Modern society is decaying; and this decay is a direct result of moral anti-realism. It is hard to say why moral anti-realism has caught wind like wild fire, but I would hypothesize it is substantially influenced by Nietzschien thought.

With this moral anti-realism, society slowly loses it’s ability to function rationally (since it has cut out The Good from its inquiry) and begins to cause people to damage themselves in the name of “you-do-you!”. As Nietzsche rightly pointed out: “All of us are no longer material for a society” – (The Gay Science, Book V, p. 304).

The form of moral anti-realism taking prominence, is this “Nietzschien kind”. Not only is it bad for a human to think they can acquire happiness through fulfilling their desires but this sort of thought leads to the crumbling of society into arbitrary, narcissistic power-struggles. None of which is good for people.

Interestingly enough, aristotelian ethics provides anecdotes to many of the issues emerging as an effect of this Nietzschien thought; and, therefore, I suggest society by-at-large goes back to aristotle’s ideas (for the most part) to live a better life. I would like to take this post to elaborate on some of the key aspects of his ethics, of which can greatly help the populace better live their lives (than this common, Nietzschien alternative).


Teleology

“Every art and every inquiry, and similarly every action as well as choice, is held to aim at some good” – (Nichomachean Ethics, Book I, Ch. 1, p. 1)

The first key element of aristotelian ethics, is looking upon everything in life through the lens of telos and seeing the good as things living up thereto. A good eye is an eye that can see well; a good clock is one that can tell the time well; etc.

People get way too entrenched in their radical individualism these days, and this causes them to damage themselves irreversibly in the name of fulfilling their desires (all the while thinking they are contributing to their own happiness). If people were constantly, instead, thinking about how they could fulfill their nature (as a human being) then they would be able to better navigate their lives to secure a deep and persistent sense of happiness.

Now, there is a common objection to this sort of thinking which I address later on. For now, I will comment that I think that everything should be viewed through the lens of telos as it relates to well-being (i.e., eudamonia) and not just telos simpliciter; but Aristotle, on the contrary, accepts a stronger version of teleology than I would (whereof everything has a purpose towards what is ultimately good, as per the dictations of the Nous).


Eudaimonia

“Happiness [eudaimonia] appears to be something complete and self-sufficient, it being an end of our actions” – (Nichomachean Ethics, Book I, Ch. 7, p. 12)

The chief good for a human being is to be a eudaimon (viz., to embody the chief good [for human beings] of eudamonia [i.e., of a deep and persistent sense of happiness, flourishing, and well-being]); and this is the most persistently satisfying and deeply rewarding pursuit a person can endeavor on. Everything else is, if it does not relate somehow thereto, a mere distraction.

People seem to have a sense that happiness is key to a good life; but seem to be utterly confused on how to achieve it nowadays: they seem to think it has to do with being radically individualistic and/or hedonistic—it doesn’t.

Now, there is an objection worth noting that, prima facie, the pursuit of one’s own happiness, and that being the chief good, seems pretty narcissistic. I will address that later hereon.


Virtue

“So it must be stated that every virtue both brings that of which it is the virtue into a good condition and causes the work belonging to that thing to be done well. For example, the virtue of the eye makes both the eye and its work excellent, for by means of the virtue of the eye, we see well...If indeed this is so in all cases, then the virtue of a human being too would be that characteristic as a result of which a human being becomes good and as a result of which he causes his own work to be done well.” – (Nichomachean Ethics, Book II, Ch. 6, p. 33)

“The happy [eudemian] life also seems to be accord with virtue, and this is the life that seems to be accompanied by seriousness but not to consist in play...If happiness [eudaimonia] is an activity in accord with virtue, it is reasonable that it would accord with the most excellent virtue, and this would be the virtue belonging to what is best” – (Nichomachean Ethics, Book X, Ch. 6-7, p. 223)

A key aspect of living well for a human being (and, arguably, any member of a rational kind) is living a (morally and intellectually) virtuous life; but it is important to note that, for Aristotle, “virtue” is not a morally-loaded term. For Aristotle, “virtue” is a sort of excellence which is relative to the subject, craft, etc. in question; whereas “moral virtue” is the subtype of virtue which is about moral excellence—i.e., doing well at being moral. It can be seen more clearly now that a person who wants to fulfill their nature must excel in every regard to that nature (i.e., must be virtuous); and a part of this is being moral, as morality pertains fundamentally to how to act best in accordance with what is good.


