I see purpose (now) as a settled state of mind beyond ordinary questioning about something significant, that serves to inform action or other beliefs, though flexible, if need be. — tim wood

Yes, I think that's closer. I was thinking similarly of a sort of comportment, a style, a way of doing things.

The usual model boils everything down to decisions and preferences, but those are always open to change. Something no longer in play, if it ever was, isn't much like one of those, but more like a sort of framework for them. It's given. It will shape all the changeable stuff, channel it in a particular direction.

But that's just a model. The question is whether we're really like that, and if so, why?

There's Hume's line in the Treatise about the "belief" in (that is to say, unwavering commitment to) object permanence: he says there are things Nature has deemed too important to leave up to our fallible reason.

What we're talking about looks something like that. (Not the sort of thing Nature left to the rational-agent, decisions & preferences model.) If it does develop over time, over the course of a life, it does so by a process we play little conscious role in. It's practically something that happens to us, like aging itself, not much like something we do. You wake up one day and realize you have a principles (or prejudices), or feel you have a purpose, whatever. Not your doing, exactly, though somehow for that very reason close to the core of your identity -- because it wasn't up to you, anymore than your identity in any other sense is.

You don't really make choices about your blind spots, for instance. — Srap Tasmaner

Maybe not, but if it's not of supreme importance, we leave wiggle-room for them.

But it's up to us whether to call such stubbornness "principle" or "prejudice" — Srap Tasmaner

I don't think it is. We may have a theoretical grasp of the situation, but I, personally, can't understand it well enough to judge.

Exactly how to hold people accountable for prejudices they
grew up with, and may only dimly be aware of, is rather hotly debated these days. — Srap Tasmaner

When it comes to absolute commitment, dimly understood childhood conditioning is not a major factor. This kind of all-or-nothing decision is made consciously, with a head full of passionately held ideals.
I'm not particularly interested in praising or blaming, except when it's about causing harm to others.

We may firmly believe that some course of action would be "the right thing to do" and still not do it. Why? Who knows. — Srap Tasmaner

Lots of reasons. It's too difficult. It's too costly. It's frightening. We might fail and be humiliated.
Sometimes we opt for a compromise: do only some of it and then turn back; support the people who do it, while we stay in the background; do the next best thing; do three other good things to make up for bailing on that one....

So what appears to be principle or prejudice may be neither, but merely an inability to act otherwise, whether accompanied by an ability to think or choose otherwise or not. — Srap Tasmaner

Okay. But are all commitments like that? Just habit or coercive circumstance?

This kind of all-or-nothing decision is made consciously, with a head full of passionately held ideals. — Vera Mont

Do we also consciously decide which ideals to hold, and how passionately?

But are all commitments like that? Just habit or coercive circumstance? — Vera Mont

Ah, is this the issue for you? You're concerned that I'm downplaying if not denying the individual's agency, in favor of habit or circumstance?

Yeah, I expect I am. I don't think you choose who you are or what you believe. You at most become aware of who you are, what you are, what you believe.

When it comes to absolute commitment, dimly understood childhood conditioning is not a major factor. — Vera Mont

"Give me the child till the age of five-- " you know the rest.

I really can't imagine what you have in mind here. Almost everything that matters happens when you are a child.

Do we also consciously decide which ideals to hold, and how passionately? — Srap Tasmaner

Yes. Not all at once; over time, one observation, idea, judgment and commitment at a time.

"Give me the child till the age of five-- " you know the rest. — Srap Tasmaner

I do. Aristotle apparently said “Give me a child until he is 7 and I will show you the foundations of the man”. Now that could mean he would observe how a child behaved between infancy and the age of seven to predict what kind of man that child would become. Or it could mean that in seven years, he could teach a child how to be the right kind of man.
Loyola perverted that to "give us a child till he's 7 and we'll have him for life", meaning that if they had control of very young children, they could program them to Jesuitism. (just boy-chidren, mind; neither of them knew a damn thing about girls).

Almost everything that matters happens when you are a child. — Srap Tasmaner

Then there's no point living past puberty, right?

Almost everything that matters happens when you are a child. — Srap Tasmaner

Then there's no point living past puberty, right? — Vera Mont

I only meant, everything that matters for determining what sort of being you are. Your understanding of physics, geometry, numbers, your native language, social bonds and social cues -- etc etc etc.

The point isn't even that you're finished by the time you're seven. Your brain's not even done yet. But you're set on your way and given the wherewithal to develop into something complete. What that will be depends on what happens to you, and of course on the choices you make, but how you make those choices is guided by what happened in those first years.

Do you disagree? Are we born and remain autonomous free agents? Rationally, I suppose, choosing our values and so forth, decade after decade? -- I presume that's a caricature of your view, so what's the real view? We are formed

over time, one observation, idea, judgment and commitment at a time — Vera Mont

certainly, but what's the nature of these? What's their origin? Do you freely choose what you notice? Do you choose what ideas occur to you? If you are moved by something you observe, something that changes your worldview or your values, did you choose to be so moved?

he usual claim is omnipotence - God can do anything and everything, which if the author and creator of the universe we live in, he would pretty much have to be. — tim wood

Why do you conclude this? Do you have absolute control over anything you created? Why do you think that God would have absolute control over the universe He created? It seems to me, that "creations", whether they are by human beings, some other creatures, or even God, are just not like that.

And if constrained, then not God — tim wood

Why? What makes you think that God must be absolutely unconstrained? I think that if you took the time to read some theology, you would see that even if it is often said that God is "all mighty", and sometimes said that He is "omnipotent" these conceptions are qualified, and it is not very often meant that he is absolutely unconstrained. Consider for example that it is often said that God only does what is good, and he exercises complete self-control to only do good. Clearly this indicates a special sort of constraint, which we as human beings also share with God. However, since we do not really understand self-constraint, and therefore have not been able to perfect it, we tend to imagine it in a very strange paradoxical way. The complete and perfect self-constraint which God is often said to have, is portrayed as an absolute freedom to do anything. And this is paradoxical because even though there are many things God could do, He also cannot do them, because of His self-constraint.

