As for judgment, if I call my enemy "evil," "monster," "inhuman," what value does that provide? As far as I can see, and I see it everywhere in the world, all it does is distract from the most effective response. — T Clark

I once had a dream where a mafia hitman followed me to North Dakota to kill me. There was a moment in the dream where I knew someone was going to die, either him or me, and I knew beyond any doubt: it's was going to be him. It's not that judgment has to prove itself somehow in terms of value. Sometimes it's just there.

And you're right, it was cannibalism :grimace:

To be blunt, why should I worry about your problems with and suspicions about my ideas. I'm not asking you to endorse them or change your own understanding of morality. — T Clark

You absolutely shouldn't give a proverbial. Thank you for being blunt.

The quote didn't answer my question.
— Philosophim

I think it does, although you might not like the answer. — T Clark

It had nothing to do with like or dislike. It was the same answer you gave before wrapped in a quote. I don't see how it added anything to your point, or answered mine.

but on questions of how I treat others, I think I see clearly. You can doubt that, but that sort of ends the discussion. — T Clark

No, I don't doubt that. Many people believe they are good people, better than average, and have faith in their own judgements. A philosophical examination should find a stance that is rationally consistent.
You're on a philosophy forum, not a religion, meditation, or self-help forum. Its not about what makes us feel good, its about coming up with rational arguments. Your assertion of a personal opinion does not pass as a rational argument. Your morality has a severe flaw if anyone but yourself practices it. And you miss the fact that despite you thinking you see clearly, you make mistakes. If living by your nature is also making mistakes, and you make the mistake of getting drunk, driving, and killing someone, are you living a moral life?

I'm talking about people who aren't good people.
— Philosophim

I have been explicit that I am describing my personal philosophy. — T Clark

That's just an opinion. That's more of a slang or general use of the word, but not a standard of logical reasoning. I have no objection to you deciding to live your life by an opinion, but if you're going to claim its a philosophy that has anymore to it then a personal desire in how you want to live, its not going to pass muster.

Several others on this thread have made similar comments. I've responded with this quote from "Self-Reliance."

And if your nature includes being self-determining to some extent? That would seem to entail that Emerson must choose who he is a child of.

Of course, if the Good is truly "better" it would seem that one only ever chooses to become a "son of the Devil" due to either a defect in self-determination or ignorance. The person who knows the better will choose it if they can. But then the question seems to become: "what is more in one's nature, to be self-determining our to be determined?"

Then there is the possibility of willful ignorance or incontinence, as opposed to the "free will that wills itself." There seems to be a middle ground between perfected freedom, which always chooses the better, and utter lack of freedom, where the partially self-determining person can will their own turn away from freedom.

This can serve an important function in keeping groups united and coordinated. — Judaka

Yes, that's what I meant by "greasing the skids."

Morality exists in situations where we require others to act in a specific way in order to get what we want.

Another reason why morality isn't just "right and wrong" is that morality is rules for the group, for the benefit of the group, but only your group. Morality can facilitate cruelty and tyranny in this way. — Judaka

I have no problem with that, but I think many people here would disagree with you when you claim issues that don't involve right and wrong, good and bad, are moral. In the OP, I argued that what most call morality I call just another case of social control. I think that's similar to what you're saying.

It seems to me that you're advocating for the superiority of this "intrinsic" morality as a replacement for the "coercive" morality, and I can't agree with that. — Judaka

Again, the prescription for personal morality I've described is just that - personal, i.e. guidance for how I should behave toward others. It wasn't meant apply to how groups go about enforcing rules for human interaction. Call those rules "moral" or not, I see them as just another form of social control.

Still, to disavow this process is kind of like refusing to vote in a democracy. — Judaka

Here, I'll stretch your metaphor to the breaking point - if I don't recognize the legitimacy of democracy, why would I participate voluntarily?

It's important to recognise that for many such acts, even 1% of the group is more than sufficient to be disruptive and adversely affect the rest. While it can seem almost like bullying for the majority to push these outliners back into line, it is in fact necessary to do. To "live and let live" and only be guided by your own moral principles is unacceptable. There are times where one must stand up for the conditions that benefit the group. — Judaka

When I say "social control" I don't mean it as necessarily a bad thing. I recognize the necessity for society to organize itself, I just don't think it's accurate to call that "morality.'

