Because belief in the supernatural is one type of delusional belief. In being logical one rejects all types of delusion. — Harry Hindu

I (mostly) agree but, since the relevent context of this thread discussion implicitly concerns "religion" (and explicity and more broadly concerns metaphysics), I think anti-supernatural is more precise and specific than "anti-delusional" (or, as you said earlier, "rational/logical").

The idea that the categories of thought are not fundamental immediately gives rise to the principle of non-duality — PeterJones

Oh. Ok. So if one holds with the idea that the categories of thought are fundamental and fundamental necessarily, the principle of non-duality fails.

Kant places the Ultimate…… — PeterJones

What is this Ultimate? By what other (non-Perennial philosophy) conception might it be understood, given that the Kantian categories of thought are the ground always and only for a posteriori cognitions?

It is not my wish to be contentious, but being embedded in Western Enlightenment speculative metaphysics in which rational extravagances are properly cautioned, sorta prejudices one against various and sundry forms of ineffable mystical experiences.

Oh. Ok. So if one holds with the idea that the categories of thought are fundamental and fundamental necessarily, the principle of non-duality fails. — Mww

It doesn't fail. It's just that you don't agree with Kant and reject the Perennial philosophy.

What is this Ultimate?

This is the question metaphysics has to answer.

By what other (non-Perennial philosophy) conception might it be understood, given that the Kantian categories of thought are the ground always and only for a posteriori cognitions?

In metaphysics it takes the form of a neutral metaphysical theory.

It is not my wish to be contentious, but being embedded in Western Enlightenment speculative metaphysics in which rational extravagances are properly cautioned, sorta prejudices one against various and sundry forms of ineffable mystical experiences.

I'm talking about metaphysics. You can believe what you like about ineffable experiences. the logic is inexorable, as Kant shows. As F.H. Bradley puts it, 'metaphysics does not endorse a positive result'. This leave just one option, which is a neutral theory. These are demonstrable facts that do not depend on what anyone believes.

It's just a matter of doing the sums. No need to abandon your rationality. I imagine every philosopher discovers the truth of Bradley's remark, which merely restates Kant's conclusion. Do you dispute this fact? Or do you interpret it differently to Kant and Bradley? . .
. ,

I do see the query as to whether materialism is a form of non-dualism, especially as that was my first thought when I became aware of more 'spiritual' forms of non-dualism. The mind-body problem is made so complicated by an apparent duality of mind and body, but a clear connection between the two.

I have read some of Damasio's writing and it is fairly well argued. It may be hard to entangle the underlying basis of the unity and know if there is an primary basis of mind and matter because they emerge together. It may come down to first causes and it is hard to know whether the matter arose from consciousness or vice versa. In a way, it may not be important as a tangent, although it can be seen as of importance in knowing whether there is any 'spirit' involved as an eternal source of consciousness.

Kant places the Ultimate……
— PeterJones

What is this Ultimate? — Mww

This is the question metaphysics has to answer. — PeterJones

If Kant placed this Ultimate, wouldn’t he have already asked and answered as to what it is? I’m trying desperately to understand how Kant’s idealism could be tweaked to a non-dualistic system by placing the Ultimate beyond the categories of thought, when it is the case Kant never placed the Ultimate anywhere, insofar as, to my knowledge, he never mentioned the concept in the first place.

Now, Kant does indeed place the unconditioned beyond the categories of thought, that towards which pure reason always directs itself in its purely metaphysical exploits but for which it never attains an object, but even if this is the case enforced by transcendental logic, it still leaves vacant the notion of non-duality necessarily arising from it. Not that it couldn’t so arise, but that it hasn’t been explained how it could.

And no, I don’t reject perennial philosophy; I simply don’t have any use for it, that expositions on critical thought hasn’t already sufficiently dismissed.
—————

“…. For, as the world has never been, and, no doubt, never will be without a system of metaphysics of one kind or another, it is the highest and weightiest concern of philosophy to render it powerless for harm, by closing up the sources of error….”

