What we ought to do is whatever we believe to be right at the time of decision. On most of those occasions, we'll chicken out or compromise or fudge, because the principled action is too dangerous, difficult, expensive, uncomfortable, unpleasant or inconvenient.
If we live up to our highest expectations once in ten tries, we're doing pretty well — Vera Mont

So follow our heart?

So follow our heart? — Moliere

When it's not being stupid, destructive or spiteful.

Well, that's a beginning. Sounds like following our heart can include limiting ourselves, then.

We'll need a better reductio of following our heart as a rule than cases like murder, rape, and all the rest I think, in that case: most heart-followers are good on those, are able to articulate exceptions, and even being in conflict with oneself it sounds to me: Do we need anything more complicated than that to think through ethics, or does that about cover it?

The devil in the details I see here will be "OK, but when are we stupid, destruct, or spiteful? To what do I oppose this when that's the case? My heart?" -- and maybe that's not so bad after all, because we see that while we might want to kill someone, we also want our freedom and so we choose our freedom: there may be the brief flash of anger to do violence, but our attachments to other things are the desires that we can act upon to choose something else.

Makes sense to me, what's wrong with it?

The devil in the details I see here will be "OK, but when are we stupid, destruct, or spiteful? — Moliere

Only you know your own emotions.

It's never going to boil down to one simple rule. It's all very well for the ubermensch to do whatever he wants and assume it will always be morally right, but the rest of us are all the time having to conduct these messy negotiations between how we feel and what we think, what we believe and what the law says, what's good for us and what's good for someone we care about, what we've accepted and begun to doubt, what's ideal and what's practical, what we want and what we ought, what we aspire to and what we're capable of.

You just work your way through it, case by case, day by day.
Then you die.

Sounds to me like there's no philosophy to be had at all in your view, then. Follow your heart and do your best between the competing desires until you no longer have to or can.

Yes?

I suppose that, in the end, I'd still allow more principles than you do, though I think principles are the sorts of things one commits themselves to. I value moral autonomy.

But I am very interested in the role of emotions in ethical thinking, and also clarifying differences between different ways of thinking ethically (or even further specifying when it is we are thinking ethically)

Sounds to me like there's no philosophy to be had at all in your view, then. Follow your heart and do your best between the competing desires until you no longer have to or can. — Moliere

Well there was that little bit about principles, convictions and knowing what's right. But no philosophy - just observations and experience.

So, what do you do if you suspect your child of having committed a crime?

Well there was that little bit about principles, convictions and knowing what's right. But no philosophy - just observations and experience. — Vera Mont

If I just know what is right and make observations and experience then where does asking questions for advice come in? Why deliberate about what is right if I just know what is right?

Seems a bit much to me. I like to know why other people do things. Sometimes they have a point.

So, what do you do if you suspect your child of having committed a crime? — Vera Mont

In my tradition? Pray.

:D

Philosophically -- no answer. These are ways of reflecting on choices, not answers to choices.

If I just know what is right and make observations and experience then where does asking questions for advice come in? Why deliberate about what is right if I just know what is right? — Moliere

I meant that I am speaking from observation and experience, not according to what some guy wrote in 400BC or 1642AD. It's okay to quote philosophers - I just choose not to. This a matter of personal taste.
You don't 'just know'. You learn, reflect, consider, weigh one doctrine against another, advice against your own inclination, loyalties against self-interest, negotiate with others, the environment, the culture and yourself. At any point in your life, you hold some beliefs and convictions about what's right. you act on them. Later, you may question those beliefs and adjust those convictions according to new things you learn.

Seems a bit much to me. I like to know why other people do things. Sometimes they have a point. — Moliere

So, ask them. Every time you get a coherent answer, you learn something about motivation. Every time you get an incoherent answer, you learn something about human nature. Every time you get a punch in the nose, you learn when not to ask questions.

These are ways of reflecting on choices, not answers to choices. — Moliere

Bingo!

Can you tell me not to tell others what to do? That seems immoral. — Hanover

There's something oddly inconsistent in the implicit claim that we ought not expect others to follow any moral precept.

How is that not, thereby, itself a moral precept?

