• Angelo Cannata
    354
    Let’s start with a premise. Everything written in this message has to be considered as a personal hypothesis, a subjective opinion or feeling, or even delusion. The moment you interpret anything written here in an objective way, as something that is real, true, something that is, or might be, a fact, that moment it will lose its magic power, the spell will instantly stop working.

    Now think of yourself, your feeling yourself now, while you are reading these words. Consider that this feeling cannot be confused with another moment when you took this same thing into consideration. Other moments are objects belonging either to your memory of the past or your imagination about the future. What you can feel now is not an object, because it is entirely exclusive of you and of now: it cannot happen to anybody else, it won’t happen anymore in the future and it never happened in the past. Other moments, of you or of other people, can contain similarities, but they won’t be the same moment: this specific moment of you feeling you now is unique and will never happen again.

    This feeling “yourself now” shouldn’t be confused with what we can imagine about other people having similar feelings. The difference is that the feeling of other people is in our imagination, while your feeling your self now is not imagination: it is a direct feeling, that actually you cannot even describe to yourself. You are feeling, now, that you are you, you are not imagining it or describing it by words.

    Other people can object that what seems to me a pure feeling is actually entirely a product of culture, language, brain structures. This objection doesn’t make a difference because, even if my feeling is just a result of my culture and language, this doesn’t destroy my personal feeling of it as something that is happening to me now. What I am talking about is not my concept of something, but my subjective feeling. Since it is entirely subjective, it doesn’t matter if it is entirely an illusion. If it is an illusion, well, I am feeling now, in me, this illusory feeling, this dream. I am not making any claim about any kind of objectivity of it. I am not making Descartes’ claim that my illusion can be taken as evidence of my existence. I am just saying that I feel myself. This statement “I feel myself” should be considered not exactly like a statement, but as more similar to an instinctive scream, that is something completely subjective, completely questionable.

    From what we have considered so far, it follows that this feeling you of yourself can diminish its existence, until it could probably even disappear completely when you are completely distracted by other thoughts, considerations and awareness. According to this hypothesis, the moment you are distracted by other thoughts, you automatically become a machine, an object, a computer, you do not exist anymore; what exists is just your body working like a machine, the same way when you die you do not exist anymore and what exists is just your corpse.

    This is similar to the situation before you were born: your atoms and molecules existed already, somewhere, separated and far from each other, but there was not you feeling yourself, at least as far as we can perceive from our subjective experience of feeling “I”.

    This means that this feeling you of yourself has degrees of existence: the moment you were born you were still just like a working machine; later, slowly, this ability of you to feel you was developing more and more.

    That’s why a lot of people today consider that abortion is not exactly 100% equivalent to a murder: we, subjectively, perceive that a baby who is not yet born must have such a reduced awareness, consciousness, that he/she is almost 100% like a working machine. My expressions “not exactly” and “almost” are essential in this case, because this not being completely 100% a machine is what makes the difference in the perspective of those who are against abortion. I don’t have any intention here to enter the debate about abortion: I have referred to it just because it is useful to my philosophical experiment about the experience of feeling “I”.

    The same reasoning about abortion applies to the debate about violence against animals and even about plants: from our subjective perspective we feel that their feeling “I” must happen in a diminished way, compared to our personal feeling “I”, so that their suffering is more similar to a machine getting violence: there is not “somebody” who is suffering inside that machine.

    We can extend this reasoning even to our perception of other adult humans: for several reasons, events, or probably even intentions and choices (but I am not going to discuss here about the objective existence of freedom, responsibility, ethics and morality), our subjective awareness can become so limited, so blind, so clouded and obscured that we can think that we can kill anybody, simply because we don’t have any strong perception, awareness, of their having a feeling “I” like we have of ourselves. Or, that one might even be the exact reason why we kill that person, that is exactly because we want that person to suffer, for example in a fit of rage, an impulse of revenge. Similar considerations apply to suicide.

    Now let’s leave aside all these reflections and go back to my initial central point: me asking you to consider your feeling yourself while you are reading these words.

    Let’s add a few more considerations.