For Emerson, it wasn't a wishy washy situation. Around 3-5% of America's white population were abolitionists, and Emerson was in that tiny minority. He was surrounded by people who were afraid that a racially diverse society would crumble. His advice, which has been passed down for generations was; think for yourself. — frank

Good point. I hadn't thought of abolition as part of the context of Emerson's philosophy.

I once had a dream where a mafia hitman followed me to North Dakota to kill me. There was a moment in the dream where I knew someone was going to die, either him or me, and I knew beyond any doubt: it's was going to be him. — frank

Yes, I saw this movie. No, wait. That was South Dakota. You have more interesting dreams than I do.

It's not that judgment has to prove itself somehow in terms of value. Sometimes it's just there. — frank

In order to effectively stop the hit man, I have to judge the situation and decide how to act. I don't have to judge whether or not what he is doing is evil. It's not relevant.

It's not that judgment has to prove itself somehow in terms of value. Sometimes it's just there.
— frank

In order to effectively stop the hit man, I have to judge the situation and decide how to act. I don't have to judge whether or not what he is doing is evil. It's not relevant. — T Clark

One would expect that before you kill someone, you would think about whether it's the right thing to do. In my dream, I didn't hesitate.

This is my theory: considerations of good and evil are mostly post hoc assessments of spontaneous action. In other words, everybody is like you. We all just act without a huge amount of thought and then guilt invades later when we realize that we didn't channel our angst in the best way, or maybe things went awesomely and we take credit for an outcome that was 99% accidental. Through experiences like that, action remains mostly spontaneous, but that lingering guilt or pride makes us pause and assess the options.

It was the same answer you gave before wrapped in a quote. I don't see how it added anything to your point, or answered mine. — Philosophim

You asked:

And if your intrinsic nature is a serial killer? — Philosophim

Emerson and I respond - "So be it." I think that answers your question. You may not find that satisfactory, but I think it's at least clear.

No, I don't doubt that. Many people believe they are good people, better than average, and have faith in their own judgements. — Philosophim

Ha! I like that.

A philosophical examination should find a stance that is rationally consistent.
You're on a philosophy forum, not a religion, meditation, or self-help forum. Its not about what makes us feel good, its about coming up with rational arguments. — Philosophim

I've made a rational argument that non-rational considerations have to be taken into account when dealing with philosophical, and human, issues. That is not a radical position to take. Lao Tzu and Chuang Tzu were roughly contemporaneous with Plato and Aristotle. Taoism has been around for more than 2,000 years. If it's your position that it's principles are not legitimately philosophical, that's a bigger question than we can answer here.

That's just an opinion. — Philosophim

How is what you've written not also an opinion? We've both supported our views with more or less rational argument. They both go back to a question of values. Is it your position that our values - what we consider important, what we like and dislike, what we think is good and bad - is all and only based on rational considerations? If so, I think that's beyond the scope of this discussion.

No, I have some obligation to respond to your arguments civilly. Which I have done. That's it. I'm not responsible for convincing you, although I have tried at least to explain my ideas to you clearly. — T Clark

On the contrary, you haven't even attempted to respond to the argument that Banno gave. Setting out your ideas and then refusing to address counterarguments is not philosophical engagement.

And if your nature includes being self-determining to some extent? — Count Timothy von Icarus

Do I think humans are "self-determining." I'll have to think about that and we'll have to define what we mean by it. As for this discussion, nothing I have written and nothing I can remember from reading Chuang Tzu or Lao Tzu takes any position on the question.

...perfected freedom, which always chooses the better... — Count Timothy von Icarus

That doesn't strike me as true at all.

This is my theory: considerations of good and evil are mostly post hoc assessments of spontaneous action. In other words, everybody is like you. We all just act without a huge amount of thought and then guilt invades later when we realize that we didn't channel our angst in the best way, or maybe things went awesomely and we take credit for an outcome that was 99% accidental. Through experiences like that, action remains mostly spontaneous, but that lingering guilt or pride makes us pause and assess the options. — frank

This makes sense to me, with this addition - considerations of good and evil may be post hoc, but they are likely to effect my judgment when another situation comes up in the future.

While I agree one ought to follow his own conscience, his conscience needs to be developed, and studying moral philosophy is helpful in that regard. Emerson, for instance, was once a preacher, and it is doubtful he would have come to his later conclusions had he not put in the study of those doctrines. One needs to know a doctrine before he can become unsatisfied by it.

In Emerson’s example we discover that no one can be controlled by a normative claim, moral, ethical, or otherwise. The only coercive rules are the legal ones, enforced as they are by the threat of force, violence, and kidnapping.