The pretence of stepping outside moral discourse in order to discuss moral discourse is exposed. — Banno

Peter Simpson uses this question as a jumping-off point for his essay, "On Doing Wrong, Modern-Style." He encountered the doctrine very often in his college students, and I think it has become even more common in the two intervening decades:

One's immediate reaction here is likely to be that, if this is so, then the theory has here proved itself to be incoherent and contradictory. It ends up asserting what it first denied, namely, the existence of a right and wrong that we do not make but which is somehow absolute and the same for everyone. Perhaps in some ways of taking the theory there is an incoherence here. But there need not be. We can suppose that two difference senses of the word 'wrong' are being used. Certainly people act as if there were two senses, since they do not regard the wrong of telling others what to do as a wrong that is up to each one's choice and that might be wrong for me but not for you. On the contrary, they say it is wrong for everyone and should be avoided by everyone. This is intelligible enough if another sense of wrong is in question. For that it is wrong in one sense of 'wrong' to tell people what is wrong in another sense of 'wrong' is not, as such, a contradiction.

The wrong that one is forbidding when one says that it is wrong to tell others what is wrong is the wrong of interfering with their freedom to decide for themselves their own right and wrong. When one tells others that such interference is wrong, one is not oneself interfering with their freedom to decide for themselves their own right and wrong. One is interfering with interfering with others' freedom to decide their own right and wrong. To make this a little clearer, let us call the wrong that each one is free to decide for himself a first-order wrong. And let us call the wrong of interfering with this freedom a second-order wrong. What is being forbidden is telling people their first-order wrong. What is not being forbidden is telling them their second-order wrong. The two wrongs are at different levels, and a prohibition on telling people what is wrong at one level is not the same as, nor need it involve, a prohibition on telling people what is wrong at another level. Indeed, the contrary is the case. Telling people their second-order wrong is not only compatible with, but even required by, the prohibition on telling them their first-order wrong. It is just way of telling them to respect each others' freedom, I mean the freedom they each have to make their own first-order right and wrong.

Still, once we have made this distinction, we do end up, in the case of the second-order wrong, with a wrong that is wrong simply and altogether. Moreover, it is clear that in this sense of 'wrong' people not only can but in fact do do wrong. . . — Peter L. P. Simpson, “On Doing Wrong, Modern-Style,” in Vices, Virtues, and Consequences, pp. 60-1

I understand the concept; but even a surgeon asks permission before excising a tumor, right? — Moliere

No, not necessarily. Medical procedures often do not require consent when the person in question is not capable of consent. In questions of moral admonition consent is tangential and not especially important. This is in part because one will not consent to the punishment that will be forced on them if they continue to act poorly (e.g. imprisonment, fines, etc.).

For my part I tend to think we're pretty ignorant of one another, so it's best to leave such tools to the professionals. — Moliere

Oh? Well who do you consider a professional? I think it's clear that many people are ignorant of themselves, and that especially close friends and family will see more clearly than they do their own actions. This is as it has always been, and it is why socialization is so important. Those who do wrong are very often ignorant of their wrongdoing, whether culpably or not. It has always been considered a mercy to make them aware of it - to help them avoid what will only become a bigger problem for them and for others.

Those who do wrong are very often ignorant of their wrongdoing, whether culpably or not. It has always been considered a mercy to make them aware of it - to help them avoid what will only become a bigger problem for them and for others. — Leontiskos

But then how to avoid being put into all of this in the first place.

No, not necessarily. Medical procedures often do not require consent when the person in question is not capable of consent. — Leontiskos

Doesn't that show how consent is important? We only operate when the person is not capable of consent, and so we should have some basis of judging for when that's the case?

In questions of moral admonition consent is tangential and not especially important. This is in part because one will not consent to the punishment that will be forced on them if they continue to act poorly (e.g. imprisonment, fines, etc.).

Do you imagine that I want to punish people who will not consent to the punishment? :D

Well, I don't really. I'm one of those "Reform, to the extent possible" sorts, although there are all sorts of thorny questions along the way.
 

Oh? Well who do you consider a professional? I think it's clear that many people are ignorant of themselves, and that especially close friends and family will see more clearly than they do their own actions. This is as it has always been, and it is why socialization is so important. Those who do wrong are very often ignorant of their wrongdoing, whether culpably or not. It has always been considered a mercy to make them aware of it - to help them avoid what will only become a bigger problem for them and for others. — Leontiskos

For making hard-and-fast rules? No one :D

Hence the emphasis on autonomy.

I do value autonomy a great deal, and I think we all ought to. I base this on our general ignorance (... though in general I'd point to psychologists and priests and family: people who a person is close to and builds a trusting relationship with -- but it would ultimately be up to them who they choose to trust: philosophically speaking it wouldn't be I, that's for certain)

I agree that the community can see you better than you can see yourself, though that doesn't mean that your close friends and family won't have biases either. Sometimes a lack of closeness could clear the eyes, and sometimes the distance obscures certain details. I don't think we really get to not socialize -- everyone who can think of themself as a distinct person in a community who makes choices is socialized to some degree, right?