    If we say that everybody has his/her exclusive feeling of being “I”, what we are talking about this way is not anymore the true authentic experience of subjectivity, because, by adopting this way of describing it, what we are considering is what is common to everybody. What is common to everybody is something objective, even when we consider “what is exclusive of everybody”: this is an objectivistic language, that moves our attention away from the exclusivity of my or your personal feeling of now. This means that the only way I have to make an idea of the feeling “I” of other people is by objectifying it, that is entering in a context of ideas that completely betrays the fact that what we are talking about is subjectivity, not objectivity. As a consequence, the only correct, authentic way of thinking about subjectivity is when I try to pay attention to my feeling “I” the moment I am thinking about it. As I said, if I think of my feeling “I” that happened yesterday, that one is an objectified, petrified concept, it is not the real concept of subjectivity that should coincide with the experience felt now by me. The same applies if we say that we are talking about “the feeling “I” here and now”: this expression is just another objectification of the concept because, when we think of it, we think of an abstract idea, similar to the concept of “my feeling I of yesterday”: these expressions do not guarantee that we are paying attention to our present feeling “I” the moment we are thinking about them.

    Again, as I said, all of these things have to be considered as subjective thoughts and ideas, either thought by me or thought by you. It follows that my idea of this “authentic concept of subjectivity” coincides with the working of the magics of this train of thoughts. If you feel that you can tell me that the magics worked, then I think that probably you have understood my message. I must add “probably”, because, obviously, I have absolutely no way to check what you really felt: my experience of my feeling “I” belongs to me exclusively and it is ultimately completely impossible to me to share it with anybody else. My experimental idea is that it seems to me that the only way we have to talk authentically about subjectivity is by trying to evoke it with a train of thoughts that works like the magic formulas and rituals of evoking ghosts. There is a difference between talking about ghosts and evoking them, that is making them really present now (by the way, I don’t believe in ghosts, it is just a reference example that I find useful).

    If the magics of this message have worked in you, you can understand why, in my opinion, almost 100% of discussions, both philosophical and scientific, about consciousness, subjectivity, qualia, “being like to be a bat”, quantum theories about consciousness, are completely wrong, completely groundless: they don’t realize that what they talk about, what they do research about, is not actual subjectivity, but an objectified, petrified idea of it, that is exactly the opposite of it, the opposite of what they want to talk about. The only way to talk correctly about subjectivity is by adopting a language that declares itself as being a subjective language, adopting the language structures of magic spells, rather than structures of reasoning that make all efforts to be objective. Magic spells, as “trains of thoughts”, have some similarity to narrative language. In some ancient traditions the act of telling stories has some magic power of evoking the real, actual presence of what they tell.

    We might wonder if this whole message could have been written by a computer, especially one equipped with AI. About this point I think that it is completely irrelevant: what I have been talking about is nothing objective. If a computer with AI can evoke ghosts, what is important to me is not if ghost have been really evoked or if the computer was really able to evoke them, or if the computer has been able to have the intention to evoke them. What is important is if I have the subjective feeling that ghosts have been evoked. If I have this feeling, then ghosts have been evoked for sure, because we are not talking about anything objective, but exclusively about subjectivity. Here the expression “for sure” has to be interpreted as my subjective declaration, an expression of my instinct, of my inner feeling, that has nothing to do with any kind of realistic objectivity.
  • mcdoodle
    1.1k
    Perhaps some poems are also your magic spells. This is by Emily Dickinson.

    Me from Myself -- to banish --
    Had I Art --
    Impregnable my Fortress
    Unto All Heart --

    But since Myself -- assault Me --
    How have I peace
    Except by subjugating
    Consciousness?

    And since We're mutual Monarch
    How this be
    Except by Abdication --
    Me -- of Me?
  • Angelo Cannata
    354


    Emily Dickinson is provocative, critical, rebellious, of course, and I appreciate this. I agree that the very act of doing philosophical research about consciousness can hide an attempt to assert a specific concept of consciousness that wants to meet or even impose the specific expectations of a specific society. In this context I agree that even what I interpret in myself as an instinctive perception, feeling of my present self, could be nothing but a result of what my society has been able to introduce into my way of thinking and perceiving myself.
    However, it seems to me that my feeling myself as a living perspective, as a point of view present here and now, still deserves consideration. After all, I make no metaphysical claims of being somebody. My feeling me is just a feeling and I take care not to want to understand it, as I think that trying to understand is not a faithful approach to this feeling.
    I think that my concept of self feeling in the present can help to have respect of others, not only people, but also plants and animals.
    In this context I even think that, probably, my feeling I and Dickinson's saying "I am nobody" are almost the same thing, despite looking like the contrary of each other, because both of them are against a metaphysical understanding of the I, rather taking the way of humility, criticism and self-criticism.
  • Fire Ologist
    713
    What you can feel now is not an object, because it is entirely exclusive of you and of now:Angelo Cannata

