It would be, indeed. But I take the view that the hedonic calculus should only be applied subject to the imperative to treat sentient beings as ends, and handing the kid over for torture would be treating him or her as a mere means, not an end.
The moral thing to do is what it has always been in such situations, e.g. in 1939 when we were made a not dissimilar offer by the Nazis: you fight the bastards. — Herg
The point is that not turning the wheel is just as much a choice as turning it. — Herg
The problem with this analysis is that to discretely decide to continue sitting is an act. It is a decision to omit standing. If someone decides to omit an act then they have acted, by deciding to continue in the course they were already in. But again, I am going to leave this omission vs. commission question for another day. — Leontiskos
NO! You lack a distinction between letting something bad happen and doing something bad. My action was to give the first person water to save them; and the simultaneous deprivation of water (from that act) of the second person is an inaction: it is a negative counter-part to a positive. You do not seem to have fully fleshed out this kind of distinction, and instead insist on everything being an action.
I intentionally let, in this example, the second person die: I did not kill them. This is morally permissible because (presumably) there was no morally permissible way to save them. — Bob Ross
Please see me and Leontisk conversation which I am responding to here as well. I addressed this with their diagrams above. — Bob Ross
Ok, good points.
By “means”, I mean “a necessary utility expended to produce an desired outcome”.
By “intention”, I mean “a purposeful or deliberate course of action”.
Because I accept the premise that “if I cannot achieve A without causing B, then I cannot intend A without intending to cause B”, I reject the premise I previously accepted (that “If I intend A and A causes effects P and Q, then I do not necessarily intend Q, even when I know that A causes Q”). — Bob Ross
Correct; and I like your diagrams for explaining it. I understand that, from your perspective, P is not a means to Q in V because if one removes P from A then Q is still connected to A. The problem is that when Q and P are necessary utilities for bringing about A, then A cannot exist without being connected to Q and P: you cannot remove P and keep Q connected to A—A disappears. — Bob Ross
I understand that, from your perspective, P is not a means to Q in V because if one removes P from A then Q is still connected to A. — Bob Ross
The problem is that when Q and P are necessary utilities for bringing about A, then A cannot exist without being connected to Q and P: you cannot remove P and keep Q connected to A—A disappears. — Bob Ross
The above account of indirect objects of intention seems to correspond to what Chisholm calls the principles of the ‘diffusiveness’ and ‘non-divisiveness’ of intention. The principle of the diffusiveness of intention is that if someone intends p, knowing that p entails q, then he intends the conjunction p and q. For instance, if a man intends to drive off in a car parked nearby, knowing that it belongs to someone else, then he intends this: to drive off in a car parked nearby that belongs to someone else. The principle of the non-divisiveness of intention is that if someone intends the conjunction p and q, he does not necessarily intend q by itself. The man may not intend just this: to drive off in a car that belongs to someone else.[22]
[22]: Roderick Chisholm, "The Structure of Intention." — Stephen L. Brock, Action and Conduct: Thomas Aquinas and the Theory of Action, Ch. 5: Praeter Intentionem, p. 204
Suppose an act has two effects: I press the accelerator and two things happen: my speed accelerates and my fuel is consumed. Do you think Aquinas is right, and it is possible to intend one effect without the other? When I press the accelerator do I intend to accelerate and do I intend to diminish my fuel? And even if so, do I intend them in the same way? Is the word "intend" being used in the same way for both of these effects? — Leontiskos
P ← A → Q
The problem is that this doesn’t completely represent the relationship whereof Q and P are necessary for A. I don’t know how to represent it this way, but in logic it would be “A → (P & Q)”: you can’t say that A → P is true when Q is false given “A → (P & Q)”. — Bob Ross
This premise is false in the examples we have given: A entailing P and Q does not imply that A entails that P entails Q—you are thinking in terms of the 7 diagram instead of a reciprocated V diagram (where A cannot exist without being connected to both Q and P). — Bob Ross
Take the car example, I am actually saying (as opposed to this premise 2):
{A → (P ^ Q)} → {![(A → P) && !(A → Q)]} — Bob Ross