But I don't think the community can take on the role of doctor, exactly, no.

For some it's priests. For some it's a guru. For some it's a text. For some a feeling. For some an MD.

But given my belief about our general ignorance about how to go about helping people, philosophically at least, I put autonomy as a pretty high priority.

Doesn't that show how consent is important? — Moliere

It shows a way in which consent is important and it shows a way in which consent isn't important.

Do you imagine that I want to punish people who will not consent to the punishment? — Moliere

If someone fully consents to a punishment then they are not being punished. What you say here makes me think that you do not understand punishment. And of course the general view being represented here does lead to the eradication of punishment, which leads to yet another societal impossibility, and to my mind counts as another reductio.

Well, I don't really. I'm one of those "Reform, to the extent possible" sorts, although there are all sorts of thorny questions along the way. — Moliere

To reform someone against their will is simply one form of punishment. C. S. Lewis argues persuasively that it is the worst form of punishment, and is deeply contrary to human dignity (link).

[Professionals] For making hard-and-fast rules? No one :D — Moliere

Then I have to wonder if you were being honest when you proposed that it is, "best to leave such [coercive] tools to the professionals." This is because when I asked you who these professionals are you said, "No one."

I do value autonomy a great deal, and I think we all ought to. I base this on our general ignorance... — Moliere

Again, the "ignorance" card doesn't play. Insofar as an intellect-based case is made for autonomy, that case is based on knowledge, not ignorance. It is based on the idea that I have more knowledge about what is best for me than anyone else does. And that is precisely what I challenged in my last post. For example, libertarians and those who champion autonomy have a great deal of trouble understanding how to parent children, and how it is that children should be answerable to adults.

I agree that the community can see you better than you can see yourself, though that doesn't mean that your close friends and family won't have biases either. Sometimes a lack of closeness could clear the eyes, and sometimes the distance obscures certain details. I don't think we really get to not socialize -- everyone who can think of themself as a distinct person in a community who makes choices is socialized to some degree, right? — Moliere

I agree, but many in this thread are saying that they should not be socialized. Socialization involves moral admonition, after all.

But I don't think the community can take on the role of doctor, exactly, no. — Moliere

Perhaps the more obvious case of those who wield moral tools are legislators and policemen. T Clark seems to think that the serial killer might be acting rightly, according to his "intrinsic nature." The legislators and the police don't think he is acting rightly, and they will throw him in prison because of it.

---

- I figured you might be lurking. :razz:

Unfortunately I am not going to be able to respond to all of that. I found some of it accurate and some of it inaccurate, but these psychological theories of yours are icing on the cake, and we must first build the cake:

If everyone is doing the best they can at each moment of their life then no one is responsible for anything, and therefore it is entirely backwards to say that humans are responsible because they are always doing the best they can. — Leontiskos

If we are always doing the best we can, this means no one is responsible for immorality. — Joshs

I want you to think about why it is that someone who is doing their best is not responsible for immorality and for bad effects that might result. A central question here is whether "everyone is doing their best" is supposed to be a contingent and synthetic truth, or a necessary and analytic truth. On my lights it only makes sense as a contingent truth, because the question of whether someone is "doing their best" relies on an investigation into how they are doing what they are doing. In everyday language when someone says, "Johnny is doing his best out there," the presupposition is that it is possible that Johnny might not be doing his best. In doing his best he is doing something that he need not be doing.

On this account, "Johnny is doing his best," is a bit like, "The Corvette is going 100 mph." The claim about the Corvette is not a necessary truth, and therefore in order to verify its truth condition we must examine the speed of the car via the speedometer or a radar gun or something of the sort. Only once our examination is complete are we justified in confirming or denying the claim about the Corvette.

It seems to me that what you have done is to borrow from negative freedom, the bad things that happen despite our best intent, and attach it to intention itself ( I WANTED to be callous, insensitive, cruel, immoral). — Joshs

Nah, this is very far from Aristotle's or Aquinas' view. I'm not sure where your ideas here are coming from. For Aquinas we always aim at what we perceive to be good, and therefore no one ever aims at immorality qua immorality.

Also, for Aristotle and Aquinas what we all ultimately aim for is happiness, and in my opinion many of the errors of your post consist in reducing that happiness aim to something smaller, such as, "deepening the intimacy of our anticipatory understandings within the social groups that matter to us." Someone can seek happiness in social intimacy, and as social animals that will contribute to our happiness, but it is a mistake to confuse social intimacy with happiness or our aim.