As to any necessity for his reality - yours sounding like Anselm's - that is only a "proof" for those who already take that real existence as axiomatic. — tim wood

I was not handing you that argument as a "proof". I was only trying to make it clear to you that if you want to talk about "God", then you need to talk about "God" as He is understood. I find this to be a common problem with the atheist approaches to God. The atheist commonly approaches God with the presupposition, that God is an imaginary, fictitious thing, not real. But this is not how God is understood in theology. This prejudice which the atheist holds is completely contrary and contradictory to how God is actually understood, so it prevents the atheist from having any understanding of God. Aquinas, for example, asserted that God's essence is His existence. This implies that the very first principle one must accept before being able to understand anything about God, in any way, is that He has real existence. So if the atheist has any bit of intent whatsoever, to understand God, this prejudice must first be dismissed. Otherwise it's a waist of time.

Reality is the realm of nature, and recall we put that to the question. — tim wood

Your claim, "reality is the realm of nature" is fundamentally false. By saying "the realm of nature" you imply the possibility of other realms not contained within the realm of nature. And as a "realms" these must be real. So even the statement itself, as written, implies its own falsity. It's like saying "there is only one multiplicity". The statement is self-defeating.

Consider, that "the artificial" is often contrasted with "the natural". We cannot say that the artificial is not real. So many will class artificial as part of the natural. But by doing this we lose the meaning of "natural", which is defined as "not artificial". The intent of the person who redefines "natural" in this way, may be to include the artificial into the realm of the natural, to argue that only the natural is real, but what's the point? That statement is self-defeating as shown, and to class the artificial as natural, is to ignore the substantial difference between the two.

As to hearts, I have to own up to my ideas about "purpose" being pretty clearly not as clear as I thought they were, or would have liked them to be. — tim wood

This is why it is a very good thread which you have started. If you learn something new then the thread is good, right? The issue here, I think, is the presuppositions which we commonly take for granted. These are what are commonly known as bedrock or hinge propositions. Since they are taken for granted they are not subjected to our doubt. Since we do not doubt them or subject them to any form of methodological skepticism, then we do not develop an adequate understanding of their meaning. So the use of many words, such as "purpose", just floats freely, being a facilitator of mundane communication, a word whose meaning is taken for granted allowing for fluid conversation. Because of this, the word's meaning gets shaped to the circumstances of conversation, and what comes out on top is the most common usage. If someone asks what is the meaning of "purpose", we have all sorts of examples in common usage to refer to. But since its such a commonly used word, we can restrict the meaning we express, to these common examples, and having not applied a methodic analysis like the skeptic does, the true deeper meaning escapes us.

However, I think I can distinguish between purpose and function. — tim wood

This is a good start. Let's look at the difference between "purpose" and "function". At first glance, we can say that the two might commonly be interchangeable, "a thing's purpose is the thing's function". But invert that and say "a thing's function is the thing's purpose", and that's not necessarily the case. This implies, right off the bat, that "function" has an even broader meaning than "purpose". Not all functions are purposes.

Further, we can see that "function" is most often an activity, whereas "purpose" is more often the goal of the activity, the end, or objective. This opens an even bigger rift between the two. What is exposed here is that "purpose" is something we attribute to an activity, the property of an activity, which puts it into a specific relation with an end, a goal. This makes the activity a means to an end. "Function" in its common usage does not necessarily imply such a relation of means to an end, because the function may be the activity itself, regardless of the purpose of the activity. So we might say, of a thing, that the thing has a function, and this function is the activity of the thing, without even indicating the purpose of that activity, or whether it even has a purpose.

So for example, if I am involved in a cooperative effort, I have a function, which is to bring the others coffee. That can be referred to as my function, what I am doing, bringing the coffee, and this can be said without any reference to the purpose, why I am bringing the coffee. In the heart example, the function of the heart can be stated as "to beat". The beating is the function of the heart, and this may be stated with a complete disassociation from the purpose of the heart. The thing has a function, an activity, and this is completely irrelevant to whether there is a purpose, goal, or end to that activity.

You can see how this has become a very convenient way to separate "function" from "purpose" thereby ignoring the question of "purpose". This is the way language evolves according to social circumstances to avoid areas of doubt, and facilitate mundane communication. We can talk about all sorts of things, and the function of each thing, with complete disregard as to whether that function has a purpose or not. That helps us to avoid having to think about whether or not natural activities have a purpose, thus keeping us away from the volatile "God" question.

The point isn't even that you're finished by the time you're seven. Your brain's not even done yet. But you're set on your way and given the wherewithal to develop into something complete. What that will be depends on what happens to you, and of course on the choices you make, but how you make those choices is guided by what happened in those first years. — Srap Tasmaner

How does that give anyone a purpose?

Are we born and remain autonomous free agents? — Srap Tasmaner

No and no.

Rationally, I suppose, choosing our values and so forth, decade after decade? -- I presume that's a caricature of your view, so what's the real view? We are formed — Srap Tasmaner

The real view? At about age 2, children begin to assert their character (Their temperament is already evident at two months.) They test the limits of autonomy, dependency and external constraint. By 7, understand about truth and falsehood, justice and injustice; manipulation and control; power dynamics. Their personality is roughly formed and they know who they are (that's usually the age at which a child recognizes if they've been assigned the wrong gender) but they don't know very much about the world.

In the next 10 or so years, they learn about the environment, other people, their society and culture, their own status in that social environment and their aspirations. Somewhere between 15 and 20, they question the beliefs, assumptions and values of their elders, and set out their own philosophy. (This is why censors are so adamant to deny them access to literature that doesn't support the status quo.) Not all adolescents are articulate; they don't all write down their thoughts - many are and do. The less intellectually inclined act out their doubts and opposition. The opportunistic keep their assessment to themselves and watch for opportunities to take advantage of its weaknesses. The meek accept the prevailing system and go along. The most fragile egos escape into materialism, fantasy or chemical placebos.

but what's the nature of these — Srap Tasmaner

The 'nature' of moment-to-moment decisions? See problem, work out solution, make a plan, act on plan. See desired objective, work out path to desired object, make a plan, act on plan.