    “What” you can feel now. Sounds like an object.

    he difference is that the feeling of other people is in our imagination, while your feeling your self now is not imagination: it is a direct feeling, that actually you cannot even describe to yourself. You are feeling, nowAngelo Cannata

    Sounds like an object. The feeling is objectified by “me” feeling.

    even if my feeling is just a result of my culture and language, this doesn’t destroy my personal feeling of it as something that is happening to me now.Angelo Cannata

    “My personal feeling of it as something that is happening.” Like an object might happen.

    but as more similar to an instinctive scream, that is something completely subjective, completely questionable.Angelo Cannata

    But you are not questioning it, even in the face of all of the content your feeling is comprised of being an illusion, you aren’t questioning the fact of the feeling. “Feeling” as an act, regardless of what is being felt, becomes the content, becomes the “what”, the object.

    the moment you are distracted by other thoughts, you automatically become a machine, an object, a computer, you do not exist anymore; what exists is just your body working like a machine, the same way when you die you do not exist anymore and what exists is just your corpse.Angelo Cannata

    So we are back to the world. Objects. Though unaware of their own objectivity, but “body” and “machine” and “likeness” and “the same way” and a “corpse”. The world of objects from which the feeling of subjective experiences inherited its own objectivity.

    I have absolutely no way to check what you really feltAngelo Cannata

    If someone says something that you would say about how you felt, but you didn’t say it, then isn’t this a measurement of whether two people have the same sense, the same feeling about something? I say 2+2 equals my feelings, and they say “I know what you mean. I feel 3+1.” Without saying “4” Both can see something of what the other feels. They objectify subjectivity together, by using different words to demonstrate the same feeling.

    I don’t know about anything I said either…
  • T Clark
    13.9k
    almost 100% of discussions, both philosophical and scientific, about consciousness, subjectivity, qualia, “being like to be a bat”, quantum theories about consciousness, are completely wrong, completely groundless: they don’t realize that what they talk about, what they do research about, is not actual subjectivity, but an objectified, petrified idea of it, that is exactly the opposite of it, the opposite of what they want to talk about.Angelo Cannata

    You seem to be arguing with someone who doesn't exist. I don't know of anyone who believes that studying human consciousness and experience using psychology, neurology, cognitive science, anatomy, biology, sociology, or any other method is the same thing as the experience itself. That doesn't mean that kind of study isn't interesting and important in its own right.
  • Angelo Cannata
    354

    Essentially I agree: I think that it impossible to get rid completely of objectivism, both in our language and in our ideas. But this doesn't mean to me that objectivity is the world, is reality, is where everything ultimately ends up to. What I do is an effort and I think that this effort is condemned to be unable to give any evidence about itself, about its own existence. On the other side, I am sure that objectivity is condemned as well to be exposed to criticism, because it is unable to give evidence of being independent from subjectivity.
    I think that the best way is trying to build a dialog between subjectivity and objectivity. This sounds very similar to me to the dialogue that, at the end, "analytical" and "continental" (or postmodern) philosophers have tried to elaborate.
    In this context, personally, I have a tendency to favor subjectivity, relativism, postmodernism.
    I also agree, essentially, about the problem of questioning and self-questioning. It is never possible to give evidence about our questioning being really radical: it can always be accused of being just hypocrisy. Still, I think that efforts are worth doing: if nothing can be proven, not even questioning, we can at least make attempts. I think that this criterion of "making attempts" is very useful to avoid getting stuck in infinite and sterile polemics.
  • Fire Ologist
    713
    But this doesn't mean to me that objectivity is the world, is reality, is where everything ultimately ends up to.Angelo Cannata

    I agree with that. There is more than objectivity, so much so that many think objectivity can be abandoned or ignored.

