my own position, or commitment, is philosophical naturalism (which, as I understand it, begins with a hybrid 'Epicurean-Spinozist' immanentist ontology) and, in sum, proposes this: nature is the aspect of reality that limits (like the encompassing horizon) what we natural beings can know about reality given only natural capabilities for knowing (i.e. explaining) reality. A — 180 Proof
which makes the point that materialism is a good (even indispensable) theory for making sense of the world but may not be true, just as Newtonian Physics is a good (even indispensable) theory for making sense of the world but is not true. — Art48
which makes the point that materialism is a good (even indispensable) theory for making sense of the world but may not be true, just as Newtonian Physics is a good (even indispensable) theory for making sense of the world but is not true. — Art48
It seems "narratives and models" are "useful" in the broadest scope only, in fact, when they are approximately true. Maybe not but I can't think of any counter-examples which you & @Art48 might be talking about.It's interesting to me that humans make sense of he world with narratives and models which may often be useful but not be true. — Tom Storm
It's unclear to me whether what's being referred to as "The One" is meant to be supernatural (outside of or apart from nature) or a part of nature (the universe). If it's supernatural, it seems to me to suffer from the problems which result when a transcendence is assumed rather than immanence--I don't think we can know anything about what's "outside" of nature/the universe. But if some aspect of nature/the universe is being referred to, why can't that be a kind of materialism (in which what is "material" would include all of the universe)? — Ciceronianus
Materialism is metaphysics, a philosophical perspective on reality, a way of thinking about things. As I, and R.G. Collingwood, think, metaphysical positions are not true or false, right or wrong… Newtonian mechanics is a set of scientific theories. I don't think it's correct to call it "wrong," it's just that it's limited. But for most uses in our everyday world, it's adequate to give us good answers. I can make accurate predictions about events here on Earth using Newton's principles. I can't make any predictions with metaphysics - that's just not how it works. — T Clark
Yes, materialism is a philosophical perspective. Newtonian mechanics , like all scientific theories, also rests on a philosophical perspective. As a theory, its predictions are ‘good’ and ‘accurate’ according to a particular metaphysical way of thinking about things. — Joshs
The predictions of quantum physics are also good and accurate, but in relation to a changed metaphysical perspective. Both the old and the new physics use terms like mass and energy, but their qualitative meaning has shifted in subtle ways that, as you and Collinwood say, can’t be subsumed under the categories of true and false. The new physics isn’t simply ‘more true’ than the old, it is qualitatively different in its concepts, but in subtle ways that are easy to miss. — Joshs
So is it purely linguistic simplicity for a particular role/purpose?An interesting, well-made video. You've covered many of the bases that need to be covered. I do have one disagreement. Materialism is metaphysics, a philosophical perspective on reality, a way of thinking about things. As I, and R.G. Collingwood, think, metaphysical positions are not true or false, right or wrong. This is a drum I've pounded here on the forum many times. As you note, materialism can be very useful as a way of looking at the world. I've read that most physicists are materialist, which makes sense. But it's not the only useful metaphysical approach, e.g. I've read that most mathematicians are idealists. Ontology is not an all or nothing thing. We can use different approaches in different situations and at different times, depending on which is more useful in each set of conditions. — T Clark
Right. Scientism is the result of attempting to apply scientific methods to philosophical problems
— Wayfarer
I would argue that scientism involves the belief that the science-philosophy separation you’re suggesting is even possible. — Joshs
Newtonian mechanics , like all scientific theories, also rests on a philosophical perspective. As a theory, its predictions are ‘good’ and ‘accurate’ according to a particular metaphysical way of thinking about things. The predictions of quantum physics are also good and accurate, but in relation to a changed metaphysical perspective. Both the old and the new physics use terms like mass and energy, but their qualitative meaning has shifted in subtle ways that, as you and Collinwood say, can’t be subsumed under the categories of true and false. The new physics isn’t simply ‘more true’ than the old, it is qualitatively different in its concepts, but in subtle ways that are easy to miss. — Joshs
The new physics isn’t simply ‘more true’ than the old, it is qualitatively different in its concepts, but in subtle ways that are easy to miss. — Joshs
But don’t you see a distinction between legitimately empirical questions that are answerable in terms of data and measurement, and philosophical questions that can’t be addressed in those terms? — Wayfarer
The notion that what's true is different qualitatively from what is established by our day-to-day interaction with the rest of the world minimizes the significance of our lives as part of the world, and separates us from what is significant, what is "true." — Ciceronianus
So is it purely linguistic simplicity for a particular role/purpose? — substantivalism
I admit it can get rather tiring making explicit what senses and brain states lead to such an' such a mathematical/abstract realization so the majority of such thinkers use certain vernacular as wide/generalized shorthand. Course, then all that philosophical seriousness about the choice between these shorthand languages is beaten into meaninglessness, pointlessness, or pragmatism. — substantivalism
But what physics means is not itself a question for physics. ‘Scientism’ comprises not recognising that, or ignoring the fact that the meaning of scientific theories is not itself a scientific theory, or believing that science will “one day” explain the meaning. — Wayfarer
. Enaction is a particular kind of nonreductive naturalism, one that stresses the continuities but also the innovations that occur between natural processes, life, mind, language, and human communities; as much an approach to embodied minds as a rethinking of
nature. Dichotomies become ambiguous in this approach,
such as that between descriptive and the normative discourse (a distinction more normative than descriptive in its
deployments). A lesson that refectively emerges from enactive epistemology is that theorising of any kind, a fortiori
theorising about human beings, is never purely descriptive.