What's their origin? — Srap Tasmaner

The brain.

Do you freely choose what you notice? — Srap Tasmaner

You notice what affects you.

Do you choose what ideas occur to you? — Srap Tasmaner

You choose from the ideas that occur to you. (Must be a home invasion. Just a burglar. My teenage son sneaking in past curfew. The next door neighbor, drunk and come to the wrong door again. Shoot him! Just threaten to shoot him. Run away! Hide and watch. Wait till he comes up the stairs and push him off. Hit him with a vase.)

If you are moved by something you observe, something that changes your worldview or your values, did you choose to be so moved? — Srap Tasmaner

No, but you have a pretty good idea by age 20 what kind of something would move you and what kind would not.

How is this a different sense of "purpose" from when I said the purpose of the heart is to circulate blood? To circulate blood is "a thing to be done", by the heart, it is "the reason" for the heart. If the heart's effort is successful, it achieves its purpose. It's the very same sense of "purpose". — Metaphysician Undercover

Isn't the difference that one is consciously intended, and the other isn't? Isn't there a valid distinction to be drawn between conscious purpose and the autonomic system? One does not have conscious control over how fast your hair grows or your peristalsis.


Anyway, here's the 'meta-philosophical' point. That as our culture is individualist, we tend to conceive of purpose and intentionality in terms of something an agent does. Purposes are enacted by agents. This is why, if the idea of purpose as being something inherent in nature is posited, it tends to be seen in terms of God or gods, which is then associated with an outmoded religious or animistic way of thought. I think something like that is at the nub of many of the arguments about evolution, design and intentionality, and the arguments over whether the Universe is or is not animated by purpose.

This Forbes Magazine article just came up, on Dennis Noble’s quest to have purpose admitted back into biology

Evolution May Be Purposeful And It’s Freaking Scientists Out (wasn’t paywalled for me).

Isn't the difference that one is consciously intended, and the other isn't? Isn't there a valid distinction to be drawn between conscious purpose and the autonomic system? One does not have conscious control over how fast your hair grows or your peristalsis. — Wayfarer

I would say that this is acceptable as a proposal worth reviewing; i.e., the proposition that there is a valid distinction between conscious intention and an "automatic system" of a living creature. However, I would also argue that upon analysis such a theoretical distinction cannot be upheld in practise. This is because the supposed separate activities of the nonconscious (automatic), and the conscious, are constantly interacting as is well known to psychologists.

The brain creates patterns of activities which we might associate with 'habits', and even though they may originally be produced through conscious intention, these patterns, in the process of habitualization, become automatic. So there is a very close relationship between the supposed conscious and non-conscious, which makes it impossible to actually separate the intention of one from the intention of the other (intention acting in a hierarchical way as described in Aristotle's Nichomachean Ethics). There are all sorts of examples to support this.

From the side of conscious intention leading the way, consider that you decide on an activity like walking. Once the decision is made, and the act initiated, the habit (automatically) kicks in, and your legs start working in the way that you've learned. From the side of the nonconscious leading the way, consider dreaming as nonconscious. Then look at the way that sensations, sounds heard for example, may enter into the dream. Are you familiar with lucid dreaming?

Now, the issue is that since intention is hierarchical, if we propose a distinction between conscious and nonconscious intention, which one actually leads the way? The conscious mind thinking about this problem might be inclined to assign ultimate authority to itself, and this I believe is the perspective of libertarian free will. A scientist though, is inclined to observe from the outside in, seeing causation in the determinist way, making nonconscious automation the highest principle. It's a conundrum now. Therefore, I conclude that this proposal, to make a distinction between conscious and nonconscious intention is misleading, creating an unresolvable conundrum, and in reality the supposed two must be reduced to one general intention, as the guiding principle. The nonconscious is actually, in reality, prior, higher, and this may be revealed in mystical experiences.

Anyway, here's the 'meta-philosophical' point. That as our culture is individualist, we tend to conceive of purpose and intentionality in terms of something an agent does. Purposes are enacted by agents. This is why, if the idea of purpose as being something inherent in nature is posited, it tends to be seen in terms of God or gods, which is then associated with an outmoded religious or animistic way of thought. I think something like that is at the nub of many of the arguments about evolution, design and intentionality, and the arguments over whether the Universe is or is not animated by purpose.

This Forbes Magazine article just came up, on Dennis Noble’s quest to have purpose admitted back into biology — Wayfarer

This is exactly the problem. Our society has revolted against religion, attempting to remove any principles seated in religion from its codes. This has disassociated the intention (purpose) of conscious action from the intention (purpose) inherent within other living creatures. We cannot associate "intention" with other living beings, because that intention would be sourced from God. So the modern trend is to associate "intention" with the moral responsibility of conscious agents only. This I believe is actually quite modern because standard definitions of "intention" refer only to purpose, but the idea that "intention" is associated only with conscious acts is very pervasive in common usage.

The result is that now we have created a separation between the intentional acts of conscious agents, and the "purposeful" acts of other living creatures. But in truth, to understand biology and all the various activities of the multitude of living beings, along with the process of evolution, we need that continuity, between the purposeful acts of other living creatures, and the intentional acts of human agents. In reality, the intentional acts of human agents are just an extension, another specific incidence, of a purposeful act of a living creature.

The questions here are, then, what is purpose (in itself), where does it come from, what is its ground? Or, what exactly gives it all meaning, makes it all worthwhile? — tim wood

When I skim-read some of the answers here, I wonder why there is such a strict divide between biological (alive) and inanimate. If we look at our bodies, the well-known expression "We are all stardust" isn't an euphemism, it is reality. Our bodies and our minds are made of the matter in the universe, and the only change is the complexity of the structures that 'life' "creates".