Now, an easy way to understand the flaw in your reasoning is to reflect on your 7 diagram; because it implies that if you were to remove P that Q is still connected to A, which is not true, for example, in the case of the car swerving example. If A is “swerving to save four people” and P is “saving four people” and Q is “hitting two innocent bystanders”, then removing P does not result in A → Q. Viz, if the intention is to save four people, then the effect of hitting two innocent bystanders is no longer connected with the intention in the event that there are no four people to save. — Bob Ross
A: Swerve right
P: Avoid hitting all four people
Q: Hit the two people on the right — Leontiskos
Fair enough--except for the killing part: it is not a killing. Yes, from what I have said, and I did not catch it on my last response, it follows that letting the second person die is a means towards saving the first person: I accept this. — Bob Ross
The other absurdity that results from your view is that Q is a means to P and P is a means to Q, which is of course impossible. This is because in (2) (P ^ Q) is interchangeable with (Q ^ P), and what this means is that A leads both to the conclusion that Q is a means to P and to the conclusion that P is a means to Q. In other words: (A → (P ^ Q)) → (A → (P ↔ Q)). — Leontiskos
That’s exactly what it means for a thing to be dependent on two other things that are independent of each other. Operating this computer with two screens requires two different monitors. Monitor 1 and Monitor 2 are independent of each other analogous to the V diagram, but A (which is the operation of the computer with two screens) requires both. If you remove 1 or 2, then you cannot operate the computer with two screens (A); and it is not like the 7 diagram either: the monitors are independent of each other and mutually required for A. — Bob Ross
I would prefer we just refer to it as intentional killing vs. killing: that is the most clear way of presenting it. — Bob Ross
First of all, let's be clear: there is nothing wrong with treating someone as a means, provided you also treat them as an end.Suppose that instead of wanting a kid to torture, the aliens really really want to play Magnus Carlsen in chess. If he agrees to play, humanity gets gifted technology. If he refuses, we all get sent to the salt mines, except Magnus. The aliens like him and will gift him a good life no matter what he decides. But Magnus refuses to play! His ego is such that he would rather the world burn then being coerced into a game. Should humanity force Magnus to play? Maybe by threatening to execute him if he doesn't? Wouldn't that be treating him as a means? — RogueAI
For example the lever-puller will say that they merely let the single person die in order to save the five
To intend and cause the death of someone is to intentionally kill them
It makes no sense for you to say that you intend and cause their necessary death but you do not kill them.
Edit: If Bob Ross were right, then one would have a magic get-out-of-jail-free card for any moral quandary: just do nothing
Now I should say again that your definition of a "means" is not a good definition.
"something useful or helpful to a desired end."
One of the fundamental problems here is that your account is unable to distinguish between the "V" and the "7" in my diagram. So then either 1) There are no relevant moral differences between "V" situations and "7" situations, and therefore your inability to distinguish them is unimportant, or 2) There are relevant moral differences between "V" situations and "7" situations, and therefore your inability to distinguish them is problematic.
So it would instead be, "Q is not a means to P in 'V' because if one disconnects Q from A then P is still connected to A." Note that Q is not a means because it does not mediate A and P.
Let's get back to fundamentals again. There are two basic principles in conflict:
• Pdfs: The principle of the diffusiveness of intention
• Pndiv: The principle of the non-divisiveness of intention
You seem to be committed to the position which says that when I drive to the grocery store I am intending to consume fuel. This isn't correct. I intend to get groceries, and the consumption of fuel is a side-effect that I would prefer not occur. I only assent to it because I don't know how to get to the grocery store without consuming fuel.
…
if for some reason fuel is not consumed during my trip, the trip is successful all the same. If I get back to my home and see that the fuel has not been diminished, I do not say, "Oh no, my purpose was not achieved!"
Remember that the key is the relation between P and Q.
But again, to know whether Q is means to P we must understand the relation between P and Q, and the conditional necessity that you are betting all your chips on is represented by (P → Q).
