He talks about using know as an expression of a conviction which is not an epistemological use ... An epistemological use of these words includes the proper justification and their truth. — Sam26

Knowledge claims are epistemological. Justification does not mark a distinction between epistemological and non-epistemological knowledge claims.

While it's true that most hinges can and do change, some don't. I gave these examples earlier, but you seem to ignore them or you're not reading everything. My examples include, there are objects, there are other minds, we have hands, etc. It's hard to see how there are objects could change. — Sam26

I was responding to your statement that:

And, even if we're talking about modern man and their language games hinge beliefs also fall outside epistemological considerations. — Sam26

A claim about hinge beliefs and a claim about some hinge beliefs are two different things. You also said:

It's the role hinges play in our system of judgments that's important, and it's certainly not about whether they're true or false. — Sam26

Does this mean that it is the role of some hinges but not others?

Knowledge claims are epistemological. Justification does not mark a distinction between epistemological and non-epistemological knowledge claims. — Fooloso4

Again, what I'm saying is that there are uses of the word know, as Witt points out, that are not epistemological. For example, "I know...," as an expression of a conviction, which is what Moore's use of know amounts to. This is a non-epistemological use; it refers to how I feel about a belief.

This is a non-epistemological use ... — Sam26

I don't agree.

260. I would like to reserve the expression "I know" for the cases in which it is used in normal linguistic exchange.

I see, not knowing and doubting, but believing and doubting as more inextricably tied. — Janus

The top part of the lower section of Plato's divided line is pistis. The Greek term can be translated as belief, trust, persuasion, confidence, and as in the NT faith. In other words, what is not doubted. That is not to say what is indubitable. The philosopher raises doubts about things that are ordinarily not doubted. His concern is the truth of things. The move from opinion to knowledge is by way of doubt or skepticism (skeptis - to inquire). There is, however, also knowledge of the arts (techne) and Socrates own knowledge of Eros, from which his knowledge of ignorance arises.

With regard to knowledge and doubt in On Certainty:

6. Now, can one enumerate what one knows (like Moore)? Straight off like that, I believe not. - For otherwise the expression "I know" gets misused. And through this misuse a queer and extremely
important mental state seems to be revealed.

What is this mental state?

12. - For "I know" seems to describe a state of affairs which guarantees what is known, guarantees it as a fact. One always forgets the expression "I thought I knew".

When Moore says he knows he has hands, this does not refute the skeptic.

8. The difference between the concept of 'knowing' and the concept of 'being certain' isn't of any great importance at all, except where "I know" is meant to mean: I can't be wrong.

Wittgenstein is not denying that Moore knows he has hands. He is rejecting Moore's misuse of the term.

7. My life shows that I know or am certain that there is a chair over there, or a door, and so on. - I tell a friend e.g. "Take that chair over there", "Shut the door", etc. etc.

I might also tell a friend to move his hand. No question arises as to whether he has a hand or whether he knows he has a hand. He knows he has a hand. I know he has a hand. But this will not satisfy the radical skeptic.

Further, although rejects radical skepticism he does hold a more measured and moderate skepticism.

651. I cannot be making a mistake about 12x12 being 144. And now one cannot contrast
mathematical certainty with the relative uncertainty of empirical propositions.

Empirical propositions do not have the certainty of mathematics. In the Tractatus he says:

6.36311 It is an hypothesis that the sun will rise tomorrow: and this means that we do not know whether it will rise.

We may not doubt whether the sun will rise tomorrow, but whether or not it will is a contingent rather than necessary fact.

urther, although rejects radical skepticism he does hold a more measured and moderate skepticism.

651. I cannot be making a mistake about 12x12 being 144. And now one cannot contrast
mathematical certainty with the relative uncertainty of empirical propositions.

Empirical propositions do not have the certainty of mathematics. In the Tractatus he says:

6.36311 It is an hypothesis that the sun will rise tomorrow: and this means that we do not know whether it will rise.

We may not doubt whether the sun will rise tomorrow, but whether or not it will is a contingent rather than necessary fact. — Fooloso4

I think Wittgenstein in "On Certainty" is exploring this distinction between contingent and necessary. In some ways in seems to be approaching a view of Quine where our most fossilized propositions can be up for revision. Consider the following:

213 "Our empirical propositions' do not form a homogeneous mass"

217 "If someone supposed that all our calculations were uncertain and that we could rely on none of them (justifying himself by saying that mistakes are always possible) perhaps we would say he was crazy. But can we say he is in error? Does he not just react differently? We rely on calculations, he does't, we are sure, he isn't."