We are naturally social and rape violates the nature of humans to be social? — Hanover

No, that's not what i said. Chickens are social, and their society generally consists of a dominant cock who kills or chases off other males, and a harem of hens that he pretty much rapes on a daily basis. The hens in turn have a pecking order of dominance and submission. Societies, even human societies are not necessarily "nice". Hence I distinguish social relations based on power and violence from those based on cooperation.
This is not to say that cooperation can survive without any coercion to defend it against exploitation. The subjugation of women, slavery, warfare, and rape, are all social arrangements possible to humans. To resist them we have religion, morals, government, justice systems etc.

It shows a way in which consent is important and it shows a way in which consent isn't important. — Leontiskos

Seems to me that the default is "requires consent" and so we have to justify why it is we are ignoring consent in some circumstance.

Then I have to wonder if you were being honest when you proposed that it is, "best to leave such [coercive] tools to the professionals." This is because when I asked you who these professionals are you said, "No one." — Leontiskos

No one when it comes to hard in fast rules. I clarified the kinds of persons I'd point to in a circumstance parenthetically, but I value autonomy in that process of selecting who the professional is.

To reform someone against their will is simply one form of punishment. C. S. Lewis argues persuasively that it is the worst form of punishment, and is deeply contrary to human dignity (link). — Leontiskos

"Against their will" would have to incur a pretty strong justification for me, given my respect for autonomy. But serial killing is pretty extreme. We've been dealing in some extreme examples where the question is when to use coercion.

While I understand the need to do so, I don't think we can get away with saying "And this is why we're good"

If someone fully consents to a punishment then they are not being punished. What you say here makes me think that you do not understand punishment. And of course the general view being represented here does lead to the eradication of punishment, which leads to yet another societal impossibility, and to my mind counts as another reductio. — Leontiskos

I'm admitting in this question that I don't see the appeal of punishment, yes.

What's the appeal?

I agree, but many in this thread are saying that they should not be socialized. Socialization involves moral admonition, after all. — Leontiskos

Hrrmm, I think it's just a disagreement about what is entailed by socialization -- is it a process of moral admonition, or a process of learning to think for yourself, or a process of collective deliberation, or a process . . . I think what's being said is that there are some forms of socialization which are not preferred; these other ways over here are preferrable, to the extent we can pursue them. Or, rather, a kind of ideal for living together.

Perhaps the more obvious case of those who wield moral tools are legislators and policemen. T Clark seems to think that the serial killer might be acting rightly, according to his "intrinsic nature." The legislators and the police don't think he is acting rightly, and they will throw him in prison because of it. — Leontiskos

I don't see legislators or policemen as moral tools.

Where we see eye-to-eye is with respect to the importance of community.

But hierarchy and coercion are generally things I don't think of as ethical, but rather expedient: they are political, not moral tools. They are useful to this or that end, but that doesn't mean they're good, per se. They are the decisions we've made so far, most of which were an inheritance to begin with.

The serial killer might be acting rightly to his intrinsic nature. But that's also a pretty extreme case for thinking ethically -- it's not on my radar as a thing I have to consider very often. I tend to believe that ethical thinking occurs between persons who respect one another, at least, so these are just difficult circumstances rather than cases against some approach.

When I think of my intrinsic nature, I just think of the sorts of things which bring harmony to my life, which is different for different people, and is still a worthwhile ethical topic in a world where serial killers exist.

Philosophically I don't think there is such a thing, really, as an intrinsic nature. For myself I'm coming at it more from the existential side. The "intrinsic nature" is created along the way, and changed with circumstances.

The beauty in ethical thinking, then, is in being able to deliberate. (Hence the value of many philosophies)

Again, the "ignorance" card doesn't play. Insofar as an intellect-based case is made for autonomy, that case is based on knowledge, not ignorance. It is based on the idea that I have more knowledge about what is best for me than anyone else does. And that is precisely what I challenged in my last post. — Leontiskos

It does, because, generally speaking, we are ignorant -- it's only in relationship with others' that I have any sort of knowledge of them, and such relationships reveal that there's much more under heaven and earth than what in my mind.

But to be in relationship we have to have some basis of trust. Family can point out flaws because we have a relationship of trust and shared values and a long history with one another.

That is -- in order to have rules and moral admonition, first we must have trust and reciprocal respect. (Or, at least, insofar that we don't, I can tell you I don't see the appeal)

For example, libertarians and those who champion autonomy have a great deal of trouble understanding how to parent children, and how it is that children should be answerable to adults.

Do they? Or do they just have different answers?

I understand his distinction between higher order and lower order objections, but it still remains an arbitrary distinction until you just declare some foundational axiom.