Seems like Bradley’s “metaphysics does not endorse a positive result” isn’t quite right after all. Powerless for harm seems a rather positive endorsement, n’est ce pas?

f Kant placed this Ultimate, wouldn’t he have already asked and answered as to what it is? I’m trying desperately to understand how Kant’s idealism could be tweaked to a non-dualistic system by placing the Ultimate beyond the categories of thought, when it is the case Kant never placed the Ultimate anywhere, insofar as, to my knowledge, he never mentioned the concept in the first place. — Mww

Well, there are a variety of interpretations of Kant's transcendental idealism. I interpret him as saying that the phenomenal world consists of mere appearances. This is Buddhist doctrine. Also, he places the origin of the intellect beyond the categories of thought on which the mind depends. He say that this phenomenon would be the central explanandum for a rational psychology, and no mystic would disagree.

Crucially, Kant realizes that all selective conclusions about the world-as-a-whole are undecidable. This is because all extreme or positive metaphysical positions may be reduced to absurdity. If Kant is right then it would be irrational and perverse to endorse one (as I believe). The only other option is a neutral theory, which is the theory endorsed by the Buddha, as was proved by Nagarjuna in his Fundamental Verses on the Middle Way. . . .

Now, Kant does indeed place the unconditioned beyond the categories of thought, that towards which pure reason always directs itself in its purely metaphysical exploits but for which it never attains an object, but even if this is the case enforced by transcendental logic, it still leaves vacant the notion of non-duality necessarily arising from it. Not that it couldn’t so arise, but that it hasn’t been explained how it could.

I'm not sure I understand your point here but suspect I may have addressed it already. For the non-dual doctrine or a neutral metaphysical theory nothing really exists or ever really happens. So the mind will never achieve the unconditioned as an object. There's no object for it to achieve. For non-dualism one has to look beyond mind to its origin. This cannot be done by the mind, of course,which is why scholars can never hope to understand non-duality in the way meditators and contemplatives come to understand it, as an actual phenomenon. . .

And no, I don’t reject perennial philosophy; I simply don’t have any use for it, that expositions on critical thought hasn’t already sufficiently dismissed.

I would say that if you have no use for it then you have rejected it. Perhaps you feel you've done so for good reasons, but clearly you believe it is useless.

{quote]“…. For, as the world has never been, and, no doubt, never will be without a system of metaphysics of one kind or another, it is the highest and weightiest concern of philosophy to render it powerless for harm, by closing up the sources of error….”

Seems like Bradley’s “metaphysics does not endorse a positive result” isn’t quite right after all. Powerless for harm seems a rather positive endorsement, n’est ce pas?[/quote]

You've misunderstood Bradley's statement. I should have explained it. A 'positive' metaphysical position is a 'yes' or 'no' answer to a metaphysical question. (EG. To say we have freewill or do not have it to adopt one of two opposed positive metaphysical positions.),Metaphysics, which is to say logic and reason, does not endorse any such position since they may all be reduced to absurdity. ,

To say 'metaphysics does not endorse a positive result 'is to say that it is an immensely valuable and effective discipline. Bradley calls it the 'only effective antidote to dogmatic superstition' (He cites orthodox theology and materialism as paradigm examples of superstitions against which it protects us.)

If we know metaphysics does not endorse a positive result then we know that a neutral metaphysical theory is the is the only one that survives analysis. This is an extremely simple point, but one can only see it if one knows there is such a thing as a neutral theory and this would require knowing something about mysticism. Few do in Kant's tradition, so confusion reigns. He characterises Western metaphysics as an arena for mock fights where nobody ever gains an inch of ground. This, I would suggest, is the price of not studying the Perennial; philosophy.

You made some good objections, but don't forget that people have been trying to find a telling objection to (what we now call) the Perennial philosophy for thousands of years without success. .

The mind-body problem is made so complicated by an apparent duality of mind and body, but a clear connection between [complementarity of] the two. — Jack Cummins

In light of Spinoza's dissolution of the "MBP" derived from the illusion – conceptual incoherence – of Descartes' substance duality (or Aristotle's substance plurality) which I've previously alluded to here , what actual "problem" remains to be discussed?

Nature = self-governed
Supernatural = over nature

supernatural is only meaningful in the light of the natural, then it would seem that everything is fundamentally natural including God and the domain God resides in. — Harry Hindu

…supernatural is only meaningful in the light of the natural, then it would seem that everything is fundamentally natural including God and the domain God resides in.