167 "It is clear that our empirical propositions do not all have the same status, since one can lay down such a proposition and turn it from an empirical proposition into a norm description. Think of chemical investigations. Lavoisier makes experiments with substances in his laboratory and now he concludes that this and that take place when there is burning. He does not say that it might happen otherwise another time. He has got hold of a definite world picture - not of course one that he invited: he learned it as a child. I say world picture and not hypothesis, because it is the matter-of-course foundation for his research and as such also goes unmentioned."

447 "Compare with this 12X12 = 144. Here too we don't say "perhaps". For, in so far as this proposition rests on our not miscounting or miscalculating and on our senses not deceiving us as we calculate, both proportions, the arithmetical one and the physical one, are on the same level. I want to say: The physical game is just as certain as the arithmetical. But this can be misunderstood. My remark is a logical and not a psychological one."

613 "If I now say "I know that the water in the kettle on the gas flame will not freeze but boil", I seem to be as justified in this "I know" as I am in any. "If I know anything I know this".- Or do I know with greater certainty that the person opposite me is my old friend so and so? And how does that compare with the proportion that I am seeing with two eyes and shall see them if I look in the glass?-I don't know confidently what I am to answer here.-But still there is a different between cases. If the water one the gas freezes, of course I shall be as astonished as can be, but I assume some factor I don't know of, and perhaps leave the matter to physicists to judge. But what could make me doubt whether this person here is N.N, whom I have know for years? Here a doubt would seem to drag everything with it and plunge it into chaos."

I would say he was exploring this distinction between contingent/necessary and seeing that some empirical proposition can be held as firmly as mathematical propositions, and even these firmly held mathematical propositions we can imagine folk reacting to them differently where notions of "right/incorrect" seem to lose any sense.

With regard to knowledge and doubt in On Certainty:

6. Now, can one enumerate what one knows (like Moore)? Straight off like that, I believe not. - For otherwise the expression "I know" gets misused. And through this misuse a queer and extremely
important mental state seems to be revealed.

What is this mental state? — Fooloso4

The mental state Wittgenstein seems to be referring to is the mental state of conviction. Moore's use of "I know..." is just that, a conviction of certainty. In OC 42 Witt refers to what is expressed by tone of voice and gestures (expressing a conviction), which fits Moore's use of "I know..." as he pronounces "I know this is a hand," by raising his hand before an audience. It's not an epistemological use of the words "I know..." where one is expressing a justified true belief.

In OC 7 Witt points out that our lives show (by our actions) these kinds of hinge beliefs, for example, by getting the chair or shutting the door. These are the subjective certainties of our world picture, which is how we act in the world. It's a misuse of know in the epistemological sense, we don't justify these kinds of beliefs, which is what Moore is trying to do and why Witt is criticizing his use of know. If OC 7 isn't about one's inner certainty, then it would be making the same mistake Moore makes.

Just to reiterate, there's a difference between one's inner subjective certainty (or using know as an expression of a conviction) and the epistemological use of "I know..." as an expression of objective certainty (knowledge). Witt uses know and certain in both ways, and it's important to distinguish between the two.

We have to remember that Wittgenstein never finished this work (OC), so it hasn't been edited. We don't know what passages would have been left in, and which passages would have been removed.

"Can one say: "Where there is no doubt there is no knowledge either (OC 121)." The doubt, in the sense of challenging one's knowledge claim, is essential to what it means to have objective knowledge. Otherwise, we end up with pronouncements like Moore's, as if the pronouncement itself is enough. It also seems to be why Wittgenstein says in OC 4 to consider the negation of these kinds of propositions. If the negation doesn't make sense, then it's not epistemological it's a hinge. The epistemological use of "I know..." has to make sense when considering its negation. If it doesn't then it's just an expression of a hinge belief. It's the doubt that separates the epistemological from the hinges. In the former the doubt makes sense, in the latter it doesn't.

I don't know Quine so can't comment on the comparison.



613 is interesting. First, he says he is justified in knowing that the water will boil. If it doesn't he assumes there will be an explanation, some factor he is unaware of. It does not threaten his picture of the world. The whole of physics has not come into question. But if this is not N.N. then everything is plunged into chaos. If this is not his old friend then everything he knows becomes uncertain.

