The difference between what you might say in a fight is different from the problems that belong to an idea as that idea.

That is what I think is at stake in the passage I quoted. — Paine

Thanks for that elaboration, but I’d like to return to the interpretation of the passage you quoted previously.

I was rather thinking that ‘what is at stake’ in that dialogue is the reality of the Ideas, and consequently what the implications would be if they are found not to be real. Denial is what ‘naturalism’, which you say is ‘hard to define’, is inclined towards, isn’t it? The denial of the reality of the ideas? I had thought that in the passage, that ‘the friends of the forms’ were defending the forms. The ‘earth-born’ represent those who are unable to reconcile the distinction between ‘being’ - what truly is - and ‘becoming’, the world of change, growth and decay, and so are calling ideas into question. (And indeed there are many ‘perplexities’ involved as has been mentioned already, as the reality of change and decay seems undeniable. It is not as if admitting the reality of the ideas is a simple matter.)

Consider this passage in particular:

And you say our communion with becoming is through the body, by means of sense perception, while it is by means of reasoning through the soul that we commune with actual being, which you say is always just the same as it is, while becoming is always changing. — Sophist, 248A, translated by Horan

I can’t help but be struck by the resemblance to a passage I’ve often quoted in the past here in respect of Aquinas:

….if the proper knowledge of the senses is of accidents, through forms that are individualized, the proper knowledge of intellect is of essences, through forms that are universalized. Intellectual knowledge is analogous to sense knowledge inasmuch as it demands the reception of the form of the thing which is known. But it differs from sense knowledge so far forth as it consists in the apprehension of things, not in their individuality, but in their universality.

Can you see the resemblance in those two passages? The differentiation between ‘sense perception’ and ‘ideas grasped by reason’? That in the platonic vision, the faculty of reason is able to grasp what is ‘always the case’? I know my attempt here might be a bit simplistic but I’m trying to get a handle on the big underlying issue as I see it.

*

I had thought that in the passage, that ‘the friends of the forms’ were defending the forms. The ‘earth-born’ represent those who are unable to reconcile the distinction between ‘being’ - what truly is - and ‘becoming’, the world of change, growth and decay, and so are calling ideas into question. (And indeed there are many ‘perplexities’ involved as has been mentioned already, as the reality of change and decay seems undeniable. It is not as if admitting the reality of the ideas is a simple matter.) — Wayfarer

The Stranger is saying that the sharp separation between being and becoming emerged in the battle against those who are:

"dragging everything from heaven and the unseen down to earth, literally grabbing trees and rocks in their hands. Indeed, they lay hold of all such objects and strenuously maintain that, that alone is, which gives rise to some contact and touch."

The friends proceed by letting some of what the earth-born "maintain to be true" to be referred to "as a sort of becoming in motion, rather than being"

The relationship between the two camps changes over time:

Str: Then let’s obtain from both sides, in turn, the account of being that they favour.

Theae: How shall we obtain them?

Str: It will be easier in the case of those who propose that being consists of forms, for they are gentler people. However, it is more difficult, perhaps almost impossible, from those who drag everything by force 246D to the physical. But I think they should be dealt with as follows.

Theae: How?

Str: The best thing would be to make better people of them, if that were possible, but if this is not to be, let’s make up a story, assuming that they would be willing to answer questions more fully than now. For agreement with reformed individuals will be preferable to agreement with worse. However, we are not interested in the people: we are seeking the truth.

Theae: Quite so. 246E

Str: Then call upon these reformed folk to answer you, and you should interpret what is said.

Theae: I shall. — ibid. 246c

The reformation takes place through getting the earth-born to accept having a soul:

Str: Well, let them say whether they maintain there is such a thing as a mortal living being.

Theae: How could they disagree?

Str: And won’t they agree that this is a body with a soul in it?

Theae: Yes, certainly.

Str: And they include soul among things that are?

Theae: Yes. 247A

Str: What about this? Don’t they agree that a soul can be just or unjust and can be wise or foolish?

Theae: Of course.

Str: But isn’t it from the possession and presence of justice and wisdom that each of these souls becomes like this, while their opposites do the opposite?

Theae: Yes, they agree with all this too.

Str: And they will surely agree that whatever is capable of being present or absent is something.

Theae: They do say so.

Str: 247B So, if they accept that there is justice, wisdom, and excellence, in general, and their opposites, and also soul in which they arise, do they say that any of these is visible and tangible or are they all unseen?

Theae: Hardly any of these is visible.

Str: Well then, surely they do not say that anything of this sort has a body?

Theae: They do not answer the entire question, in the same way. Although they think, that the soul has acquired a body of some sort, when it comes to wisdom and the other qualities you asked about, 247C they are ashamed either to admit that these are not included in things that are, or to maintain emphatically that they are all physical.

Str: Well, Theaetetus, we can see that these men have been reformed, for the original stock, their earth-born ancestors, would not have been ashamed of anything. Instead, they would insist that whatever they are unable to squeeze with their hands is nothing at all.

Theae: Yes, you have expressed their attitude fairly well.

Str: Then let’s question them once more. Indeed, if they are prepared to concede that there is even a 247D small non-physical portion of things that are, that is sufficient. For, they must explain the shared nature that has arisen simultaneously in the non-physical, and also in anything physical, with reference to which, they say that they both are. Perhaps this may leave them perplexed; and if that is what happens to them then consider this; would they be willing to accept a suggestion from us and agree that “what is” is as follows?

Theae: Yes, what is the suggestion? Tell us and we shall know immediately.

Str: Well, I am saying that anything actually is, once it has acquired some sort of power, 247E either to affect anything else at all, or to be affected, even slightly, by something totally trivial, even if only once. Indeed, I propose to give a definition, defining things that are, as nothing else except power.

Theae: Then, since they do not have anything better to suggest right now they accept this.

Str: Very well, though perhaps a different suggestion may occur both to us or them 248A later. For the present, let this stand as it has been agreed by both parties.

