That is a predominantly psychological observation. — Paine
Where does the philosophy start? — Paine
As with others’ souls (p. 178) or the pain causing another to writhe in front of us (p. 235), we do not know it, because that is not how knowledge works. We respond to them (or ignore them). — Antony Nickles
Wittgenstein says otherwise [than (my claim -Antony): that another’s pain is not an object of knowledge]. At PI 246, he says that: “other people very often know if I’m in pain.” — Luke
"To examine why philosophy wants X," is to intentionally step outside of philosophy and into psychology (or else anthropology). It is to say, "I am no longer doing the thing that philosophy does." — Leontiskos
I have claimed the primary focus in the PI is to examine why philosophy wants certainty (“purity”), and, even more, to learn something about ourselves in the process. — Antony Nickles
107. The more closely we examine actual language, the greater becomes the conflict between it and our requirement. (For the crystalline purity of logic was, of course, not something I had discovered: it was a requirement.)
This distinction is clearest in the almost uniformly misinterpreted PI #109. “Philosophy is a battle against the bewitchment of our intelligence by means of language.” It is not that language is the “means” of our bewitchment, so we just need to get clear about language in order not to be bewitched. Language is the means of “battling”; looking at our expressions is the method by which we battle. — Antony Nickles
(PI 1)These words, it seems to me, give us a particular picture of the essence of human language. It is this: the words in language name objects a sentences are combinations of such names. —– In this picture of language we find the roots of the following idea: Every word has a meaning. This meaning is correlated with the word. It is the object for which the word stands.
(PI 38)For philosophical problems arise when language goes on holiday. And then we may indeed imagine naming to be some remarkable mental act, as it were the baptism of an object. And we can also say the word “this” to the object, as it were address the object as “this” a a strange use of this word, which perhaps occurs only when philosophizing.
(PI 23)The word “language-game” is used here to emphasize the fact that the speaking of language is part of an activity, or of a form of life.
Language lacks the precision and exactness that the philosopher expects and demands of it. It is not language itself but this misunderstanding of how language works, this particular picture of language, that is what has bewitched philosophers, including the early Wittgenstein. — Fooloso4
But the question isn't why you or I do, or don't do, what philosophy does, but why does philosophy do what it does? — Srap Tasmaner
Because it's a question about philosophy? — Srap Tasmaner
Witt is solving a problem for many philosophers, that simply wasn't there to begin with, EXCEPT for certain ones demanding various forms of rigorous world-to-word standards.. And those seem to be squarely aimed at the analytics, if anyone at all. — schopenhauer1
Help me understand why it is SPECIFICALLY Wittgenstein where I see this?? — schopenhauer1
Witt is solving a problem for many philosophers, that simply wasn't there to begin with, EXCEPT for certain ones demanding various forms of rigorous world-to-word standards.. And those seem to be squarely aimed at the analytics, if anyone at all. — schopenhauer1
We often find expressions, as we often do here, that ask for the essence of religion or morality or the self or consciousness. — Fooloso4
One could raise the question without leaving the philosophical frame, but it seems clear that that is not what is happening here. This would be the difference between the question, "What is it that we are doing as philosophers?" and the question, "What is it that those philosophers are doing?" (And the reification of "philosophy" does not change this point.) — Leontiskos
Well, the form in which the question is posed, "What does philosophy want?", has neither a first nor a third person pronoun, so it is a matter of interpretation, of context, of intention. — Srap Tasmaner
--- Perhaps here it's worth mentioning that Antony Nickles offered a statement; I take responsibility for the question his statement would serve as an answer to. --- — Srap Tasmaner
Why do you think it was clear the question was not asked within the "philosophical frame"? — Srap Tasmaner
Yes, and this is particularly true in the case where one is distancing themselves from philosophy. One could raise the question without leaving the philosophical frame, but it seems clear that that is not what is happening here. This would be the difference between the question, "What is it that we are doing as philosophers?" and the question, "What is it that those philosophers are doing?" — Leontiskos