I've made a rational argument that non-rational considerations have to be taken into account when dealing with philosophical, and human, issues. That is not a radical position to take. — T Clark

Of course, no disagreement. You've taken an non-rational position into account, but it has been found lacking in the larger claim of morality. Considering not rational positions is fine and a good thing. But considering something does not mean concluding it is correct. I see no indication that your position is tenable as anything apart from someone who wants to justify living as they see fit without any further consideration of how this plays out if everyone followed the same ideal.

Emerson and I respond - "So be it." I think that answers your question. You may not find that satisfactory, but I think it's at least clear. — T Clark

If this is your final answer, then you did answer my question. You do not believe in morality then, you believe nothing should dictate your actions besides yourself. You are unconcerned with contradictions when other people are involved, and I doubt that in practice, you would live in such a way if such conflicts arose.

T Clark, I like you and think you're generally a well spoken and decent person. But this is weak. When you introduce your ideas on these boards, it is not a place to assert and not address the details of your argument. That's just proselytizing. I feel you can be better than that, and maybe you're unaware of what you're doing, so I'm bringing it to your attention. I get you may feel defensive over this accusation, please don't. Think about it for some time first.

How is what you've written not also an opinion? We've both supported our views with more or less rational argument. — T Clark

No, I have not seen a rational argument. I have seen rationalizing, or presentation of weak support for what one wants while dismissing things which would challenge it. A quote from someone expressing a similar opinion as yourself is not a rational argument.

They both go back to a question of values. Is it your position that our values - what we consider important, what we like and dislike, what we think is good and bad - is all and only based on rational considerations? — T Clark

No, it is a question of what morals are vs what we value. If you claim what you value is what is moral, then you have much more to explore and answer as to why this rationally is. If you're going to claim, "It just is," then this isn't a rational conversation, just a statement of opinion. This would be the same as me asking someone, "If God is real and good, why does evil happen?" and they replied, "It just does, its good because God allowed it."

As for the direct question of, "Are our values based on rational considerations?" this is hardly a debate. Personal values do not have to be based on rational decisions. But this is not morality. You have to assert that what we personally desire and value is morality, when the default is that they are very separate things. It is your assertion that they are the same that you have not proved that is the problem.

I have no problem with that, but I think many people here would disagree with you when you claim issues that don't involve right and wrong, good and bad, are moral. In the OP, I argued that what most call morality I call just another case of social control. I think that's similar to what you're saying. — T Clark

Morality is a dysfunctional word with too many very similar, overlapping but separate meanings. For example, I think it's truth that morality is both natural and artificial/manmade, however, I think the "morality" that is natural and the "morality" that is manmade are distinct and different things. One referring to our biology and one roughly referring to our culture. It's very difficult to delineate the "natural" from the "artificial", and I wouldn't even be willing to try. "Personal morality" and this coerce/social morality we've described could be distinct from each other, but overlap greatly and I've no way to unravel that mess. Philosophers such as posters here want to resolve such contradictions and try to provide solutions, but only end up overstepping their authority in a meaningless way. If someone says "morality is X and not Y", what is determinative of the correct answer? Is it common use? The rules of language? Or something else?

Call those rules "moral" or not, I see them as just another form of social control. — T Clark

"Moral" sounds prescriptive or evaluative, I'd say this "social control" is part of morality, and that morality & social control are not mutually exclusive. Their mutual exclusivity seems to be the core of your argument, but what's the argument for it?

Here, I'll stretch your metaphor to the breaking point - if I don't recognize the legitimacy of democracy, why would I participate voluntarily? — T Clark

You can forfeit your position as a participant, but the rules of the democracy are enforced by law and coercive factors will bend you or break you until you comply. By refusing to participate you sacrifice the power to influence outcomes while still experiencing the full weight of said outcomes. There are reasons to refuse to participate, but it's not pragmatic.

This makes sense to me, with this addition - considerations of good and evil may be post hoc, but they are likely to effect my judgment when another situation comes up in the future. — T Clark

Right. That's what I said.

it has been found lacking in the larger claim of morality. — Philosophim

Found lacking by you and some others. Some other others have been more sympathetic. Also, as I wrote in the OP:

As far as I can see, all formal moral philosophies, and certainly any philosophy that specifies how other people should behave, is not moral at all, or even really a philosophy. It’s a program of social control - coercive rules a society establishes to manage disruptive or inconvenient behavior — T Clark

You are unconcerned with contradictions when other people are involved, — Philosophim

By contradictions I assume you mean conflict or potential conflict. There is nothing in my description of my personal morality, so-called, that prevents me from taking the needs and interests of other people into account.