Theae: Let it stand.

Str: Now let us move on to the others, the friends of the forms, and you should interpret their doctrines for us too. — ibid. 246e

We are back to the quote I started with where the Stranger criticizes the friends by showing a big problem with keeping being and becoming completely separated, culminating in:

Str: But, by Zeus, what are we saying? Are we actually going to be persuaded so easily that change, life, soul and thought are absent from 249A what altogether is, that it neither lives nor thinks, but abides unchanging, solemn and pure, devoid of intelligence? — ibid. 248e

The Stranger continues this criticism in ways that uncover other problems.

As an Eleatic ambassador of sorts, the Stranger accepts Parmenides must be modified but not rejected. He proposes something like that happen to the friends.

The Aquinas passage does connect with ideas about the soul in the Sophist but needs discussion of the remainder of the text.

The zero-sum game presented here seems pretty objective for someone who eschews absolutes and representations of the real. I recognize that there are different ways of looking at our shared experience. To link them as categorical antagonists, however, has history revealing a psychological truth. But revealing truth is one of the activities Rorty militates against. If the claim is a serious one, he has to abandon his aversion to verification. Sometimes, it seems like he demands admission to a club he denies exists.

If one frees the two perspectives from Rorty's fight to the death, they become more like Nagel's objection to "the view from nowhere", a narrative Wayfinder regards highly. Rorty shares the critical view of science in some places but has complained that Nagel is too mystical in others. So, 'materialist' by comparison but not on the basis of claiming what nature is. He resists saying what that is. As I review different examples of his work, it is confusing to sort out what he objects to from an alternative to such. It is not my cup of tea.

As an American I hear his anti-war view that ideas should not force one to fight. I don't know if he talks about Thoreau but that is the register I hear the objection. A democracy of no. But that is its own discussion, or if is not, that becomes a new thesis. I fear the infinite regress. — Paine

Okay, these are good points and I agree.

For the purposes of this discussion, I have learned enough to say that Rorty is not one of those who are 'materialist' according to the criteria in Ur-Platonism. Rorty's demand that humans are the measure makes that impossible. I take your point that Gerson is not joining Rorty and Rosenberg at the hip. That allows me to ask what they have to do with each other.

[...]

They require the logic Rorty would expel. It is whatever else that is said that I cannot imagine.

[...]

In my defense, it is not like Gerson explains the sameness. His enemies never change. — Paine

I suppose I am trying to flush out exactly what it is you don't like about Gerson's thesis. I am focusing primarily on his five points of Ur-Platonism. Now someone could surely define nominalism and then divide all of philosophy into nominalist and non-nominalist philosophies. Or they could define nominalism and skepticism and then divide all of philosophy into the four logical categories. It seems that Gerson has defined anti-materialism, anti-mechanism, anti-nominalism, anti-relativism, and anti-skepticism. He calls the conjunction of those five positions pureblood Ur-Platonism (or anti-naturalism). If a philosophy contains only 4/5 then it would be a slightly watered down version of Ur-Platonism, etc. If it contains 0/5 then it is pureblood Naturalism. Ur-Platonism and Naturalism are therefore conceived as two poles sitting opposite one another.

What is objectionable about this? Is the objection that Ur-Platonism doesn't correctly map to Platonism, or to traditional philosophy? Is it that any theory which places Plotinus and Aristotle into the same group must be a false theory, because they are so different? Is it that because Rorty and Rosenberg have both similarities and differences, the theory must somehow fail?

Regarding Rorty:

Anti-materialism is the view that it is false that the only things that exist are bodies and
their properties.

Anti-relativism is the denial of the claim that Plato attributes to Protagoras that ‘man is
the measure of all things, of what is that it is and of what is not that it is not’.

Anti-scepticism is the view that knowledge is possible. Knowledge (ἐπιστήμη) refers to
a mode of cognition wherein the real is in some way ‘present’ to the cognizer. — Gerson, Platonism versus Naturalism

You say:

For the purposes of this discussion, I have learned enough to say that Rorty is not one of those who are 'materialist' according to the criteria in Ur-Platonism. Rorty's demand that humans are the measure makes that impossible.

[...]

But revealing truth is one of the activities Rorty militates against. If the claim is a serious one, he has to abandon his aversion to verification. — Paine

This leads me to believe that, for Gerson, Rorty is not a materialist but he is at least a relativist and a skeptic. He is a relativist on account of his demand that "humans are the measure," and he is a skeptic on account of his aversion to verification and revealing truth.

Regarding the relation between Rorty and Rosenberg, and Platonism and Naturalism, Gerson has this to say:

Rosenberg is in broad agreement with Rorty about what anti-Platonism is, although it may be the case that Rosenberg would disagree with Rorty about the pre-eminence of the natural sciences. But the disagreements among naturalists or anti-Platonists are not my main topic; nor, for that matter, are the disagreements among Platonists. What I aim to show is that Rorty (and probably Rosenberg) are right in identifying Platonism with philosophy and that, therefore, the rejection of the one necessarily means the rejection of the other. But I also propose to argue for an even bolder thesis that this one. . . — Gerson, Platonism versus Naturalism, p. 3

It seems like Gerson is not falling into the traps you suppose. He is not saying, for example, that Rorty and Rosenberg are entirely alike. Perhaps you are opposed to his "bolder thesis," and in particular the claim that, "I would like to show that what I am calling the elements of Platonism—to which I shall turn in a moment—are interconnected such that it is not possible to embrace one or another of these without embracing them all"?

I think the best way to approach this is through Aristotle discussing the pursuit of knowledge for its own sake — Paine

Okay, I have always liked that passage.

