The philosopher raises doubts about things that are ordinarily not doubted. His concern is the truth of things. The move from opinion to knowledge is by way of doubt or skepticism (skeptis - to inquire). There is, however, also knowledge of the arts (techne) and Socrates own knowledge of Eros, from which his knowledge of ignorance arises. — Fooloso4
With regard to knowledge and doubt in On Certainty:
6. Now, can one enumerate what one knows (like Moore)? Straight off like that, I believe not. - For otherwise the expression "I know" gets misused. And through this misuse a queer and extremely
important mental state seems to be revealed.
What is this mental state?
12. - For "I know" seems to describe a state of affairs which guarantees what is known, guarantees it as a fact. One always forgets the expression "I thought I knew".
When Moore says he knows he has hands, this does not refute the skeptic. — Fooloso4
Empirical propositions do not have the certainty of mathematics. In the Tractatus he says:
6.36311 It is an hypothesis that the sun will rise tomorrow: and this means that we do not know whether it will rise.
We may not doubt whether the sun will rise tomorrow, but whether or not it will is a contingent rather than necessary fact. — Fooloso4
If science presents a theory based on experiments or mathematical models, then someone probably believes the conclusions are either true or false. If they believe they're true or false, they're using propositions. Most all of what we know is in the form of propositions. — Sam26
A claim to have good reason to believe X is partly what we mean by know. Good reasons are how we justify many of our beliefs and why we make claims that a proposition is true. It is a claim to know. — Sam26
But there are many beliefs the truth of which is not determinable. — Janus
I don't see the problem with saying that you know you have hands, or that you know any of the things that can be directly seen to be the case. — Janus
OC 1. If you do know that here is one hand, we'll grant you all the rest.
He does not agree with your claim that hinges are not epistemological because: — Fooloso4
My view is that belief in God is not a hinge belief. — Sam26
For many religions, belief in God is a hinge. — Sam26
107. Isn't this altogether like the way one can instruct a child to believe in a God, or that none
exists, and it will accordingly be able to produce apparently telling grounds for the one or the other?
I would just repeat that a claim to know is not knowledge in the sense of definitely knowing the truth of some proposition but is rather merely belief. — Janus
My view is that belief in God is not a hinge belief.
— Sam26
In an earlier post you said: — Fooloso4
Not to those who are convinced otherwise. To doubt it would put everything, their whole system of beliefs, into doubt.
Is there any support in Wittgenstein for the notion of a "proper hinge"? — Fooloso4
What is the nature of a hinge belief? What if someone's world picture includes belief in God as a hinge belief? Or, what if another world picture excludes belief in God as part of their hinge beliefs? Can we just decide whether this or that belief is a hinge? — Sam26
I'm not sure what you mean. — Sam26
If I had to characterize “hinge proposition” I would say it is one where a human accepts it and its logical consequences as a whole. This acceptance would not be because it strikes us as true but that it has some pragmatic effect on us that when we put them into practice it brings value and meaning to our lives. — Richard B
I'm not sure that we have the same view on hinge beliefs. It depends on what you mean by "logical consequences" of a hinge belief. There is no doubt that hinge beliefs have consequences in our acts (linguistic and non-linguistic), and that there is a logical scaffolding to our belief systems. However, we have different views of hinges if you use "logical consequences" as a synonym for correct reasoning (inductive and deductive). Also, hinge beliefs don't depend on some practical effect. A practical effect would give some justification for the belief, which goes counter what a hinge belief is. — Sam26
The question becomes, are there good reasons to reject or doubt what they consider a hinge belief? — Sam26
336. But what men consider reasonable or unreasonable alters. At certain periods men find
reasonable what at other periods they found unreasonable. And vice-versa.
But is there no objective character here?
Very intelligent and well-educated people believe in the story of creation in the Bible, while others
hold it as proven false, and the grounds of the latter are well known to the former.
166. The difficulty is to realize the groundlessness of our believing.
612. I said I would 'combat' the other man, - but wouldn't I give him reasons? Certainly; but how far do they go? At the end of reasons comes persuasion. (Think what happens when missionaries
convert natives.)
What may count as good reasons for you may not be what others regard as good reasons. Once again: — Fooloso4
336. But what men consider reasonable or unreasonable alters. At certain periods men find
reasonable what at other periods they found unreasonable. And vice-versa.
But is there no objective character here?
Very intelligent and well-educated people believe in the story of creation in the Bible, while others
hold it as proven false, and the grounds of the latter are well known to the former.
You seem to be pushing Witt into a more relativistic position — Sam26
305. Here once more there is needed a step like the one taken in relativity theory.
152. I do not explicitly learn the propositions that stand fast for me. I can discover them
subsequently like the axis around which a body rotates. This axis is not fixed in the sense that
anything holds it fast, but the movement around it determines its immobility.
There is a relativistic point to all this of course, but there is also an objective component, which is more important. — Sam26
Proof against radical skepticism is not such a circumstance. — Fooloso4
It is not that Wittgenstein thinks that Moore does not know it is a hand, it is that he misuses the word, as if it corresponds to a mental state that guarantees that what he knows must be true because he knows it. It is this that is not granted. — Fooloso4
I believe this is incorrect, and it's a misunderstanding of what it means to know. I assume your use of the phrase "definitely know the truth" means to know with 100% certainty. Most of what we claim to know is not known with absolute certainty. Most of what we claim to know is what's probably true or likely the case, and this follows from logic (inductive reasoning). I think your idea of knowledge is too restrictive. — Sam26
How could we have, and why would we need, proof against radical skepticism, if it incoherent? — Janus
I think the counterpoint would be something like 'What could it possibly mean for it to be false?'. — Janus
Moore thought it necessary, which is the reason he claimed to know he had hands. — Fooloso4
And I would go further and say that if we don't know that we know it to be true, that is if there can be any doubt that it is true, then we don't know it either. I'm not imputing this to Wittgenstein but highlighting the point where I probably disagree with him. Is there anything that you believe could not possibly be false? — Janus
Let me ask, do you believe your position that “if there can be any doubt that it is true, then we don’t know it either” can be doubted as true? If so, this is not knowledge, just belief. — Richard B
It is not really knowledge, but a stipulative definition of it, based on the logic I understand to be inherent in the idea of knowing. — Janus
I'm not getting your point. Are you claimimg I don't know what knowledge is? Or that you do? — Janus
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