Being vs. Doing

“moral virtue is the result of habit...[and] none of the moral virtues are present in us by nature, since nothing that exists by nature is habituated to be other than it is” – (Nichomachean Ethics, Book II, Ch. 1, p. 26)

An important distinction in Aristotle’s ethics, which is largely ignored in modern times, is the difference between doing something and being something: the former is a mere action related to that something, whereas the latter is an embodiment of that something (viz., is a way of living which best exemplifies that something). I am not thereby a healthy person by doing something that is healthy; and, likewise, I am not thereby a good person by doing something that is good. Being good, healthy, etc. is about cultivating habits of character which best align with, that best embody, what is good, healthy, etc.

People very often think they are a good person for merely forcing themselves to do something good (when they could have chosen not to); when, in reality, they are not a good person if they have to fight their own impulses to do the right thing.


Principle of the Mean

“Virue, therefore, is a characteristic marked by choice, residing in the mean relative to us, a characteristic defined by reason and as the prudent person would define it. Virtue is also a mean with respect to two vices, the one vice related to excess, the other to deficiency” – (Nichomachean Ethics, Book II, Ch.6, p. 35)

Moral virtue, which pertains to right and wrong behavior, is, according to Aristotle, all about cultivating the mean habit out of two extremes—for this will best help a person live a well principled life via reason. For example, the mean between niceness and meanness is kindness; and the mean between cowardice and rashness is courageousness. These are (moral) virtues exactly because they are, with respect to their topics of behavior, the most well-regulated (with reason) habits of character; whereas the (moral) vices are vicious exactly because they are the passions overtaking reason and causing the person to live a poorly-regulated life.

People tend, nowadays, to think that happiness is about chasing pleasures and avoiding pains; but this couldn’t be further from the truth: living a well-regulated life—i.e., a morally virtuous life—is going to give one a deep and persistent sense of happiness.


Objection 1: What Telos?

A common objection to Aristotelian ethics is that there are no good reasons to believe in telos. Afterall, nature is an ever-going process of evolution—so where’s the telos?

Firstly, Aristotle believed in “God” (i.e., the Nous) and so, for him, there is telos in everything. However, I think with the advancements in science (such as evolution) we do need to give a more adequate response than Aristotle has in his works.

There are two types of telos: strong and weak. The former is purpose endowed by an agent (whether that be God or a human or what not), whereas the latter is purpose endowed by an non-agent. My house has strong telos, because it was developed and designed by human beings for the purpose of shelter and housing. Whereas my eye was not, at least for my fellow naturalists, not designed by any agent but, rather, underwent (and is undergoing) a process of evolution; however, this does not negate the fact that my eye is designed to see (and in a particular kind of way) and, consequently, it has a weak form of telos.

At worst, the answer to this objection is to note that the kinds of telos which the objector is finding missing is really weak teleology or not relevant to living a good life (because it does not relate to well-being).

At best, one could accept a form of theism that gets around this objection.


Objection 2: Fails the Is-Ought Gap Test

Aristotle never addresses the is-ought gap because, quite frankly, it wasn’t considered an issue back then; but, for us in the modern era, we do need to at least address it.

The is-ought gap objection would go something like this: “it seems as though that one should fulfill their nature does not follow immediately from the fact that one needs to fulfill their nature to achieve happiness; and so it seems as though Aristotle is just appealing to ‘obviousness’ to justify what is good being a thing fulfilling its nature”.

Because I happen to think the is-ought gap is a force to be reckoned with, I actually think Aristotle’s original positions falls prey to the is-ought gap and, thusly, this objection prima facie succeeds. However, I think Aristotelian ethics can be salvaged quite easily: what is good is what is (positively) intrinsically valuable, and what is the most (positively) intrinsically valuable is well-being in the deepest, richest, and most persistent sense. If this is true, then the fact that one should fulfill their nature follows validly from them needing to fulfill their nature to achieve eudamonia.

Objection 3: Narcissism

The third most common objection is that Aristotelian ethics instructs people to care about other people only insofar as it relates to them achieving their own happiness; which is morally counter-intuitive since it is incredibly narcissistic.

Aristotle’s response sort of bites the bullet (so to speak), by accepting that one should only care about people as it relates to their own happiness but that rational creatures cannot achieve happiness (in a supreme sense) without caring about other people.

I would say, contrary to Aristotle, that the moral person cares about what is good indiscriminately and, consequently, should care about the well-being of all living beings (even though they may have to prioritize some over others pragmatically but yet still in an unbiased fashion). There is no need, under my view, to paradoxically collapse narcissism into altruism in my interpretation of Aristotelian thought.

Thoughts?