Our world picture is subject to change isn't that the purpose of Wittgenstein's riverbed analogy in OC 96?

Our world picture is subject to change isn't that the purpose of Wittgenstein's riverbed analogy in OC 96? — Sam26

Yes. This means, in part, that some things that had previously functioned as hinges no longer do, and some that now function as hinges may in time no longer be hinges. When he says that some propositions are exempt from doubt I don't think he means that hinges are atemporal or universal.

Ya, I think I agree with that.

Moore conflates, as many people do, the use of "I know..." as an expression of a conviction, as opposed to an expression of epistemology (JTB). "Suppose I replaced Moore's 'I know' by 'I am of unshakeable conviction' (OC 86)?" — Sam26

It would equally absurd that Moore stand in front of a lecture and say “I, with conviction, have two hands” along with “I know”. The most natural reaction would be to think something is not quite normal here.

Yes, and this is just what he did, he was in front of people when he expressed his "common sense" view that he knew he had a hand. It's not always as easy to spot the linguistic problem as you might think.

"And now if I were to say 'It is my unshakeable conviction that etc.', this means in the present case too that I have not consciously arrived at the conviction by following a particular line of thought, but that it is anchored in all my questions and answers, so anchored that I cannot touch it.

"All testing, all confirmation and disconfirmation of a hypothesis takes place already within a system. And this system is not a more or less arbitrary and doubtful point of departure for all our arguments: no, it belongs to the essence of what we call an argument. The system is not so much the point of departure, as the element in which arguments have their life (OC 103, 105)."

Of course, this refers again to the "inherited background or world picture" that forms the system in which we have our forms of life, language games, and our talk about epistemology. This also includes things that are not only true but also false, which explains why the riverbed of hinges can change. Some hinges are more fixed than others and the changes are more imperceptible.

Now that I think more about it @Fooloso4 there are some hinges that tend to be more immutable. For example, that we are beings that move through space, that I'm a being separate from other beings, that there are other minds, other objects, etc. These may even be necessarily hinges given the laws of the universe. I don't know if I've brought this up before, but maybe that's where you got the idea from. So, there are hinges that range along a kind of scale, some being more or less immutable, and most not being immutable at all.

"And isn't that what Moore wants to say, when he says he knows all these things?--But is his knowing it really what is in question, and not rather that some of these propositions must be solid for us (OC 112)?

Wittgenstein makes the point that some propositions must be solid for us. This is important in terms of what can be rationally doubted within our world picture or inherited background. However, given how broad our world picture is, there will inevitably be false beliefs within it, so what might be a hinge at T1, might not be at T2. In the past, I've mainly focused on hinges that tend not to change or that change very little over time, but Wittgenstein's hinges are much broader in scope. In other words, Wittgenstein's hinges would include actions (linguistic and non-linguistic actions) within any system of belief, even beliefs that are mere myths. There are groups of language games within these various systems that support the system, including epistemological language games. For many religions, belief in God is a hinge. So, we end up with competing systems, with hinges in one system that aren't hinges in another system. What's solid in one system won't be solid in another, and what is doubtable in one system may not be doubtable in another.

That said, certain hinge beliefs ground all of our systems, and these hinge beliefs tend not to change or change very little over time. Again, examples include: "There are other minds," "There are objects," "We have hands," and "The Earth has existed for a long time, etc." These hinges should be in a group of their own because they tend to be the most solid and beyond the reach of any reasonable doubt. They seem to be core hinges.

"If you tried to doubt everything you would not get as far as doubting anything. The game of doubting itself presupposes certainty (OC 115)."

What is the certainty that is presupposed? Well, we've been talking about this in the previous posts, viz., the world picture or inherited background. Doubting by its very nature requires a place of certainty. "If you are not certain of any fact, you cannot be certain of the meaning of your words either (OC 114f)."

There is an important point about doubting that's similar to a point raised in earlier posts about knowing, viz., both have uses that point to an inner feeling; Knowing as an expression of conviction and doubting as an expression of intuition or a feeling of unease. Both of these uses are proper, but they are different from the uses of these words in an epistemological context.

It seems to me that knowledge and doubt are two sides of the same coin, i.e., you can't have one without the other. "Can one say, 'Where there is no doubt there is no knowledge either (OC 121)."

One could use the word doubt in a way similar to expressing an opinion, viz., there is no justification or very little justification for the doubt, similar to a feeling or intuition. However, just like many of our opinions, it generally carries very little weight. Just as knowledge is superior to mere belief, doubting backed by good reasons or good evidence is superior to a doubt that lacks some form of justification.

