"What we have here, however, is the most formal foundation of a “creaturely metaphysics.” It is creaturely according to its most formal object: because it concerns the suspended tension⁹ between consciousness and being (and not the absoluteness of the self-identity of either consciousness or being).It is creaturely, moreover and more decisively, according to its most formal method: because it proceeds according to the in fieri—becoming¹⁰—of a back-and-forth relation (and not by way of a discrimination between self-sufficient unities)."
What we are likewise does not contain what we will become, our ends. And what we become is tied up in the rest of the world, and so all other created essences. For creatures, what something is must be determined relationally, which seems to suggest a certain lack of freedom. — Count Timothy von Icarus
But first we might consider, is this really the first, most formal problem of metaphysics? It certainly seems dominant. — Count Timothy von Icarus
As for "creaturely" it seems to be describing the interplay between physical display and consciousness. Thus I can say, "That is a dog," but I can't experience what it is to be that dog.
I took it that the "formal question" is about where any methodology must begin re metaphysics. Are we to begin our investigation with being or the mind? - essentially. Basically, we can't start saying things about being until we first resolve what we need to start investigating first. — Count Timothy von Icarus
(I think it would be too simple, though tempting, to say: Neither one, it’s about methodology. At this extremely abstract meta-level, I don’t think we can introduce a third category called “methodology.”) — J
The epistemological instability highlighted here "manifests itself in the ineluctable back-and-forth between a meta-ontics and a meta-noetics," which is "ultimately a reflection, at the level of method, of the inherent instability of creaturely being as such." — Count Timothy von Icarus
If the univocalist has a flat ontology with everything being captured by the exact same univocal concept of being, the analogical thinker has an ontology with a depth dimension, where there is a kind of “depth of field” qua being. — Leontiskos
Kimhi’s Thinking and Being — J
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