This argument that it is okay to pursue first causes extends to all who attempt it. When Aristotle makes arguments against others employing what Gerson calls Ur-Platonism principles, that doesn't make his interlocutors unqualified to speak upon it. — Paine

I don't think Gerson would focus on the idea that Aristotle's interlocutors are unqualified to speak upon it, though he might eventually say that. I think he would focus on the idea that they are wrong. If Aristotle can here be said to be espousing a form of anti-skepticism, then the claim would be that Aristotle's opponents are wrong. Thus I would want to say that "this argument. . . extends to" all, not only those who attempt it. It extends, for example, especially to those who reject the legitimacy of pursuing first causes. The ones who were already pursuing first causes don't really have any need of the argument.

The reference to Simonides invokes a struggle with tradition that is ever present in Plato's dialogues. An excellent essay on this topic is written by Christopher Utter. — Paine

Okay thanks, it looks like an interesting paper. I will have a look.

This leads me to believe that, for Gerson, Rorty is not a materialist but he is at least a relativist and a skeptic. He is a relativist on account of his demand that "humans are the measure," and he is a skeptic on account of his aversion to verification and revealing truth. — Leontiskos

It should be noted that Rorty made efforts to differentiate his idea from those charges. That demonstrates a general acceptance of the negativity of those qualities as generally understood. That separation may not really work but it is different from being a champion for those qualities. I object to Rorty's claim of what comprises philosophy because it fails as a Logos, not because it fails a litmus test from applying a set of definitions. A mid-wife tested if the creature would live and did not give any words of encouragement or hope for a future.

What is objectionable about this? Is the objection that Ur-Platonism doesn't correctly map to Platonism, or to traditional philosophy? Is it that any theory which places Plotinus and Aristotle into the same group must be a false theory, because they are so different? Is it that because Rorty and Rosenberg have both similarities and differences, the theory must somehow fail? — Leontiskos

My objection is more of a question; What is the benefit of all this taxonomy?

I don't see the value of "Platonists" as a recognizable kind except when it serves as a place holder in the context of specific comparisons. When Aristotle uses the term so prominently throughout his work, it does not change the fact he is deeply engaged with Plato's writing and developing those ideas into his own expression. For one example, compare the language of the latter part of the Sophist with De Anima.

There are many places where Aristotle explains what Plato meant without identifying himself as against it. We on the sidelines can ponder if such statements are the last word on the matter. A recent example of that is the discussion of Timaeus in the Metaphysics thread. That is a drop in the ocean of academic work devoted to drawing such distinctions between the two.

Many centuries later, Plotinus arrives in a land crisscrossed with the paths of self-identified Stoics, Academicians, Cynics, Peripatetics, etcetera. There is also an infusion of "Syncretic" thinkers who shop a la carte from others. In this rowdy crowd, Plotinus sought to create his own Ur- Platonism. The Gnostics are to be expelled from the empire and the citizens who remain will work within a shared view of what "Platonists" means when challenging each other's opinions. This imposition of order is how Augustine responded to Plotinus as what led him to turn away from Manicheism. The structure of Heaven was built with this architecture.

There are components of that order that reveal influences from sources before Plato and those he militated against. There is a deep pool of scholarship in that aspect of Plotinus that I have only treaded water in. My mind is tiny.

In the arena of Plotinus building from Plato and Aristotle or diverging from them, there is an asymmetry upon display. Plotinus does not acknowledge himself as anything more than an explainer of Plato's meaning. Aristotle accepts responsibility for both the convergence and the divergence. When we on the sidelines wish to see a difference between Plotinus's and Plato's text, a tendency to argue upon the basis of authority has to be wrestled with. That is what I dislike about Gerson, too. It is a quality I dislike quite independently with whether I agree or disagree with either writer in specific cases (which I have done).

I hope that touches on the mapping and inclusion questions. I am confused how the similarity or differences between Rorty and Rosenberg are components of a thesis that could be defended or challenged. I only can discern a motley beast.

Say, for the purposes of argument, I accepted Gerson's taxonomy. What does his classification have to do with changing future work as he exhorts us to do? He would correctly identify that Rorty is outside the boundary as Gerson has drawn it. Why attach the possibility for philosophy upon one who has just been expelled from it? The limitation is self-imposed. The "naturalists" whoever they may be, won't notice a change in the rules. For those devoted to reading the original texts, it presumes too much of what is still worth proving.

I do not want to paper over the differences between views in Plato's time. The Stranger's depiction in the Sophist of the battle between views of "what is" stands as testimony to such.

To treat the modern battle as simply a continuance of the first overlooks critical cultural differences. There are champions of the modern and there are detractors. How history is conceived plays a big part in their differences. Take Kierkegaard and Nietzsche, for example. They both refused to shake the pom-poms with team Hegel. But the differences between them obviously extend far beyond what Hegel wrote. All three reference Plato as points of departure. But it is of limited utility to compare them upon that basis alone. All three do think they are doing philosophy. Can the differences be delineated through compliance or divergence from a set of categories?

Dissatisfaction with the modern is expressed by some as the loss of a previously preserved virtue, others by a loss of a means of production, others by a loss of the means to experience life available to ancestors. That is not an exhaustive list of all possibilities, just some pieces that show how various are the attempts to connect those perspectives with our present and future lives.

With that said, where does accepting Gerson's criteria play a part? How does it figure in the struggle for future pedagogy in our lives comparable to the struggle in Plato's time?

Thanks Paine. It always takes me awhile to get to these because they require more effort than the average TPF posts.

I object to Rorty's claim of what comprises philosophy because it fails as a Logos, not because it fails a litmus test from applying a set of definitions. — Paine

Okay.

My objection is more of a question; What is the benefit of all this taxonomy? — Paine

Isn't philosophy important? If philosophy is important, then on Gerson's thesis, Ur-Platonism is important.

For example your claim was highly Gersonian when you said, "That is a predominantly psychological observation. Where does the philosophy start? Or not?" (). If philosophy is important then it is important to understand what philosophy is, and it is particularly important to be able to ferret out false claims to philosophy. This all seems true to me.