Isn't it therefore reasonable to say that what our minds do are exploring, understanding and parsing the inherent 'purpose' and 'meaning' in our bodies and from the world around us? Like small, hard to read text-files that we make a bigger and more complex story about?

I am curious what counter-arguments there are to this, and why people here create this divide between life and non-life, when so much of what we are is non-life - and so our thoughts, feelings, purpose, drive - isn't it more reasonable to say it is Atoms and matter having a living experience, and we are simply translators and archeologists?

How do we find out what is the best way for us? — Janus

The first thing we find out is that the best way for us is not identical with the best way for me.

The first thing we find out is that the best way for us is not identical with the best way for me. — unenlightened

I agree, when it comes to considering the details. There would seem to be general principles as to what is most conducive to human flourishing and rational self-government, but since we are not only beings of a certain kind but are also each unique individuals, knowing what is best for me must also come from direct self-knowledge and insight as well as grasping general principles and practices.

From here:

I don't see why a lack of overarching purpose and meaning should diminish the importance of general human and particular individual purpose and meaning. — Janus

But doesn't it reduce it to a matter of opinion? The assumption of Greek philosophy, generally, was that reason, logos, animated the universe but was also the animating principle of the individual soul/psyche. Not that there's anything wrong with what you're saying - it's not meant as a personal criticism, but insofar as this is typically how us moderns view the world, in terms of our individual search for meaning.

I saw an account recently of the meaning of a teleological explanation: it is an explanation in terms of what something is for, rather than what conditions caused it. It doesn't sound like much, but really a lot hinges on that distinction.

For instance in Aristotle's fourfold causation, the final cause of a particular thing is its end goal or purpose. A mundane example is that the final cause of a match is fire, as the lighting of fires is the purpose of a match. But notice that in this case, the final cause comes after the striking of the match, being the reason for the existence of the match.

The efficient and material causes are the composition of the matchhead and the act of striking it. That is very much how science since the scientific revolution has tended to view causality: what causes something to happen, in terms of the antecedent combination of causes giving rise to an effect. Cause in the Aristotelian sense has largely been dropped. That's where a lot of the controversy about the so-called meaninglessness of the scientific worldview originates. It's also what is addressed in the Forbes Magazine article I linked above - and it's a bitter controversy, indeed, with a lot of heavyweights slugging it out. So trivial, it isn't.

The result is that now we have created a separation between the intentional acts of conscious agents, and the "purposeful" acts of other living creatures. But in truth, to understand biology and all the various activities of the multitude of living beings, along with the process of evolution, we need that continuity, between the purposeful acts of other living creatures, and the intentional acts of human agents. In reality, the intentional acts of human agents are just an extension, another specific incidence, of a purposeful act of a living creature. — Metaphysician Undercover

Agree. (I think this opens out into a discussion of Terrence Deacon's book Incomplete Nature, where he develops the idea of 'ententional processes' in nature although I've only read the first half of it.)

Our bodies and our minds are made of the matter in the universe, and the only change is the complexity of the structures that 'life' "creates". — Caerulea-Lawrence

But it's a difference that makes a significant difference. Look at the following nonsensensical words:

Blimp wozel finty glorm, cradd zifter lorny daple. Splexh voond zater flink, draff kipto glenty. Wexal dramp yoter blisk, quist nober frinty wald. Blorp kinfa jexty mavel, tind skrop lexin gader. Vekil drorn wopsy glent, kelfy blishd toren valk. Plunty miglo fenst joder, krelf zent flompy wexal.

They're all "just letters", right? What distinguishes that paragraph from the rest of the text on this page is that, absent the organisation imposed by language-using agents, it conveys no meaning.

isn't it more reasonable to say it is Atoms and matter having a living experience — Caerulea-Lawrence

But there's nothing in the theory of 'atoms and matter' which account for the nature of experience. That is the subject of the well-known David Chalmer's paper Facing Up to the Problem of Consciousness, a perennial topic on this forum, and which spawned an entire academic industry of 'consciousness studies'.

But doesn't it reduce it to a matter of opinion? The assumption of Greek philosophy, generally, was that reason, logos, animated the universe but was also the animating principle of the individual soul/psyche. Not that there's anything wrong with what you're saying - it's not meant as a personal criticism, but insofar as this is typically how us moderns view the world, in terms of our individual search for meaning. — Wayfarer

So, you think it would be better if everyone thought the same and all find the same meaning in, and purpose for, life? I don't see it that way—it's like aesthetics where I think there are real qualities, and real differences of quality, but as with altered states of consciousness, the truth as to which works are the best is impossible to determine definitively.

The kind of knowing involved in the arts, just as with self-cultivation, is participatory, not propositional. And what really matters is that you find purpose and, meaning in your own life. This is not to say that there are not general principles—so it is still wrong, and not merely " a matter of opinion" if someone finds their purpose in being a serial killer, pedophile or rapist.

I saw an account recently of the meaning of a teleological explanation: it is an explanation in terms of what something is for, rather than what conditions caused it. It doesn't sound like much, but really a lot hinges on that distinction.

Humans design things for particular purposes and even some animals can do that, I don't see how it follows that leaves were designed for the purpose of photosynthesis, stomachs for digestion, teeth for processing food or killing prey, claws for digging or killing and so on

For instance in Aristotle's fourfold causation, the final cause of a particular thing is its end goal or purpose. A mundane example is that the final cause of a match is fire, as the lighting of fires is the purpose of a match. But notice that in this case, the final cause comes after the striking of the match, being the reason for the existence of the match.

Yes I have been long familiar with Aristotle's four types of causes. Final causes are certainly relevant to human life because things are designed with particular purposes in mind. I don't see any reason to think that is the case with nature, although the question is one of those imponderables which cannot be definitively answered. The idea would only make sense in a theistic context—if you were one of those who believe in a God who has a plan then of course final cause would make sese in the context of that belief or assumption.

