In June of 1911 an institution was founded known as the Bridge. It was in part funded using the Nobel prize money of chemist and physicist Wilhelm Ostwald. Its purpose was to organize society under one common – scientific – worldview. It meant to do this by being a central hub for knowledge - A place where one could go and find answers or information regarding any question which science could provide. The bridge was not meant to simply be a giant library of sorts, but rather, it would standardize the information and organize it, with the aim being to provide this information to all other institutions, thereby promoting intellectual unity. By increasing the efficiency of science through standardization and organization, society could more effectively establish a common worldview which took seriously the immense scientific progress from the previous century. The Bridge, however, closed its doors in 1913, never seeing its goal accomplished, but its purpose lived on.

The project drew the attention of a number of its contemporary scientists, including the attention of theoretical physicist Ernst Mach. Mach, like Ostwald was a positivist. They both believed that bringing society under a common scientific worldview, was necessary to bring human reason into the next phase of its development. This required that science be reformulated to only allow within its explanations, facts which were built from experience, and experience alone. Because of this, Mach agreed with Ostwald on another point - that the atomic theory postulated by thinkers such as Helmholtz and Boltzmann, while useful perhaps on paper, was dangerous to the rigor of science. The theory violated what Mach took to be a fundamental tenet of science, that one should never theorize past experience – doing so was not only unnecessary, but dangerous to ‘the economy of thought’.

“One and the same view underlies both my epistemologicophysical writings and my present attempt to deal with the physiology of the senses – the view, namely, that all metaphysical elements are to be eliminated as superfluous and destructive to the economy of science” (AS, IX).

In 1912, a public manifesto was released by Mach; signed by 32 other thinkers, such as Einstein, Freud, Hilbert, Loeb, etc the document essentially called for precisely the vision Ostwald had put forth. Asking all interested scientists and philosophers to help establish a common worldview for society, by drawing upon all knowledge within the special sciences which can be derived from ‘the facts of experience’. Positive facts, as they were called, the positivism which Mach called for, influenced a number of like minded thinkers. Mach’s thinking would continue to influence the intellectuals in Vienna past the first world war. So, when Moritz Schlick, took over the position as chair of philosophy of science (a position previously held by Mach and Boltzmann), in 1922, he began having weekly structured group meetings intending to set the human pursuit of knowledge on proper footing. This group would eventually become known as the Vienna Circle, including members such as Rudolf Carnap, Otto Neurath, and Friedrich Weismann, and in 1929 they would release their own manifesto (written by Carnap, Hans Hahn, and Otto Neurath) citing as their aim the unify science, developing a language where every word refers to something real, not metaphysical – the position known as logical positivism. The group discussed in great detail Wittgenstein’s Tractatus, and saw within it a verification principle of meaning, much like their own work, but Wittgenstein was rarely compelled to join the meetings, and when he did, he would read Tagore’s poetry to them aloud with his back turned.

Ludwig Boltzmann stood opposed to energetisicm of Ostwald, and the anti-metaphysical agenda of Mach. Throughout the late 1800s/early 1900s most physicists were still against the atomic theory, and the influence of Mach on the sciences saw metaphysics as dangerous to the “economy of thought” insofar as it was useless metaphysics.

Boltzmann saw great utility in the use of models in his work, seeing them as inventions of the human mind which prove their value insofar as they prove useful.

“Models in the mathematical, physical and mechanical sciences are of the greatest importance. Long ago philosophy perceived the essence of our process of thought to lie in the fact that we attach to the various real objects around us particular physical attributes – our concepts – and by means of these try to represent the objects to our minds. Such views were formerly regarded by mathematicians and physicists as nothing more than unfertile speculations, but in more recent times they have been brought by J. C. Maxwell, H. v. Helmholtz, E. Mach, H. Hertz and many others into intimate relation with the whole body of mathematical and physical theory. On this view our thoughts stand to things in the same relation as models to the objects they represent. The essence of the process is the attachment of one concept having a definite content to each thing, but without implying complete similarity between thing and thought; for naturally we can know but little of the resemblance of our thoughts to the things to which we attach them. What resemblance there is, lies principally in the nature of the connexion [sic], the correlation being analogous to that which obtains between thought and language, language and writing. (…) Here, of course, the symbolization of the thing is the important point, though, where feasible, the utmost possible correspondence is sought between the two (…) we are simply extending and continuing the principle by means of which we comprehend objects in thought and represent them in language or “ (Boltzmann 1974a, 213).


Boltzmann, like Hertz, Mach, and Helmholtz agreed that the representations we make ought not
be said to share a complete similarity with the objects represented, but disagreeing with Mach,
Boltzmann believed that such metaphysical speculation could be fruitful.

“(…) Hertz makes physicists properly aware of something philosophers had no doubt long since stated, namely that no theory can be objective, actually coinciding with nature, but rather that each theory is only a mental picture of phenomena, related to them as sign is to designatum. (…) From this it follows that it cannot be our task to find an absolutely correct theory but rather a picture that is as simple as possible and that represents phenomena as accurately as possible. One might even conceive of two quite different theories both equally simple and equally congruent with phenomena, which therefore in spite of their difference are equally correct. The assertion that a given theory is the only correct one can only express our subjective conviction that there could not be another equally simple and fitting image” (Boltzmann 1974b, 90-91).

In order to explain, for example, the transference of heat, Boltzmann posited atoms whose motion transferred energy. Boltzmann says that “...the fact that this cannot be demonstrated quite so clearly is due only to the difficulties of computing molecular motion”. The atomistic view of the world, didn’t rely on experiences of atoms, but Boltzmann saw them as furnishing our understanding such that he thought: “...contemporary atomistics gives a fully adequate picture of all mechanical phenomena”; even if they have yet to prove them via experience, he says “...we shall hardly expect to find the phenomena that will not fit into the frame of the picture”, since, “...all essential facts are found in the features of our picture”. Adopting the term ‘bilder’ or ‘pictures’ from physicist Heinrich Hertz, Boltzmann essentially thought the models we make within the mind, are a kind of picture. Mach, however, thought them merely mathematical fictions, only proving useful on paper, but not truly grasping the matter. In fact, in 1910 Mach wrote: “If the belief in the reality of atoms is so essential for you, I forsake the physical way of thinking, I do not want to be a real physicist...I thank you very much for the community of believers. For I prefer the freedom of thought”.

Hertz owed much of his thought to his teacher Helmholtz, who posited a theory meant to explain how we form images of reality. Helmholtz, similar to Mach, believed that objective events in nature are the causes for our sensations – which he called signs -translated via our organs. These signs bear no resemblance to reality, they are, however, “...still signs of something – something existing or something taking place” (FP). Unlike signs, the images we form from them must, “...be similar in some respect to the object of which it is an image” (FP). He thought this a necessity in accounting for our ability to “... discover the lawful regularities in the processes of the external world” (FP). But, in what sense exactly they are to be seen as resembling one another isn’t immediately clear. In an earlier text, Helmholtz had written that: “Our representation of things can be nothing else at all except symbols, naturally given signs for things, that we learn to use for the regulation of our motions and actions...comparison between representation and things not only fails to exist in actuality...but any other kind of comparison is in no way thinkable and has no sense at all (1857).