447 seems to challenge 651 regarding the relative uncertainty of empirical propositions. But is my certainty that this is a hand the result of empirical observation?

125. If a blind man were to ask me "Have you got two hands?" I should not make sure by looking.
If I were to have any doubt of it, then I don't know why I should trust my eyes. For why shouldn't I
test my eyes by looking to find out whether I see my two hands? What is to be tested by what?
(Who decides what stands fast?)

The mental state Wittgenstein seems to be referring to is the mental state of conviction. — Sam26

It is as stated in 12: that "I know" seems to describe a state of affairs which guarantees what is known, guarantees it as a fact. Stated impersonally, if someone knows something then it is true.

In OC 7 Witt points out that our lives show (by our actions) these kinds of hinge beliefs, for example, by getting the chair or shutting the door. — Sam26

What he says is that "life shows that I know or am certain". At 8 he states that:

8. The difference between the concept of 'knowing' and the concept of 'being certain' isn't of any great importance at all, except where "I know" is meant to mean: I can't be wrong.

Just to reiterate, there's a difference between one's inner subjective certainty (or using know as an expression of a conviction) and the epistemological use of "I know..." as an expression of objective certainty (knowledge). Witt uses know and certain in both ways, and it's important to distinguish between the two. — Sam26

If I sit in the chair it is objectively certain that there is a chair. My sitting in it is all the justification that is required. But the requirement for justification is out of place. This does not mean that it is not an epistemological use of 'know'. It means that you are imposing the very requirements on the term 'know' that Wittgenstein is arguing against. If there are two different ways in which the term is used, it is the difference between the way it is ordinarily used and the mistaken sense in which it is used to mean that one who knows can't be wrong. There is no mental state of knowing that guarantees its correctness.

We have to remember that Wittgenstein never finished this work (OC), so it hasn't been edited. We don't know what passages would have been left in, and which passages would have been removed. — Sam26

The same is the case with all his writings except the Tractatus.

We disagree, I'm moving on.

Yes, we do disagree. I don't think we are likely to change our opinions now, but we have both over time changed our understanding to some degree. So, I do think there is value in discussing and defending our take on things. In defending our views we go back to the text and sometimes we find something new.

I would also like to point out that what is at issue extends beyond us. There are others reading, thinking, and in some cases commenting. I invite them to not move on just yet if they, like me, continue to be puzzled, and continue to find new things each time we read the text and what others say. To this end what I regard as most important is not simply getting Wittgenstein right but the attempt to get him right, even if we decide he gets it wrong. If is an exercise in thinking and seeing.

To this end what I regard as most important is not simply getting Wittgenstein right but the attempt to get him right, even if we decide he gets it wrong. If is an exercise in thinking and seeing. — Fooloso4

Do you think he put as much effort in his words as you are in interpreting them? Is it even in some way "right" to over-interpret any one human's words to this extent? Do you think the onus of understanding is on the author or the reader? If not the author, then can I write a post, and make you figure it out if you don't understand it? Do we not fall into the trap of some sort of "Appeal to Prophecy" if we can read so much into a relatively sparse text? What makes one person infinitely analyzable and others ignored? Can popularity become its own epiphenomenon, creating the meaning beyond the actual text? If that's the case, can this be done with any more-or-less abstract piece of writing? If so, what are we doing here doing practically infinite hermeneutics? Is that philosophically sound, or is it overmining? If an author tries to confound with too many questions, is that bad faith arguing, clever philosophizing, or "showing"? How do we know which is which besides preference in style, or what others say is supposed to count as preferential style? Can one actually put in more effort than an author in philosophizing a point of the author? If so, why? If that's the case, might it be more prudent to put the effort into taking what one learns and developing one's own ideas and philosophy instead of endless hermeneutics of really trying to "get" an obscure text?

There are others reading, thinking, and in some cases commenting. — Fooloso4

I agree. Your disagreements interest me even if I don't have the urge to chip in. To post in a forum is to post for an audience as well as the one you're responding to.

To this end what I regard as most important is not simply getting Wittgenstein right but the attempt to get him right, even if we decide he gets it wrong. If is an exercise in thinking and seeing. — Fooloso4

On Certainty and for that matter PI is an un finished work. I would rather not like to think about “getting it right” as much as a continuation of what he had started. This is more exciting because it could take philosophy is new and interesting directions.

