

Ok, so the supposedly "open doors" of Wittgenstein is quite closed in your mind in terms of imaginative possibilities for reality...

I don't understand knowing yourself as a matter of "constructing views"...quite the opposite; I think it is a matter of relinquishing views, and the need for certainty that motivates them. — Janus

No, again here you are putting it opposition. It could be both.. Construction, critique, new construction, etc... At some point, you make a case. Hell, even Wittgenstein is supposed to have a point somewhere in his "showing"... So you go one step further to the skeptical...

I don't know what you are referring to. None of what you are saying in that post seems to have any bearing on what I had said. If you care to explain how it relates to specific things I wrote, that might help. — Janus

A lot of people, it seems including yourself, like his style which I described, and I was saying what my problem is with this.

Ok, so the supposedly "open doors" of Wittgenstein is quite closed in your mind in terms of imaginative possibilities for reality... — schopenhauer1

Presumably there is only one way for reality to be, so it is not imaginative possibilities for reality, but exploring ways we can imagine reality might be, and I don't see any reason to think that Wittgenstein's philosophy precludes such imaginative explorations. That would be like saying that Wittgenstein's philosophy precludes fiction.

At some point, you make a case. — schopenhauer1

Why the need to "make a case"? Phenomenology consists in description, not theorizing. I see Wittgenstein as being a kind of phenomenologist at least in his later work. O also have to admit I don't know his work all that well.

A lot of people, it seems including yourself, like his style which I described, and I was saying what my problem is with this. — schopenhauer1

I haven't said I like his style, but I do tend to favor deflationary philosophies over system-building, as I don't think any metaphysic ought to be taken seriously.



.

We are, however, never free from hypotheses. We remain in the realm of opinion. We never attain knowledge of the beginning (arche) of the whole. — Fooloso4

I agree with this; we can never grasp the whole, and as I often say any grasping is necessarily dualistic, whereas the whole would not be, so...

So Socrates' vision is inspiring, and I might see the end of the dialectic (among other pursuits) as being an altered state of consciousness wherein nothing discursive is known, but everything is seen anew.

So, while I agree we are never free from hypothesis as long as we are in discursive mode, I think we can be free in non-discursive modes. This freedom may not be of much use for discursive philosophy, but it certainly has its role in the arts and in self-cultivation.

When you are philosophizing you have to descend into primeval chaos and feel at home there.
(Culture and Value)

That is to say, in the midst of opinion. — Fooloso4

I agree with that, but I think opinion is only an aspect of the primeval chaos. Chaos also has its own kind of order apparently.

Philosophy is not a body of doctrine but an activity.
(T 4.112)

A philosophical problem always has the form: “I simply don’t know my way about".
(PI 123)

We begin from where we are. As Socrates says:

... we must follow the argument wherever, like a wind, it may lead us
(Republic 394d). — Fooloso4

All true, I think. We must begin in medias res, There seems to be no guarantee that we can ever "know our way about" in any fully determinate sense, but perhaps we can become less confused.

I guess it depends on what you mean by "zeteic skeptic." Plato seems to allow a priority to dialogue—as opposed to speeches—even as he suggests there are strong limits on what words can reach (Republic, Letter VII). A big theme in the Protagoras is that the Sophists keep wanting to leap into long speeches, while Socrates keeps trying to pull them into a "back and forth" conversation (i.e., a certain form of argumentation). This is still argument, but it isn't a type of argument that is passively received. This difference—the involvement of the other party—is key, since the "whole person" must be "turned" towards the Good to know it. We might also consider the explicit warning against losing faith in all arguments just because one has discovered that a favored argument turns out to be bad, presented during the interlude on misology in the Phaedo.

Plato seems to embrace a certain sorts of theorizing, e.g. the discussion of normative measure in the Statesman and Protagoras, just as he seems confident is a certain sorts of knowledge possessed by people, namely techne (which ties in with normative measure).