The efficient and material causes are the composition of the matchhead and the act of striking it. That is very much how science since the scientific revolution has tended to view causality: what causes something to happen, in terms of the antecedent combination of causes giving rise to an effect. Cause in the Aristotelian sense has largely been dropped. That's where a lot of the controversy about the so-called meaninglessness of the scientific worldview originates. It's also what is addressed in the Forbes Magazine article I linked above - and it's a bitter controversy, indeed, with a lot of heavyweights slugging it out. So trivial, it isn't.

I see no place for formal or final cause in the context of science. Material cause just means the set of conditions and constraints that operate globally as distinct from efficient or proximal causes which consist in local actions generally thought to involve energetic interactions.

Why should we project thinking in terms of formal and final causes beyond the human context? I'm not impressed by academic "heavy weights" but prefer to assess what they say on its own merits. I'm not impressed by arguments from authority, no matter who the purported authority might be.

That said I don't weigh in subjects I am not at least competent in, but when it comes to metaphysics there are no real experts. I agree with Wittgenstein that philosophy is not a matter of theory, but of practice, not of explanation but of description and conceptual clarity—I say leave the theories to the scientists, since so-called theories which cannot be tested don't really qualify as theories at all in my book.

So, you think it would be better if everyone thought the same and all find the same meaning in, and purpose for, life? — Janus

Not for a minute.

Why should we project thinking in terms of formal and final causes beyond the human context? — Janus

The ‘nature of purpose’ is the question posed in the original post. I feel that article I linked at least addresses it. The Aristotelian dimension places it in historical context.

That’s the question posed in the original post. I feel that article I linked at least addresses it. — Wayfarer

I'd prefer if you would speak for yourself rather than asking me to read linked articles. Otherwise, I'll be left guessing as to what your own thoughts are, and I really don't have the time for that.

I'd prefer if you would speak for yourself rather than asking me to read linked articles. Otherwise, I'll be left guessing as to what your own thoughts are, and I really don't have the time for that. — Janus

I did compose a lengthy response. I pinned the Forbes article because of its particular focus on the subject of the OP, and also to indicate that the question is a live issue and subject of debate, especially in biology.

I don't see any reason to think that is the case with nature, although the question is one of those imponderables which cannot be definitively answered. — Janus

In fact, the question of purpose, whether it is real or whether it is just imputed, seems to me a philosophical question par excellence. The fact that it’s *not* a scientific question, and why it’s not, is also a very interesting question.

In fact, the question of purpose, whether it is real or whether it is just imputed, seems to me a philosophical question par excellence. The fact that it’s *not* a scientific question, and why it’s not, is also a very interesting question. — Wayfarer

The reality of human and animal purpose is not in question. The question as to whether nature itself exists to fulfill an overarching purpose ("overarching" because such a purpose would necessarily be beyond nature itself) seems to be an impossible question to frame coherently outside the context of the assumption of theism.

Apart from the idea that there could be a designer who created nature for a purpose, what other possibility is there for an overall purpose for nature as a whole? If you are able to frame the question in another way, I would be happy to consider it.

Science doesn't deal in anything which is either unobservable or has no observable effects, so I don't find it surprising that it is not a scientific question. If it cannot be coherently formulated as a question (outside the presumption of theism) then I can't see how it is a philosophical question either.

The other question I would ask is how such an unanswerable (if not coherently unaskable) question could have any bearing on the philosophical issues around the human situation and human potential.

and also to indicate that the question is a live issue and subject of debate, especially in biology. — Wayfarer

Now you seem to be contradicting yourself: saying that the question of purpose is "a live issue and subject of debate, especially in biology" while also saying it is not a scientific question.

The reality of human and animal purpose is not in question. The question as to whether nature itself exists to fulfill an overarching purpose ("overarching" because such a purpose would necessarily be beyond nature itself) seems to be an impossible question to frame coherently outside the context of the assumption of theism. — Janus

That’s the question I was exploring above:

as our culture is individualist, we tend to conceive of purpose and intentionality in terms of something an agent does. Purposes are enacted by agents. This is why, if the idea of purpose as being something inherent in nature is posited, it tends to be seen in terms of God or gods, which is then associated with an outmoded religious or animistic way of thought. I think something like that is at the nub of many of the arguments about evolution, design and intentionality, and the arguments over whether the Universe is or is not animated by purpose. — Wayfarer

As for the purpose of ‘nature as a whole’, I think that indeed frames the question in such a way that we could never discern an answer. We don’t know ‘the whole’, but only participate in and enact our roles and purposes within that larger context. But as Victor Frankl observed, those with the conviction that there is meaning and purpose in life generally do better than those without it. Call it faith, if you will, but I resist the facile claim that this amounts to ‘belief without evidence’.

Science doesn't deal in anything which is either unobservable or has no observable effects, so I don't find it surprising that it is not a scientific question — Janus

But this is why the question has assumed urgency in biology, in particular, as all living organisms obviously act purposefully. Of course, in physics, there is no question of purpose - it’s all action and reaction, describable according to mathematical laws. As that became a paradigm for knowledge generally, namely ‘physicalism’, then it was simply assumed that life itself was also purposeless, as physicalism assumes that physics is the master paradigm, of which organisms are but one instantiation. But this is just what is being challenged in this debate over whether and how organisms and evolutionary processes are purposeful.