In the Principles of Mechanics, Hertz says that in trying to predict future events,

“We form for ourselves images or symbols of external objects”...

In order that this requirement may be satisfied, there must be a certain conformity between nature and our thought.” (The Principles of Mechanics, 2)


Hertz believed that experience proves whether this conformity exists, insofar as our images are useful. Unlike Helmholtz, Hertz believed that you can form many different images for the same object, and they might differ in fundamental ways. They must all, however, adhere, Hertz thought, to two principles. These were:

“The form which we give them is such that the necessary consequents of the images in thought are always the images of the necessary consequents in nature of the things pictured.

And
All pictures must conform to logic

In picking between two (or more) images, Hertz said we ought to pick the more ‘appropriate’, that is, the one which pictures more essential relations and which has the fewest superfluous relations (2). But, we cannot avoid “empty relations” altogether Hertz thought, “they enter into the images because they are simply images, - images produced by our mind and necessarily affected by the characteristics of its mode of portrayal” (2). The pictures we form, can display their utility to us, thereby proving their conformity to reality without needing to suppose or supply any further conformity. “For our purposes it is not necessary that they should be I conformity with the things in any other respect” (PM,1). Hertz believed logic fully capable of disallowing inadmissible images into our mind, and paired with the first principle which disallows images which fail to conform to the essential relations of things experienced, our images could be both useful in science and improve in accuracy (3).
“What enters into the images for the sake of correctness is contained in the results of experience, from which the images are built up. What enters into the images, in order that they may be permissible, is given by the nature of our mind” (3).

Hertz ultimately thought:
“To the question whether an image is permissible or not, we can without ambiguity answer yes or no ; and our decision will hold good for all time. And equally without ambiguity we can decide whether an image is correct or not ;. but only according to the state of our present experience, and permitting an appeal to later and riper experience. Bat we cannot decide without ambiguity whether an image is appropriate or not ; as to this differences of opinion may arise. One image may be more suitable for one purpose, another for another ;. only by gradually testing many images can we finally succeed in obtaining the most appropriate.”




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Now, thinks back to Wittgenstein. Recall, that a thought is a logical picture of a fact (3); whether it is true or not requires us to compare it to reality. But, remember, meaningful language can present false facts; elements combined in a way which simply isn’t true.
“An atomic fact is thinkable means: we can imagine it” (3).


This is because, in thought, we can imagine states of affairs which simply turn out false. Wittgenstein combines Hertz’ two principles, stating that a pictures (a thought) is a picture insofar as it has a logical form. That is, every picture is permissible by logic – an illogical picture is not a picture - and its unique logical form is what it has in common with reality such that it can picture it.

Wittgenstein tells us “...everything in logic is permitted”. This is because “...we cannot think illogically” (5.473). It is therefore impossible “...to present in language anything which ‘contradicts logic’” (3.032). If the form of the thought is such that it pictures the essential relations of the thing being pictured, then the thought is true. It is therefore logic which limits the usage of meaningful language. While Wittgenstein indeed thought that the aim of science is a true picture of the world, he didn’t think that there was just one picture of the world.

“Let us imagine a white surface with irregular black spots. We now say: Whatever kind of picture these make I can always get as near as I like to its description, if I cover the surface with a sufficiently fine square network and now say of every square that it is white or black. In this way I shall have brought the description of the surface to a unified form. This form is arbitrary, because I could have applied with equal success a net with a triangular or hexagonal mesh. It can happen that the description would have been simpler with the aid of a triangular mesh; that is to say we might have described the surface more accurately with a triangular, and coarser, than with the finer square mesh, or vice versa, and so on. To the different networks correspond different systems of describing the world” (6.431).

The squares of the fine square mesh, or the triangles or hexagons of the other two, would be the objects with which we form atomic propositions; they merely have a form, and when connected with the other object which otherwise merely gives a colorlessness, we get a black or white shape. This is how science reaches its goal; by bringing experience into a unified whole, through the application of different pictures which are coherent to us, and furnish our understanding. But, Wittgenstein thought these pictures didn’t actually tell us anything about reality.

“(We could construct the network out of figures of different kinds, as out of triangles and hexagons together.) That a picture like that instanced above can be described by a network of a given form asserts nothing about the picture”.

This is why Wittgenstein believes that Newtonian mechanics merely brought “...the description of the universe to a unified form”, not that it literally describes how things exist. “ …the fact that it can be described by Newtonian mechanics asserts nothing about the world; but this asserts something, namely, that it can be described in that particular way in which it is described, as is indeed the case” (6.342). Wittgenstein, like Hertz and Boltzmann, thought that our pictures don’t literally picture the world, they merely furnish our understanding by giving us an intelligible picture that is useful. A picture is intelligible to us if there is a ‘uniformity’ present; that is, all elements are balanced and make sense relative to one another.

“In the terminology of Hertz we might say: Only uniform connexions are thinkable” (6.361).

We can only posit additional elements when there is an ‘asymmetry’ present in the picture.

"When, for example, we say that neither of two events (which mutually exclude one another) can occur, because there is no cause why the one should occur rather than the other, it is really a matter of our being unable to describe one of the two events unless there is some sort of asymmetry. And if there is such an asymmetry, we can regard this as the cause of the occurrence of the one and of the non-occurrence of the other"


Laws are not out in the world, and our utilization of the concept of law is only one mesh we can apply to the world. That the objects and laws which govern them are accurately pictured in science is an illusion according to Wittgenstein (6.371). Whatever mesh we apply to reality, we must not forget that we could equally and rightly apply another mesh as well. There is no riddle between the idealist and realist conception of the world, each are merely one mesh which essentially states “...Whatever building thou wouldst erect, thou shalt construct it in some manner with these bricks and these alone” (6.341). Helmholtz reached a similar position at the end of The Facts of Perceptions wherein he wrote:

“It is always well to keep this in mind in order not to infer from the facts more than can rightly be inferred from them. The various idealistic and realistic interpretations are metaphysical hypotheses which, as long as they are recognized as such, are scientifically completely justified. They may become dangerous, however, if they are presented as dogmas or as alleged necessities of thought. Science must consider thoroughly all admissible hypotheses in order to obtain a complete picture of all possible modes of explanation. Furthermore, hypotheses are necessary to someone doing research, for one cannot always wait until a reliable scientific conclusion has been reached; one must sometimes make judgments according to either probability or aesthetic or moral feelings. Metaphysical hypotheses are not to be objected to here either. A thinker is unworthy of science, however, if he forgets the hypothetical origin of his assertions. The arrogance and vehemence with which such hidden hypotheses are sometimes defended are usually the result of a lack of confidence which their advocates feel in the hidden depths of their minds about the qualifications of their claims.“ (The facts of Perception, 1878)


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More to come

Long ago philosophy perceived the essence of our process of thought to lie in the fact that we attach to the various real objects around us particular physical attributes – our concepts – and by means of these try to represent the objects to our minds ~ Boltzmann — 013zen

I have learned from philosophy of science that the 'particular physical attributes' that are 'attached' (or imputed) to objects, are derived from Galileo's 'primary qualities'. These include mass, velocity, etc:

We cannot conceive a corporeal substance without a determinate figure, size, position, motion/rest, and number; nor can we imagine bodies separated from any of these attributes. Galileo calls them “primary affections” of matter.'