    Still, I think that efforts are worth doing:Angelo Cannata

    I agree as well. I see a lot of effort to clarify the postmodern. I think the pendulum has swung too far, too long, and more effort is needed to admit the fixed, the unchanged, and the objective.

    The revolution is over. Dogma and the dominance of reason is over. But we keep making rules and using reason to argue with each other; we should just admit there is dogma we can’t escape and it is worth the effort to see if we can find agreement on any of it.
  • Angelo Cannata
    354

    I didn't mean that real things are different from the study of them. Of course everyone knows that studying an orange is not an orange. What I meant is that they think that they are studying subjectivity, they think that subjectivity, or consciousness is what they are making their research about. Against this thought, I oppose that they do not study subjectivity, they do not study consciousness. This criticism of mine, obviously, can be applied to everything, if we generalize it. Obviously, a lot of work of physicists who study the stars, for example, is not strictly and directly connected to the real stars, but to our ideas of them. This is inevitable. However, I think that certain topics can be objectified more easily, while other ones are more exposed to completely losing any connection with them. I think that objectifying stars, for example, is not a big issue. On the contrary, I think that science is so powerful and so valuable exactly because of its strong objectifying methodology. But objectifying subjectivity sounds to me like wanting to answer to a hug and a kiss with a mathematical lecture. I don't deny that even hugs and kisses can be reduced to maths, although infinitely complex maths. But I think that the task of philosophy is not just reducing and understanding. As I said in my opening post, I think that, for some topics, the criterion of wanting to understand is wrong even in philosophy. I think that philosophy can relate itself with topics in ways different from wanting to understand, to reduce, to explain. We know that philosophers, especially the ancient ones, were not all just thinkers and "understanders": philosophy was to many of them a style of living.
  • T Clark
    13.9k
    I didn't mean that real things are different from the study of them. Of course everyone knows that studying an orange is not an orange. What I meant is that they think that they are studying subjectivity, they think that subjectivity, or consciousness is what they are making their research about. Against this thought, I oppose that they do not study subjectivity, they do not study consciousness.Angelo Cannata

    Sorry, you lost me. You recognize the objective study of something is not the same as the thing itself. So, why can't I objectively study consciousness or human experience?

    Taoists say "The Tao that can be spoken is not the eternal Tao. The name that can be named is not the eternal Name." But that's not just true about consciousness, it's true of everything, including oranges.
  • Fire Ologist
    713
    I think that certain topics can be objectified more easily, while other ones are more exposed to completely losing any connection with them.Angelo Cannata

    I completely agree with that. And we should treat with a skeptical eye anything objective that is said of those types of objects of study that can be buried in jargon completely disconnected from the initial inquiry.

    But the fact that certain objects of study, like metaphysics, or the reasoning, knowing mind, can easily lose connection from the seeming source of the inquiry, should not banish them from serious study. Not that you are saying that they should be banished - it’s just the thrust of postmodernism seems to me leaves them as parlor tricks and exercises in futility only. There will always be a metaphysic. We should seek it, carefully, but seek it.
  • Angelo Cannata
    354

    I think that oranges are different from consciousness, with reference to this discussion. I think that oranges are not very subjective. That's why science is able to say a lot about orange, a lot of strong, measurable and very unquestionable things. About consciousness, science is even unable to determine if it exists and what it is exactly. The reason, in my opinion, is that our experience of our subjectivity here and now is almost entirely coincident with the concept of subjectivity itself. I think that our experience of subjectivity that happens in the present is the most subjective thing that we can think of. In this situation, wanting to objectify subjectivity, to be able to study it, is like wanting to put a kiss or a hug in a slide to be able to observe it with a microscope.
  • T Clark
    13.9k
    I think that oranges are different from consciousness, with reference to this discussion. I think that oranges are not very subjective.Angelo Cannata

    I disagree. Consciousness can be studied just as much as oranges can. And oranges can be experienced subjectively.

    About consciousness, science is even unable to determine if it exists and what it is exactly.Angelo Cannata

    I don't agree. There are often problems getting people to define what they mean when they say "consciousness," but once you get that tied down, there's no problem. Of course it exists. I've experienced it myself and observed it's results in others.