The conclusion’s soundness seems to depend on the prefix “super-”, which of course means ‘over’. However, ‘over’ covers up two distinct concepts. Does it mean ‘above’ (over and not touching) or ‘on’ (over and touching)? If it means ‘on/connected to’ then supernatural just means artificial. Humans trick nature into doing things beyond their natural ends all the time. But at the same time, it is just human nature to do artificial things. Therefore, the difference is just direct and indirect. So, in this sense, we have a mutually arising relationship like the one you described.

On the other hand, Platonic monotheists have actively pushed the unconnected sense. Their God creates ex nihilo and is the unmoved mover. It is the radical other that by definition can not be embraced. It always sits outside any harmonization project like non-dualism.

In short, above all else it rests on ‘over’.

For non-dualism one has to look beyond mind to its origin. This cannot be done by the mind, of course,which is why scholars can never hope to understand non-duality in the way meditators and contemplatives come to understand it, as an actual phenomenon — PeterJones

If non-dualism is an actual phenomenon, according to meditators, what is it that appears? What is it that physically, quantitatively, exists, as effect on sensibility, which all an appearance was ever meant to indicate? Which sensory device is affected by a non-dual appearance, in order for the scholar or the regular joe to immediately intuit anything with respect to it?

While it is true the mind cannot look beyond itself, it is equally true the mind is that by which everything conceivable is looked for; there is no other irreducible originator of whatever it is that humans do pursuant to their intrinsic intellectual capacities.

If it be granted the human mind is a purely logical system, and as such, for any possible conception the negation of it is given immediately upon the spontaneity of the conception itself, it is then self-contradictory to suggest the origin of non-dualism can only reside beyond the mind, when it is necessarily the case dualism originates within it. If dualism is given, or if not given then at least determinable by the mind, and if the principle of complementarity holds, then it is necessarily the case the concept of non-dualism also originates under the same conditions and therefore from within that same mind.

So it would seem, despite what meditators and contemplatives would have it, the origin of non-dualism must be beyond the mind, or beyond the mind as scholars and regular joes understand it, for no other reason than that form of mind used by other than meditators cannot justify the conception beyond the principle by which it is a valid thought.

And from that arises the notion that the categories of thought, which legislate the speculative methodology of the scholar’s mind, in which the relation of conception and intuition are determinable, are not necessary functionaries for a mediator’s/contemplative’s notion of mind from which non-dualism would manifest.

Which gets us right smack dab into the phenomenal/noumenal dichotomy, insofar as, while it is irrational to degrade the distinction itself as impossible, re: noumena are conceptually valid but still only intuitively impossible, it remains the fact there is no non-contradictory means of constructing judgements with respect to empirical representations of them.

It follows that a mind predicated on an intrinsic duality cannot possibly originate that which is contradictory to it, but that in itself is not sufficient to prove another kind of mind also cannot, which immediately leaves it possible another kind of mind can originate a non-dualism absent its antecedent complement.

But how would an intrinsically dualistic mind, such as a human mind, which must include the minds of meditators and contemplatives insofar as these are humans, ever even enjoin to that which for it, is impossible?

“…. From all this it is evident that rational psychology has its origin in a mere misunderstanding. The unity of consciousness, which lies at the basis of the categories, is considered to be an intuition of the subject as an object; and the category of substance is applied to the intuition. But this unity is nothing more than the unity in thought, by which no object is given; to which therefore the category of substance—which always presupposes a given intuition—cannot be applied. Consequently, the subject cannot be cognized. The subject of the categories cannot, therefore, for the very reason that it cogitates these, frame any conception of itself as an object of the categories; for, to cogitate these, it must lay at the foundation its own pure self-consciousness—the very thing that it wishes to explain and describe….”
————

On the other hand, of course in one respect you are quite right:

“…. those who are engaged in metaphysical pursuits are far from being able to agree among themselves, but that, on the contrary, this science appears to furnish an arena specially adapted for the display of skill or the exercise of strength in mock-contests—a field in which no combatant ever yet succeeded in gaining an inch of ground, in which, at least, no victory was ever yet crowned with permanent possession.…”

Hence the fun in philosophizing well, or, as ol’ Rene admonishes, “rightly conducting reason”: display of skill in which no one is embarrassed, and an exercise in strength in which no one gets hurt.