So first, A is not "swerving to save four people." Saving four people is impossible, and we do not intend the impossible
Now, an easy way to understand the flaw in your reasoning is to reflect on your 7 diagram; because it implies that if you were to remove P that Q is still connected to A, which is not true, for example, in the case of the car swerving example. If A is “swerving to save four people” and P is “saving four people” and Q is “hitting two innocent bystanders”, then removing P does not result in A → Q. Viz, if the intention is to save four people, then the effect of hitting two innocent bystanders is no longer connected with the intention in the event that there are no four people to save.
Now if we are aiming at Q then we don't need to achieve P (although we could). So we can remove P without removing Q. But in fact we are not aiming at Q; we are aiming at P, and Q is not a means to P as
↪Herg
so helpfully demonstrated.
The central point has to do with whether Q is a means to P.
If you want to say that Q is still intentional killing even in the "V" case then that is a separate argument from the claim that Q is a means to P
• A "means" is asymmetrical. If A is a means to B, then B cannot be a means to A. Two things cannot be a means to one another.
"Supposing !(A → Q), would I still choose A?"
I would prefer we just refer to it as intentional killing vs. killing: that is the most clear way of presenting it. — Bob Ross
Yes of course you would, for that would aid your position. Likewise, I would prefer if we just refer to it as killing vs. non-intentional killing. So again, I suggest we not use the word "killing" without a prefix.
A "means" is asymmetrical. If A is a means to B, then B cannot be a means to A. Two things cannot be a means to one another. — Leontiskos
Sure, that’s fine: maybe I misunderstood what you were originally saying. I am saying is that Q is a means towards A, and A is an intention towards P. Q is intentional then, if one accepts that Q is intentional if it is a means towards A (that is being actualized). — Bob Ross
Q is a means to P, because one cannot achieve P without Q. Q is a necessary, utility towards P. — Bob Ross
No I am not. P does not entail Q nor does Q entail P in the car example: A → P & Q. — Bob Ross
This premise is false in the examples we have given: A entailing P and Q does not imply that A entails that P entails Q — Bob Ross
In the car example, one cannot achieve P without Q, so Q is a means to achieving P because a means is something useful to a desired end, and Q is useful towards the end P. — Bob Ross
This is the central point for our debate whether or not, in our examples, the person is intentionally killing anyone; but it is not the central point for our debate about whether or not letting a person die is always immoral. — Bob Ross
Like I said before, the V diagram is an incomplete representation of the examples we have had. Let’s take the car example: Q is required for P in this specific scenario S, although Q is not required to bring about P all else being equal (let’s call it E).
In S, one can represent it with the V diagram but with Q and P being both required for A; and one cannot remove Q without removing P. — Bob Ross
I reject “P<ndiv>”. Why should one accept that? — Bob Ross
Suppose an act has two effects: I press the accelerator and two things happen: my speed accelerates and my fuel is consumed. Do you think Aquinas is right, and it is possible to intend one effect without the other? When I press the accelerator do I intend to accelerate and do I intend to diminish my fuel? And even if so, do I intend them in the same way? Is the word "intend" being used in the same way for both of these effects? — Leontiskos
Secondly, intending to consume fuel to get groceries does not result in the purpose being uncompleted if fuel didn’t end up getting consumed: consuming fuel was the means to the end (i.e., purpose) and not the purpose itself. — Bob Ross
The above account of indirect objects of intention seems to correspond to what Chisholm calls the principles of the ‘diffusiveness’ and ‘non-divisiveness’ of intention. The principle of the diffusiveness of intention is that if someone intends p, knowing that p entails q, then he intends the conjunction p and q. For instance, if a man intends to drive off in a car parked nearby, knowing that it belongs to someone else, then he intends this: to drive off in a car parked nearby that belongs to someone else. The principle of the non-divisiveness of intention is that if someone intends the conjunction p and q, he does not necessarily intend q by itself. The man may not intend just this: to drive off in a car that belongs to someone else.22
That is, he may not be doing what he is doing because it will deprive someone else of a car, but only because it will provide him with the quickest means of getting to his destination. Again, this is the difference between direct and indirect objects of intention: only the former are explanations of the action that fulfills the intention. But despite this difference, if the man knows that the car belongs to someone else, it would be ridiculous to say that he positively meant not to drive off in someone else’s car.
