That it is a “false” narrative does not explain why Plato, Descartes, Kant, Positivism, etc. got sucked into it (belief or opinion vs knowledge; appearance vs reality; the thing-in-itself; only either true or false). That is what Witt is investigating. — Antony Nickles

The way I see those, is they are all different and often self-referential and contained frameworks that don't all have to do with exactly "certainty" in the same way say, that a scientific experiment or a math problem is "certain". These are metaphysical and epistemological frameworks, many of which are architectonic, building upon themselves.

What they have in common is a construction or positive idea about reality. If he is getting at that they think they "solved" something rather than being permanently skeptical, I think that is a bias against constructive theories, and not acknowledging that they can work as hypothesis that can later be changed by other ways of thinking.. I don't see the problem.

This is a tough one, because it’s easy to dismiss Descartes as delusional or paranoid. The particular instance is not as important as the fabrications that create it, which is not the automaton, but turning our human limitations into a problem, here, only seeing “appearance” because we want to have the certainty of “reality”, when the desire is in reaction to the fear that, in fact, sometimes we don’t know whether someone is lying; that their judgments, their decisions, etc. can exist but be unexpressed; that we may be wrong about them, to trust them, to give our love to them. — Antony Nickles

I'm not sure what you (or Witt?) is saying here. Descartes is taking a pretty common sense position that I cannot LITERALLY know what the other person is thinking inside, but I can judge them to be feeling similar to me. So I don't see the big deal about certainty you (Witt?) is making there.

Finding yourself in the grip of skepticism is also tricky (even accepting its truth) because we don’t see that: imagining we live without it (as part of the human condition) or have solved it, is to still be in its snare. — Antony Nickles

I'm not sure what this is saying either. Indeed it is good to be skeptical and try to figure out the world or not I suppose.

Or it's because the sensation I have when I stab myself in the arm is unlike the sensation you have when you stab yourself in the arm, and so our pains are not the same and we don't know one another's pain. — Michael

Maybe the way to put this is that equating our pains is not how pain is important to us. If this situation actually did happen, what would matter to us about comparing pains would be attending to one or other of us. Philosophy abstracts this discussion to a place of equating pains, and then creates “sensation” as a kind of object, rather than just me expressing how I feel (which is too vague), so that knowledge might stand in the place of our having to react to someone in pain. What it wants is to be sure of the other person (and what to do), and not have to make the leap of faith of treating them as a person in pain.

The way I see those, is they are all different and often self-referential and contained frameworks that don't all have to do with exactly "certainty" in the same way say, that a scientific experiment or a math problem is "certain". — schopenhauer1

They share the desire and thus create and impose a criteria or standard that is like the idea they have of science or math. Thus why Plato discusses math first in the Theatetus, and Descartes wants to be beyond doubt, and Kant requires the imperative.

What they have in common is a construction or positive idea about reality. — schopenhauer1

One point I think Witt is making is that taking our world as, say, mitigated by “appearance” or “belief” is to exactly take a negative view of our ordinary means of seeing and communicating and judging. As if we are never connected to the world, instead of only sometimes not knowing our way about. They in a sense kill the world to save it in the vision they want: the thing-in-itself (which we can’t know directly), or the forms (which we only remember), or God’s knowledge, or only true/false propositions.

I'm not sure what this is saying either. Indeed it is good to be skeptical and try to figure out the world or not I suppose. — schopenhauer1

I’m referring to the radical skepticism that is generalized and creates a gap between us and the world that philosophy turns into an intellectual problem. Not just questioning the status quo.

They share the desire and thus create and impose a criteria or standard that is like the idea they have of science or math. Thus why Plato discusses math first in the Theatetus, and Descartes wants to be beyond doubt, and Kant requires the imperative. — Antony Nickles

They are analyzing our ways of understanding of the world... For example what is the nature of arithmetic and geometrical notions or scientific discoveries. Call it various "judgements" about the world rather than truths if you want. Kant had the categorical imperative indeed, but that was faulty from the outset, not because he wanted certainty, but because (in my opinion) it assumes various things and ignores others to get what it wants regarding ethical dilemmas. But none of this seems to be the reasons Wittgenstein gives.. just a blanket "they all want to be certain!" rather than they are investigating avenues for human epistemology and metaphysics..