Oh boy. How do you make things so complicated and confused? But okay, it's not a topic you wish to pursue, so we can leave it here. See you around.

An interesting OP and some interesting responses. I have been meaning to get involved in this discussion since it started, but it kept slipping my mind. I have gone through all the other responses - reading some, scanning others - so I don't think I am duplicating anything or asking questions that have been answered.

Those who have paid any attention to my posting history should know that I have found a philosophical home in Lao Tzu's "Tao Te Ching" and R.W. Collingwood's "An Essay on Metaphysics." My responses here will reflect that.

One way of seeing beyond theism and atheism is in Buddhism, which focuses on consciousness. — Jack Cummins

This is also true of Taoism as described by Lao Tzu, Chuang Tzu, and others.

However, there is the underlying idea of non-duality, which may be a perennial one within many traditions. I have had some difficulty thinking about the idea but have been reading recently which I am finding useful in making sense of the idea. — Jack Cummins

Lao Tzu and I see this as an issue that goes beyond spiritual issues of immanence and transcendence to more mundane issues. This from Stephen Mitchell's version of Verse 2 of the "Tao Te Ching."

When people see some things as beautiful,
other things become ugly.
When people see some things as good,
other things become bad.

Being and non-being create each other.
Difficult and easy support each other.
Long and short define each other.
High and low depend on each other.
Before and after follow each other. — Lao Tzu - Tao Te Ching

'Such a dualistic view of reality is a failure of vision and results in a narrow and self-alienating view of life. And yet it is this version of the nature of reality, that has influenced the culture of Western civilisation greatly for the last 2000 years...' — Jack Cummins

I'm more or less in agreement although Taoism takes a kinder, gentler, i.e. less judgmental view.

I wonder to what extent such a non-dualistic viewpoint offers a solution to the split between materialism and idealism, as well as between atheism and theism. — Jack Cummins

Here's where I roll out the metaphysics, which everything discussed in your OP is. As Collingwood and I know, we don't have to choose non-dualism, materialism, idealism, atheism, theism, or any other ism. None of them are true or false, right or wrong. They are intellectual tools we use for particular purposes in particular situations. Believing that some metaphysical positions are true and some are false strikes me as dualistic. Hmm...do I really believe that? I'll have to think more. I'm an engineer with a strong interest in science. When I do scientific stuff, I'm mostly a materialist, a realist, a dualist I guess. When I do philosophy, I'm always a pragmatist and mostly... what? I guess an idealist, anti-realist, or non-dualist.

I have begun to think that the division between theism and atheism is anything but a black or white issue, and this is not down to agnosticism or of proof of the existence of God. — Jack Cummins

Theism is a difficult issue for us metaphysicians. It's kind of a hybrid - half a matter of fact - God either exists or it doesn't - and half metaphysical. I can make what I think is a legitimate metaphysical argument for God. This is not the place to do that. Maybe I'll start a new thread.

The problem with this idea is that there is no demonstration that idealism is true. — Tom Storm

Do you believe that one metaphysical position is true and all the others - materialism, realism, anti-realism, idealism, physicalism, existentialism, and so on and so on - are false? You have always struck me as a pragmatist and that idea, to me, is very unpragmatic.

We are all one and everything is oneness has been a New Age monistic mantra - coming out of the theosophy movement and 1970's counterculture. — Tom Storm

I forgot to respond to this in my last post. As you know, non-dualism goes back much further than the New Age movement. The Vedanta, Buddhism, and Taoism go back as far or further than the earliest Greek philosophers.

Kant makes the situation clear in the Critique of Pure Reason, where he concludes that all selective conclusions about the world as a whole are undecidable. Here a 'selective conclusion' is an extreme position, and 'undecidable' means not what it means in mathematics, but that positive (yes/no) both answers are absurd, rendering all metaphysical questions undecidable. As F.H. Bradley puts it, 'Metaphysics does not endorse a positive result'. . — PeterJones

I agree with this. I'll have to go back to the "Critique of Pure Reason." I'll also take a look at Bradley.

Well, once we have calculated that only one world-theory works and identified it then all we need do is study it. We then have a sound understanding of metaphysics and only need develop it. — PeterJones

There is not only one world-theory that works he said definitively. They all work, more or less, for better or worse, sometimes, in certain situations.