Some expressions of doubt are senseless. For example, doubting that there are other persons, grounds for doubt are lacking, everything speaks in favor of there being other persons and nothing against it. What would count as a grounding for such a doubt? "And couldn't we peacefully leave him to doubt it, since it makes no difference at all (OC 120)?"

certain hinge beliefs ground all of our systems, and these hinge beliefs tend not to change or change very little over time. Again, examples include: "There are other minds," "There are objects," "We have hands," and "The Earth has existed for a long time, etc." These hinges should be in a group of their own because they tend to be the most solid and beyond the reach of any reasonable doubt. They seem to be core hinges. — Sam26

In one sense , it shouldn’t matter that certain hinge beliefs change slowly, because they do change. The river bank changes much more slowly that the flow of the river, but over long enough periods of time it can be seen to change as continuously as the river. The sense of every hinge proposition you mentioned (“There are other minds," "There are objects," "We have hands," and "The Earth has existed for a long time”) has already been put into question by writers like Husserl and Heidegger. To be clear, they are not claiming that these are false assumptions, but that their assumed intelligibility can be shown to be confused from the vantage of a different starting point.

I think sometimes we lump hinges into a very large pot, as though they're all the same. However, that there are other objects or other minds isn't going to change, at least as far as I can see.

At the bottom of our epistemological use of "I know..." is an ungrounded way of acting, in other words, justification comes to an end. It ends with "...a lot of empirical propositions which we affirm without special testing; propositions, that is, which have a peculiar logical role in the system of our empirical propositions (OC 136)." It seems clear that Wittgenstein is referring to our world picture or our inherited background.

"The propositions, however, which Moore retails as examples of such known truths are indeed interesting. Not because anyone knows their truth, or believes he knows them, but because they all have a similar role in the system of our empirical judgments (OC 137)." It's the role hinges play in our system of judgments that's important, and it's certainly not about whether they're true or false. "We don't for example, arrive at any of them as a result of investigation (OC 138)." If someone wants to say they're true, then I ask, "How do you know they're true?" If you point to some criteria for their justification, then I believe you're missing Wittgenstein's point.

"Even if the most trustworthy of men assures me that he knows things are thus and so, this by itself cannot satisfy me that he does know. Only that he believes he knows [my emphasis] (OC 137)."

There is a side issue with knowing that seems to get conflated with what we mean by knowledge (JTB), and what we claim as knowledge. A claim to know, even if one believes that they have the proper justification, doesn't always equate to knowing. This seems obvious, and yet people think that there is some problem with JTB because one can seemingly have a belief that's justified and true, and yet that belief can turn out to be false. Claiming to know is not necessarily knowing. We often believe we know, but later find out that we didn't know. It's simply a difference between one's claims and reality, they don't always match. Moreover, most of what we know is probabilistic and subject to what we think is likely the case, not what is necessarily the case. Given the probabilistic nature of most of our knowledge, it's reasonable to conclude that sometimes what we believe is justified and true, is simply false. This is just part of the nature of our claims and not a flaw in how we define knowledge (JTB). Within any system of beliefs, there will always be some false beliefs, even if we think those beliefs are well-established.

"What does this mean: the truth of a proposition is certain (OC 193)?"

"With the word 'certain' we express complete conviction, the total absence of doubt, and thereby we seek to convince other people. That is subjective certainty.

"But when is something objectively certain? When a mistake is not possible. But what kind of possibility is that? Mustn't mistake be logically excluded (OC 194)?"

Wittgenstein uses certain in two different senses in OC, subjectively certain, as an expression of a conviction or feeling about a belief, and objectively certain, which is another way of expressing a piece of knowledge as JTB. So, certainty and knowledge both have their subjective and objective counterparts, and they are often confused.

OC 194 brings up a very interesting point, i.e., the tendency is to say, "I know...," and here one thinks one is using know in the epistemological sense (as Moore's does), as a guarantee that one knows, as if a mistake is not possible. However, if a claim to know is in itself knowledge, it would seem that knowing would lose its force, it would be akin to a conviction, opinion, or intuition. Knowledge must stand up to the doubt, "How is it that you know?" Note that with a mere belief, one might respond to the question "Why do you believe that?" with the answer "I just do," and that's acceptable as a mere belief; but a claim to knowledge as JTB requires more, it requires that the belief be justified and true. And of course, Wittgenstein in challenging Moore's use by asking what would count as a justification for "I know this is a hand." Wittgenstein is telling us that Moore's use of "I know..." is akin to an expression of a conviction, not objective knowledge as Moore thinks it is. Of course, this brings us full circle, viz., that the propositions that Moore retails as knowledge hold a special place within our world picture. Moore doesn't know, in his context, what he thinks he knows.