....He argues that the appearance of a body corresponds to the properties of the body that are its cause. It is not up to philosophy to say how various apearances are related to the affections of the objects we perceive; rather it requires the technical methods of natural philosophy. For example, to avoid being deceived by the broken visual appearance of an oar half in water, we need to find the physical cause of the appearance. This will show that the visual appearance is correct. — SEP, Primary and Secondary Qualities

These primary qualities are those that are measurable, hence their significance in Galileo's epistemology. The fact that they're objectively measurable, or the same for all observers, is what is signficant about them. This is one of the foundations of scientific method, isn't it? Measurement being fundamental to that. But I question the sense in which 'objective measurements' are concepts. I would have thought the hypothesis is the concept, the predictions of which are measured against observation.

On this view our thoughts stand to things in the same relation as models to the objects they represent ~ Bolzmann. — 013zen

Isn't this proposal subject to criticisms of 'correspondence theory of truth'? 'According to this theory (correspondence), truth consists in the agreement of our thought with reality. This view ... seems to conform rather closely to our ordinary common sense usage when we speak of truth. The flaws in the definition arise when we ask what is meant by "agreement" or "correspondence" of ideas and objects, beliefs and facts, thought and reality. In order to test the truth of an idea or belief we must presumably compare it with the reality in some sense. 1- In order to make the comparison, we must know what it is that we are comparing, namely, the belief on the one hand and the reality on the other. But if we already know the reality, why do we need to make a comparison? And if we don't know the reality, how can we make a comparison? 2- The making of the comparison is itself a fact about which we have a belief. We have to believe that the belief about the comparison is true. How do we know that our belief in this agreement is "true"? This leads to an infinite regress, leaving us with no assurance of true belief. (Randall, J. & Buchler, J.; Philosophy: An Introduction. p133)

Witt himself says: — 013zen

“... I think there is some truth in my idea that I really only think reproductively. I don’t believe I have ever invented a line of thinking, I have always taken one over from someone else.........................What I invent are new similes”.

According to the SEP article on Ludwig Wittgenstein, "Considered by some to be the greatest philosopher of the 20th century", and according to the IEP article on Ludwig Wittgenstein (1889—1951) "Ludwig Wittgenstein is one of the most influential philosophers of the twentieth century, and regarded by some as the most important since Immanuel Kant".

So there must be more to Wittgenstein than he says of himself " I don’t believe I have ever invented a line of thinking". So the question is "what?"

Without wanting to overlap with @schopenhauer1 current thread on Wittgenstein, as you infer, no-one lives in a vacuum, including Wittgenstein when he wrote the Tractatus. So it cannot be that he did no more than cut and paste what was around him at the time, but must have creatively added something of significant originality.

It cannot be the case that his insights in the Tractatus have been superseded by his later works, or by more contemporary philosophers, as the Tractatus is still being discussed by contemporary philosophers as being of contemporary philosophic importance.

So even if the Tractatus is only an incomplete and partial explanation of the relationship between thought, language and the world, what original insights did it add to the contemporaneous debate between Mach/Ostwald on one side and Hertz/Boltzmann on the other?

Analogously, I am sure that no mark Monet ever made hadn't been made by a prior artist, so Monet's originality was not in the marks he made but in the relationship between the marks he made. Similarly, as with a simile, the originality is in the comparison between two things, not the things themselves. So we know Wittgenstein may well have borrowed ideas from both the empiricist and metaphysician, but where in the Tractatus is hidden his unique insight into the relationship between the empiricist and the metaphysical?

Though perhaps this is not directly relevant to the OP about the history surrounding the Tractatus, although maybe the question of why the Tractatus is important must be part of the history of the Tractatus.

So there must be more to Wittgenstein than he says of himself — RussellA

While I take your point, I don't necessarily agree that this must be the case.

With that being said...I tend to take Witt at his word when he says that all he's ever done is brought the ideas of others into closer proximity in order to see the similarities between them.

But, I think you're exactly right when you say:

Monet's originality was not in the marks he made but in the relationship between the marks he made. Similarly, as with a simile, the originality is in the comparison between two things, not the things themselves. — RussellA

So we know Wittgenstein may well have borrowed ideas from both the empiricist and metaphysician, but where in the Tractatus is hidden his unique insight into the relationship between the empiricist and the metaphysical? — RussellA

This is exactly the question I am searching after; if there is such a thing.

With that being said, I pointed out my disagreement with the original bit I quoted simply because I suspect part of Witt's influence is, in part, due to him "borrowing" so much from sources that typically disagree. Because of this, it held a certain position for each new generation of thinkers. Since the original interpretation was positivistic during Witt's life, it held a certain influence for some time among the prominent positivists, and then it was reinterpreted as being elucidatory, and that held prominence for some time before the "supposed" new reading came along championed by folks like Conant, which supposes the work is a proponent of there being only austere nonsense. Due to the diversity of its "sources" there's "something for everyone" so to speak, perhaps.

But, I think that's only part of it. I do believe that there is something unique in what he was doing in precisely the manner you point out regarding Monet. But, just as art is relevant to an age, I do wonder what if anything Witt can tell us today - even if I am correct that he did have something relevant to say to his contemporaries.

Hertz wrote the principles of mechanics, and died in 1894 in his 30s. Boltzmann died in 1906...Hertz said relatively little about his "picture" theory in The Principles of Mechanics, only saying that the images formed needed to not be contradictory, and needed to produce another image representative of the necessary consequents of the thing being pictured - namely, reality.

But, that's about it.

Even still, positivism was the prominent view amongst scientists and philosophers after the death of these two, and when the Tractatus was written in 1918.

I tend to wonder if Witt was trying to show how one can set up the positivism of Mach with the new logical methods of Frege's work and arrive at a Hertzian and Boltzmann like view, which allows of metaphysical pictures. This is to say that the manner in which Hertz envisioned it, when likewise furnished with Frege's work, draws a bridge between the two views - they share a logical bridge, so to speak.