Say, for the purposes of argument, I accepted Gerson's taxonomy. What does his classification have to do with changing future work as he exhorts us to do? He would correctly identify that Rorty is outside the boundary as Gerson has drawn it. Why attach the possibility for philosophy upon one who has just been expelled from it? — Paine

I think this methodology is incredibly sound, and that we utilize it in all sorts of ways, namely elucidating what something is by reference to clear examples of what it is not. We elucidate justice by way of injustices; we elucidate truth by way of falsehood; we elucidate beauty by way of ugliness; we elucidate health by way of sickness. This isn't to say that we should stop there. Of course there should also be positive accounts of the essence of things like justice, truth, etc. Still, I don't really see the critique you are giving.

Further, even if we reject Gerson's account of philosophy I believe we will still need to engage in the same project he is engaged in, and that it is an important project. The alternative seems to be either committing ourselves to the view that philosophy isn't important or else to the view that there is no such thing as philosophy (and therefore nothing which is necessarily not philosophy).

To treat the modern battle as simply a continuance of the first overlooks critical cultural differences. There are champions of the modern and there are detractors. How history is conceived plays a big part in their differences. Take Kierkegaard and Nietzsche, for example. They both refused to shake the pom-poms with team Hegel. But the differences between them obviously extend far beyond what Hegel wrote. All three reference Plato as points of departure. But it is of limited utility to compare them upon that basis alone. All three do think they are doing philosophy. Can the differences be delineated through compliance or divergence from a set of categories? — Paine

The modern and post-modern landscape complicates things, but I don't think it invalidates Gerson's thesis. Gerson is drawing up the boundaries of the playing field of philosophy, and you keep pointing to philosophical bouts. Gerson has no problem with philosophical bouts. The question is whether they are within the boundaries.

I am wondering if a cultural anti-authoritarianism is impeding Gerson's thesis. This anti-authoritarianism says, "Who are you to say what counts as philosophy!?" I don't see this as a substantial critique. Again, the deeper matter for me is the alternative between either committing ourselves to the view that philosophy isn't important or else to the view that there is no such thing as philosophy. It's not hard to read Gerson's thesis as a proposal rather than an imposition, or as an invitation to think through a necessary problem rather than an overbearing authoritarianism.

Dissatisfaction with the modern is expressed by some as the loss of a previously preserved virtue, others by a loss of a means of production, others by a loss of the means to experience life available to ancestors. That is not an exhaustive list of all possibilities, just some pieces that show how various are the attempts to connect those perspectives with our present and future lives. — Paine

Gerson sees all sorts of modern thinkers as Platonists, and I think that's right. I don't know that what is at stake is a confrontation between the pre-modern and the modern.

With that said, where does accepting Gerson's criteria play a part? How does it figure in the struggle for future pedagogy in our lives comparable to the struggle in Plato's time? — Paine

I think we struggle against sophistry in much the same way that Plato struggled against sophistry. For example, the disputes surrounding the DEI programs in the schools and colleges is one way that our pedagogical battles continue on, and Gerson's thesis would surely have a stake in those sorts of questions.

Just to return to this, you have not answered why Plato, in his letter, when he clearly has an opportunity to present himself as a skeptic, instead chooses to say something very different, and even implies that he has shared knowledge of the forms with others (although not through dissertations.)

The Seventh Letter might not have been written by Plato, but it was decidedly not written by a skeptic.

Your reference to the Phaedo also doesn't say what you say it does in context. He doesn't call the forms "foolish" at 100. Rather, Socrates is making an argument for the immortality of the soul based on the assumption that something like the theory of forms is true. That is, he is (perhaps foolishly, or seemingly so) not going to justify the forms here again, but will show what follows from his understanding of them.

Plato does have Socrates say something to the effect of: "no one should take this exact narrative too seriously and think these things are just as I have described them," but this would seem to be a reference to the images he is painting. Like he says in the letter, you can't put this stuff into words. This is why he uses many different images to try to get the ideas across. This is why Socrates repeatedly demures from speaking on these issues directly, because they cannot be spoken of. The warning then is to not mistake his image, appearance, for the reality he is directing our attention to. It isn't to say something like, "and I actually don't know if any of this has any real merit because knowledge of such things is impossible, so don't take me too seriously."

And it's worth noting that "opinion" is in some ways a very inadequate translation of doxa. Today we tend to think of opinion as subjective, as having no real grounding outside itself. But doxa refers to images or what things "seem to be like." What things "seem to be like," is an important parts of what they are. The divided line is all one line, rather than two discrete lines, for a reason. Appearances are part of reality. The line is a hierarchy. To know such appearances, to move up the line, to know something of the truth (in the way the English "knowledge" is colloquially used). Plato's use of doxa has none of the connotations of the English "opinion," where we might think that "to only have opinion" means to lack any knowledge and understanding of a thing.

Again, if Plato knew nothing of the Good, but is just spinning tales based on pragmatic usefulness (a pragmatic consideration based on... what? he doesn't know anything of the Good right?) then would be acting like the very paradigm of the Sophists he criticizes so heavily. He would be someone who pretends to know what he doesn't know and who uses words to try to manipulate people for his own pragmatic ends.

Just to return to this, you have not answered why Plato, in his letter, when he clearly has an opportunity to present himself as a skeptic, instead chooses to say something very different, and even implies that he has shared knowledge of the forms with others (although not through dissertations.) — Count Timothy von Icarus

He leaves it to the reader to decide whether he is a skeptic by way of their engagement is skeptical practice. That is to say, by way of doubt and inquiry. The question of what he knows is left open. Where does he imply that he and others have knowledge of the forms?

The Seventh Letter might not have been written by Plato, but it was decidedly not written by a skeptic. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Well, you may have decided it was not written by a skeptic, but there are others who do not share that opinion.

Your reference to the Phaedo also doesn't say what you say it does in context. He doesn't call the forms "foolish" at 100. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Right. He does not call the forms foolish. What he says is:

“Consider then, he said, whether you share my opinion as to what follows, for I think that, if there is anything beautiful besides the Beautiful itself, it is beautiful for no other reason than that it shares in that Beautiful, and I say so with everything ... I simply, naively and perhaps foolishly cling to this, that nothing else makes it beautiful other than the presence of, or the sharing in, or however you may describe its relationship to that Beautiful we mentioned, for I will not insist on the precise nature of the relationship, but that all beautiful things are beautiful by the Beautiful. That, I think, is the safest answer I can give myself or anyone else.”