The other question I would ask is how such an unanswerable (if not coherently unaskable) question could have any bearing on the philosophical issues around the human situation and human potential. — Janus

But this is exactly an instance of the kind of positivism that I keep saying you seem to advocate. Remember the exchange yesterday, about Wittgenstein’s complaint that modern culture seems to say that something either has a scientific solution, or no solution at all? Isn’t this what you’re implying? That if science can’t adjudicate the question, then there can’t be an answer to it?

purpose comes with – or is invented by – mind. Bottom line, purpose is boot-strapped. And for most people that never being an adequate account, they invent something, usually, G/god/s, but maybe also technology and science meet the need for purpose. — tim wood

To me this is certainly the zone where the question comes from: that life is always toppling forwards, and being curious reason-seeking animals, humans ask for purposes. I too am a Collingwood man: the answers form an empty set. But the presuppositions that people bring to the question are interesting. Using the word 'mind' for instance is amazingly frequent, even among materialists.

I see no place for formal or final cause in the context of science. — Janus

If we want to understand our own existence, it is necessary. The trend, when Darwinist evolutionists separated themselves from Lamarckian evolutionists, and ridiculed Lamarck, was to ignore the purposefulness of living actions as a cause of evolutionary change, accepting instead "chance" as a proper cause of variation in living beings. However, these biological assumptions create the rift of understanding between conscious intentional actions of human agents, and purposeful actions of other living creatures.

Now, intentional activity is relegated to the social sciences, and there is a separation between these social sciences and the proper science of biology. The rift has been created by the way that empirical evidence is valued and assessed, which dates back to Darwinism. "Purpose" is effectively excluded from science proper, as unobservable. However, it is a necessary subject of social science. This creates the separation between "purpose" in the actions of human agents, and "purpose" in the actions of other living creatures, which I referred to in my last post. We place human beings on a pedestal, being "agents of intent", subject to law and social conventions, separating them from other creatures, and in doing this we provide no principles to show how conscious intention along with laws and social conventions, are just an evolutionary progression from, (an extension of), the purposeful acts of other living beings.

If we want to understand our own existence, it is necessary. — Metaphysician Undercover

If we want to have a particular understanding. It has seemed to me that your bias is always to attempt to force everything into a Procrustean bed of Aristotelian "science" - or understanding, his not quite being any science. And if all your efforts were just an "Aristotle says" game, that would be enough, interesting and instructive. But instead you seem to insist that it's all the way the world actually works. And it's pretty clear that the world does not actually work on Aristotelian principles and ideas.

"I should like to start by asking," what, exactly, you think teleology is. In particular I'm interested in whether you will say that the telos of a thing a) is a (some)thing, and b) is in some way intrinsic to but separate from the thing.

My bias is that for individuals becoming what they are is just the operation of law with occasional mutation - the kitten becomes a cat and never a horse. As for the evolution of species, that the operation of both law and chance, with occasional mutation. This group goes North and develops characteristics favorable for living in cold, that group South, and for hot. And those that do not, die.

Or are we in agreement, with just different words?

as our culture is individualist, we tend to conceive of purpose and intentionality in terms of something an agent does. Purposes are enacted by agents. This is why, if the idea of purpose as being something inherent in nature is posited, it tends to be seen in terms of God or gods, which is then associated with an outmoded religious or animistic way of thought. I think something like that is at the nub of many of the arguments about evolution, design and intentionality, and the arguments over whether the Universe is or is not animated by purpose. — Wayfarer

This is more of a psychological thesis than a philosophical treatment of the idea of purpose. Biologists may speak in terms of purpose in evolution, but they generally acknowledge this is a kind of metaphor. The 'literal' question is as to whether evolution is directed and driven by an end goal or goals. If it would have this kind of purpose then the question becomes 'Whose purpose?" and of course the only intelligible answer would seem to be 'God's".

You say purpose and intentionality are conceived in terms of something an agent does. What is an alternative way of framing it? That's the question you haven't addressed. The arguments over whether or not the Universe is animated by purpose, just are the arguments over whether or not a God exists. What else could they be?

As for the purpose of ‘nature as a whole’, I think that indeed frames the question in such a way that we could never discern an answer. We don’t know ‘the whole’, but only participate in and enact our roles and purposes within that larger context. But as Victor Frankl observed, those with the conviction that there is meaning and purpose in life generally do better than those without it. Call it faith, if you will, but I resist the facile claim that this amounts to ‘belief without evidence’. — Wayfarer

But the question just is about the purpose of nature as a whole. No one denies that humans and other animals have their purposes. And Frankl is indeed correct that those who find purpose in their lives do better than those who don't, but that says nothing about the existence or non-existence of purpose in nature as a whole. Some people need to believe in an overarching purpose in order to find purpose in their own lives, and others don't. Humans are diverse. I would say the most general purpose for humans would be to actualize, to realize, one's potential. Not everyone requires a "greater authority" in order to be concerned with the question of their own potential. Of course some do, and it is those who trun to religion. You agreed before that everyone does not need to think the same way.

But this is why the question has assumed urgency in biology, in particular, as all living organisms obviously act purposefully. Of course, in physics, there is no question of purpose - it’s all action and reaction, describable according to mathematical laws. As that became a paradigm for knowledge generally, namely ‘physicalism’, then it was simply assumed that life itself was also purposeless, as physicalism assumes that physics is the master paradigm, of which organisms are but one instantiation. But this is just what is being challenged in this debate over whether and how organisms and evolutionary processes are purposeful. — Wayfarer

Yes,organisms act purposefully—I haven't denied that. It isn't assumed on account of physics that life is purposeless (in the overarching sense)—it is only in the life sciences that purposeful behavior is observed. It follows that there is no evidence of purpose outside the context of life, and there it is only the purposes of individuals and collectives of individuals (animal and human communities) which are manifest. I don't think your psychological explanation holds water. There is no debate within evolutionary biology about whether evolution is purposeful—such a question is outside the scope of science as it is a theological question.

The other question I would ask is how such an unanswerable (if not coherently unaskable) question could have any bearing on the philosophical issues around the human situation and human potential.
— Janus

But this is exactly an instance of the kind of positivism that I keep saying you seem to advocate. Remember the exchange yesterday, about Wittgenstein’s complaint that modern culture seems to say that something either has a scientific solution, or no solution at all? Isn’t this what you’re implying? That if science can’t adjudicate the question, then there can’t be an answer to it? — Wayfarer

When you find you cannot counter what I say with rational argument you resort to framing me as one of your favorite bogeymen—as a positivist. How many times do I have to remind you that I don't think science is capable of answering anywhere near all the questions that are inherent in the human condition? Those questions have to be grappled with and answered, in their different ways, by individuals.