Thus it is easy, with a few tweaks, to reconcile Kant's analysis in the Critique with the Middle Way doctrine. — PeterJones

I have a strong interest in Taoism and I was surprised, when I finally got around to reading the "Critique of Pure Reason," how much common ground there was.

…. For, as the world has never been, and, no doubt, never will be without a system of metaphysics of one kind or another, it is the highest and weightiest concern of philosophy to render it powerless for harm, by closing up the sources of error…. — PeterJones

Is this from Bradley? Do you have a reference?

If it be granted the human mind is a purely logical system — Mww

Do you believe this is true?

So it would seem, despite what meditators and contemplatives would have it, the origin of non-dualism must be beyond the mind, or beyond the mind as scholars and regular joes understand it, for no other reason than that form of mind used by other than meditators cannot justify the conception beyond the principle by which it is a valid thought. — Mww

I think this is right, although I think it's more than just "meditators and contemplatives" who see it that way. I am neither, and I do. I also consider myself a regular Joe. As I see it, Kant's noumena and Lao Tzu's Tao are "beyond the mind."

noumena are conceptually valid but still only intuitively impossible — Mww

Does this mean you reject noumena as a useful metaphysical concept?

an intrinsically dualistic mind, such as a human mind — Mww

An interesting idea. I don't think it's accurate. Wait... maybe I do. I'll think about it more.

"…. From all this it is evident that rational psychology has its origin in a mere misunderstanding. The unity of consciousness, which lies at the basis of the categories, is considered to be an intuition of the subject as an object; and the category of substance is applied to the intuition. But this unity is nothing more than the unity in thought, by which no object is given; to which therefore the category of substance—which always presupposes a given intuition—cannot be applied. Consequently, the subject cannot be cognized. The subject of the categories cannot, therefore, for the very reason that it cogitates these, frame any conception of itself as an object of the categories; for, to cogitate these, it must lay at the foundation its own pure self-consciousness—the very thing that it wishes to explain and describe….” — Mww

Where is this quote from? I think it's wrong, or at least misleading.

Thank you for reminding me of Lao Tzu's writings, because they do capture the descriptive issues of Tao. Sometimes, even though the concepts of theism and atheism and other positions are useful as a tool, they can become too rigid as ways of seeing. Indeed, transcendent and imminent can be seen as dualistic, which is the way human thinking involves splitting.

Labels are central to both theories and metaphysics, as ways of trying to analyse the way in which life works, as the aspects beyond physics. For many it may come down to science gradually, with philosophy almost as an apologetic appendage. Even science, founded in empirical knowledge is only descriptive understanding. Science and philosophy can become split, with so much validity being placed on the 'truth' of science when the abstraction of creating scientific theories and models involves the metaphysical and metaphorical imagination.

The idea of a 'neutral theory' is an interesting one as being seen as objective. Kant thought that he was able to establish it by a priori logic. It does come down to the issue of whether there is an absolute 'truth' and the perennial philosophy is an interesting alternative to Kant because it involves pluralistic understanding based on intersubjective common principles.

However, the concept of a neutral theory may be still problematic because it is bound up with meanings and values. For example, the choice of the dual options of theism or atheism may come down to psychological and pragmatic concerns in choices of how to perceive the nature of 'reality'.

@Jack Cummins

https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/comment/914581

which is the way human thinking involves splitting. — Jack Cummins

Yes, I think human thinking is naturally drawn to dichotomies.

Science and philosophy can become split, with so much validity being placed on the 'truth' of science when the abstraction of creating scientific theories and models involves the metaphysical and metaphorical imagination. — Jack Cummins

I agree with this.

Do you believe that one metaphysical position is true and all the others - materialism, realism, anti-realism, idealism, physicalism, existentialism, and so on and so on - are false? You have always struck me as a pragmatist and that idea, to me, is very unpragmatic. — T Clark

I haven't said anything is false - gods, idealism. Just that they haven't been adequately demonstrated. Hence I have no good reason to beleive them. I'm not saying they are not true - that's a positive claim I can't justify. Skepticism rather than pragmatism.

As you know, non-dualism goes back much further than the New Age movement. The Vedanta, Buddhism, and Taoism go back as far or further than the earliest Greek philosophers. — T Clark

Indeed the source of the new Age movement and some fairly soft core version of the perennial philosophy. I just meant the recent morphing of this.