    In this situation, wanting to objectify subjectivity, to be able to study it, is like wanting to put a kiss or a hug in a slide to be able to observe it with a microscope.Angelo Cannata

    How to hug, according to scienceScience
  • Kizzy
    133
    Wow, what a post! When a magician is revealing the tricks, who is left to be entertained? Who is so easily amused and still coming to see the show?

    If we say that everybody has his/her exclusive feeling of being “I”, what we are talking about this way is not anymore the true authentic experience of subjectivity, because, by adopting this way of describing it, what we are considering is what is common to everybody. What is common to everybody is something objective, even when we consider “what is exclusive of everybody”: this is an objectivistic language, that moves our attention away from the exclusivity of my or your personal feeling of now. This means that the only way I have to make an idea of the feeling “I” of other people is by objectifying it, that is entering in a context of ideas that completely betrays the fact that what we are talking about is subjectivity, not objectivity. As a consequence, the only correct, authentic way of thinking about subjectivity is when I try to pay attention to my feeling “I” the moment I am thinking about it. As I said, if I think of my feeling “I” that happened yesterday, that one is an objectified, petrified concept, it is not the real concept of subjectivity that should coincide with the experience felt now by me. The same applies if we say that we are talking about “the feeling “I” here and now”: this expression is just another objectification of the concept because, when we think of it, we think of an abstract idea, similar to the concept of “my feeling I of yesterday”: these expressions do not guarantee that we are paying attention to our present feeling “I” the moment we are thinking about themAngelo Cannata
    Yes!! Glad you continued on here with this important addition...consideration to these details ought to be had even further....I am walking on imaginary eggshells here.

    I read Martin Buber's "I and Thou" and shared that intel in the "currently reading" discussion nearly 10 months ago. I find it may suit the liking of maybe perhaps at least one whom is also interested in this discussions contents. In the book, Buber uses the two words, I-it and I-thou, I-It treats the other as an object to be used for one's own purposes. It lacks empathy and reduces the other to a mere thing or instrument. I-Thou is characterized by mutual respect, empathy, and dialogue. It recognizes the unique worth and dignity of the other, fostering genuine connection and shared humanity. Buber writes in Part One, "As experience, the world belongs to the primary word I-it. The primary word I-thou establishes the world of relation." [M.Buber 1923, I and Thou, translated by R.G.S, Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 38 George St, 1937] Link to download ebook here: https://www.maximusveritas.com/?page_id=781

    People mistake interactions and relationships for one in the same type of connection or connection piece....

    In this situation, wanting to objectify subjectivity, to be able to study it, is like wanting to put a kiss or a hug in a slide to be able to observe it with a microscopeAngelo Cannata
    I find this intriguing. I once envisioned a similar scenario: a new couple, where one partner prematurely declares their love. This declaration alters the dynamics of the foundational base that was building the relationship between the two individuals. The more time left for contemplation, I believe, may start to shift the perceptions of the other partner.

    Once the foundation has shifted and time has passed, the mind may race, with or without our control, potentially testing the relationship. The test comes when the conversation occurs, where each individual is given the opportunity to express their feelings and reactions to the statement that caused this shift in perspective. The way we express these feelings also contributes to these foundational conditions, either reinforcing or challenging our pre-existing notions.

    These feelings update the subject with existing ideas, opinions, and experiences (biases) that brought them to this moment. When we listen to understand the thoughts or opinions of the other, we uncover new reactions and observed qualities. Each individual discovers something in the other that changes how they view each other, for better or worse.

    Values, worth, and weight are assigned without specific energy inputs/outputs known. These are massless but carry weight and value on a scale embedded within the individual before conscious awareness. The scale is not measuring weight; it's showing how its weight moves the body. The mass of the body doesn't reveal anything; gravity is a non-factor. The mass of the body and the weight or value we place on objects, things, or words are maintained in the mind. Understanding ourselves aids in understanding all.

    Weight and pressure are felt and placed upon us, but they have no mass. Friction, heat, work, energy in mind? Do ideas here in mind hold heat, power, energy, motion, time, or space? I am not sure. My immediate thought is: No, we, the people with the ideas, do!