When you introduce your ideas on these boards, it is not a place to assert and not address the details of your argument. That's just proselytizing. I feel you can be better than that, and maybe you're unaware of what you're doing, so I'm bringing it to your attention. — Philosophim

Thank you for your smug condescension.

As for the direct question of, "Are our values based on rational considerations?" this is hardly a debate. — Philosophim

Based on the contents of this thread, it seems you are wrong.

You've started to be insulting. Perhaps we should end it here.

Morality is a dysfunctional word with too many very similar, overlapping but separate meanings. — Judaka

I agree. That's one of the reasons I started this discussion.

I think it's truth that morality is both natural and artificial/manmade, however, I think the "morality" that is natural and the "morality" that is manmade are distinct and different things. One referring to our biology and one roughly referring to our culture. It's very difficult to delineate the "natural" from the "artificial", and I wouldn't even be willing to try. "Personal morality" and this coerce/social morality we've described could be distinct from each other, but overlap greatly and I've no way to unravel that mess. — Judaka

If you are saying that what I call personal morality vs social control and what you call natural vs. artificial morality are similar concepts, then I agree.

"Moral" sounds prescriptive or evaluative, I'd say this "social control" is part of morality, and that morality & social control are not mutually exclusive. Their mutual exclusivity seems to be the core of your argument, but what's the argument for it? — Judaka

No, I don't think they're mutually exclusive. On the contrary, I am saying I think what people call "morality" is nothing more than social control.

You can forfeit your position as a participant, but the rules of the democracy are enforced by law and coercive factors will bend you or break you until you comply. By refusing to participate you sacrifice the power to influence outcomes while still experiencing the full weight of said outcomes. — Judaka

If I didn't think democratic government is legitimate that doesn't mean I wouldn't still recognize I am subject to the consequences of not following the rules and I would behave based on that understanding.

Right. That's what I said. — frank

Yes. I didn't read carefully enough.

Found lacking by you and some others. Some other others have been more sympathetic — T Clark

I'm not talking to them, but about our conversation.

Thank you for your smug condescension. — T Clark

It was not meant to be condescending, but pointing out as a fellow human being something I think you were not aware of. Feel free to disagree, but it was not meant to talk down to you.

By contradictions I assume you mean conflict or potential conflict. There is nothing in my description of my personal morality, so-called, that prevents me from taking the needs and interests of other people into account. — T Clark

Nor is there anything that compels or inclines you to take the needs and interests of others in account. Which again, is not any moral principle at all besides, "I do what I want". And if other people take your moral principle and interact with you, steal from you, beat you up, then say, "Its just my nature, I'm being moral," you have no rational answer besides to accept their claim. I'm not saying you couldn't come up with a more reasonable answer, but you didn't even bother to.

As for the direct question of, "Are our values based on rational considerations?" this is hardly a debate.
— Philosophim

Based on the contents of this thread, it seems you are wrong. — T Clark

I am not discussing with the thread, I am discussing with you.

You've started to be insulting. Perhaps we should end it here. — T Clark

I asked you not to get defensive and just think about what I was saying. That's hardly an intent to insult, especially after I've complimented you a few times in this thread. If you don't want to engage anymore, that is your call.

"Guilt" becomes a category I can assign to others — Moliere

Yes, Mummy only says "be good for Mummy" when she has assigned 'badness'. In fact you have it backwards; one is told to be good, and thereby learns to assign guilt to oneself. Because if one was good, one would not need to be told. Children are helpless and dependent on people who assign them to be ...

- egocentric predators - until puberty, they will be ostracized by their peers, imprisoned or killed by law enforcement agents. You can't have a society of toddlers in adult bodies - that's a purposeless mob. — Vera Mont

So they have to internalise that identity and fight against themselves to placate those upon whom their life depends.

On intrinsic nature.

The temptation to say "I see it like this", pointing to the same thing for "it" and "this". Always get rid of the idea of the private intrinsic nature in this way: assume that it constantly changes, but that you do not notice the change because your memory constantly deceives you. — Banno

I don’t want to speak for TClark, but the way inner nature, or Buddha nature, is understood within a variety of contemporary philosophical perspectives is via the concept of no-self, a cognitive system with no homuncular ‘I’ driving it. As Varela explains "...lots of simple agents having simple properties may be brought together, even in a haphazard way, to give rise to what appears to an observer as a purposeful and integrated whole".