That is, it would be wrong for me to tell you not to murder (which, by the way is a completely stupid ethic, but be that as it may), but it would not be wrong for me to tell you that it would be wrong to be critical of others because we've asserted (for whatever reason) that being critical of others is of the highest order of wrongness. It is what we hinge this ethical system upon that we've identified in this thread.

But, upon further analysis, we learn quickly that is not the case that the highest order of goodness is being uncritical of others because there's this other undercurrent within this conversation about autonomy that states the highest order of morality is to protect autonomy and (for some reason) being critical of others attacks directly the concept of autonomy. Criticism therefore is subservient to autonomy, and (I would assume) that if certain sorts of criticism could be shown to promote autonomy, then those sorts of criticism ought be promoted. Such would be the case if lack of criticism is a lower order order good then is the protection of autonomy.

But then we might want to go more meta on this and ask why autonomy is such a high order objective, and perhaps we would say that the free will is what really is worth protecting and it's not so much that I protect you as a decision maker but I protect your decision making component and I therefore cannot do anything that directly impedes your decision making. That might result in an agreement that we ought not criticize, but it might not. It would seem that since we're on the 8th page of this thread arguing back and forth, criticizing as we do, we actually think that critical feedback is a useful means to promote free will, which in turn protects our autonomy, which then defeats the suggestion we shouldn't be critical. Those sorts of things are likely to happen when we admit that the highest good isn't not being critical, but that not being critical is just a rule of thumb that often (but not always) works to promote those higher order goods.

And I'm not leaving things at saying that free will is the highest good because I think there's something higher than that, which is humanity, which is our unique ability as creatures to have the ability to act freely as we do. That is, we are people, and people are important per se and we cannot do anything that damages a person's right to be as he is. To state that an attack on a person's intellectual or moral decision detonates his individuality is a questionable claim, as it would seem that special element within the person is indestructible given the proper spirit. If that's the case, then it would follow we ought instill virtue into individuals so as to not make their spirit subject to dissolution at the simplest of criticisms. Character, through instilling virtue, then becomes the highest good, and all else then becomes subservient to that. Any claim though that virtue cannot be forged through criticism is contrary to facts. People do become better when challenged, like it or not.

In fact it is criticism and challenge that leads to greater resolve and character. I, for example, have been provided all sorts of benefits in my life, many beyond what others have, but I also was provided enough criticism and challange (and suffering actually) to have emerged with a much more valuable character.

That is to say, sometimes it is important to hear that one's thoughts and actions are stupid when they in fact are. Otherwise, you are just allowed to be born stupid, to live stupid, and then to die stupid. How that can be described as a life respected and cultivated is stupid of the highest order.

Is there some principle you follow even though it's contrary to what you feel in your heart? I certainly hope not. That's how gang members are made. They do what everyone else says is right as opposed to what they feel, and eventually they don't feel anything anymore. They're just numb to their own consciences.

In other words: telling people not to listen to their own hearts, but instead follow the crowd is beyond stupid. It's a recipe for social disaster.

I suppose that, in the end, I'd still allow more principles than you do, though I think principles are the sorts of things one commits themselves to. I value moral autonomy. — Moliere

As I've tried to make clear, when I talk about "personal morality" I'm talking about how I, myself, come to what might be called "moral" decisions. I wasn't saying I expected, or even wanted, others to do the same. That being said, I've never come across a moral principle I found convincing or satisfying except, perhaps, the golden rule.

But I am very interested in the role of emotions in ethical thinking, and also clarifying differences between different ways of thinking ethically (or even further specifying when it is we are thinking ethically) — Moliere

When everything is working correctly, so-called "moral" decisions present themselves to me as emotions, intuitions, understandings, insights, or intentions, not usually as rational arguments. Sometimes they skip those steps completely and go directly to actions. As I mentioned, that's what Taoists call "wu wei," acting without acting. Perhaps that's a bit misleading. In the world Chuang Tzu and Lao Tzu came from, that's where all action, whether or not we call it moral, arises.

- Good post.

It would seem that since we're on the 8th page of this thread arguing back and forth, criticizing as we do, we actually think that critical feedback is a useful means to promote free will, which in turn protects our autonomy, which then defeats the suggestion we shouldn't be critical. Those sorts of things are likely to happen when we admit that the highest good isn't not being critical, but that not being critical is just a rule of thumb that often (but not always) works to promote those higher order goods. — Hanover

Yes, I agree.