There is a lot to unpack here, and I've just scratched the surface.

Note that with a mere belief, one might respond to the question "Why do you believe that?" with the answer "I just do," and that's acceptable as a mere belief; but a claim to knowledge as JTB requires more, it requires that the belief be justified and true. And of course, Wittgenstein in challenging Moore's use by asking what would count as a justification for "I know this is a hand." Wittgenstein is telling us that Moore's use of "I know..." is akin to an expression of a conviction, not objective knowledge as Moore thinks it is. — Sam26

If I was Moore, I would demonstrate my knowledge by showing him traditionally held techniques, actions accomplished by using a hand, and convince him that knowledge as JTB should be revised to demonstrable public action (DPA).

Wittgenstein's point is that no justification is required. Certain propositions, viz., hinge propositions are generally outside our epistemological language games.

"The reason why the use of the expression "true or false" has something misleading about it is that it is like saying "it tallies with the facts or it doesn't", and the very thing that is in question is what "tallying" is here (OC 199)."

It seems very easy to say that a proposition is true because it tallies, mirrors, corresponds, etc. with the facts, but in Moore's case what does it mean? Moreover, what does it mean for any proposition to tally with the facts? There must be a way of deciding for or against a proposition (OC 198). Some propositions are determined to be justified and true based on what method of justification we're using, for example, logic, sensory experience, testimony, linguistic training, etc. To determine how most propositions are true we use one of these justification methods. The question though, for Wittgenstein has to do with certain kinds of propositions, Moorean propositions, which hold a special place in our system of beliefs, viz., the grounding of our epistemological talk of justification and truth. If justification comes to an end with hinges, then tallying loses its meaning with hinges, which seems to be why the question "What is tallying with the facts?"

"Really 'The proposition is either true or false' only means that it must be possible to decide for or against it. But this does not say what the ground for such a decision is like (OC 200)."

My interpretation is that the ground refers back to the world picture or inherited background, i.e., it grounds our very talk of justification and truth. Moore doesn't see that bedrock doesn't need grounding; it is the ground. Indeed, most of us don't see it. This solves the infinite regress problem, viz., where does justification end?

"Giving grounds [justification], however, justifying the evidence, comes to an end;--but the end is not certain propositions' striking us immediately as true, i.e., it is not a kind of seeing on our part; it is our acting [non-linguistic], which lies at the bottom of our language game (OC 204)."

Wittgenstein's ideas seem to build on each other. At the bottom, i.e. the grounding or the world picture, then we have our actions (non-linguistic actions) within that grounding. On top of this comes a primitive language, then more sophisticated language games like knowing and doubting. Knowing and doubting come much later, it's parasitic on the world picture.

Wittgenstein's point is that no justification is required. Certain propositions, viz., hinge propositions are generally outside our epistemological language games. — Sam26

What I am emphasizing here is what Wittgenstein says in On Certainty in the following:

110 “….As if giving grounds did not come to an end sometime. But the end is not an ungrounded presupposition: it is an ungrounded way of acting.”

But recall that Wittgenstein regarded the ordinary meaning of "to know" to not imply infallibility, in the sense that even if a fact P necessarily implies another fact Q, "knowing that P" does not necessarily imply Q.

This stems from his epistemic consideration that in a literal sense nothing is knowable in the sense demanded by a philosopher. And yet he appreciated that everyone including himself ordinarily use the verb "to know" all the time. Therefore he concluded that the ordinary meaning of "to know" isn't an insinuation of ideal knowledge.

If Moore's knowledge of his hands is interpreted in that light, then had Moore later discovered that he didn't actually have hands, his discovery wouldn't contradict his earlier ordinary claim to "know that he had hands"

What I am emphasizing here is what Wittgenstein says in On Certainty in the following:

110 “….As if giving grounds did not come to an end sometime. But the end is not an ungrounded presupposition: it is an ungrounded way of acting.” — Richard B

Yes, that's an important part of his thinking in OC.

But recall that Wittgenstein regarded the ordinary meaning of "to know" to not imply infallibility, in the sense that even if a fact P necessarily implies another fact Q, "knowing that P" does not necessarily imply Q. — sime

Right, he never implies that "to know" means some infallibility on our part.

I don't think Wittgenstein would use phrasing like "P necessarily implies some fact," or what others use, viz., "P if and only if P," etc.