But there are limits on what can be said with words, because words always deal with the relative, and this is where I see the zeteic skeptic label being particularly apt. In particular, there is the critique of teaching as somehow being a simple "putting of ideas into a person," in the Republic. When Socrates tells Glaucon that he has no knowledge of the Good, this seems to both aim at and have the effect of drawing Glaucon on in search of this alluring knowledge. After this, Plato presents his three "images," the Good as the sun, the Divided Line, and the Cave. These images go beyond rhetoric, into the realm of analogy and metaphor, but they are still painted using language.

Notably, in each description something has to come from outside the image to explain the Good. For example, the Good cannot be on the divided line because this would make it just one point among many, and thus neither absolute nor transcedent. Rather, the Good lies off the line because the Absolute must contain both reality and appearances. Likewise, the philosopher must descend back into the cave to gather up the whole, rather than being satisfied with a part.

In the cave image it is Socrates himself, a reference to the historical Socrates, who "breaks in" to the image from without, transcending its limits. I have seen a few writers suggest that this moment is Plato's answer to Glaucon's pivotal question: "why would we ever prefer to be the man who is just, but who is thought unjust and punished by others, rather than the man who is unjust but who is thought just and rewarded by others?" Plato cannot answer this question with mere words, which are relational and thus always point to relative goods; he answers with a deed, the moral life and death of Socrates.

At the heart of this question is the distinction between things that are good only relative to something else, things that are good in themselves, and things that are both relatively good and good in themselves (a distinction that collapses into a binary in Aristotle, but here we can see a mirror of the appearances/reality/Absolute distinction).

Yet I think Plato thinks words, and more importantly philosophy as a whole, can do a lot for us. In the Republic, each of Socrates' main interlocutors takes on the characteristics of one of Socrates' political analogies for types of men (e.g., the timocratic man, the tyrannical man, etc.). By the end of the dialogue, each has an insight whereby they move up one level, ascending the steps towards philosophical man. Plato then, sees philosophy as a transformational process. Where his skepticism is most obvious is vis-á-vis the rhetoric and demonstrations of the Sophists. If the "whole person," is not changed, we can always reject an argument. Likewise, as we see in the Gorgias, Protagoras, Theatetus, etc., words can be twisted any way their speaker wants, resulting in dismal products, like the first speech of the Phaedrus. The image of the value of what Plato is doing then seems quite a bit different than Wittgenstein's "getting the fly out of the fly bottle."

How does this match up to Wittgenstein? It seems to me like Wittgenstein thinks that philosophy can do a lot less for us. Both philosophers see limits on what can be done with language, but it seems to me that Wittgenstein (particularly the early Wittgenstein) sees far more constraint here. Particularly, Wittgenstein's view on religious speech doesn't seem to allow for the truly transcedent role of the Good vis-á-vis human freedom and actualization that is staked out in Plato, or the Good's role vis-á-vis the Absolute.

I think Wittgenstein's image of language games as being relatively discrete (e.g. the theory of religious speech) seems to potentially be what Plato is warning against is his concerns over misology (depending on how Wittgenstein is read). Reason ultimately relates to the whole for Plato. Sophistry becomes toxic because it takes reason as being fractured—here it applies, here it is bent to my will, here it is just formalities. But for some of the intellectual descendents of Wittgenstein this is precisely what they take Wittgenstein to be positively arguing for in parts of PI (e.g. the part about the king who thinks the world began when he was born), i.e., different games cannot speak to one another because reason does not transcend them.

Of course, Wittgenstein is read many different ways, and sometimes Plato is deflated into an out and out skeptic on everything, so they can variously be quite far apart or quite close together. I would tend to think them quite far apart on several readings though. If Wittgenstein's king is taken to represent that truth is dependent on presuppositions that cannot be reached by reason, or if his ideas on language are taken more generally to say that games are what we know rather than being an (imperfect) tool vis-á-vis knowledge, I'd say the two are skeptical about quite different things.

As to midwifery, I see similarities in approach in some ways. But the idea of "giving birth in beauty," so potent in Plato, doesn't seem to be in Wittgenstein the same way (this would be a good or bad thing depending on who you ask).