At the time, this idea would have been relevant, but if this is the case, I wonder how it would be relevant today. Since the atomic view was proven right, scientists have cozied up to making metaphysical pictures of reality, that only loosely correspond to what its meant to picture. Examples are utilized all the time for teaching purposes, with the stipulation that "this isn't quite exactly how so and so looks" - the elucidation is, like Wittgenstein says, to be "thrown away" as it was only meant to be used as a heuristic to get the right picture. We employ a similar methodology when we talk about the characteristics of current in a conductor being isomorphic to water within a pipe. Pressures and currents correspond to voltages and amps, despite energy not being transmitted in any similar regard whatsoever. It's to be thrown away, once what you understand from it is gained. It makes the way for a fuller understanding.

If my thinking is even somewhat correct, in some ways we may have already taken a lot of the insights that perhaps Witt thought his contemporaries needed to make.

I do wonder what if anything Witt can tell us today - even if I am correct that he did have something relevant to say to his contemporaries. — 013zen

As I see it:

As Kant successfully combined in his Critique of Pure Reason two prior theories previously thought independent of each other (Empiricism and Rationalism) into one, the synthetic a priori, Wittgenstein successfully combines in his Tractatus two prior theories previously thought independent of each other into one, (the Positivism of Mach and Ostwald and the model picture of reality of Hertz and Boltzmann) into one, language and thought as a logical picture of reality.

Positivism, in Western philosophy, is generally any system that confines itself to the data of experience and excludes a priori or metaphysical speculations.

For Boltzmann there is utility in a model corresponding with reality, and for Hertz, the thought of an image or picture, or the language of a sign or symbol, conforms with reality.

The Tracterian approach to language and thought as a logical picture of reality is equivalent to a metaphorical picture of reality

There are many articles that describe the language used by Wittgenstein in the Tractatus as metaphorical.
1) Wittgenstein and Metaphor, Jerry H. Gill, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research
2) Wittgenstein and metaphors in the Tractatus, Patrizia Piredda, 2021, Academia Letters
3) Wittgenstein’s Metaphors and His Pedagogical Philosophy, A Companion to Wittgenstein on Education.

One consequence of language as metaphor is the revolutionary idea that substance is able to traverse the actual and passible worlds rather than only underlying the actual world as traditionally thought. This solves the philosophical puzzle about how we are able to think about things that don't exist. Logical space is not the source of material change but of modal change (Kyle Banick - Wittgenstein, Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus: Metaphysics and Ontology, YouTube)

As regards terminology, I wouldn't call science's current approach a "metaphysical picture of reality", rather a metaphorical picture of reality. I agree about the importance of metaphor in how we understand the world, and as you say "Pressures and currents correspond to voltages and amps, despite energy not being transmitted in any similar regard whatsoever".

In the light of the Tractatus as proposing a metaphorical picture of reality, does this cast light on 6.54

My propositions serve as elucidations in the following way: anyone who understands me eventually recognize them as nonsensical, when he has used them - as steps - to climb up beyond them (He must, so to speak, throw away the ladder after he has climbed p it)

Once I am able to metaphorically picture a voltage as a pressure, the metaphor becomes redundant. in that I now understand voltage as pressure. Not that voltage is like a pressure but rather voltage is a pressure. For Wittgenstein, the ladder is the metaphor, and can be thrown away as redundant once it has enabled understanding.

Many argue that language is metaphorical in nature.
1) Metaphors We Live By is a book by George Lakoff and Mark Johnson published in 1980. The book suggests metaphor is a tool that enables people to use what they know about their direct physical and social experiences to understand more abstract things like work, time, mental activity and feelings.
2) Andrew May in Metaphors in Science 2000 makes a strong point that even Newton's second law is a metaphor.

The Tractatus developed the Picture Theory of Language, language as metaphor, from which developed the modal notion of possible worlds. This was revolutionary in the 1920's, and as such relevant to his contemporaries. But this raises the question whether still of relevance today. I would say yes, for two reasons. First, language as metaphor and the modal notion of possible worlds are still relevant, and second, it appears that even today there are many who have not yet accepted these insights.

For example, Donald Davidson in his article What Metaphors Mean argues that metaphors mean what their words literally mean, in that they have no hidden meaning but can be explained by what they do within the context it is being used

In addition, those Direct Realists who believe that the world we see around us is the real world itself, things in the world are perceived immediately or directly rather than inferred on the basis of perceptual evidence.

The insights of the Tractatus have still not been fully accepted, important though they are.

I more or less agree with this; it's basically the direction my thoughts have been headed, lately.

With that being said, the only this you say that I overtly disagree with is:

Once I am able to metaphorically picture a voltage as a pressure, the metaphor becomes redundant. in that I now understand voltage as pressure. Not that voltage is like a pressure but rather voltage is a pressure. — RussellA

Voltage is not pressure; we are using one mode of thinking to facilitate another.

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So, since we have similar thoughts...I've been mauling over recently if this is, perhaps, a re-envisioning of Maxwell's use of physical analogy in science, with the added concern of how to better adapt thought to those analogies in order to eliminate supposed "pseudo-problems".

Also, I've read a paper by John Preston regarding the similarities between Mach, Hertz, Boltzmann, and Wittgenstein's treatment of "pseudo-problems" and how specifically Hertz and Boltzmann were proponents of the idea that these "problems" were illusions that would ultimately vanish once we've adopted the proper expressions for the phenomena we are attempting to elucidate via analogy. Boltzmann specifically was very focused on this just before his death, and gave some lectures which sound surprisingly Wittgensteinian on the topic.

Isn't this proposal subject to criticisms of 'correspondence theory of truth'? — Wayfarer

Hertz, Boltzmann, and I take Wittgenstein held that the problem never arrives, because all that is meant by "truth" is the correspondence, and whether or not there is such a correspondence, reality will tell us.

"In order that this requirement may be satisfied, there must be a certain conformity between nature and our thought. Experience teaches us that the requirement can be satisfied, and hence that such a conformity does in fact exist" (Hertz, Intro).

As you rightly point out, the correspondence theory of truth is that P is true iff what P says corresponds with reality in the right way. But, then one can ask, in what sense can P, a proposition made up of words, correspond with reality made up of objects?

Also, it seems circular in its reasoning in that you could always ask how one is certain that what P says, in fact, conforms in the right manner to reality.

But, these three thinkers didn't think any of our "pictures", "models", "propositions" could be literally said to be True, with a capital "T", they are only more or less similar to what they are meant to depict.

It's like if I had a map of Boston...I can have several different styles and variations of that map showing different information, landmarks, territories, etc and the shapes could be different depending on the scale and what not.

What if we ask, "well which map is true"?

None of them, really. To be a true "map" of Boston, I'd need a map the same size as Boston that's identical to Boston in every way. The map isn't a "true" representation of Boston but each map I look at has some of the correspondences with Boston and those correspondences might be "true" while others not. Reality is what tells you whether or not this is the case.

The same is the case with my example above regarding pressures/volts amps/currents.

Is a volt a pressure? No, but certain similarities in one manner of thinking correspond to the other and can help to elucidate the other. But, it is not true that voltage is a pressure. Voltage is far more complicated but there is an isomorphism in how the two dynamic systems behave such that one can be meaningfully mapped to the other in an informative way.