This stems from his epistemic consideration that in a literal sense nothing is knowable in the sense demanded by a philosopher. And yet he appreciated that everyone including himself ordinarily use the verb "to know" all the time. Therefore he concluded that the ordinary meaning of "to know" isn't an insinuation of ideal knowledge. — sime

Philosophers don't, as a general rule, hold to the notion that knowledge implies infallibility if that's what you're implying. Inductive reasoning is probabilistic, so any knowledge gained by inductive reasoning is not infallible by definition. I think Wittgenstein's point is that some uses of "I know.." are not epistemological as in Moore's case, at least that's part of Witts point.

I do not think Wittgenstein regards knowing and doubting as sophisticated language games. Both knowing and doubting in their nascent forms are primitive.

3. If e.g. someone says "I don't know if there's a hand here" he might be told "Look closer". - This possibility of satisfying oneself is part of the language-game. Is one of its essential features.

7. My life shows that I know or am certain that there is a chair over there, or a door, and so on. - I tell a friend e.g. "Take that chair over there", "Shut the door", etc. etc.

41. ... But "I know where you touched my arm" is right.

160. The child learns by believing the adult. Doubt comes after belief.

354. Doubting and non-doubting behavior. There is the first only if there is the second.

510 .. It is just like directly taking hold of something, as I take hold of my towel without having doubts.

These examples of looking, sitting, feeling, believing, acting are all "non-linguistic".

I'm saying that knowing and doubting as epistemological uses are more sophisticated language games. Knowing and doubting does not occur as an epistemological language game when speaking of hinge beliefs, generally. So, if you're speaking in terms of primitive man there is no knowing and doubting epistemologically. And, even if we're talking about modern man and their language games hinge beliefs also fall outside epistemological considerations.

OC 3 is just an example of where it might be proper to doubt and how we might satisfy that doubt. Moore's use is not such a case.

7 is referring to a subjective knowing and certainty. That's my interpretation.

None of the rest of your e.g.'s hurt my position. You don't seem to be following my position carefully. At least that's what it seems to me.

I'm saying that knowing and doubting as epistemological uses are more sophisticated language games. — Sam26

While a philosopher's epistemological considerations may involve sophisticated language games knowing and doubting need not.

You don't seem to be following my position carefully. — Sam26

Perhaps not. You stated that:

Knowing and doubting come much later — Sam26

Epistemological considerations may come much later but knowing and doubting do not. It is not clear what the distinction you are making between knowing and doubting and their epistemological uses. If the point is that epistemology as an branch of philosophy arises later then yes, of course.

You say:

So, if you're speaking in terms of primitive man there is no knowing and doubting epistemologically. — Sam26

I do not know what "knowing and doubting epistemologically" means. Knowing or doubting and such things as criteria and justification for knowing or doubting are two different things.

And, even if we're talking about modern man and their language games hinge beliefs also fall outside epistemological considerations. — Sam26

Since hinges can and do change, even if only rarely and slowly, epistemological considerations are not off the table

I see, not knowing and doubting, but believing and doubting as more inextricably tied. The problem I have with the idea that knowing involves uncertainty or defeasibility, is that it seems weird, inconsistent or incoherent. to say that you know, but that you could be mistaken. It also seems strange to say that we could know, despite not knowing that we know, which seems to be a corollary of JTB. What exactly constitutes justification seems underdetermined.

So, I would say knowing comes into play when we, leaving aside considerations that evolve out of indulging artificially manufactured faux-doubt, cannot be wrong concerning what we know. In the primeval scenario, for example, you see the tiger on the path in front of you—you know the tiger is there. Alternatively, you hear a tiger-like growl somewhere in the bushes and you believe there is a tiger there, but there is some room for doubt.

So, going back to the 'Moore' example, I would agree with him that knows he has hands.

Epistemological considerations may come much later but knowing and doubting do not. It is not clear what the distinction you are making between knowing and doubting and their epistemological uses. If the point is that epistemology as an branch of philosophy arises later then yes, of course. — Fooloso4

Witt seems to point to two senses of know and certainty throughout OC. He talks about using know as an expression of a conviction which is not an epistemological use. He also talks about subjective certainty which is the same as know when used to express one's conviction. This is what I mean by non-epistemological uses of these words. An epistemological use of these words includes the proper justification and their truth.

Since hinges can and do change, even if only rarely and slowly, epistemological considerations are not off the table — Fooloso4

While it's true that most hinges can and do change, some don't. I gave these examples earlier, but you seem to ignore them or you're not reading everything. My examples include, there are objects, there are other minds, we have hands, etc. It's hard to see how there are objects could change.