The point is that there can be no one general definitive answer to such questions, and that whatever "answers" are found cannot be rigorously tested as scientific answers can ("answers" in inverted commas because the experiences in which the sense of encountering them are generally ineffable). The one general truth that comes out of creative and spiritual pursuits is that people are capable of transformative altered states of consciousness. This is amply and perhaps most vividly demonstrated by the use and study of psychedelics, but I think meditative practices, mystical experiences and the arts also show this human potential for experiential transformation.

I've learned from past experience that you get annoyed when I do not answer your banal questions. So I'll give it a go.

"I should like to start by asking," what, exactly, you think teleology is. In particular I'm interested in whether you will say that the telos of a thing a) is a (some)thing, and b) is in some way intrinsic to but separate from the thing. — tim wood

Teleology is a way of studying things which looks at things in relation to purpose, reason for being. Accordingly, the telos of a thing can never be intrinsic to the thing, as purpose is defined by the thing's relation to something else, for example its function in a larger whole.

My bias is that for individuals becoming what they are is just the operation of law with occasional mutation - the kitten becomes a cat and never a horse. As for the evolution of species, that the operation of both law and chance, with occasional mutation. This group goes North and develops characteristics favorable for living in cold, that group South, and for hot. And those that do not, die.

Or are we in agreement, with just different words? — tim wood

I don't think we are in agreement. You've left out the teleological aspect. Why did this group go north, and that group go south? See, you say that going north, or going south, caused these groups to develop "characteristics favorable" to those areas, but you neglect the fact that they choose to go in those directions, so they already had characteristics which made them favour those areas, prior to going.

Teleology is a way of studying things which looks at things in relation to purpose, reason for being. Accordingly, the telos of a thing can never be intrinsic to the thing, as purpose is defined by the thing's relation to something else, for example its function in a larger whole. — Metaphysician Undercover

No disagreement here.

Why did this group go north, and that group go south? See, you say that going north, or going south, caused these groups to develop "characteristics favorable" to those areas, but you neglect the fact that they choose to go in those directions, — Metaphysician Undercover

But disagreement here. Going North didn't cause anything. Being North, they either adopted or died. Nor did I say that the going caused anything. And their choice incidental.

Above you have, "things in relation to purpose, reason for being." I prefer function, what it does, how it does it, and why.

Teleology has had its day. I suppose it was an improvement on whatever it replaced, but that 2300+ years ago - the "+" indeterminate because I have no idea when teleology first made an appearance. Nor does it seem to possess any explanatory value - beyond being a kind of assurance that things will behave as they're supposed to and not otherwise.

Teleology is a way of studying things which looks at things in relation to purpose, reason for being. — Metaphysician Undercover

That's correct: teleological explanations explain phenomena in terms of their purpose, rather than in terms of their antecedent causes. It seems a minor difference but a lot hinges on it.

The 'literal' question is as to whether evolution is directed and driven by an end goal or goals. If it would have this kind of purpose then the question becomes 'Whose purpose?" and of course the only intelligible answer would seem to be 'God's". — Janus

But this illustrates the very point I was making. The way we have to see it is that it must be either psychological - in the mind - or then it's theistic - as the agency of God. I'm attempting to deconstruct the worldview which makes it seem that these are the only choices. I think (and MU agrees in the above) that 'intentionality' is manifest at every level of organic life, and that it is purposeful.


The Forbes article:

Dennis Noble sees evidence of purposive and intentional evolution in our immune response to viruses. Detection of the invader triggers a flurry of rapid mutations in the genes of B cells, creating a legion of gene variants. These variants are antibodies, the most effective of which are deployed to combat the virus. In a defensive assault, the immune system self-modifies its own DNA. “It changes the genome. Not supposed to be possible,” says Noble. “Happens all the time.”

The conventional view is that this is still random natural selection—cranked up to warp speed inside the body during the lifetime of an individual organism. Noble agrees, but adds the observation that the organism’s immune system initiates and orchestrates the ramped up process, harnessing natural selection to fight off the invader. For Noble, this routine procedure offers clear evidence of the organism actively participating in its own evolution—it’s doing natural selection. This is an alternative theory of evolution where cognition is fundamental. In this theory, the smallest unit of life—cells—have some version of intelligence and intent that allows them to detect and respond to their environment. Noble clocks the immune response as a goal-directed pattern of behavior at the cellular level that scales to every level of organization within a living system. He believes we’re working ourselves into a sweat to exclude something so essential to evolution and to life as purpose and intention.

The article goes on:

Noble is part of The Third Way, a movement in evolutionary biology that views natural selection as part of a holistic, organism-centered process. He co-authored Evolution “on Purpose," published by MIT Press in 2023, which argues that organisms evolve with intention.

The Third Way site is here - I've been aware of it for a while, I read it from time to time. It's not aligned with any form of ID, but it's also sceptical of mainstream neo-darwinism. (I'm particularly drawn to the essays of Steve Talbott, which I encountered on The New Atlantis website.)

The historical background to the rejection of teleological explanations is tied to the advent of Galileo's physics which eliminated Aristotelian physics. But the idea of purpose and its absence is another matter.

The philosophical point lurking behind this is the question of 'randomness'. There's a lot of heat generated around the idea that evolution is a 'random process' - which of course it actually isn't, even under neo-Darwinism, because natural selection is a far from random process. But there still is an element of chance in two senses - that the existence of life itself is posited by naturalism to be a kind of fluke occurence, the fortuitous combination of elements that happened to give rise to organic life. And that the process by which mutations occur is also largely fortuitous, with unfavourable mutations being eliminated while those favourable to replication of the genotype being preserved. But the overall paradigm is still one of the 'blind watchmaker', to use Richard Dawkin's memorable simile: the process itself is not driven by any kind of intelligence, but is ultimately reducible to, and explainable in terms of, physical principles, albeit represented in unique forms by the complexities of organic chemistry.