Maybe the way to put this is that equating our pains is not how pain is important to us. If this situation actually did happen, what would matter to us about comparing pains would be attending to one or other of us. Philosophy abstracts this discussion to a place of equating pains, and then creates “sensation” as a kind of object, rather than just me expressing how I feel (which is too vague), so that knowledge might stand in the place of our having to react to someone in pain. What it wants is to be sure of the other person (and what to do), and not have to make the leap of faith of treating them as a person in pain. — Antony Nickles

When we're discussing something like the hard problem of consciousness and the ontology of sensations then it very much matters to us if our pains are the same or not.

All you seem to be arguing is that when we're hungover after a night of heavy drinking then we should care more about whether or not there is some aspirin. I doubt anyone disagrees. But I fail to see the relevance of this on a philosophy forum.

Descartes is taking a pretty common sense position that I cannot LITERALLY know what the other person is thinking inside, but I can judge them to be feeling similar to me. So I don't see the big deal about certainty you (Witt?) is making there. — schopenhauer1

As I mentioned to @Michael above yes, the other is ultimately hidden from us (despite our being able to guess at thoughts or anticipating, etc), but the framework Descartes is using treats them as inhuman, as it were, unless we can “judge” they are people, as if it is a matter of proof rather than taking them to be human, accepting them, acting towards them as if they were.

One point I think Witt is making is that taking our world as, say, mitigated by “appearance” or “belief” is to exactly take a negative view of our ordinary means of seeing and communicating and judging. As if we are never connected to the world, instead of only sometimes not knowing our way about. They in a sense kill the world to save it in the vision they want: the thing-in-itself (which we can’t know directly), or the forms (which we only remember), or God’s knowledge, or only true/false propositions. — Antony Nickles

Actually, the Thing-In-Itself is precisely what we know most according to Schopenhauer, so not all philosophers think like that. His idea of Will is immanent, and personal, not theoretical construct. And even Kant, is simply explaining theory of cognition, early cognitive psychology, if you will.. It isn't replacing the feeling of everyday, it is answering questions of what it means for us to construct the world.. You need space and time for example, you need qualities, and quantities, etc. etc.

I’m referring to the radical skepticism that is generalized and creates a gap between us and the world that philosophy turns into an intellectual problem. Not just questioning the status quo. — Antony Nickles

I think this idea of turning into an "intellectual problem" is a non-problem. There are philosophers that have various ideas on the matter. Kant has his CI, but Schopenhauer has his compassion.. Plato had his notion of The Good, Aristotle the virtues, hedonism, cynicism, and all of it. These are just various ways of looking at the human condition and the world and how the human relates with the world. I am at a loss for why this is no good.

yes, the other is ultimately hidden from us (despite our being able to guess at thoughts or anticipating, etc), but the framework Descartes is using treats them as inhuman, as it were, unless we can “judge” they are people, as if it is a matter of proof rather than taking them to be human, accepting them, acting towards them as if they were. — Antony Nickles

I took that quote to simply mean, we judge them to have internal sensations like we do.. not that we need proof. But I do know that Descartes had a horrible understanding that animals didn't have inner sensations like people do. But then, that would be the opposite view of proof because of external signs and such. Rather, it seems like an irrational belief in only people having inner sensations, and that means no proof was needed, just an unjustified belief in a hierarchy.

When we're discussing something like the hard problem of consciousness and the ontology of sensations then it very much matters to us if our pains are the same or not. — Michael

Witt would be showing how this “problem” and ontology are manufactured by our human desires. I’m not sure this thread is the place to discuss that controversial a subject. I did address it in this Hard Problem post.

Witt would be showing how this “problem” and ontology are manufactured by our human desires. — Antony Nickles

So because we only care about aspirin when we have a headache then it follows that first person private sensations don't exist, or that if they do exist then they are the same for all people?

That's obviously a non sequitur.

Kant had the categorical imperative indeed, but that was faulty from the outset, not because he wanted certainty, but because (in my opinion) it assumes various things and ignores others to get what it wants regarding ethical dilemmas. — schopenhauer1

I don’t mean to harp on about “certainty” as if that is the only desire philosophy has. It’s just Witt’s example, which Cavell characterizes as the removal of the human (voice). Philosophy also desires generalization, abstraction, universality, predetermination, etc. The means of imposing these criteria, is, as you say, that it “assumes various things and ignores others to get what it wants”.