The point is subtle. Many authors disagree with the diffusiveness of intention principle.23 Donagan, following Bratman, while not explicitly addressing Chisholm, uses this example: ‘If you intend to run a marathon and believe that you will thereby wear down your sneakers, it does not in the least follow that you intend to wear down your sneakers.’24 This example is similar to one used by St Thomas. ‘If someone often or always gets his feet wet when he goes to a muddy place, then granted that he does not intend this, nevertheless it is not said to be by [bad] luck.’25 But what Aquinas means is that although he does not intend simply to get his feet wet, this still falls under his intention. What Chisholm’s critics seem to ignore is the other principle, the non-divisiveness of intention.26 When taken together with it, the principle of the diffusiveness of intention appears to fit very well with the doctrine that actions are individuals, i.e. that one and the same action may admit many true descriptions whose combination is logically contingent. — Stephen L. Brock, Action and Conduct: Thomas Aquinas and the Theory of Action, Ch. 5: Praeter Intentionem, p. 204-5
Consider the frequent objection to the moral significance of the question of the directness or indirectness of some result, e.g. someone’s death. If what you do kills him anyway, what difference does it make whether or not you were aiming at his very death? It makes at least this much difference: if you did not aim at his very death, then, provided that you do succeed in bringing about what you did aim at, you will not mind if something happens to prevent him from dying after all.47 That is, even if his death is a nearly certain result of your succeeding in what you are doing, it is not you who are making certain of it. Of the things that might happen to thwart the killing of someone, at least some are things that someone bent on killing him would take into consideration and try to stop, while someone not having that aim would not. At any rate, his death cannot be as certain, on the supposition of your accomplishing your aim, as it would be if it were your aim, again on the supposition of your accomplishing your aim. The certainty of your getting what you aim at, if you get what you aim at, is plainly greater than the certainty of the occurrence of something other than what you aim at, if you get what you aim at. Still, this difference, which is only one of degree of certainty, is perhaps not very significant morally. At any rate the fact that you are not directly aiming at anyone’s death does not at all entail that no matter what you do, you cannot be guilty of murder.48 — Stephen L. Brock, Action and Conduct: Thomas Aquinas and the Theory of Action, Ch. 5: Praeter Intentionem, p. 210
"Supposing !(A → Q), would I still choose A?" — Leontiskos
What you are noting is the original intention, stripped of the necessary means towards A in the application of A in scenario S. That’s fine, but you can’t stop there — Bob Ross
No it is not: letting someone die is not an intentional killing—killing is an action. By “cause”, we could be saying that one’s action or inaction caused the person’s death. — Bob Ross
Do you not agree that “killing” is an action which results in the death of a living being? If you do, then it should be very apparent to you that letting someone die is not a killing — Bob Ross
This is either the biggest straw-man of my position I have had yet (to-date); or you have not grasped what I have been arguing. Letting someone die is morally permissible IF one cannot save them without committing an immoral act. — Bob Ross
It is always wrong to intentionally kill innocent people; so utilizing a means which has a foreseen consequence of killing an innocent person (thereby making it a part of the accidental aspect of the intention) is wrong. — Bob Ross
You have a lot of good points, but I am, to be honest, losing track of the course of this conversation. So I am going to take your advice and wipe the slate clean. I am going to attempt to provide a more clear and robust analysis of what I am trying to argue: consider anything in here that is contradictory to what I have previously said as a concession. — Bob Ross
An intention is an ideal meant to be actualized. — Bob Ross
An intention can have two aspects: what is essential and what is accidental.
The accidental aspect of an intention is the part of the ideal which is only in virtue of the particular circumstances in which it is being actualized.
The essential aspect of an intention is the part of the ideal which is not dependent on the circumstances whatsoever; and comprises the essence of it. — Bob Ross
The course of action chosen in a situation to actualize the intention is a part of the accidental aspect of it. E.g., if I intend to quench my thirst and I decide that I should walk into the kitchen to get a water bottle (or fill up a glass with water), then doing so is something I intend to do but merely because in the particular circumstances it is best for actualizing the essential aspect of my intention (which is to quench my thirst).