    We assign and misplace values that are subjectively distinct for a reason: to learn our lesson. This subjective nature has nothing to do with the objectivity of the external world or reality as it exists without mind. Uniqueness, randomness, and chaos together happening and creating ideas along the track we know as time. The worth and values, knowingly and unknowingly placed and misplaced, may guide us to a better place to learn from, yet we still know nothing about the "nature" of the Universe from this. How natural is the Universe, really? Earth is home to freaks of nature, but how natural is that, truly?

    MUST BE THE MAGIC!! :halo:

    Quotes from Buber's "I and Thou":

    "Feelings are "entertained" : but love comes to pass. Feelings dwell in man; but man dwells in his love. That is no metaphor, but the actual truth. Love does not cling to the I in such a way as to have the Thou only for its "content," its object; but love is between I and Thou"

    "Take knowledge: being is disclosed to the man who is engaged in knowing, as he looks at what is over against him. He will, indeed, have to grasp as an object that which he has seen with the force of presence, he will have to compare it with objects, establish it in its order among classes of objects, describe, and analyse it objectively. Only as IT can it enter the structure of knowledge. But when he saw it, it was not thing among things, no event among events, but exclusively present. Being did not share itself with him in terms of the law that was afterwards elicited from the appearance, but in terms of its very self."

    "The primary word I-thou can be spoken only with the whole thing. Concentration and fusion into the whole being can never take the place through my agency, nor can it even take place without me. I become through my relation to the Thou; as I become I, I say Thou. All real living is meeting"

    "I can neither experience nor describe the form which meets me, but only body it forth. And yet I behold it, splendid in the radiance of what confronts me, clearer than all the clearness of the world which is experienced. I do not behold it as a thing among the "inner" things nor as an image of my "fancy," but as that which exists in the present. If test is made of its objectivity the form is certainly not "there." Yet what is actually so much present as it is? And the relation in which I stand to it is real, for it affects me, as I affect it."

    "Creation reveals, in meeting, its essential nature as form. It does not spill itself into expectant senses, but rises up to meet the grasping senses. That which will eventually play as an accustomed object around the man who is fully developed, must be wooed and won by the developing man in strenuous action. For no thing is a ready-made part of an experience; only in the strength, acting and being acted upon, of what is over against men, is anything made accessible. Like primitive man the child lives between sleep and sleep (a great part of his waking hour is also sleep) in the flash and counter-flash of meeting"

    "And just as prayer is not in time but time in prayer, sacrifice not in space but space in sacrifice, and to reverse the relation is to abolish the reality, so with the man to whom I say Thou. I do not meet with him at some time and place or other. I can set him in a particular time and place; I must continually do it: but I set only a he or she, that is an it, no longer my thou.
    So long as the heaven of Thou is spread out over me the winds of causality cower at my heels, and the whirlpool of fate stays its course.
    I do not experience the man to whom I say Thou. But I take my stand in relation to him, in the sanctity of the primary word. Only when i step out of it do i experience him once more. In the act of experience Thou is far away.
    Even if the man to whom I say Thou is not aware of it in the midst of his experience, yet relation may exist. For Thou is more than It realizes. No deception penetrates here; here is the cradle of the Real Life."
  • Angelo Cannata
    354
    Consciousness can be studied just as much as oranges canT Clark

    I think that my perception of the situation of consciousness can be compared to a house inhabited by ghosts. Science can see the house and it says “Here is consciousness: we can see the house, we can study it, that’s all”. My feeling is that there are ghosts in that house, but, since they are ghosts, I have no way to give any evidence of them. On the other side, science cannot say “There are no ghosts in that house; the whole is the house, there is nothing else”. In other words, science cannot say that what it cannot study does not exist. It would be easy to object to this: how do you know that something does not exist, since you acknowledge that you cannot study it? In this situation the conclusion is that no dialogue is possible. It is similar to the question about the existence of God: it is impossible both to prove that God exists and to prove that does not exists. Science cannot claim that consciousness can be entirely reduced to what science is able to study of it. How can you know that you have exhausted all that is possible to know about any topic? So, I think it is more correct to say that science can study some aspects of consciousness: this is clear, provable. But, once science has given evidence of those aspects of consciousness that it can study, how can it say that there is nothing more?

    Despite this situation of impossible dialogue about ghosts, I like to explore possibilities, if something more can be clarified, if some kind of dialogue is possible yet.