But, then one can ask, in what sense can P, a proposition made up of words, correspond with reality made up of objects? — 013zen

Yes, that's the point I was trying to make, and you've addressed it well.

@013zen @Wayfarer

1) Voltage is not pressure; we are using one mode of thinking to facilitate another.
2) I've been mauling over recently if this is, perhaps, a re-envisioning of Maxwell's use of physical analogy in science, with the added concern of how to better adapt thought to those analogies in order to eliminate supposed "pseudo-problems".
3) .....................because all that is meant by "truth" is the correspondence, and whether or not there is such a correspondence, reality will tell us.
4) ..................there must be a certain conformity between nature and our thought. Experience teaches us that the requirement can be satisfied...............
5) But, then one can ask, in what sense can P, a proposition made up of words, correspond with reality made up of objects?
6) The map isn't a "true" representation of Boston but each map I look at has some of the correspondences with Boston and those correspondences might be "true" while others not. Reality is what tells you whether or not this is the case.
7) Is a volt a pressure? No, but certain similarities in one manner of thinking correspond to the other and can help to elucidate the other.

Taking the above into account, certain concepts may be helpful in working through the Tractatus.

What is the relationship between a model of the truth, a metaphorical truth, a simile expressing the truth or the literal truth

The Correspondence Theory means different things to different people
Correspondence means to have a close similarity, to match or agree almost entirely (Oxford Language Dictionary).

For the Direct Realist, as regards thought, if the Direct Realist sees a red postbox and thinks about this red postbox, their belief is that in the world exists a red postbox, and they are directly seeing it. Therefore, for the Direct Realist, there is no correspondence between what they see and think and what exists in the world, as what they see and think entirely agrees with what is in the world.

For the Indirect Realist, as regards thought, if the Indirect Realist sees a red postbox in the world and thinks about this red postbox, their belief is that in the world exists something that is not a red postbox but is causing them to see and think about a red postbox. Therefore, for the Indirect Realist, there is a correspondence between what they see and think and what exists in the world, as what they see and think only agrees with what is in the world.

As regards language, for both the Direct and Indirect Realist, there is a correspondence between the word and what exists in the world.

Therefore for Randall and Buchler, it is true that as regards thought, the Direct Realist believes they directly know reality and therefore don't need to compare their belief with the world, whereas for the Indirect Realist, as they believe they don't directly know reality, they therefore do need to compare their belief with the world.

What is a model of the truth
In thinking about why the sun rises in the east various models can be proposed. One model is that the Earth revolves around the sun. Another model is that the Sun was put into a chariot and everyday the God Helios would drive the chariot all along the sky causing the Sun to rise and set. It has been discovered that the model of the Earth revolving around the sun has proved more predictive that the model of the God Helio.

As any model can be improved, it is not that case that a particular model is wrong but that some models are more useful in particular contexts than others. For example, the model of the Earth revolving around the Sun may be more suitable in a science context, whereas the the model of the God Helios may be more suitable in a literary context.

It can also be seen that applying the wrong model in the wrong context may well result in unwanted philosophical problems which may well disappear if a more suitable model had been chosen. For example, on the one hand, using the God Helios model in a science context will clearly create philosophical problems that wouldn't have arisen if the Earth rotating around the Sun model was used. On the other hand, using the Earth rotating around the Sun model in the context of Greek mythology, in trying to understand the relationships between Helios and his parents Hyperion and Theia, will be clearly unhelpful

IE, no model is wrong in itself, but may be wrongly used. The purpose of a model is to be able to predict changes to the context within which it is being used.

Models, metaphors, similes and the literal truth in the example of seeing the colour "red"

If one sees the colour red, then one is thinking about the colour red.

1) For the Direct Realist, if one sees a red postbox then a red postbox exists in the world. The thought of a red postbox is neither a model, metaphor nor simile but is the literal truth.

2) a) For the Indirect Realist, if one sees a red postbox, the belief is that there is something in the world that caused the perception of such a red postbox. But what exactly that something is is unknowable, in the sense of Kant's noumena.

b) As regards models, the cause of what is seen can be modelled, such as a model of red postbox. Such a model exists in the mind and not the world, as the world is unknowable. The usefulness of the model is demonstrated by being able to predict changes in what is seen, not changes to what is in the world, but changes to what is seen.

c) However, it is a human characteristic to equate effect with cause. The cause of a bitter taste is a bitter drink, the cause of an acrid smell is acrid smoke, the cause of seeing the colour red is something that is red, the cause of heat on the skin is a hot object and the cause of a screeching noise is a screech. The effect is seeing a red postbox. The cause is categorised by the mind as a red postbox.

d) Therefore, what is the relation between what is seen (a red postbox) and what the mind has categorised as its cause (a red postbox). This relationship cannot be literal, as the effect is not the same as its cause. The relationship is not that of a simile, as the effect is not like the cause. The relationship must be that of a metaphor, because an identity has been assumed between two different things having a necessary property in common. Different in that one is an effect and the other is a cause, but sharing the necessary property that the mind has categorised the cause after the effect.

IE, for the Direct Realist seeing a red postbox is the literal truth and for the Indirect Realist seeing a red postbox is a metaphorical truth.

Models, metaphors, similes and the literal truth in the example of voltage and pressure

Is pressure a model, metaphor, simile or the literal truth in explaining voltage.

When one reads "Voltage is the pressure from an electrical circuit's power source that pushes charged electrons (current) through a conducting loop, enabling them to do work such as illuminating a light. In brief, voltage = pressure, and it is measured in volts" (www.fluke.com) - in what sense does voltage = pressure.

In the Merriam Webster dictionary, the word "pressure" has several meanings, including "the action of a force against an opposing force" and "voltage" as "potential difference expressed in volts".

We can model voltage by thinking about the pressure of water causing water to run when a tap is opened, where the pressure of water in pipes becomes a model for the voltage determining current in a wire.

As a simile, the pressure of water in pipes is like the voltage determining current in a wire.

It may be that originally pressure only referred to water, but the meaning of words is not predetermined, and the meaning of words change with time, sometimes becoming more generalised. As the Merriam Webster dictionary notes, pressure may be taken as the interaction between two forces, and with a change in meaning, rather than saying voltage in wires is like pressure in water, we can now use the metaphor that voltage is pressure.

However, this then takes us to Donald Davidson and his article What Metaphors Mean, where he argues that metaphors mean what their words literally mean and that there is no hidden metaphorical meaning. In effect, he is saying that what seem to be metaphors are in fact words being used literally. In the case of the seeming metaphorical expression "voltage is pressure", he is making the case that this means that voltage is literally pressure.

IE, even the expression "voltage is pressure" may be read not only as a model but also as a simile, metaphor and literally, all dependant upon one's point of view.

Thank you for the detailed information, @013zen.