To state that an attack on a person's intellectual or moral decision detonates his individuality is a questionable claim, as it would seem that special element within the person is indestructible given the proper spirit. If that's the case, then it would follow we ought instill virtue into individuals so as to not make their spirit subject to dissolution at the simplest of criticisms. — Hanover

Right. I would say that the criticizing of someone's decision or action is an important part of human and social life. The ability to make decisions uncoerced is important, but the opportunity to see the shortsightedness of one's decisions and to grow into someone who can receive criticism and then make better decisions is also important. I don't think we can just take the first and leave the second.

And I do agree that this comes down to virtue more than anything else, in which case it must be asked how we are to instill virtues so that people don't find autonomy absolutism so alluring. Bad ideas need to be addressed when they take root in a culture. In my estimation the vice of pusillanimity is at the heart of many of these autonomy-based ideas. There seems to be a lack of courage to face challenge or criticism. There may also be an intellectual component regarding the pure ideality of autonomy, but I think the vice is the bigger player. Another name that this sort of thing goes under is "moral subjectivism," where everyone's moral system is supposedly self-enclosed.

That is to say, sometimes it is important to hear that one's thoughts and actions are stupid when they in fact are. Otherwise, you are just allowed to be born stupid, to live stupid, and then to die stupid. How that can be described as a life respected and cultivated is stupid of the highest order. — Hanover

Yes, as I said:

Those who do wrong are very often ignorant of their wrongdoing, whether culpably or not. It has always been considered a mercy to make them aware of it - to help them avoid what will only become a bigger problem for them and for others. — Leontiskos

And I'm not leaving things at saying that free will is the highest good because I think there's something higher than that, which is humanity, which is our unique ability as creatures to have the ability to act freely as we do. That is, we are people, and people are important per se and we cannot do anything that damages a person's right to be as he is. To state that an attack on a person's intellectual or moral decision detonates his individuality is a questionable claim, as it would seem that special element within the person is indestructible given the proper spirit. If that's the case, then it would follow we ought instill virtue into individuals so as to not make their spirit subject to dissolution at the simplest of criticisms. Character, through instilling virtue, then becomes the highest good, and all else then becomes subservient to that. Any claim though that virtue cannot be forged through criticism is contrary to facts. People do become better when challenged, like it or not.

In fact it is criticism and challenge that leads to greater resolve and character. I, for example, have been provided all sorts of benefits in my life, many beyond what others have, but I also was provided enough criticism and challange (and suffering actually) to have emerged with a much more valuable character. — Hanover

So this is a great example of a positive ethic as opposed to a negative ethic. A positive ethic is one where you are supposedly obligated (or the best outcome is) to do something. A negative ethic would be one where you are obligated not to do something. So, a negative ethic might be not harming other people intentionally, for "no reason". A positive ethic might be something as you are proposing like "instilling character".

This has been my question in the other thread.. At what point can you impose a positive ethic if it violates a negative ethic? When is one justified over the other? My answer has been that you cannot generally justify a positive ethic over a negative ethic if there was no need for it.. In other words, if I am causing the source of harm for you (negative ethic), in order to make you go through a positive ethic (character building) this is wrong. However, if you are ALREADY in a situation whereby you need remediation (child-rearing), it may be said that if one is the caregiver, one can impose a positive ethic, as it is now perhaps necessary in order for the person to flourish in the future in some way. The harm has been done (one failed to prevent), so now one remediates.

The problem is that the "negative ethics" being espoused are not true ethics at all (and of course this all relates obliquely to your antinatalism). We have no negative right to not be criticized; we have no negative right to not receive moral admonition; we have no negative right not to be imprisoned and coerced when we commit serial murder; we have no negative right not to be caused suffering*, etc. This is "negative ethics" run amok, and it violates the sort of minimalism that has classically characterized negative rights.

* At least in the way that the antinatalist thinks of the causing of suffering, which includes everything from inconvenience to bringing about conditions which may lead to suffering.

In other words, if I am causing the source of harm for you (negative ethic), in order to make you go through a positive ethic (character building) this is wrong. — schopenhauer1

For sure it would not be moral of me to neglect my children so that they suffer terribly but that then causes them to be self-sufficient and highly successful. The end would not justify the means. But I do think there is merit to not spoiling the child, to making them endure their struggles. There is real difference between adults who had upbringings where they were provided their every need and those that earned their way.

It's the person who has learned his lessons through experience that is most steadfast, and I'd argue most virtuous. The person who never faltered and never considered veering the course is a special breed, but his behavior might be best explained as obedient and compliant, doing as he does because he never contemplated otherwise. But the guy who refuses to be diverted from the virtuous path because he knows too well where it leads, whose behaviors are the result of a life not perfectly lived, is the person who has a more heroic way about him.