If you going to critique what I say at least read with more care. That said, I'm sure we have disagreements nothing new here.

I see, not knowing and doubting, but believing and doubting as more inextricably tied. The problem I have with the idea that knowing involves uncertainty or defeasibility, is that it seems weird, inconsistent or incoherent. to say that you know, but that you could be mistaken. — Janus

It could simply mean that your inductive reasoning, which is a legitimate form of knowing is only probable (most of science is inductive). So, I could say without sounding weird that I have good reasons to believe I know X, but that there is a small chance I could be mistaken. This happens all the time. Evidence changes and so do our conclusions. I think the problem is when we conflate the meaning of knowledge as JTB for example, and one's claim to knowledge, they are two different things. The definition is one thing, that is what it means to know, but your inductive claim doesn't have the same force of necessity (if necessity is the correct word).

It could simply mean that your inductive reasoning, which is a legitimate form of knowing is only probable (most of science is inductive). So, I could say without sounding weird that I have good reasons to believe I know X, but that there is a small chance I could be mistaken. This happens all the time. Evidence changes and so do our conclusions. I think the problem is when we conflate the meaning of knowledge as JTB for example, and one's claim to knowledge, they are two different things. The definition is one thing, that is what it means to know, but your inductive claim doesn't have the same force of necessity (if necessity is the correct word). — Sam26

Science is a form of knowing in a participatory and a practical sense. We know the world, in the sense of participating in it, via science. It is practical too in the that it is a practice, a know-how. Propositional knowledge though, it seems to me, requires observation. I know I have hands because I can see them, observe myself using them and so on. I know it is raining when I am out and I feel the rain on my body and see the drops falling. In those kinds of cases, of which there are countlessly many in our lives, we cannot be mistaken, barring faux-doubt and bizarre thought-experiment scenarios, which I don't believe deserve our concern.

When you say "So, I could say without sounding weird that I have good reasons to believe I know X, but that there is a small chance I could be mistaken." I have no problem agreeing with you because it is not a claim that I know, but a claim to have good reason to believe that I know. And this highlights the strangeness of saying that I could know, without knowing that I know. For me, if I don't know that I know, as I say I do in cases like 'I am a human being' 'my body is bilaterally symmetrical (more or less)', I have hands and feet'. 'My head sits on my shoulders' and so on endlessly, then I would say instead that I don't know, but I believe or don't believe this or that, or I reserve judgement.

Science is a form of knowing in a participatory and a practical sense. We know the world, in the sense of participating in it, via science. It is practical too in the that it is a practice, a know-how. Propositional knowledge though, it seems to me, requires observation. I know I have hands because I can see them, observe myself using them and so on. I know it is raining when I am out and I feel the rain on my body and see the drops falling. In those kinds of cases, of which there are countlessly many in our lives, we cannot be mistaken, barring faux-doubt and bizarre thought-experiment scenarios, which I don't believe deserve our concern. — Janus

Science uses the same justification methods we all do, logic (inductive and deductive reasoning), sensory experience (observation), and testimony (peer reviewed papers, lectures, etc). It's just that science is generally more precise with these methods than the general public. Most knowledge in general is practical, not just science. Moreover, science draws conclusions based on whatever method of justification it's using, and these conclusions are in the form of propositions. If science presents a theory based on experiments or mathematical models, then someone probably believes the conclusions are either true or false. If they believe they're true or false, they're using propositions. Most all of what we know is in the form of propositions.

Knowledge can come in the form of a skill (know how) or in the form of a belief. Mostly when we talk about knowledge we're talking about beliefs not knowledge as a skill (like riding a bike or conducting skillful experiments). Although skills overlap with knowledge as a belief.

When you say "So, I could say without sounding weird that I have good reasons to believe I know X, but that there is a small chance I could be mistaken." I have no problem agreeing with you because it is not a claim that I know, but a claim to have good reason to believe that I know. And this highlights the strangeness of saying that I could know, without knowing that I know. For me, if I don't know that I know, as I say I do in cases like 'I am a human being' 'my body is bilaterally symmetrical (more or less)', I have hands and feet'. 'My head sits on my shoulders' and so on endlessly, then I would say instead that I don't know, but I believe or don't believe this or that, or I reserve judgement. — Janus

A claim to have good reason to believe X is partly what we mean by know. Good reasons are how we justify many of our beliefs and why we make claims that a proposition is true. It is a claim to know.

Part of Wittgenstein's argument against Moore is that we don't know we have hands. The hinge belief that we have hands is just part of the world picture we have along with a million other things, but it's not knowledge. I believe Witt is correct about this.