I want to talk about the mechanist, picture theory of meaning. There is nothing wrong with it in my opinion; but, in my opinion, many scientists have moved from it towards not a picture denoting a microscopic view of a state of affairs; but, more towards a unified wholistic view of meaning as comprising many parts working in a system. This is where the picture theory of meaning, simply can't zoom out and broaden its scope to account for new parts of the whole to describe.

Do you agree with this?

Taking the above into account, certain concepts may be helpful in working through the Tractatus. — RussellA

This was quite helpful :)

Adding to what you said, though... The debate which took place during the end of the 1800s and the beginning of the 1900s was a debate amongst indirect realists. Positivists, following after Hume, Comte, Kant, Mach, etc responded to our inaccessibility to reality by giving up metaphysical postulating, in favor of analyzing experience into elements, while Helmholtz, Boltzmann, Hertz thought there must be some uniformity between our experience and reality (or as you put it, between cause and effect). I only add this because, while it may be true that contemporaneously indirect realists are proponents of models, and the like, historically it is precisely this "in fighting" that was of fundamental importance to understanding the culture surrounding the Vienna circle and the like.


-----

"Voltage is the pressure from an electrical circuit's power source that pushes charged electrons (current) through a conducting loop, enabling them to do work such as illuminating a light. In brief, voltage = pressure, and it is measured in volts" (www.fluke.com) - in what sense does voltage = pressure. — RussellA

This is a prime example of using a metaphor to get across a particular picture of what's occurring - namely, that voltage is kind of like pressure. But, as you've pointed out, no model is ever quite right, and that's the point (and in part what I take Witt's point to be). A voltage is quite literally, not a pressure.

As you point out:

In the Merriam Webster dictionary, the word "pressure" has several meanings, including "the action of a force against an opposing force" and "voltage" as "potential difference expressed in volts". — RussellA

We seem to have a synonym of sorts, based on the definition; but the definition merely reports usage (again, as you point out), and its no surprise that people do, in fact, use the words in that manner...but, it's precisely because that particular picture is so engrained in colloquial understanding that of course that's how people use the word.

But, our modern laws presented in differential equations for things like volts, clearly seem to suggest that "pressure" is only a suitable understanding of what voltage "accomplishes" at the macroscopic level (which is why we use the metaphor), but fundamentally, it's merely the amount of energy delivered by 1 coulomb (or a set amount of electrons). It's more like if you had three 12 oz bottles; 1 filled with water, 1 with Pedialyte, and one with juice. A volt is how hydrating the 12 oz bottle is.

However, this then takes us to Donald Davidson and his article What Metaphors Mean, where he argues that metaphors mean what their words literally mean and that there is no hidden metaphorical meaning. — RussellA

I take it he means only in scientific applications, yes? :P Either way, I personally find this view unintelligible at face value.

I want to talk about the mechanist, picture theory of meaning. — Shawn

Could you be more clear? :sweat: I am only somewhat familiar with the mechanist theory as it pertains to folks like Descartes and the revival of early atomism...but you say picture theory of meaning.

This is where the picture theory of meaning, simply can't zoom out and broaden its scope to account for new parts of the whole to describe. — Shawn

In what sense?

Could you be more clear? :sweat: I am only somewhat familiar with the mechanist theory as it pertains to folks like Descartes and the revival of early atomism...but you say picture theory of meaning. — 013zen

Yes, if the modeling, which logical positivists were interested in, is about a true state of affairs (facts), then how can they account for complex relationships where differing parts of mechanisms render a theory or scientific discovery as true?

In what sense? — 013zen

I believe, in the sense that if one were to try (like many scientists do) and encompass a theory to be explanatory for the whole frame, then I believe that picturing relations in the atomistic sense is something that can't attempt to do.

1) (Donald Davidson and his article What Metaphors Mean)...........I take it he means only in scientific applications, yes? Either way, I personally find this view unintelligible at face value. 2) A voltage is quite literally, not a pressure. 3) We seem to have a simile of sorts, based on the definition; but the definition merely reports usage. — 013zen

This leads into the question as to how a model of the truth, the metaphorical truth, the simile as an expression of truth and the literal truth relate to the Picture Theory of the Tracatus.

The Picture Theory of the Tracatus

Before the Tractatus, philosophers thought that language mirrored reality.

Wittgenstein in the Tractatus introduced the idea that language doesn't mirror reality, but has the same logical form as reality.

2.12 "A picture is a model of reality"

On the one hand there is thought

3 "A logical picture of facts is a thought."

On the other hand there is are propositions

4.12 "Propositions can represent the whole of reality, but they cannot represent what they must have in common with reality in order to be able to represent it – logical form"
4.001 - "The totality of propositions is language."

There is the relation of thought with language.

4 "A thought is a proposition with a sense."

We can have the thought that the grass is green, and we can have the proposition that "the grass is green". The thought is the proposition, in that any thought must be expressible as a proposition, and any proposition must be expressible as a thought. Both the thought and proposition picture not reality but the logical form of reality.

However, only substances can be pictured, as only objects make up the substance of the world. As concepts such as god, religion, ethics, good, evil and morality are not substances, they cannot be pictured.

2.021 "Objects make up the substance of the world".

7 "What we cannot speak about we must pass over in silence".

Thoughts and propositions are an amalgam of Formal Concepts and Concepts Proper. Formal Concepts include things such as objects, events, things, numbers, complex, fact, functions and make up the logical framework of a thought and proposition. Concepts Proper such as mountains, hills, tables and chairs are what are being represented.

4.1272 The same applies to the words complex, fact, function, number, etc. They all signify formal concepts.
4.126 ..............I introduce this expression in order to exhibit the source of the confusion between formal concepts and concepts proper.............

The logical part of a thought or proposition does not tell us how the world is. For Wittgenstein, there is no synthetic a priori, as knowledge about the world only comes from observation of the world, and for the Tracatus a priori philosophising has no use.

The difference between Direct Realism and Indirect Realism
The Direct Realist believes that thoughts and propositions picture reality, whereas the Indirect Realist believes that the thoughts and propositions picture the logical form of reality.

Indirect realism is broadly equivalent to the scientific view of perception that subjects do not experience the external world as it really is, but perceive it through the lens of a conceptual framework. Conversely, direct realism postulates that conscious subjects view the world directly, treating concepts as a 1:1 correspondence. (Wikipedia Direct and indirect realism)

The Picture Theory is a model
A picture is a model

2.12 "A picture is a model of reality"

The Picture Theory cannot be literal
A picture cannot be literal, as a picture has the same logical form of reality, not the same form as reality.

If we picture an apple, as the picture cannot tell us about the form of reality, the picture cannot tell us what exists in the world, meaning that what exists in the world is unknowable, as is Kantian noumena. If the picture could tell us about the form of reality, then we would know what existed in the world.

Therefore the apple we picture doesn't exist in the world, but it does exist in the picture, otherwise we wouldn't be able to picture it.