In my estimation the vice of pusillanimity is at the heart of many of these autonomy-based ideas. — Leontiskos

It's also the fear that the individual is fragile in some way, that you'll break them if you criticize them. Steel is forged by hammering it which strengthens it. It's an analogy of course, and I realize the same hammer that forges steel can fracture glass. And some people have glass souls I guess, but most don't, and they're deprived if they're never hammered.

Not sure how far the analogy goes, but it sounds cool.

Is there some principle you follow even though it's contrary to what you feel in your heart? I certainly hope not. — frank

The problem is that "heart" is not really defined by you. It sounds like just gut instinct. I would think my moral decisions are based upon instinct, reason, experience, bias and probably some other things. But we've all faced moral quandaries in our lives and we've had to sort through them, asking ourselves (and maybe others) what the best course is. Telling someone to just listen to their heart isn't enough. Sometimes you have an inkling your heart is telling you you're going the wrong direction and you want to be sure.

I want you to think about why it is that someone who is doing their best is not responsible for immorality and for bad effects that might result. A central question here is whether "everyone is doing their best" is supposed to be a contingent and synthetic truth, or a necessary and analytic truth. On my lights it only makes sense as a contingent truth, because the question of whether someone is "doing their best" relies on an investigation into how they are doing what they are doing. In everyday language when someone says, "Johnny is doing his best out there," the presupposition is that it is possible that Johnny might not be doing his best. In doing his best he is doing something that he need not be doing.

On this account, "Johnny is doing his best," is a bit like, "The Corvette is going 100 mph." The claim about the Corvette is not a necessary truth, and therefore in order to verify its truth condition we must examine the speed of the car via the speedometer or a radar gun or something of the sort. Only once our examination is complete are we justified in confirming or denying the claim about the Corvette. — Leontiskos

Let me split up this issue of ‘doing one’s best’ into what I see as its different aspects. Let’s take as an example little Susie and her piano lessons. Susie has only had about 10 lessons so far. When she practices for her lesson, is she doing her best? I have argued that desire is always tied to anticipatory sense-making, to expanding possibilities of intelligibility, and that this is intrinsically reinforcing. There is therefore nothing from a motivational point of view that stands in the way of our ‘going for broke’ in terms of pushing our creative imagination to its limits. And what are its limits? Well, no one expects Susie to perform a Chopin sonata after 10 lessons. Not just the range of possible innovations of individuals , but also of cultures is constrained and defined in relation to how we already understand our world. The lone genius is a myth. Brilliant thinkers arise out of milieus (Classical Greece, Renaissance Northern Italy, 19th century Germany).

Correct me if I’m wrong, but wouldn’t you argue that ‘not doing one’s best’ generally requires that the person who is the target of such an accusation be aware of the fact that they are not doing their best, that they deliberately desired and chose to underperform relative to what they knew they were capable of? Bringing this back to little Susie, dont we need to surmise that she simply didn’t feel like putting all her effort into practicing? It wouldn’t be a question of aiming a radar gun at her speed of playing, since this wouldn’t tell us anything about her performance relative to her potential unless we compared the results over time and discovered that she was moving in the wrong direction. Even this wouldn’t take us very far without asking her whether she thought she was losing interest in the piano, or alt least losing interest in exceeding her previous level of skill, for whatever reason.

As you can see, I’ve moved the terrain of the issue of ‘doing one’s best’ away from that of a variability in performance given an unchanging ground of positive motivation (intrinsic reinforcement) to push the limits of one’s ability and understanding, and toward connecting variation in performance directly to shifts in intent and motivation. Now things become complicated. Let’s say the teacher calls Susie lazy. What does laziness mean? Does it mean that Susie has decided not to push her creative potential to its limit, and that my claim that such a directedness toward expansive knowing is not intrinsically motivating? Or does it mean that Susie continues to actively expand her curiosity and inventiveness, but not in the direction her teacher wants her to direct it? There are all kinds of reasons we hold back in performance situations. We may be entering a crisis of commitment, where we discover that our time is better spent elsewhere. Perhaps our daydreaming which gets in the way of a current task lead us to our true calling. The question , then, is whether laziness reflects a failure on the part of the accused or a failure on the part of the accuser to recognize that the lazy person is in fact doing their best, but not in a way that conforms to the accuser’s expectations. Perhaps your perception that the other is not doing their best indicates an inability to see past the normative expectations through which you judge their motives. You see what they’re not doing, but not what they are doing.