But it was an interesting class. I remember one day one of the topics we discussed wasn't "did Moses exist" but "what would it mean for Moses to exist?" and this still resonates with me. The biblical Moses does A, B, C, D etc. -- according to the Bible -- that is the "biblical moses." But if he only did e.g. A & C would he still be "Moses?" Or what if his name wasn't even Moses but something else but maybe he did "A"? I think this to myself everytime someone says Moses wasn't a "real." — BitconnectCarlos
I walked into that. But at the start of the sentence he says “If we are using the word ‘to know’ as it is normally used…” — Antony Nickles
"To examine why philosophy wants X," is to intentionally step outside of philosophy and into psychology (or else anthropology). It is to say, "I am no longer doing the thing that philosophy does." — Leontiskos
Wittgenstein quotes Augustine:
“quid est ergo tempus? si nemo ex me quaerat scio; si quaerenti explicare velim, nescio”. (PI 89)
"What, then, is time? I know well enough what it is, provided that nobody asksme; but if I am asked what it is and try to explain, I am baffled.” — Fooloso4
True, Kant doesn't tell us that the only truth is synthetic a posteriori, but then neither does Wittgenstein. I mean he doesn't talk in those terms, and neither is it implicit in his philosophy as far as am aware. So, it's not clear what you think you are taking aim at here. The distinction I referred to was not confined to synthetic a posteriori propositions. — Janus
I agree that there are parallels between what Kant's and Wittgenstein's philosophies, but the foci are quite different, the former being epistemological and the latter semantic, and even in the latter's later philosophy, phenomenological. Both do treat traditional metaphysics as being impossible as sciences of the determinable because both reject the idea of intellectual intution being able to provide knowledge or testable porpositions. — Janus
The idea of sense and reference incompletely in line with how I was treating the ideas of sensicality and non-sensicality. When we refer to logical or mathematical terms or empirical objects, then we have determinable referents. when we refer to God or Will or Karma or the Absolute, we do not have determinable referents. — Janus
It doesn't follow however that such non-sensical terms are nonsensical in the sense of being utterly meaningless, to repeat, they are non-sensical only in the sense that they lack determinable referents. Wittgenstein did not reject the ineffable, in fact he accorded it the greatest importance in human life, and that was precisely where he diverged from the Logical Positivists. — Janus
This doesn't seem to me to be the point at all. We clearly can know well enough what we are talking about when it comes to empirical, logical and mathematical matters; with religion, aesthetics and ethics, not so much, because the latter are groundless. We can get each other in aesthetic, ethical and religious discourse, but we do so in terms of canonicity, tradition and feeling, and the subjects we discuss are really ineffable when it all boils down. — Janus
That's my general take on the human situation, and I think it accords fairly well with both Kant and Wittgenstein, insofar as I am familiar with their philosophies. — Janus
But there is no explanation of how other truths cannot be philosophically valuable (not just POETRY or whatever dismissive thing you give other forms of philosophical writing).. — schopenhauer1
"incompletely in line". — schopenhauer1
My issue isn't simply that he called things nonsense, but the implication that certain things SHOULDN'T be said, because they can only be felt or shown, or revealed or whatnot.. Which of course, flies against much of philosophical writing which does try to EXPLAIN various "non-empirical" ideas. — schopenhauer1
Were you not using the word “know” as it is normally used when you said that we do not know the pain causing another to writhe in front of us (because that’s not how knowledge works)? — Luke
When does one step outside of philosophy into psychology? — Fooloso4
When someone engages in the psychoanalysis of philosophy they are surely not in a self-consciously philosophical frame. — Leontiskos
To examine why philosophy wants X," is to intentionally step outside of philosophy — Leontiskos
This would be the difference between the question, "What is it that we are doing as philosophers?" and the question, "What is it that those philosophers are doing?" — Leontiskos
(And the reification of "philosophy" does not change this point, nor does asking about the motivation behind philosophy as opposed to asking about the activity of philosophy.) — Leontiskos
Witt is solving a problem for many philosophers, that simply wasn't there to begin with, EXCEPT for certain ones demanding various forms of rigorous world-to-word standards.. And those seem to be squarely aimed at the analytics, if anyone at all. — schopenhauer1
If the critique is only a critique of a particular epoch or school of philosophy, and not a critique of philosophy tout court, then my point is moot. — Leontiskos
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