The ethical significance of the realization of no-self is that “when there are no more boundaries between myself and the other – when I am the other and the other is me – there can be no animosity, hatred, or anxiety between us. This is the crux of St. Augustine's famous saying: Ama, et fac quod vis (Love, and do what you will). Love – understood in terms of the Christian selfless love (agape), analogous to Buddhist compassion (karuna) – is the cohesive force of interbeing, the (groundless) ground of genuine peace and co-existence. “(Sebastian Voros)

The question is whether T Clark sides with Buddhists like Menscius, who asserts that the Good is tied up with natural kinds of innate dispositions, or with a no-self notion of inner virtue.

Shaun Gallagher writes:

If we ask where precisely is the notion of the good in
Varela’s work, the answer is the Buddhist conception of compassion. The good is what compassion means, the good is to eliminate suffering. So for Varela and for Buddhist theories this is closely tied to the conception of or the elimination of the self as a source of suffering. In
some Buddha traditions, the notion of self is associated with suffering, the notion of compassion is directed towards suffering in the sense that we are trying to reduce suffering, not only of oneself, but also of others. One can conceive of this selflessness in terms of skilled effortful
coping which is associated with the Taoist idea of what is called not doing. When one is the action, no residue of self-consciousness remains to observe the action externally.
In the Buddhist practice of self deconstruction, to forget one self is to realize ones emptiness , to realize that one’s every characteristic is conditioned and conditional. so it’s this appeal to this notion of a selfless type of phenomenon that for Varela really constitutes the sort of core of the notion of goodness, since in fact by eliminating the self one eliminates suffering, and one acts
compassionately.

Yes, Mummy only says "be good for Mummy" when she has assigned 'badness'. In fact you have it backwards; one is told to be good, and thereby learns to assign guilt to oneself. Because if one was good, one would not need to be told. Children are helpless and dependent on people who assign them to be ... — unenlightened

I'm not so sure. Guilt need not be so narratively driven -- it can be triggered by any number of events and memories, and need not make any kind of sense. I can feel my guilt is unjustified, because I know that the person guilt-tripping me is eliciting a response -- I still feel the guilt, but that doesn't mean I'm really sorry or think of myself as not-good or needing-to-be-good.

↪Joshs - You can multiply examples of misused blame and judgment all day, just as I can multiple examples of misused knives all day. Neither one of us would be showing that blame or knives are inherently evil.

Do you think praise can exist without blame?

(Note that the example of being "too pre-emptive" is an example of misused blame, or on your account, its antecedent.) — Leontiskos

I don’t think praise can exist without disappointment, which is of course different from blame. We blame when we try our best to understand the motives of another in such a way that we can see those motives as morally justified. In an ideal scenario, it is only after we exhaust all possible generous ascriptions of their acts that we throw up our hands and reluctantly blame them. I am very sympathetic to the enormous difficulty of making sense of the often mysterious behavior of others. All I can tell you is that I’ve never met an immoral, evil, blameworthy or unjust person. It is not that I’ve never felt anger and the initial impulse to blame, but when I undergo the process of trying to make intelligible their motives I am always able to arrive at an explanation that allows me to avoid blame and the need for forgiveness. Furthermore, there is a fundamental philosophical basis for what I assert is the case that it is always possible to arrive at such a non-blameful explanation that can withstand the most robust tests in the real world. Having said that, I’m aware that my view is a fringe one. I only know of one other theorist who has come up with a similar perspective. I’m also aware that my view will be seen as dangerously naive.

This is the crux of St. Augustine's famous saying: Ama, et fac quod vis (Love, and do what you will). — Joshs

It was his answer to the old problem of evil, right?

Guilt need not be so narratively driven -- it can be triggered by any number of events and memories, and need not make any kind of sense. I can feel my guilt is unjustified, because I know that the person guilt-tripping me is eliciting a response -- I still feel the guilt, but that doesn't mean I'm really sorry or think of myself as not-good or needing-to-be-good. — Moliere

My favorite psychologist, George Kelly, defined guilt as the perception of one's apparent dislodgment from one's core role structure. Whatever one does in the light of their understanding of others' outlooks may be regarded as their role. In guilt, our falling away from another we care for could be spoken of as an alienation of oneself from oneself. When we feel we have failed another, we mourn our mysterious dislocation from a competence or value which we associated ourselves with. One feels as if “having fallen below the standards [one has] erected for himself”

It follows from this that any thinking of guilt as a `should have, could have' blamefulness deals in a notion of dislocation and distance, of a mysterious discrepancy within intended meaning, separating who we were from who we are in its teasing gnawing abyss.
[/quote]

As for my own understanding, I don't need to satisfy you. Or Banno. — T Clark

The level of awareness espoused in this thread is that of the eight-year-old decrying "you're not the boss of me!".