Notice that the 'Third Way' approach mentioned above is not an attempt to re-introduce an 'intelligent designer' or presiding intelligence. It's strangely similar to one ancient form of the Logos, namely, the Logos Spermatikos, similar to that described in the Catholic (New Advent) Encylopedia:

God, according to them (the Stoics), "did not make the world as an artisan does his work, but it is by wholly penetrating all matter that He is the demiurge of the universe" (Galen, "De qual. incorp." in "Fr. Stoic.", ed. von Arnim, II, 6); He penetrates the world "as honey does the honeycomb" (Tertullian, "Adv. Hermogenem", 44), this God so intimately mingled with the world is fire or ignited air; inasmuch as He is the principle controlling the universe, He is called Logos; and inasmuch as He is the germ from which all else develops, He is called the seminal Logos (logos spermatikos). This Logos is at the same time a force and a law, an irresistible force which bears along the entire world and all creatures to a common end, an inevitable and holy law from which nothing can withdraw itself, and which every reasonable man should follow willingly (Cleanthus, "Hymn to Zeus" in "Fr. Stoic." I, 527-cf. 537).

which I find a compelling metaphor (although I hasten to add, nothing like that is proposed on the Third Way site that I'm aware of.)

But disagreement here. Going North didn't cause anything. Being North, they either adopted or died. Nor did I say that the going caused anything. And their choice incidental. — tim wood

Of course going north was causal. It caused them to be in those conditions. The conditions you describe as required to be "either adopted or died". You appear to be refusing to acknowledge that animals choose which direction they go, and their is purpose behind their travels. Since animals are in general, free to wonder, there must be a reason why they would choose to put themselves in an 'adapt or die' situation. This reason for them doing this is causal, though you deny it.

That's correct: teleological explanations explain phenomena in terms of their purpose, rather than in terms of their antecedent causes. It seems a minor difference but a lot hinges on it. — Wayfarer

I think that this is a misrepresentation. Teleology looks at purpose as causal. This is final cause. To portray a dichotomy between teleology and causality is to fall into the determinist trap of scientism, in which final cause, intention, free will etc., is excluded from the category of "causal". This restricts "cause" to efficient cause, making the world deterministic.

.

Teleology looks at purpose as causal. — Metaphysician Undercover

We're going to need your definition of "cause." And if needed, whether the teleological cause is unique or general.

Here are three+; you're welcome to choose or provide your own.
1) Agent A affords agent B both opportunity and motive to effect event E, which B does. A is then said to have caused E.
2) Agent A sets into motion a train of events E1, E2,..., En. Agent A is said to have caused En.
3) Cause C and Event E are said to be coincident in both space and time. Thus what causes the dynamite to explode is not in this sense the Agent with the motive, nor his lighting the fuse, but instead the lit fuse "causing" - igniting - the dynamite, the deltas of time and space being zero.
4) Or the Greek sense, if you can do it. I'm satisfied with that being understood as whatever answers the questions why or how.

Also you appear not to distinguish between purpose and purposeful. A screw in a machine has a purpose, but it would be a kind of animism to suppose it - the screw - to be purposeful.

And I would appreciate it if you would provide your distinction between function and telos. To me, function is what-it's-for, and if we're lucky, how it does it. Above you have telos being about relation and thus not being in the thing, the relation being "between" the thing and its purpose - not sure exactly what that means, or what you're trying to say. If telos is just another word for purpose, and if by purpose is meant function, then it should not be too difficult to note where the words are used beyond their sense. If telos is somehow the purposefulness - intention - of something able to have such a thing, then that is imho, the issue - what would be that thing.

This restricts "cause" to efficient cause, making the world deterministic. — Metaphysician Undercover

Eh? How does this work? How or why is efficient cause deterministic?

I'm sure we overlap in some of this; issues are where we differ.

The 'literal' question is as to whether evolution is directed and driven by an end goal or goals. If it would have this kind of purpose then the question becomes 'Whose purpose?" and of course the only intelligible answer would seem to be 'God's".
— Janus

But this illustrates the very point I was making. The way we have to see it is that it must be either psychological - in the mind - or then it's theistic - as the agency of God. I'm attempting to deconstruct the worldview which makes it seem that these are the only choices. I think (and MU agrees in the above) that 'intentionality' is manifest at every level of organic life, and that it is purposeful. — Wayfarer

First, what exactly do you mean by saying that intentionality is active at every level of organic life? Second, even if intentionality were "active at every level of organic life" in the way you mean it (presuming that you actually have a good grasp on what you mean by that), how could you test in a way that could demonstrate that? And even if you could demonstrate it, what significance could it have to how we should live our lives?

I am not going to deny that intentionality is "active at every level of life", because I don't really even know what that could mean. I think I understand to some degree human and even some higher animal intentionality, and I can see how that understanding might help my own living self-cultivation, but I can't see how a belief like, for example, the intentionality of cells could be of any relevance to that cultivation, because I find no familiarity in the idea.

And the final point I want to make is that even if we could know and show that there is an intentionality that we could understand as such at every level of life what could that demonstrate or prove about anything transcendent (which I think is where you are wanting to go with this. perhaps in order to justify some of your cherished personal beliefs)?

Perhaps there was a good reason that Gotama refused to answer metaphysical questions; not just because he thought that such preoccupations would distract people from practice, but perhaps also because he realized that such question are inherently unanswerable. Surely if he could have given empirically demonstrable or somehow self-evident once heard, and hence convincing, propositional answers to such questions, then that would have settled the matter in his disciples' minds and then they could have got on with the important thing: practice, no longer distracted by the perplexity that being obsessed with such questions would create.