Socrates does not attempt to describe the precise relationship of beautiful things to Beauty itself. One would think it important to do so if it is to be accepted as philosophically sound.

Like he says in the letter, you can't put this stuff into words. This is why he uses many different images to try to get the ideas across. — Count Timothy von Icarus

There is more to it than that. See what he says about his "second sailing" in the Phaedo:

After this, he said, when I had wearied of looking into beings, I thought that I must be careful to avoid the experience of those who watch an eclipse of the sun, for some of them ruin their eyes unless they watch its reflection in water or some such material ...

So I thought I must take refuge in discussions and investigate the truth of beings by means of accounts [logoi] … On each occasion I put down as hypothesis whatever account I judge to be mightiest; and whatever seems to me to be consonant with this, I put down as being true, both about cause and about all the rest, while what isn’t, I put down as not true.

(99d-100a)

In the Republic:

“... in applying the going up and the seeing of what's above to the soul's journey up to the intelligible place, you'll not mistake my expectation, since you desire to hear it. A god doubtless knows if it happens to be true. At all events, this is the way the phenomena look to me: in the knowable the last thing to be seen, and that with considerable effort, is the idea of the good …”

(517b-c)

A god knows if this account "happens to be true" but he does not claim to know this. He is not using images to convey something he knows. He is using images and the imagination as a way of thinking about how things he does not know and cannot see. This is very different from the image of philosopher whose soul is turned to see the Forms.

acting like the very paradigm of the Sophists he criticizes so heavily. — Count Timothy von Icarus

As he says in the Sophist, sometimes the philosopher appears as a sophist. (216d) What distinguishes the one kind from the other? Without getting too far into it, I think it is a matter of intent. The sophist aims to benefit himself, the philosopher to benefit others. it is for the benefit of others that they believe in the just, beautiful, and good. To this end the philosopher makes images of them.

He would be someone who pretends to know what he doesn't know — Count Timothy von Icarus

But Socrates does not pretend to know what he does not know. In the passage from the Republic he does not say that the way things look to him are the way they are. He says that a god, not him, knows if it happens to be true.

The question of what he knows is left open. Where does he imply that he and others have knowledge of the forms?

I shared them and bolded the most relevant parts earlier. There is a reason "skeptical Plato" theorists, from what I have seen, almost always deny the authenticity of the letter. At the very least, the letter decidedly does not say "I write no doctrines because I have none," let alone "I wrote no doctrines because I know nothing."

But Socrates does not pretend to know what he does not know. In the passage from the Republic he does not say that the way things look to him are the way they are. He says that a god, not him, knows if it happens to be true.

It's not a question of Plato's Socrates, it's a question of Plato the author. If Plato is a skeptic and doesn't think he really has any good idea what the Good is, why is he writing things that are so suggestive and have been overwhelmingly understood as saying something quite the opposite? To pragmatically move the dial on policies he prefers? (but of courses, not ideas he knows are good, since he is a skeptic). This would seem to put him right in with the Sophists, fighting over who gets to mount their shadow puppets over the fires of Athens.

- Yep, good points. I find ' allusion to Burnyeat's article apropos.

I shared them and bolded the most relevant parts earlier. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Do you mean this post?

For everything that exists there are three instruments by which the knowledge of it is necessarily imparted; fourth, there is the knowledge itself, and, as fifth, we must count the thing itself which is known and truly exists.

I do not read it as implying that he or anyone else has knowledge of:

the good itself, the beautiful itself, and the just itself.

The three instruments by which knowledge is imparted are the name, the definition, and the image. None of these instruments is adequate for imparting knowledge of the good itself, the beautiful itself, and the just itself. If we look at the statement regarding a light being kindled, it is the result of converse with the matter and a life lived together.The Perseus translation has this last as communion therewith. How does one live together with or be in communion with the good itself, the beautiful itself, and the just itself if these are not known?

There is a reason "skeptical Plato" theorists, from what I have seen, almost always deny the authenticity of the letter. — Count Timothy von Icarus

That may be true in some cases, but I do not deny its authenticity. I brought up the letter in support of my claims.

At the very least, the letter decidedly does not say "I write no doctrines because I have none," let alone "I wrote no doctrines because I know nothing." — Count Timothy von Icarus

I agree. He does not say these things.

What I said is:

In other words, according to Plato in the Seventh Letter there are no core doctrines or any doctrines at all in his writings that can rightly be attributed to him. I have included more from the letter below. — Fooloso4

And the statement you quoted and responded to:

The idea found in the Republic of eternal, fixed, transcendent truths known only to the philosophers is a useful political fiction. This "core doctrine" is a myth, a noble lie.

If Plato is a skeptic and doesn't think he really has any good idea what the Good is — Count Timothy von Icarus

I did not say he did not have a good idea what the Good is. Having an idea is not having knowledge. He is a skeptic in part because he knows the difference between them.

...why is he writing things that are so suggestive and have been overwhelmingly understood as saying something quite the opposite? — Count Timothy von Icarus

Because, as I have said, he thinks it will be beneficial to those who are not philosophers. He thinks the images he casts on the cave wall are preferable to those of the poets, theologians, sophists, and politicians. The philosopher, however, because he desires the truth, is not satisfied with what others say.

This would seem to put him right in with the Sophists, fighting over who gets to mount their shadow puppets over the fires of Athens. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Not with them. Against them. His shadows, his images of what 'is' in place of theirs. This is what the banning of the poets from the Republic is about.



.

I cannot see beyond the paywall on that article.