The difference between metaphor and simile
From the Merriam Webster dictionary
Metaphor = a figure of speech in which a word or phrase literally denoting one kind of object or idea is used in place of another to suggest a likeness or analogy between them (as in drowning in money)
Simile = a figure of speech comparing two unlike things that is often introduced by like or as (as in cheeks like roses)

To be a simile, the picture has to be like the logical form of reality, whilst to be a metaphor, the picture has to be the same as the logical form of reality.

For both the metaphor and simile there is a relation between two different things, whether Mr. S is a pig or Mr. S is like a pig. For a metaphor these two different things have a necessary property in common, whereas for a simile they only have a contingent property in common.

The Picture Theory cannot be that of a simile
The relationship between the picture and what is pictured cannot be that of a simile, as this would lead into an infinite regression, similar to the homunculus argument against Indirect Realism. This argues that the mind of the Indirect Realist is directed at an object, such as an apple, that represents another object, another apple, which in its turn represents another object, another apple -etc.

Similarly, the picture of an apple cannot be a picture of a representation of an apple, but must be a picture of an apple.

The Picture Theory must be that of a metaphor
In order to avoid this infinite regression, the picture must be of what is pictured. The picture of an apple must be the apple that is pictured, sharing the same necessary properties, and as such, a metaphor.

IE, the Picture Theory within the Tractatus is a metaphorical theory.

Yes, if the modeling, which logical positivists were interested in, is about a true state of affairs (facts), then how can they account for complex relationships where differing parts of mechanisms render a theory or scientific discovery as true? — Shawn

1. Logical positivists were not proponents of "modeling". For a logical positivist, the meaning of a proposition is its method of verification.

2. Positivists, proper, were less interested in language but moreso theorizing; they considered "economical" theories, to be those that were based on our senses.

3. Witt's picture theory, I think, accounts for this by recognizing the simple fact that we can, and do, meaningfully talk about those complex relationships. The picture theory states that meaningful language pictures a possible state of affairs...that is to say, a logically possible state of affairs. This is to say, that unlike the logical positivists that thought all metaphysics was meaningless, Witt thought that if it is a logical possibility based on experience, that it too must be meaningful. How else could we understand it otherwise? We build models of objects in our mind by adding and subtracting possibilities we've gleaned from experience.

I believe, in the sense that if one were to try (like many scientists do) and encompass a theory to be explanatory for the whole frame, then I believe that picturing relations in the atomistic sense is something that can't attempt to do. — Shawn

The atomistic element of the work is simply to say that there are logically distinct categories that we utilize in building up a proposition. They are logical atoms, so to speak.

But, then one can ask, in what sense can P, a proposition made up of words, correspond with reality made up of objects? — 013zen

I don't see the problem. A reality made up of objects is always already a linguistically mediated or interpreted reality.

I don't see the problem. A reality made up of objects is always already a linguistically mediated or interpreted reality. — Janus

But was that even addressed by Witt? That seems like a psychological point that goes way deeper than simply linguistic analysis. How brains, neurons parse out objects, how our brains even obtain language is way broader than the simple parsing of sentences into objects and their predicates, no matter how many symbols you add universal, existential or otherwise.

But was that even addressed by Witt? — schopenhauer1

No, because that was not the purpose the Tractatus. The Tractatus was addressing a specific problem, not trying to explain every aspect of language.

The Tractatus was an attempt to show that we can analyse ordinary language propositions,
such as "the car is red and the car is on the road", into elementary propositions such as "the car is red" and "the car is on the road" which can then be combined using truth-functions. A proposition is elementary when it is independent of all other elementary propositions.

The Tractatus was an attempt to prove in one particular instance that a whole may be understood by understanding parts that are independent of each other.

Even if the Tractarian project failed because of the colour-incompatibility problem, the question of the relationship of the whole to its parts remains of philosophical interest.

No, because that was not the purpose the Tractatus. The Tractatus was addressing a specific problem, not trying to explain every aspect of language. — RussellA

So perhaps I should explain more then: It was not addressed by Witt, but it SHOULD HAVE if his goal was to show how propositional logic allows for mapping onto reality due to selecting out true states of affairs; the MECHANISM for doing so must be EXPLAINED. Otherwise, what's the point? And even his own method of simply asserting the theory fails, because of self-contradictions that propositional logic can run into, as you suggested.

So from this:
1) He accounts for no mechanism behind the "Picture" in the theory, just asserts it.
2) The logic that supports the "Picture" fails on its own, even without explanation to how it maps onto/corresponds to reality.

But was that even addressed by Witt? — schopenhauer1

Well, he did say that the world is the totality of facts not of things.

Well, he did say that the world is the totality of facts not of things. — Janus

That doesn't even mean anything. There are many levels of "facts".. There are historical facts, scientific facts, geographical facts, social facts (political, sociological, economic, etc.), psychological facts, evolutionary facts, it's endless. They all have different domains, many of which are debatable. He is saying nothing in not so many a words.

I take him to be referring to actual states of affairs, the point being that things are not 'stand alone' but are relational.

Facts are not debatable, whether or not something is a fact may be debatable.

Facts are not debatable, whether or not something is a fact may be debatable. — Janus

Let me ask you, are there many philosophies that would advocate that the world is composed of false states of affairs?

I know there were debates about "existence" vs. "subsistence" and such, but most people had a notion that there is a difference between things that actually are the case, things that have potential to be the case, and things that can never be the case. But I am not sure how this actually adds to this. No one generally believes the world is made up of false facts.

Not to mention that this seems like really weakened Kantian or PSR notions that there is a ground (facts) to our knowledge. It's like a non-explanatory linguistic-based Kantian notion of how we can filter reality.

Let me ask you, are there many philosophies that would advocate that the world is composed of false states of affairs? — schopenhauer1

There are no "false states of affairs", there are only states of affairs. I think Wittgenstein's statement shows a kind of relational 'process' view of the nature of the world rather than a 'substance' or essentialist view.

There are no "false states of affairs", there are only states of affairs. — Janus

Oh FFS, use whatever pedantic terms you want.. true propositions, states of affairs, what have you...

I think Wittgenstein's statement shows a kind of relational 'process' view of the nature of the world rather than a 'substance' or essentialist view. — Janus

Go on.. I am wondering if this is just Janustein or Wittgenstein though..

I am wondering if this is just Janustein or Wittgenstein though.. — schopenhauer1

It is my inexpert interpretation of one of Wittgenstein's ideas.

It is my inexpert interpretation of one of Wittgenstein's ideas. — Janus

Fair enough :up:

:cool:

It was not addressed by Witt, but it SHOULD HAVE if his goal was to show how propositional logic allows for mapping onto reality due to selecting out true states of affairs; the MECHANISM for doing so must be EXPLAINED. — schopenhauer1

There is nothing wrong in making an assertion and not justifying it by a mechanism, which, after all, is the basis of scientific modelling. From Britannica Scientific Modelling

Scientific modelling, the generation of a physical, conceptual, or mathematical representation of a real phenomenon that is difficult to observe directly. Scientific models are used to explain and predict the behaviour of real objects or systems and are used in a variety of scientific disciplines, ranging from physics and chemistry to ecology and the Earth sciences.