Sure. But when you grow up you might choose to act with some consideration for others.

I am very sympathetic to the enormous difficulty of making sense of the often mysterious behavior of others. All I can tell you is that I’ve never met an immoral, evil, blameworthy or unjust person. It is not that I’ve never felt anger and the initial impulse to blame, but when I undergo the process of trying to make intelligible their motives I am always able to arrive at an explanation that allows me to avoid blame and the need for forgiveness. Furthermore, there is a fundamental philosophical basis for what I assert is the case that it is always possible to arrive at such a non-blameful explanation that can withstand the most robust tests in the real world. Having said that, I’m aware that my view is a fringe one. I only know of one other theorist who has come up with a similar perspective. I’m also aware that my view will be seen as dangerously naive. — Joshs

As a non-philosopher, I think it is important to explore this line of thinking - given the rather dreadful consequences of a blame culture we have observed over the centuries.

You say you have never met an immoral, evil or blameworthy person.

I largely agree with this. But my temptation to pass judgement remains strong within me. I have met many people who are extremely dangerous and who don't share my understanding of the world, and this difference in their axioms or their experience is often taken as a form of culpability. Most people follow strong codes and reasoning. I remember the critic Clive James talking about Rupert Murdoch some years ago. Everyone was hoeing into Murdoch as an 'unprincipled scoundrel' - James responded with a quip - 'I think Murdoch is a man of principles, I just think they are the wrong principles.' The question always seems to come back to what do we do with this word 'wrong'?

I think I'm tempted by a notion that how we feel can be given a name -- and so separated at least conceptually -- but that feeling can be attached to anything. (been trying to think through a philosophy of emotion recently, and it's fairly rough); in a sense who we are just is these attachments. Without attachment there'd be no reason to do anything at all, and when our attachments change so do we.

Guilt can be elicited through these stories due to our cultural rituals surrounding acts being blameworthy or priaseworthy, but the story that comes from the guilt isn't the guilt. Our culture invokes guilt in particular circumstances as a means for teaching people to be good (or obedient, or whatever) and the stories arise from that basic manipulation. The particular circumstances of ones own guilt is the narrative, but guilt is an emotional response from an attachment of some kind (the attachment could be as simple as "See clouds:Feel guilt:Explain guilt" -- it needn't make rational sense for the guilt to be there.)

Now, a lot of us happen to have mothers, and parents have an enormous amount of power over children, so it's little wonder that parents influence how children grow (for better or worse), and furthermore that since we're a sexual species it ought not be surprising that children are sexual, too. I give that much to Freud.

And here:

Whatever one does in the light of their understanding of others' outlooks may be regarded as their role. In guilt, our falling away from another we care for could be spoken of as an alienation of oneself from oneself. When we feel we have failed another, we mourn our mysterious dislocation from a competence or value which we associated ourselves with. One feels as if “having fallen below the standards [one has] erected for himself”

It follows from this that any thinking of guilt as a `should have, could have' blamefulness deals in a notion of dislocation and distance, of a mysterious discrepancy within intended meaning, separating who we were from who we are in its teasing gnawing abyss. — Joshs

I think this is a good story, too. Though it's not the guilt, per se, since guilt can be attached to anything at all -- though these are the common sorts of stories which people feel are right about guilt (and I'm not sure any of them are wrong, exactly, though perhaps overgeneralized)

So I'm attached to an image of myself as a good person and furthermore that image is attached to guilt whenever what I do does not match that image within this particular ethical framework where guilt is attached to principle or character.

But guilt could also be attached in other ways, naturally. "Guilt" seems almost like a basic emotion in the same way I'd be tempted to call "red" a basic color -- it's a feeling on the tapestry of consciousness, but it can be configured in so many ways.

So they have to internalise that identity and fight against themselves to placate those upon whom their life depends. — unenlightened

Yup. Just as those others have to adjust to them. That's how societies work - or, failing that, stop working.