I don't get what Strauss has to do with the limit of what is knowable. What I have read of Strauss is mostly in the register of political philosophy. The mentions of the 'esoteric' are connected to that interest as his idea of the pedagogy of the elite. It is one way to interpret the Republic and Meno. There are plenty of other ways.

Why did not the theists in that thread appeal more to the reading of Cornford rather than involve Strauss who argued for the idea of natural rights? I question both of those authors for different reasons.

What is the connection between the skeptical approach of Socrates and some overriding theology? Agnosticism is being equated with atheism here. None of the references to Strauss in that old thread involved quoting what he actually said. It feels like whacking a piñata.

A bit more on the Seventh Letter:

Nevertheless, the thorough examination of all these problems, going up and down and over each one with great effort, imparts knowledge of a good thing unto a person of a good nature.

(343e)

There is a difference between knowledge of a good thing and knowledge of the good itself.

And when all of these things – names, definitions, appearances, and perceptions – have been painstakingly elaborated in relation to each other and examined through thoughtful argumentation by
people who ask questions and provide answers without malice, only then is it that the light of knowledge and understanding of each element shines forth unto a person who has applied himself as
much as humanly possible. (344b-c)

As much as humanly possible sets a limit that may fall short of knowledge of the thing itself. So then, if the pursuit of philosophy does not lead to knowledge of the good, the beautiful, and the just then why pursue it? Put somewhat differently, what do we expect and hope for in our pursuit of philosophy?

In a reversal of the turning of the soul toward the Forms, there is a turning of the soul to itself, toward self-knowledge. Self-knowledge is guided by knowledge of our ignorance. We do not know the Forms. We do not have a vision of the Forms. The question then is: which way do we turn? Do we turn away from the "human things" in pursuit of some imagined (and it must be imagined if it is not something we have seen or known) reality or toward it? It is one thing to aspire to something beyond ourselves, but quite another to mistake imagination for knowledge. Absent knowledge of the good we can still seek to know what is good for us.

I cannot see beyond the paywall on that article. — Paine

Yes, I see it is paywalled now. I read it a number of years ago. It is a critique of Strauss' convoluted and inaccessible interpretations of Plato, and the confrontation between Timothy's commonsensical interpretation and Fooloso's convoluted interpretation reminded me of it. As I recall, the point of Burnyeat's "Sphinx without a Secret" was that highly convoluted interpretations of Plato are not only wrong, but they are also contrary to the philosophical spirit of Plato's dialogues. Additionally, in Burnyeat's eyes this is what led to Strauss' guru-esque status among his students.

Agnosticism is being equated with atheism here. — Paine

Good point.

I would add that Socratic skepticism is being equated with other forms of skepticism

If the Burnyeat perspective is worth considering, argue it on your own behalf if it is not publicly available.

I have argued that Plotinus is claiming authority of a certain kind. I accept that I have to do more than claim such to be the case.

- I think @Count Timothy von Icarus is already arguing that perspective. I was just pointing him to a corroborating source. I assume that some who have access to university portals might have access to the article. But I will review the article and try to come back to this.

I can’t help but be struck by the resemblance to a passage I’ve often quoted in the past here in respect of Aquinas:
"….if the proper knowledge of the senses is of accidents, through forms that are individualized, the proper knowledge of intellect is of essences, through forms that are universalized. Intellectual knowledge is analogous to sense knowledge inasmuch as it demands the reception of the form of the thing which is known. But it differs from sense knowledge so far forth as it consists in the apprehension of things, not in their individuality, but in their universality."
Can you see the resemblance in those two passages? The differentiation between ‘sense perception’ and ‘ideas grasped by reason’? That in the platonic vision, the faculty of reason is able to grasp what is ‘always the case’? I know my attempt here might be a bit simplistic but I’m trying to get a handle on the big underlying issue as I see it. — Wayfarer

I assume the "underlying issue" for you is similar to what Chalmers labeled "the Hard Problem" of how humans are able to distinguish (differentiate) between obvious physical Reality (things) and obscure essential Ideality (essences). That's the job of the Rational Faculty of human intellect. But how it works in a physical neural context is a multi-millennial philosophical mystery that may be closer to becoming a mundane science fact.

For example : In brain-scoping studies, the aha! moment of insight is associated with synchrony of neuronal firing : i.e. when the brain is functioning as an inter-operative (holistic) system. Years ago, a neurologist had his own aha! moment : "what fires together, wires together". Presumably, forming concepts and memories. Some have concluded metaphorically that the brain is like an antenna, resonating with the universe. I don't take it literally, but the analogy may be insightful.

In a video linked to a Big Think article*1, several professionals of various disciplines --- Beau Lotto, neuroscientist ; Alva Noë, philosopher ; Donald Hoffman, cognitive psychologist ; among others --- discuss Consciousness and Perception of the world. They all seem to be agreeing with Kant, that we only know mind-made appearances via the senses, not the Ideal essences. And with Plato, that there is a valid philosophical distinction between Real and Ideal.

In our 21st century era, that is also the difference between the focus of Science (material reality ; instances) and of Philosophy (essential ideality ; universality). Yet some scientists, studying the brain and complex systems have reached similar conclusions, but tend to avoid fraught terms such as "ideal" & "forms" & "holism". "Hoffman argues that consciousness is more fundamental than the objects and patterns perceived by consciousness. We have conscious experiences because consciousness is posited as a fundamental aspect of reality" ___ Wiki. :smile:


*1. Is Reality Real?
https://bigthink.com/videos/objective-reality/

It is a critique of Strauss' convoluted and inaccessible interpretations of Plato — Leontiskos

Have you read Strauss or just relying on

Burnyeat's eyes — Leontiskos

?

What you call my and Strauss' "convoluted interpretation" is perhaps based on assumptions about how to read Plato that Strauss and others have called into question.

From an interview with Stanley Rosen. I have highlighted one statement because I think it is at the heart of much of the disagreement here.