A means is something useful for an intention. — Bob Ross
A means is something useful for an intention. — Bob Ross
A means is not necessarily necessary. — Bob Ross
A means that is utilized for an intention always becomes a part of that intention. E.g., if I have the intention of getting groceries and I can use my bike or car and I choose to use my car, then using my car becomes a part of the ideal (but as an accidental aspect of it). — Bob Ross
The foreseen consequences of a means always become a part of the intention which utilizes that means. E.g., if I have the intention of getting groceries and I choose to use my car of which I know will pollute the atmosphere, then my car polluting the atmosphere is a part of the ideal (but an accidental aspect of it). — Bob Ross
It follows that in the V diagram, Q is not a means towards P; and P is not a means towards Q. A is a means towards Q and P. — Bob Ross
A means is something useful for an intention. — Bob Ross
It follows that swerving to kill two people to save two other people is a means towards saving the two people; but that the killing of the two people was not a means to saving the two people but, rather, an effect of swerving. — Bob Ross
It follows that the effects of swerving are twofold: killing two people and saving two people; and that both are intentional, because the foreseen consequences of a means (which, in this case, is swerving) are always intentional (albeit a part of the accidental aspect). — Bob Ross
It is always wrong to intentionally kill innocent people; so utilizing a means which has a foreseen consequence of killing an innocent person (thereby making it a part of the accidental aspect of the intention) is wrong. — Bob Ross
We aren't; that's the bit where we're treating him as a means.I don't see how we're treating Magnus as an end by forcing him to play chess with the aliens. — RogueAI
You don't have to save someone's life or better their condition to be treating them as an end. If you're playing chess and enjoying it, then my leaving you alone to enjoy yourself is treating you as an end.There is nothing at stake for him. He's not in any danger. We're not saving his life or bettering his condition in any way by forcing him to play/making him our slave. — RogueAI
Of course, but you said this:We're forcing him to play strictly for our own ends. — RogueAI
So we can treat him as an end by letting him go to the aliens. Of course he didn't want to play, but we have hypnotised him so that he now does, and presumably he will enjoy doing so. If you want to tweak the scenario so that he suffers while he's playing, then in effect we're complicit in torturing him, in which case the situation is essentially the same as it was with the kid, and so we shouldn't hand him over, we should fight the aliens instead.The aliens like him and will gift him a good life no matter what he decides. — RogueAI
Surely the point here is that if let Hitler live, he will continue to fail to treat millions of people as ends by murdering them; and our only way of treating those people as ends is to fail to treat Hitler, and unfortunately the janitor, as ends. So we either fail to treat two people as ends, or we are complicit in the failure to treat millions as ends.↪RogueAI Correct. If they know that they are going to kill an innocent person by intentionally killing hitler; then they are intentionally killing that innocent person to kill hitler. — Bob Ross
Okay, fair enough, and this is a good post. I will offer a few more posts, but I don't know how long I will stick around. I was limiting myself to the "means" question in large part because I don't have time to get drawn into all of the other related topics.
Somewhat, but I would not call it "an ideal."
"The end is first in the order of intention; the means is first in the order of execution."
My essential or per se intention is that which adheres most closely to the aim that my will has formed.
As a metaphor, the fastest and most efficient route to the grocery store adheres most closely to my end, my intention to get groceries.
The danger here is attaching intention too strongly to ends such that it becomes unattached to means
. You have an intention to quench your thirst but you also end up forming an intention to walk into the kitchen
Means and ends are both kinds of intentions
do they become equal parts in the intention of the end?
This is what Brock means by direct intention vs. indirect intention. A means is directly intended whereas a foreseen effect is only indirectly intended.
A is a (chosen) means to P, and Q is a foreseen effect of A, but does it follow that A is a means to Q?
This is where it becomes important to recognize that a means must be appropriated by a volitional subject in order to truly be a means.