Yes, we do disagree. I don't think we are likely to change our opinions now, but we have both over time changed our understanding to some degree. So, I do think there is value in discussing and defending our take on things. In defending our views we go back to the text and sometimes we find something new. — Fooloso4

I'm not saying there's no value in discussing and defending these ideas because there is, and I know that others are reading as we write. The frustration is that people are constantly misinterpreting things, so I have to keep repeating myself. I think I'm being clear, but not so much apparently. I find it an agonizing process, but I can't stop. I stop for a bit, and then in a few months, I'm right back at it. It's a love-hate relationship.

Do you think he put as much effort in his words as you are in interpreting them? — schopenhauer1

Absolutely! He was a very careful and thoughtful writer.

Is it even in some way "right" to over-interpret any one human's words to this extent? — schopenhauer1

How does someone know when something is "over-interpreted"?

I think there are interpretations that are wrong, but sometimes they might lead to interesting discussions.

Do you think the onus of understanding is on the author or the reader? — schopenhauer1

There are some weak authors and some weak readers. Sometimes weak readers blame the author for what they cannot do.

If not the author, then can I write a post, and make you figure it out if you don't understand it? — schopenhauer1

Many years ago, when in school, I would offer get comments that my writing was "cryptic". I did not take this as a negative since many of the authors I liked were cryptic. I eventually came to see things differently. What occurred to me was that one needs to earn the right to have others figure out what you are saying. I have not earned that right. I now try to say things clearly.

With regard to your many questions, what I said above serves well for my response:

To this end what I regard as most important is not simply getting Wittgenstein right but the attempt to get him right, even if we decide he gets it wrong. If is an exercise in thinking and seeing. — Fooloso4

The same can be said with regard to some other others as well.

On Certainty and for that matter PI is an un finished work. — Richard B

Wittgenstein did not write books. He writes aphoristically. I think a good many of them are finished.

a continuation of what he had started. — Richard B

What do you think that is?

This is more exciting because it could take philosophy is new and interesting directions. — Richard B

Do you have examples or do you have in mind what statements such as the following:

… our investigation is directed not towards phenomena, but rather, as one might say, towards the ‘possibilities’ of phenomena.

(PI 90)

I find that interesting and have quoted it many times, but I have no sense of what those possibilities are.

It is good to hear you say that. Thanks!

What do you think that is? — Fooloso4

Do you have examples or do you have in mind what statements such as the following: — Fooloso4

Part II of the PI is often an overlooked, less quoted part of the book. But I believe it hints at the many directions Wittgenstein was possibly exploring. Lets take a look at some:

In these passages, it is not just analyzing the use of words that Wittgenstein is exploring.

Part II, section I, "One can imagine an animal angry frightened, unhappy, happy, startled. But hopeful? And why not? A dog believes his master will come the day after tomorrow? And what can he not do here? How do I do it? How am I supposed to answer this? Can only those hope who can talk? Only those who masters the use of a language. That is to say, the phenomena of hope are modes of this complicated form of life." I think here Wittgenstein is pondering the relationship between primitive reactions and complex form of life, is he not asking questions and looking for an explanation, and not just wanting to describe the language of hope?

Part II section ii, In saying "When I heard this word, it meant.... to me" one refers to a point in time and to a way of using the word. (Of course, it is this combination that we fail to grasp.) Again Wittgenstein is going beyond just the analysis of the use of a word, but looking also at the relation of reference and time.

Part II section v, "It is like the relation: physical object-sense impression. Here we have two different language games and a complicated relation between them-If you try to reduce their relation to a simple formula you go wrong." Here a fascinating discussion between two different philosophical outlooks one founded on a naturalistic view and the other a more introspective view?

Part II section x "How did we ever come to use such an expression as "I believe.." Did we at some time become aware of phenomenon (of belief)? Did we observe ourselves and other people and so discover belief?" A very interesting question, but will the answer come from analysis of the use of words?

Part II section xi "I shall call the following figure, derived from Jastrow, the duck-rabbit. It can be seen as a rabbit's head or as a duck's. And I must distinguish between the 'continuous seeing' of an aspect and the 'dawning' of an aspect." What is Wittgenstein doing in this passage? In trying to describe a picture, is he exploring how we borrow from our language to describe what seems to be a rather interestingly unique experience and to get another human being to see it as I do?