ROSEN: Well, firstly, the approach to the Platonic dialogues has changed over the course of history. For example, in Neo-Platonist times, interpreters of the dialogues took the dramatic form very seriously. And they read very complicated views into what would look to, say, the members of the contemporary analytical tradition like extremely trivial and secondary stylistic characteristics. Secondly, there was a tradition of taking seriously the dramatic form of the dialogue. It began in Germany in the 18th century with people like Schleiermacher. And that tradition extends through the 19th century, and you see it in scholars like Friedländer and in philosophical interpreters like Gadamer. And we now know, of course, that Heidegger in his lectures on the Sophist took the details of the dialogue very seriously. So, that has to be said in order for us to understand that the apparent heterodoxy or eccentricity of Leo Strauss’ approach to the Platonic dialogues is such a heterodoxy only with respect to the kind of positivist and analytical approach to Plato ... Final point, within the last ten years, even the analysts have began talking about the dramatic form of the dialogue as though they discovered this. More directly, the Strauss approach is characterized by a fine attention to the dramatic structure, the personae, all the details in the dialogues because they were plays, and also by very close analyses.

...

The purpose of the text is to stimulate the reader to think, and it does that by being an intricate construction with many implications, some of which are indeterminate in the sense that you can’t be sure of what Plato meant and what Socrates meant, but they are intended to make you, the interpreter, do your thinking for yourself ... I think that it would be better to emphasize that the dialogue has as its primary function the task of stimulating the reader to think for himself, not to find the teaching worked-out for him.

...

First of all, there is no unanimity in the tradition of reading Plato. I told you that what passed for orthodoxy is no longer orthodox. The same analysts who made fun of Leo Strauss and me and his other students, today are copying us, but with no acknowledgment. They are copying the Straussian methods, but not as well. Leo Strauss is a much more careful reader and a more imaginative reader, and I certainly am as well. You get these inferior, inferior versions of the same methods they criticized ten years ago. This thesis of a long, orthodox tradition, that’s nonsense. It doesn’t exist. Even if it did, it would show nothing.

https://college.holycross.edu/diotima/n1v2/rosen.htm

I assume the "underlying issue" for you is similar to what Chalmers labeled "the Hard Problem" of how humans are able to distinguish (differentiate) between obvious physical Reality (things) and obscure essential Ideality (essences). — Gnomon

Co-incidentally there might be a superficial resemblance. There's a theme in pre-modern philosophy, which is that reason, the capacity of intellect (nous) to perceive/grasp the forms (ideas, principles, essences) is what distinguishes rational man from dumb beasts. The 'eye of reason'. Hence the (specifically occidental) mythology of the rational soul, wherein reason itself has a salvific potential - although, for Aquinas, not unaided reason, as revelation is primary and all would be lost without it (he is after all a Christian saint). But the reason that passage appeals to me, and I've mentioned it many times, is because it lays out the outlines of Aquinas' version of Aristotle's 'matter/form' dualism very clearly. (You can find it here. Incidentally, also check out this dialogue with Google Gemini on the possible link between hylmoporphic dualism and computer design.)

There's an over-arching narrative that interests me, although I don't know if anyone else here agrees with it - it is that with the decline of scholastic realism and metaphysics proper, something of great importance was lost to Western culture, generally. It's a book-length argument, though, so I'm not going to continue trying to press it.

:up: Thanks, very good interview, illuminating.

What you call my and Strauss' "convoluted interpretation" is perhaps based on assumptions about how to read Plato that Strauss and others have called into question. — Fooloso4

No, for Burnyeat Strauss' problem is a kind of dogmatism combined with showmanship or privileged insight, and for me the critique would simply need to be adjusted for your unique form of dogmatism, namely one based on skepticism. The contrarian showmanship is much the same.

Here is an excerpt somewhat late into the article:

Let us be clear that if Strauss’s interpretation of Plato is wrong, the entire edifice falls to dust. If Plato is the radical Utopian that ordinary scholarship believes him to be,52 there is no such thing as the unanimous conservatism of ‘the classics’; no such disaster as the loss of ancient wisdom through Machiavelli and Hobbes; no such person as ‘the philosopher’ to tell ‘the gentlemen’ to observe ‘the limits of politics’. Instead, the ‘larger horizons behind and beyond’ modern thought open onto a debate about the nature and practicability of a just society. Those of us who take philosophy seriously will think that this clash of reasoned views among the ancient philosophers is more relevant to our present interests than the anti-Utopian ‘teaching’ that Strauss has single-handedly invented. So let me try to show that Strauss’s interpretation of Plato is wrong from beginning to end.

His beginning is an inference from literary form. Plato wrote dialogues, dramas in prose. Therefore, the utterances of Socrates or any other character in a Platonic dialogue are like the utterances of Macbeth: they do not necessarily express the thought of the author. Like Shakespeare, ‘Plato conceals his opinions.’53

The comparison is, of course, woefully inadequate. There are dramas and dramas, and Plato’s distancing of himself from his characters is quite different from Shakespeare’s. It is not through literary insensitivity that readers of the Platonic dialogues, from Aristotle onward, have taken Socrates to be Plato’s spokesman; nor is it, as Strauss imagines, through failure to appreciate that a drama comprises the ‘deeds’ as well as the ‘speeches’ of the characters.

The dramatic action of the Republic, for example, is a sustained exhibition of the power of persuasion. Socrates persuades Glaucon and Adeimantus that justice is essential for the happiness of both city and man. He persuades them that justice can be realised in human society provided three great changes are made in the life of the ruling class. First, the family and private property must be abolished; second, women must be brought out of seclusion and educated to take part in government alongside the men; third, both men and women must have a lengthy training in advanced mathematics and active philosophical discussion (not the reading of old books). He persuades them, moreover, that these changes can be brought about without violence, by the kind of persuasive argument he is using with them.

The proof of the power of persuasion is that in the course of the discussion – this is one of the ‘deeds’ that Plato leaves the observant reader to notice for himself – Glaucon and Adeimantus undertake to participate in the task of persuasion themselves, should the day of Utopia come.54 A significant event, this undertaking, for Glaucon and Adeimantus belong to the aristocratic elite. In Straussian language, they are ‘gentlemen’: the very people Socrates’ persuasion must be able to win over if he means what he so often says, that a just society is both desirable and practicable.