As my favorite psychologist, George Kelly wrote:

When a teacher complains that her pupil is ‘lazy’ and the psychologist encourages her to observe what the child does while he is being ‘lazy’; when a social worker complains that her client is ‘shiftless’ and the psychologist suggests that she observe and describe the persistence and ingenuity with which he maintains his indigent status; when the psychiatrist complains that his patient is too ‘passive’ for therapy and the psychologist urges him to delineate the variety of ways in which the patient utilizes his ‘passivity’; when a fellow psychologist describes his subject as ‘unmotivated’ and one urges that self-expression be more carefully observed—all of these are examples of the application of the psychology of personal constructs to the analysis of spontaneous activities.

When we find a person who is more interested in manipulating people for his own purposes, we
usually find him making complaints about their motives. When we find a person who is concerned about motives, he usually turns out to be one who is threatened by his fellow men and wants to put them in their place. There is no doubt but that the construct of motives is one which is widely used but it usually turns out to be a part of the language of complaint about the behavior of other people. When it appears in the language of the client himself, as it does occasionally, it always-literally always appears in the context of a kind of rationalization apparently designed to appease the therapist, not in the spontaneous utterances of the client who is in good rapport with his therapist.

One technique we came to use was to ask the teacher what the do if she did not try to motivate him. Often the teacher would insist that the child would do nothing -absolutely nothing - just sit! Then we would suggest that she try a non-motivational approach and let him "just sit." We would ask her to observe how he went about "just sitting." Invariably the teacher would be able to report some extremely interesting goings-on. An analysis of what the "lazy'" child did while he was being lazy often furnished her with her first glimpse into the child's world and provided her with her first solid grounds for communication with him. Some teachers found that their laziest pupils were those who could produce the most novel ideas; others that the term "laziness" had been applied to activities that they had simply been unable to understand or appreciate.

The problem is that "heart" is not really defined by you. — Hanover

I too noticed this. Rationally, I tried to think why one says "in your heart" or, far that matter "in your mind", as some sort of required preface to ask a question. As if the asker or said question was simply unable to express their points without surpassing some sort of ingrained barrier.

Do you not see what I mean? I suppose, "in your heart" would reference, "your core", that is to say, an ideal world where all is well. I certainly enjoy speaking from the heart. But without acting from one's mind, such a reality will never be achieved. Or rather, last for very long..

The problem is that the "negative ethics" being espoused are not true ethics at all (and of course this all relates obliquely to your antinatalism). We have no negative right to not be criticized; we have no negative right to not receive moral admonition; we have no negative right not to be imprisoned and coerced when we commit serial murder; we have no negative right not to be caused suffering*, etc. This is "negative ethics" run amok, and it violates the sort of minimalism that has classically characterized negative rights.

* At least in the way that the antinatalist thinks of the causing of suffering, which includes everything from inconvenience to bringing about conditions which may lead to suffering. — Leontiskos

But that is a very uncharitable understanding, don't you think? It fits nice if you want to try to defeat the argument, sure.

It's not that we have 'no negative right not to be criticized'. That's not necessarily part of the negative ethics. That is simply interaction. Rather, if I said to you, "Please leave me alone", and you stood there yelling in my face, chasing me down, harassing me, then that might qualify for a negative right not to be harassed. But simply criticizing someone doesn't meet that threshold. What qualifies as "right not to be... (fill in the blank)" can be up for interpretation. The point is, whatever negative ethic there is, you cannot use your understanding of what is a positive "right" to violate it. WHAT COUNTS as a negative ethic, is up for interpretation though.

The problem is that "heart" is not really defined by you. It sounds like just gut instinct. I would think my moral decisions are based upon instinct, reason, experience, bias and probably some other things. But we've all faced moral quandaries in our lives and we've had to sort through them, asking ourselves (and maybe others) what the best course is. Telling someone to just listen to their heart isn't enough. Sometimes you have an inkling your heart is telling you you're going the wrong direction and you want to be sure. — Hanover

It's a lucky person who has friends who will grab them back and talk sense into them when they're headed toward a bad place. But when you're helping your friend, you aren't telling them to deny what they already know. You're telling them to face it.

You're right, it's not just a matter of feelings. Still, when the potential rapist comes to you asking for advice, tell him that a man who commits rape has no love for himself. Tell him he already knows the answer. If it turns out you're wrong, and he really has no sense of right and wrong, it doesn't matter what you tell him. He's just going to have to end up in jail. By the way, a psychology professor who worked with child molesters in the prison system told his students that people like that almost never rehabilitate. There's just something wrong with them. God almighty could come down and zap it into stone, and they still wouldn't get it. Using them as examples for understanding morality in general is probably not the best plan.