1. "He means to achieve P"
2. "He means to achieve Q"
3. (both)
[4. “He per se intends P, and per accidens intends Q” ]
If Q is merely a foreseen effect then he neither means to achieve Q, nor does he mean to not-achieve Q. The fact that he does not mean to achieve it shows that it is not directly intended (in Brock's language). The fact that he does not mean to not-achieve it shows that it is indirectly intended on the presumption that he chooses/intends A. If he means to not-achieve Q then he would not choose/intend A. As I said above, "Supposing !(A → Q), would I still choose A?"
If A were a means to Q, then you would say that A is useful for some intention (with respect to Q). But what intention is that? The intended end is P, and A is only intended because it is a means to P.
A is "a means" to Q in the abstract sense, but it is not a means that you appropriate via intention
Throughout you have been making dozens of very minor mistakes which I overlook for the sake of time. Here is an example of that. Your first clause is technically true, but the description is inaccurate. Action A (swerving) is not done "to kill two people to save two other people."
So the whole point of my conversation with you is to demonstrate that a means and a foreseen effect are both intended, but in different ways!
Is it always wrong to accidentally-intentionally kill innocent people? More precisely, is it always wrong to indirectly intend to kill innocent people? Is voluntary "manslaughter" always negligent?
Another thing that we haven't directly delved into is the difference between causal necessity and logical necessity.
This relates to intention because indirect intentions and per accidens causality tend to go hand in hand. The closer to per se causality an act approaches, the less plausible is the idea that the effect was not directly intended. For example, it makes some sense to say that you pulled the lever without (directly) intending to cause the person's death, but it makes no sense at all to say that you pulled the lever without intending to switch the track
If you want to tweak the scenario so that he suffers while he's playing, then in effect we're complicit in torturing him, in which case the situation is essentially the same as it was with the kid, and so we shouldn't hand him over, we should fight the aliens instead. — Herg
Correct. If they know that they are going to kill an innocent person by intentionally killing hitler; then they are intentionally killing that innocent person to kill hitler. — Bob Ross
It is an ideal insofar as it is an idea about how reality should be. — Bob Ross
Not quite. The per se intention would be the ideal which you are trying to actualize, and any means of achieving it would be accidental. — Bob Ross
My essential or per se intention is that which adheres most closely to the aim that my will has formed. — Leontiskos
That which adheres most closely to that aim is just a means that adheres most closely to that aim—and so it is accidental, not per se. — Bob Ross
Getting groceries is the per se intention; and the fastest and using the most efficient route to the grocery store is the per accidens intention.
I think we are distinguishing per se and per accidens differently, perhaps? — Bob Ross
I would say a means is NOT an intention; but means can be intentional. — Bob Ross
But a means is not identical to an intention: there are means which one doesn’t not [sic] intend (e.g., they are not aware of them). The intention towards walking in the kitchen is a separate intention from quenching my thirst, but they are closely connected: the latter is the essence of what I am intending to do, whereas the former is just an accidental means towards it. I still intend both, just differently.
Likewise, if I did not intend the former, it would not change the fact that it is a means to the latter. — Bob Ross
Not in the sense as I defined it. I guess, what is your definition of a ‘means’? It can’t be how I defined it, because that definition does not preclude unintentional means. — Bob Ross
So we have it that a (chosen) means becomes a part of the intention of the end, and the foreseen effects of a (chosen) means become a part of the intention of the end. But the same crucial question that I asked earlier arises here: do they become equal parts in the intention of the end? — Leontiskos
Not in the sense that I think you mean it. I only intend to walk to the kitchen because I intend to quench my thirst. — Bob Ross
A is a means to Q because A is useful for facilitating Q—even if one accidentally intends or doesn’t intend at all Q.