From the choice of technical language to decisions about
perspective and relevance, awareness of implications, and concern for potential uses, theorising is always an ethical
engagement, situated in a community of embodied researchers and institutions. This is not to say that normative questions can be exhausted by any kind of theorising, enactive or otherwise.
I see what you’re saying, but I am inclined to think that the failure to think reflexively about what science does, and the methods a particular science uses, is not a limitation of a thing called science meant in some universal, ahistorical sense, but of a certain era of science which doesn’t recognize human becoming, including the wives we create, as open-ended, historical, and contextual. — Joshs
Tom Storm: Even if we can never perfectly describe reality, I’d say that any particular narrative and model (e.g. Newtonian Physics) can be closer to reality than another (e.g., Alchemy). — Art48
T Clark: Are you saying a metaphysical position isn’t true or false? (Why? Because such positions go beyond the evidence and therefore their truth/falsity cannot be determined?) — Art48
I’d say Newtonian Mechanics is wrong. It gives the right answer to a certain number of decimal places but if you go far enough (10th decimal, 100th decimal), it gives an answer that disagrees with Relativity and with reality. — Art48
There are compelling grounds to doubt "solipsism" (e.g. disembodiment, immaterialism, brain-in-vat, etc) which suffice for dismissing it.180 Proof: If you agree hard solipsism cannot be disproven, then wouldn’t the minimum that we must necessarily presuppose be our consciousness and sensations, and nothing else? — Art48
By your own admission, Art, grounds against doubting "materialism" (e.g. embodiment, multiplicity, dis-order) far exceed grounds for doubting it, which suffice for not dismissing "materialism", especially compared to much more doubtful alternatives (e.g. immaterialism, solipsism).Of course, the evidence for an external material world is very, very strong but the point of the video is that the evidence does not prove materialism.
It doesn't make sense to ask whether grammar is "true or false" any more than it does to ask this of metaphysics. I think (Western) metaphysics consists in what is necessarily presupposed (e.g. ontology) in order for epistemological statements (e.g. physics (i.e. cosmology)) and axiological statements (e.g. ethics, aesthetics) to make sense as domain-specific criteria for truth and falsity. In other words, physics models computable aspects of nature (just as ethics maps eusocial aspects of human nature) whereas metaphysics indefeasibly describes physics' model-making (& ethics' map-making).Are you saying a metaphysical position isn’t true or false?
Well I say that beyond all doubt, above the Planck scale, shorter than Relativistic distances and slower than Relativistic velocities, "Newtonian Mechanics" is (almost) completely accurate.Also, I’d say Newtonian Mechanics is wrong.
Physical laws and constants make explicit (some? many? most?) "limits of the natural world" and, after countless billions upon billions of experimental observations, that there is no evidence of violations of any physical laws is, imo, compelling grounds to doubt your "belief", Art.I believe “supernatural” is a vacuous term because we do not yet know the limits of the natural world.
It doesn't make sense to ask whether grammar is "true or false" any more than it does to ask this of metaphysics. I think (Western) metaphysics consists in what is necessarily presupposed (e.g. ontology) in order for epistemological statements (e.g. physics (i.e. cosmology)) and axiological statements (e.g. ethics, aesthetics) to make sense as domain-specific criteria for truth and falsity. In other words, physics models computable aspects of nature (just as ethics maps eusocial aspects of human nature) whereas metaphysics indefeasibly describes physics' model-making (& ethics' map-making). — 180 Proof
I believe “supernatural” is a vacuous term because we do not yet know the limits of the natural world. Once, lightening was considered supernatural. I get in my car, talk into a little handheld device, and it directs me to a destination 100 miles away (i.e. mobile phone and GPS) or allows me to talk to someone on another continent. A few centuries ago, that would have been called supernatural. — Art48
is meant to be supernatural (outside of or apart from nature) or a part of nature (the universe). — Ciceronianus
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