    Perhaps a point of dialogue is the concept or experience of uniqueness.

    Science can study what is shared, repeatable, measurable, but is completely unable to understand things that are absolutely unique. In every object of study and knowledge science selects things and aspects that are shared and studies them. About consciousness, science can study what is shared, repeatable, measurable. Every single object has its uniqueness, obviously, but normally this doesn't make it specially interesting. For example, a flower might have tiny shades that make it unique, actually every flower has its unique aspects, an identical flower will never exist again, but this doesn't make it specially interesting. The unique moments and aspects of consciousness and subjectivity are different, because they are what makes us feel that we exist and we are not just working machines.

    If I think of myself, I get lost in the question why I am in this body and not in another body, in this period of history and not in another one. From a scientific point of view there is a quick answer: you feel yourself in your body because your atoms and molecules do not coincide with the atoms and molecules of other people. This answer can give me an idea how my brother can feel different from his friend. But both my brother and his friend have an essential aspect: no one of them is me. I feel myself in a completely different situation from my brother and from his friend, because I cannot command either of their bodies, but I see that I can command my body. When you say that I am me because of my atoms, this assumes a perspective that can be the perspective of my brother, or the perspective of his friend. But, if I consider seriously my perspective, the special fact that I am inside it, from my perspective there is something special in my situation. I cannot tell myself that I am just one like a lot of other ones. If this was true, why don’t I feel me in the body of other people? Why does my perception of myself have this special feeling, that I feel in me, inside myself and not inside anybody else? If I pay attention to my feeling of myself, it is impossible to me to tell myself that I am just another one: I would lie to myself. My brother’s friend is just another one, both he and my brother are “others”. But I am not “other” to me: how is that? How is that all other people are all “others” and I, instead, am not “other”, but me? Why am I not just another one to me, the same way, from my perspective, his friend is another one to my brother? Instead of being I in these years, in this body, it could have been somebody else, so that my perspective would not exist, the same way it didn’t exist in the past. Somebody else might have been born in my body, so that today there wouldn’t be me feeling me and exploring these questions. Why there is me now here? What makes me be and feel me? It would be easy to say that I feel me because there are mechanisms in me that produce this feeling. The problem is that this answer ignores the inevitable speciality that my perspective has to me.
  • J
    608
    A very interesting OP and discussion. A salutary reminder that analytic philosophy doesn’t necessarily provide the correct framework for all important philosophical problems.

    The phrase “this feeling ‛yourself now’”, and your identification of this subjective experience with subjectivity itself, puts me in mind of the notorious Kierkegaard passage that opens The Sickness Unto Death. There’s a new translation from Bruce H. Kirmmse, but the canonical Walter Lowrie version seems clearer to me:

    What is the self? The self is a relation which relates itself to its own self, or it is that in the relation [which accounts for it] that the relation relates itself to its own self; the self is not the relation but [consists in the fact] that the relation relates itself to its own self. — Soren Kierkegaard

    I think SK is pointing to the same slippery fact that you are trying to articulate – that something uniquely difficult to describe or explain happens when we make our subjective experience an object of our own reflection. Must this attempt fail? Does the experience’s existence in a kind of perfect present tense doom any attempt to grasp it, as you suggest? SK says, on my understanding, that what characterizes a self is an activity, a relating. It is not a relation – that would make it an object – but rather an activity or experience that allows, or results in, the “relation of self-reflection,” which can be grasped, more or less. Whether this activity can yet be objectified in some other way, through some further reflection, perhaps through memory, I don’t know, and it’s not clear to me what SK thought about that.

    Writing this, I experience the same difficulty that I assume SK and you experienced in trying to articulate this crucial yet elusive moment of thought. I well remember colleagues in grad school who used this passage from SK as a kind of exemplar for everything they thought opaque and phony about continental philosophy. Au contraire! Difficult though it is, we have to keep trying to push the limits of language in order to learn what we think about the self, about ourselves. And it may well be the case that -- again, uniquely to this problem of subjectivity -- what we think about the self constitutes the self.
  • T Clark
    13.9k
    In other words, science cannot say that what it cannot study does not exist. It would be easy to object to this: how do you know that something does not exist, since you acknowledge that you cannot study it? In this situation the conclusion is that no dialogue is possible.Angelo Cannata

    You say science, but science is just a formalization of how people go about knowing the world - I guess one would say "reason." It is a common understanding, although clearly not universal, that proposed phenomena for which there is no evidence do not exist. No, it's not that they don't exist, it's that there is nothing useful to say about them.