You are right that Q is a foreseen effect; but that doesn’t absolve A from being a means toward that effect. — Bob Ross
I can appreciate what you are going for: he “means” to achieve P and not Q in the sense that P is the main, primary goal and Q is not at all. But this does not absolve him, in this scenario, from intending Q; because a foreseen effect of a chosen means is intentional. — Bob Ross
It seems like, then, you are agreeing with me with different words: Q is, in this example, intentional—but indirectly. Then it is not true that “He means only to achieve P”: he means to achieve P, and this requires him to achieve Q as well (simply because A is a means towards both and never one or the other). — Bob Ross
It is useful for achieving Q—which has not direct relation to any intention. There could be no intention towards Q, and it would still follow that Q can be facilitated by way of A. — Bob Ross
It is appropriated via intention if one accepts my premise that “if one foresees an effect (Q) of a means (A) and chooses to use that means (A) to achieve their intention towards another effect (P), then they thereby intend Q”. — Bob Ross
This is why I was wary to call it “per accidens”, because I am NOT referring to a colloquial usage of the term “accident”: the latter is used commonly to refer to something someone didn’t intend to do. Manslaughter is when someone unintentionally kills someone: having a per accidens intention to kill someone for the sake of a per se intention to save someone else is NOT an unintentional killing.
The accidental aspect I am referring to, is the part of the intention, which is still an intention, that is required in the specific circumstances to achieve the original, per se, intention. Both are intentional, even if they are intended in different ways. That’s not how manslaughter works. — Bob Ross
So we either fail to treat two people as ends, or we are complicit in the failure to treat millions as ends.
[1] If you kill someone, then you are not treating them as an end (unless it is mercy killing).
[2] If you let someone die when you could save them, the same is true.
[...]
...the principle that we should treat people as ends rather than just as means (which I shall label EP)... — Herg
Surely the point here is that if let Hitler live, he will continue to fail to treat millions of people as ends by murdering them; and our only way of treating those people as ends is to fail to treat Hitler, and unfortunately the janitor, as ends. So we either fail to treat two people as ends, or we are complicit in the failure to treat millions as ends. — Herg
disagree. You have fallen into the consequentialist trap. You think it is ok to use people as a means towards (or at as sacrifices for) good ends. — Bob Ross
In the case of Alan, Betty, Charles and Dora, where the driver let Charles and Dora die by not turning the wheel, can we at any rate agree that you consider the lives of Charles and Dora to be less important than obedience to the rule that you should not kill an innocent person by positive action?1. I did not use the five, by letting them die, as a means because there is no action I took which leveraged a means towards that end — Bob Ross
It's 50 years since I read Kant, so I am horribly rusty. But when I look up Kant's second formulation of the categorical imperative, I find that it reads as follows:[1] If you kill someone, then you are not treating them as an end (unless it is mercy killing).
[2] If you let someone die when you could save them, the same is true.
[...]
...the principle that we should treat people as ends rather than just as means (which I shall label EP)...
— Herg
Similar to what ↪Bob Ross has said, I don't think (1) or (2) violate EP. (1) and (2) fail to treat someone as an end, but they do not treat that person as a means. EP requires that we "treat people as ends rather than just as means." (1) and (2) violate the separate principle that we must always treat everyone as an end, which is not a commonly accepted moral principle. — Leontiskos
Surely the point here is that if let Hitler live, he will continue to fail to treat millions of people as ends by murdering them; and our only way of treating those people as ends is to fail to treat Hitler, and unfortunately the janitor, as ends. So we either fail to treat two people as ends, or we are complicit in the failure to treat millions as ends.
— Herg
I'm sorry, I don't know what you are getting at in your second sentence here. Can you put it another way?This is the same equivocation between EP and the separate principle. Kantian morality does not admit of perplexity, where there are cases where we must decide who to treat as an end. — Leontiskos
I don't see the EP as a subordinate end, and I apologise if I gave the impression that I did. It's rather the other way round: I see the EP (in my two-part formulation) as primary, and the hedonic calculus, if we need it all, as secondary.I am not sure how well Benthamite utilitarianism mixes with the second formulation of Kant's Categorical Imperative. It is a bit of an odd mixture, and this movement from (Kant's) EP to the separate principle is a case in point. As I see it, the difficulty is that EP can't really fit the role of a "subordinate end," to use Bentham's language. Bentham's approach seems opposed to Kant's, and Kant seems directly opposed to consequentialism. — Leontiskos
In the case of Alan, Betty, Charles and Dora, where the driver let Charles and Dora die by not turning the wheel, can we at any rate agree that you consider the lives of Charles and Dora to be less important than obedience to the rule that you should not kill an innocent person by positive action?
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