Lastly, Part II section xii "If the formation of concepts can be explain by facts of nature, would we not be interested, not in grammar, but rather in that in nature which is the basis of grammar? - Our interest certainly includes the correspondence between concepts and very general fact of nature. (Such fact facts as mostly do not strike us because of their generality.) But our interest does not fall back upon these possible causes of the formation of concepts; we are not doing natural science, nor yet natural history-since we also invent fictitious natural history for our purposes.

I am not saying; If such and such facts of nature were different people would have different concepts (in the sense of hypothesis). But: if anyone believe certain concepts are absolutely the correct ones, and that having different ones would mean not realizing something that we realize-then let him imagine certain very general facts of nature to be different from what we are used to, and the formation of concepts different from the usual ones will become intelligible to him."

I think this is the most interesting direction Wittgenstein is considering here. The philosophy of concept formation. This is not about describing how we use our words, but exploring how we come to formulate our concepts.

"When Moore says he knows such and such, he is really enumerating a lot of empirical propositions which we affirm without special testing; propositions, that is, which have a peculiar logical role in the system of our empirical propositions (OC 136)."

The propositions Moore claims to know, viz., those listed in his paper A Defense of Common Sense are the propositions Wittgenstein is referring to. Besides the most commonly used of Moore's statements "I know this is a hand," others include, "There exists at present a living human body, which is my body," and (paraphrasing) "There are other human bodies of the same class that have lived on Earth and have had many different experiences." These are the propositions Wittgenstein is referring to as empirical propositions that we affirm without special testing. In other words, we don't normally need a justification (epistemologically) for these beliefs. These are hinge propositions (I prefer to call them hinge beliefs), and they fulfill the logical role of being bedrock, foundational, or basic to our whole system of epistemological language games. It's where justification ends (no special testing required). Why? Because special testing or justification gets its life from these hinge beliefs. Not only do these beliefs give life to our epistemological language games, but they also give life to the language games of doubting. Such beliefs also reflect an ungrounded way of acting, which is at the core of our world picture or inherited background.

And where it's proper to give a justification for Moore's propositions, i.e., the exceptions, then these propositions are not hinges. So, they can function as proper propositions in certain contexts, but not generally. As I've mentioned elsewhere, and where I've expanded on what I think follows from OC, is that these beliefs at their core are pre-linguistic beliefs, shown in our actions.

It's not only Moore's use of know that is problematic, but saying these hinge beliefs are generally true is also problematic in similar ways.

I agree with the significance of Part ll and that Wittgenstein goes far beyond the analyzing the use of words. What I am wondering about is the idea of taking philosophy in new and interesting directions. There are scattered comments about him seeing his work as preparatory for what others will do.

I believe that my originality (if that is the right word) is an originality belonging to the soil rather than to the seed. … Sow a seed in my soil and it will grow differently than it would in any other soil. (CV, 36)

The most difficult part of Wittgenstein's epistemology is to understand the groundlessness of our epistemology. The whole system is predicated on arational beliefs, and this is what is so different about Wittgenstein's approach to knowing and doubting. I believe that if you don't see this, you're missing the core of what Wittgenstein is saying.

"Must I not begin to trust somewhere? That is to say: somewhere I must begin with not-doubting; and that is not, so to speak, hasting but excusable: it is part of judging (OC 150)."

One last tantalizing passage from Wittgenstein and his thinking about concept formation. From Culture and Value:

"Life can educate one to a belief in God. And experiences too are what bring this about; but I don't mean visions and other forms of sense experience which show us the 'existence of this being', but, e.g. sufferings of various sorts. These neither show us God in the way a sense impression shows us an object, not do they give rise to conjectures about him. Experiences, thoughts, - life can force this concept on us. So perhaps it is similar to the concept of 'object'.

This is not about pondering the use of the word "God", but pondering life itself.

This is not about pondering the use of the word "God", but pondering life itself. — Richard B

In his Notebooks 1914-1916 he says:

The meaning of life, i.e. the meaning of the world, we can call God.

To believe in a God means to understand the question about the meaning of life.

To believe in a God means to see that the facts of the world are not the end of the matter.

To believe in God means to see that life has a meaning.

However this may be, at any rate we are in a certain sense dependent,
and what we are dependent on we can call God.