    Backing up a bit, I think you've changed the terms of the argument. Just because there are non-scientific, non-rational ways of knowing things, e.g. consciousness, that doesn't mean that scientific, rational, study of those same things is not interesting and valuable. We've never disagreed about the fact that the scientific study of consciousness is not the same as conscious experience itself.
  • Philosophim
    2.6k
    You may be interested in a post I've written here that avoids the dichotomy of objective vs subjective as a basis for knowledge here. https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/14044/knowledge-and-induction-within-your-self-context/p1

    There's a nice summary from the first reply down. Several people have found this to be worth exploring, as it tackles the issues you're noting in a logical way that still allows us a method of knowledge. I would comment more on your post, but it would only dip into these points.
  • Angelo Cannata
    354
    it's that there is nothing useful to say about themT Clark
    is not interesting and valuableT Clark
    I think that, by referring to usefulness and interest, you have touched an important point. I think that an essential reason why philosophy today is in a crisis is because it seems not useful nor interesting. I think this is a result of becoming more and more technical, professional, scientific, precise, this way becoming so abstract that even professional philosophers can't clarify what this clarity is supposed to be used for, once it is (hypothetically) reached. Today's philosophy has become less and less human, less and less related to life, to the human experience of existence. I think that attention to experienced subjectivity, even at the cost of renouncing to some control, power, clarity, precision, has an ability to recover philosophy to life. We would just need to work on it, especially to make it in a dialog with the precision of analysis.
  • T Clark
    13.9k
    I think that, by referring to usefulness and interest, you have touched an important point. I think that an essential reason why philosophy today is in a crisis is because it seems not useful nor interesting. I think this is a result of becoming more and more technical, professional, scientific, precise, this way becoming so abstract that even professional philosophers can't clarify what this clarity is supposed to be used for, once it is (hypothetically) reached. Today's philosophy has become less and less human, less and less related to life, to the human experience of existence. I think that attention to experienced subjectivity, even at the cost of renouncing to some control, power, clarity, precision, has an ability to recover philosophy to life. We would just need to work on it, especially to make it in a dialog with the precision of analysis.Angelo Cannata

    I agree with all of this.
  • Angelo Cannata
    354
    And it may well be the case that -- again, uniquely to this problem of subjectivity -- what we think about the self constitutes the self.J
    I think that there is a risk in every attempt to describe the self: turning the description into a rule. This creates the premises for racism, violence and dictatorship. If we say "the self is for sure this and that", the automatic consequence is that those who look like having a different concept or experience of the self are at risk of being conceived as less human, less conscious, less intelligent, deserving less respect. When I try to describe my being lost in the sea of my experience of myself, other people might tell me that they do not perceive at all all these intriguing thoughts and feelings. Think, for example, of Buddhists, who think that our self has to disappear in the unity of the whole, of the universe, although I am not sure that now I am describing properly Buddhist ideas about this. Or think of extroverts, who find themselves happy and fulfilled not when they think deeply about their self, but when they experience other people's living presence, connections, relationships. Or think about languages (I am not sure about this, but I have heard something like this) that don't have at all the first singular person pronoun "I", or perhaps "you" as well.
    In this context I think that any kind of philosophy of the self should be conceived like a special branch of art, like, for example, the music of Mozart. Mozart is a marvellous, great and fantastic musician, but if someone tells us that they don't like Mozart, they rather like Haydn and Beethoven and they find Mozart meaningless and boring, there is nothing we can complain about, despite Mozart being universally recognized as one of the top musicians of all times.
    This is one more reason, in my opinion, why we should be skeptical about attempts to find scientific or quantum explanations of our experience of the self, consciousness, or of the self of other people.
    On the contrary, if these things are framed in the much freer mentality of art, they can become great points for reciprocal dialogue, exploration, with a mentality of openness, interest and respect towards those who have radically different ideas and experiences about the self.
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