I am in Crewe train station waiting to catch the train to London.
It is a fact that the train leaves from platform 4.
It is also a fact that the Eiffel Tower is 300m tall.
It is also a fact that the Great Northern is the highest selling beer in Australia.
It is also a fact that the capital of Nevada is Carson City.
My knowledge of the world is the set of these independent facts.

In the statement "my knowledge of the world is the set of these independent facts", whether the world exists in the mind (as proposed by Idealism) or exists independently of the mind (as proposed by Realism) is irrelevant to the truth of the statement.

That the sun rises in the east is explained by the model of the Earth rotating around the Sun. No mechanism for why the Earth rotates around the Sun is included within this model, as mechanisms are not part of models.

As Witt writes in the Tractatus:

2.12 "A picture is a model of reality"

and as a model the Picture Theory does not need to be justified by a mechanism.

That the fact "the train leaves from platform 4" and the fact that "the Eiffel Tower is 300m tall" are independent facts is true, independently of any mechanism that could be used to justify it. That they are independent is a primitive truth.

That the colour red is not the colour green is true is also a primitive truth, and as such cannot be justified by any mechanism.

Yes, Wittgenstein in the Tractatus may make statements not justified by any mechanism, such as:

6.3751 For example, the simultaneous of two colours at the same place in the visual field is impossible, in fact logically impossible, since it is ruled out by the logical structure of colour.

But this is one of the major aspects of the Tractatus, that some truths cannot be described in words, but can only be shown

4.1212 What can be shown cannot be said

We all know that the colour red is not the colour green, and there is no mechanism that could justify such knowledge. As the Tractatus says, it cannot be said, it can only be shown.

I agree with a lot of what you've said in your posts...specifically regarding the broader scope of the work,. However, I found myself disagreeing here and there regarding the details. You mention the supposed colour incompatibility problem, but to my understanding, this issue only crops up if you take the work to operate in a manner similar to Russell. His understanding of complex propositions, as opposed to elementary propositions was, I take it, not the same as Witt's and is one crucial reason that Russell never understood the work (according to Witt), despite Russell developing his own logical atomism based on the work.

Suppose you have the proposition:

"The car is red and the car is on the road"

This is clearly a complex proposition...but, "the car is red" and "the car is on the road" are not elementary propositions, but still complex propositions. Hence why, by saying "The car is red" you know it cannot be "blue", despite the fact that the truth of one elementary proposition cannot determine the truth of another.

No, the elementary proposition is: "F(x)" and "G(x)" with "x" being a formal or pseudo concept (a wittgensteinian object), which is taken as argument for the functions "is red" and "is on the road", which mean nothing in and of themselves. They are as Frege would say, unsaturated.

You can, of course say something of the sort:

"God created the universe"

and this is perfectly meaningful. "God" is taken as the object or argument for the function "created the universe".

No, genuine metaphysical talk about "God" or "ethics" isn't a problem because some resignation that "silence" is required regarding certain "things" that are somehow determined to be "not substance" (This would simply be begging the question...like, who made Witt the determiner of such a delineation? Also, he never seems to draw that line out...). We ought to remain silent where we cannot speak clearly...and we can only speak clearly about things closer to our experience.

Witt talks about his issue with ethics in his Lecture on Ethics, and his position is far more nuanced than some arbitrary line drawn between substance and lack thereof...whatever that could mean. "God" insofar as we have a conceptual understand, or model of the "object" can, of course be meaningfully talked about. But, to suppose that one could ever develop a "science" of ethics, or of "God" is totally nonsensical. To say something is "ethically good" or "absolutely good" is to say, no matter what the circumstances or facts surrounding the action, it is always "good" to do "x". This is a tautology. But, Witt doesn't think that insofar as it is a tautology, that it is meaningless. He, actually, believes that ethics IS tautological in nature. We cannot help but feel that, for example, "tourchering and murdering adorable puppies for fun" is wrong....Witt calls it a genuine paradox because on the one hand, if we analyze the sentence it simply pictures facts, with no ethical element...no ethical "atoms" exist, so to speak....but, none the less, we cannot help but determine that no matter what, "x" is wrong. Since, clear language can only justify something by providing other facts as support, but no matter how many auxiliary facts we provide we cannot help but determine "x" to be wrong (there is no justification)..."ethical" terms "overflow" their usage...but, of course, since this is a tautology. That's what tautologies do...they are unyielding to any other states of affairs.

At any rate....I need more time to digest your comments, before providing a more well put response. But, like I said, I agree on a lot of the general themes, as well as a lot of the thrust of the work...but, not so much the details...but that will require more time to tease out. Hopefully this suffices for now.

There is nothing wrong in making an assertion and not justifying it by a mechanism, which, after all, is the basis of scientific modelling. From Britannica Scientific Modelling — RussellA

My point is this: which philosophies argue that the world, at least in terms of human communication, is not composed of facts or true propositions? You might think of post-modernism, but that emerged later. Nietzsche could be considered, but his metaphysics didn't focus much on how we understand the world, especially not through language.

Consider the concept of "subsistence" vs. "existence." For example, the statement "the unicorn is on the mat" is a false proposition because it's an impossibility. So, I'm puzzled as to why a philosophy would assert, "My knowledge is made up of independent facts," as if this were a profound statement. What does this even mean in a way that significantly impacts philosophical thought?

If I say, "the cat is on the mat," and we observe a cat on the mat, we might call this a true proposition. But does this contribute to philosophical discourse any more than saying, "Saving money is beneficial for future needs"? It's a truism. Almost no one disputes it. Well done for stating the obvious.

What intrigues me more, as a fan of philosophical insights, is understanding what constitutes true propositions. Telling a financially illiterate person that saving money is good without explaining how to save effectively is pointless. Similarly, stating truisms in philosophy without delving into the mechanisms behind them adds little value.

My broader point is that non-empirical philosophies can also be considered true propositions:

"The world is Will and Representation because of X, Y, Z."
Here, X, Y, and Z are not empirical evidence.

How do we determine that this philosophy is not a true proposition? It only needs to be a true proposition. "Will and Representation" could be token objects that either are or are not the case.

If Wittgenstein isn't explaining why a proposition cannot be true, why should we care if the broader claim, "The world consists of true propositions or independent facts," is correct? Again, it's a truism that means nothing without a mechanism to determine what is actually true or not.


From here you can try to tell me that it has to form a picture that models such as the cat on the mat. But at the same time, Will and Representation can also form a picture or model of a state of affairs of the world if it is true. However, it is a metaphysical truth that is not empirically falsifiable. So now it is not the picture but the verification that his notion of meaningful language hinges on. But then that doesn’t answer the question of why true propositions have to be empirically verified to be meaningful. It’s very much just an assertion and discounts “facts” or states of affairs that one cannot necessarily verify empirically. It’s arbitrarily putting a hierarchy on what counts as meaningful language it seems to me.