Thus the ‘deeds’ of the Republic, so far from undercutting Socrates’ utopian speeches, reinforce them. Plato uses the distance between himself and the character of Socrates not to conceal his opinions, but to show their efficacy in action. Any ‘gentlemen’ who read the Republic and identify with Glaucon or Adeimantus should find themselves fired with the ambition to help achieve justice on earth, and convinced that it can be done.

Strauss, of course, wants his ‘gentlemen’ readers to form the opposite conviction, about the Republic and about politics in general. What persuasions can he muster? There is the frail comparison with Shakespeare. There is the consideration that Socrates is a master of irony and ‘irony is a kind of dissimulation, or of untruthfulness’.55 But to show in detail that Plato means the opposite of what Socrates says, Strauss resorts to a peculiar mode of paraphrase which he evidently learned from the tenth-century Islamic philosopher, Farabi.56

The technique is as follows. You paraphrase the text in tedious detail – or so it appears to the uninitiated reader. Occasionally you remark that a certain statement is not clear; you note that the text is silent about a certain matter; you wonder whether such and such can really be the case. With a series of scarcely perceptible nudges you gradually insinuate that the text is insinuating something quite different from what the words say. Strauss’s description of Farabi describes himself: ‘There is a great divergence between what Farabi explicitly says and what Plato explicitly says; it is frequently impossible to say where Farabi’s alleged report of Plato’s views ends and his own exposition begins.’57

The drawback with this mode of commenting on a Platonic dialogue is that it presupposes what it seeks to prove, that the dialogue form is designed to convey different meanings to different kinds of readers.58 If there is a secret meaning, one might concede that Maimonides’ instructions show us how to find it and that Farabi’s mode of commentary is the properly cautious way to pass it on to a new generation of initiates. But Strauss has not yet shown that Plato does conceal his opinions, let alone that they are the opposite of what Socrates explicitly says. Hence his use of techniques adapted from Maimonides and Farabi is a vicious circularity. . . — Myles Burnyeat, Sphinx without a Secret

Have you read Strauss or just relying on "Burnyeat's Eyes." — Fooloso4

I like Burnyeat. I have read more Straussians than Strauss himself, and at the beginning of his article Burnyeat explains that his critique is both a critique of Strauss and the Straussian pupils simultaneously, given the way that the pupils exaggerated the problems that Burnyeat sees in Strauss.


(I included portions in the quote that Paine might find interesting vis-a-vis Gerson.)

...My difficulty with @Fooloso4's Plato is fairly simple. I think Plato is a great philosopher and an unparalleled pedagogue, and Fooloso ends up making him an invisible philosopher and a shoddy pedagogue. Fooloso has an a priori (political?) motivation to wrestle Plato away from the Christian tradition, and his means is a skeptical-know-nothing version of Plato that prevents one from building any substantial doctrine upon Plato's writings, much less a Christian doctrine. This successfully undercuts the Western tradition of interpreting Plato since at least Augustine, but it also undercuts the idea that Plato was a great pedagogue. Why? Because on Fooloso's account, anyone who draws anything of substance from Plato has de facto misunderstood him; and if everyone has misunderstood Plato then surely Plato is a shoddy teacher or else a non-teacher. I find this all rather silly, especially given the strange swirling motivations which are very far from an innocent attempt to understand Plato in himself. The irony is that in order to dethrone a Christianized Plato, Fooloso has conjured up a dogmatism of his own, namely the dogma of Plato as a skeptical-know-nothing. Obviously such an approach creates the ambience of a secret knowledge of gnostic Platonism, unknown to the uninitiated, and this in turn further catalyzes the idea that Plato is a weak pedagogue, in need of auxiliary help in order to be understood.

And to be clear, the focus on Christianity comes from Fooloso, not from me. He protests far too much, often when no one has said a word about Christian interpretations of Plato. For my part, I accept a healthy distinction between Plato and Christianity, and I am not a great promoter of a single perennial philosophy running throughout the West. I would prefer to let Plato speak, but in order for that to happen we must acknowledge that he has a voice and we must also clear our ears of biases that would pre-scribe his voice.

But the reason that passage appeals to me, and I've mentioned it many times, is because it lays out the outlines of Aquinas' version of Aristotle's 'matter/form' dualism very clearly. (You can find it here. Incidentally, also check out this dialogue with Google Gemini on the possible link between hylmoporphic dualism and computer design.) — Wayfarer

Yes. Aristotle's hylomorphism was a proposed explanation for the philosophical distinction between Body & Mind. But it could also serve as a metaphor for the modern analysis of material/physical Hardware and abstract/metaphysical Software. Presumably, only rational animals are able to make that differentiation between what we see and what we infer. In a computer, the hardware serves as the Hyle to embody and process the abstract data of digital logic : Morph. Together they become a "computer", and act as a "thinking machine".

But materialists will object that the Data (mind-stuff) is dependent on the Hardware (matter stuff) to provide the necessary substance for computation. Hence, no Brain, no Mind. But that's an Either-Or reductive way to look at the Mind/Body problem. I suspect that Aristotle and Aquinas would view the thinking-computing system Holistically as a Both-And feature of Nature. That's also the basis of my personal BothAnd philosophy.

For me, BothAnd is the holistic principle of Holism & Complementarity, as illustrated in the Yin/Yang symbol. Human reason can differentiate Yin from Yang, and Mind from Body, but the system only works as a team. Separately, the Mind-Software-Idea is vacuous, and the Brain-Hardware-Matter is inert. But working together they produce the "magic" that makes a Person or Computer more than a collection of isolated Bits & Bolts : a system for receiving, processing & sending Symbolized Meaning that is significant only to rational minds in functional brains. :nerd:


YIN / YANG : HARDWARE / SOFTWARE