In this sense God would simply be fate, or, what is the same thing: The world-which is independent of our will.

I can make myself independent of fate.

There are two godheads: the world and my independent I.

"I should like to say: Moore does not know what he asserts he knows, but it stands fast for him, as also for me; regarding it as absolutely solid is part of our method of doubt and enquiry (OC 151)."

It seems clear that Wittgenstein is not only saying Moore's use of know is a misuse, but also that it's not knowledge. The beliefs (arational and hinge beliefs) Moore claims to know are the bedrock, foundation, and solid "...part of our method of doubt and enquiry." It forms a whole system of beliefs that "...characterize the way [we] judge, characterize the nature of judgment (OC 149)." The "nature of judgment" includes our epistemological language games and our language games of doubting. This means that justification and truth are an outgrowth of what stands fast, which is why, generally speaking, hinge beliefs are not justified and not true or false. How can this be? There is no how or why it's simply how we act. "Why do I not satisfy myself that I have two feet when I want to get up from my chair? There is no why. I simply don't. This is how I act (OC 148)."

Does this mean that the system of our judgments doesn't change, of course not, it just means that at any given point in time, there is a system of judgment that we don't question. Some of the beliefs in the system will remain unchanged and some will be removed, and others added, but the system will always be there as part of our bedrock beliefs. That there is a system of judgment is unchanging, it can't be otherwise. There is a limit to reason, to justification and truth, and it's an arational system of beliefs.

Do I think Wittgenstein is correct? Absolutely, and it changes the nature of epistemology, and moreover, it shows the limits of epistemology. I believe many philosophers and thinkers have overlooked Wittgenstein's final remarks.

What is the nature of a hinge belief? What if someone's world picture includes belief in God as a hinge belief? Or, what if another world picture excludes belief in God as part of their hinge beliefs? Can we just decide whether this or that belief is a hinge? And, if for example, belief in God is a hinge, then there is no need to justify the belief as true or false, since they're arational beliefs. Does Wittgenstein address this problem, or do we end up with conflicting hinge beliefs? Dr. Duncan Pritchard often mentions this in his papers and his lectures. I believe Wittgenstein does address this issue.

What is the nature of a hinge belief? What if someone's world picture includes belief in God as a hinge belief? — Sam26

Is this not the nexus between the intellect and action, rationalism and pragmatism, where the human leaves the third person intellectual detachment and enters in the first person animal needing to survive and reproduce?

I read Pritchard's paper on Hinge Epistemology. The first thing to be noted, as can be seen in the title, is that he regards hinges as epistemological.

And, if for example, belief in God is a hinge, then there is no need to justify the belief as true or false, since they're arational beliefs. — Sam26

That depends on what is being claimed. If someone were to say that they believe in God, I cannot prove them wrong. If, however, they claim that like Abraham God commands him to sacrifice his son then their belief in God and what God commands would need justification.

239. I believe that every human being has two human parents; but Catholics believe that Jesus only had a human mother. And other people might believe that there are human beings with no parents, and give no credence to all the contrary evidence. Catholics believe as well that in certain
circumstances a wafer completely changes its nature, and at the same time that all evidence proves
the contrary. And so if Moore said "I know that this is wine and not blood", Catholics would
contradict him.

If a priest takes transubstantiated wine and attempts to donate it to a blood bank, whether his belief is true or false is in question.

243. One says "I know" when one is ready to give compelling grounds. "I know" relates to a
possibility of demonstrating the truth. Whether someone knows something can come to light,
assuming that he is convinced of it.
But if what he believes is of such a kind that the grounds that he can give are no surer than his
assertion, then he cannot say that he knows what he believes.

The believer will insist that the wine has truly become blood. When chemical analysis confirms that it is wine the believer will reject the science. This is something he will say he knows. Something beyond scientific understanding. What we might regard as compelling ground may be something he thinks needs to be corrected by the word of God. There are deeper truths, he might say, that science is blind to.

336. But what men consider reasonable or unreasonable alters. At certain periods men find
reasonable what at other periods they found unreasonable. And vice-versa.
But is there no objective character here?
Very intelligent and well-educated people believe in the story of creation in the Bible, while others
hold it as proven false, and the grounds of the latter are well known to the former.

So, where does this leave us? As far as I can tell, at an impasse. Such beliefs are not simple arational they are irrational.

I'm not sure what you mean.