I haven't said anything is is - gods, idealism. Just that they haven't been adequately demonstrated. — Tom Storm

I guess skepticism says "I don't have enough information to know." Pragmatism says "It doesn't matter, just pick one that works.

The problem with pragmatism is that it does matter what you pick - awful things 'work'. At an extreme end, murdering people to get to the top can work. Abortion works as birth control. And what do we mean by work? A lot of people say things ‘work’ but on close examination you can see that they don't.

But, perhaps, ironically, I can say skepticism 'works' for me - in most cases I can't believe in things for which I have no good evidence.

The problem with pragmatism is that it does matter what you pick - awful things 'work'. At an extreme end, murdering people to get to the top can work. Abortion works as birth control. And what do we mean by work? A lot of people say things ‘work’ but on close examination you can see that they don't. — Tom Storm

You have chosen an uncharitable interpretation of what I wrote.

I have been reading about Spinoza's philosophy and as far as I can see there is a lot of ambiguity over how his ideas are interpreted, especially the equation between God and nature and his idea that God was 'nothing other than the whole universe'. As an alternative to atheism it can be viewed as suggesting that 'God' is in every aspect of nature.

I am currently looking at a chapter by Varadara V. Raman, 'Thoughts on Deism and Pandeism', in , 'Pandeism: An Anthology of the Creative Mind' (ed Mapson and Perry.in which it is argued that, God,
'is there in the heart of grand supernova as in the singularities of dismal black holes. He is mutely present in every breath of Man as in every neuron fired in the brains. The Creator is into the Creation: In creatura creator. A crude analogy would be a playwright who writes a one-hero play and gets into its performance himself: not very common, but not impossible, especially for God. This is the God of pandeism.'

In that respect, the duality of nature and God can be seen as more consistent with non-consistent with spiritual non-dualism as opposed to the materialistic one. The choice of seeing nature/consciousness or God/consciousness may be the duality of choice inherent in human thinking.

Believing that some metaphysical positions are true and some are false strikes me as dualistic. — T Clark

All is well if one avoids extreme positions. Non-dualism is not directly opposed to theism or atheism. They are two extreme ideas that oppose each other. Thus folks on both sides of the God debate reject mysticism.

Lao Tzu's remark 'True words seem paradoxical' is better translated (and sometime is) as 'Rigorous words seem paradoxical' - to avoid the idea that they are true as opposed to false in a dialectical sense. If they were true or false in the usual dialect6ical sense then hey wouldn't seem paradoxical. . . .

The choice of seeing nature/consciousness or God/consciousness may be the duality of choice inherent in human thinking. — Jack Cummins

Yes. The inherent duality of human thinking is the reason non-duality is such a difficult idea. In metaphysics. For Lao Tzu's position we have to look beyond the categories of thought.

If it be granted the human mind is a purely logical system…..
— Mww

Do you believe this is true? — T Clark

I treat the concept of “mind” as something everybody knows what is meant by it even if there really isn’t any such thing, and from that, I prefer to say pure reason is a purely logical system, but the subject at the time this came up was mind, and the nonsense of getting beyond it, so……
—————

noumena are conceptually valid but still only intuitively impossible
— Mww

Does this mean you reject noumena as a useful metaphysical concept? — T Clark

Oh absolutely. I treat noumena as the proverbial red-headed stepchild….he’s here, by accident, can’t pretend he isn’t so obligated to set a place at the table for him, but no freakin’ way he’s gonna be included in a will. Noumena in the Kantian sense are born from the faculty of understanding over-extending itself into the forging of general conceptions for which neither the remaining components of this particular type of cognitive system, nor Nature Herself as comprehended by that same system, can obtain an object.
—————

Where is this quote from? I think it's wrong, or at least misleading. — T Clark

It is Kant, B422, and concerns expositions surrounding the self as a closed, private, all-encompassing concept represented by “I think”, what Kant calls the “unity of consciousness”, and how that concept is misused by treating it as an object, which is what I meant by reification of pure conceptions.

Gotta remember the times of the thesis, long before neuroscience and those fancy-assed brain waves the average smuck…..er, sorry, I mean “….those of common understanding…”, re: 99.9% of humanity….couldn’t possibly care less about.
————-

For, as the world has never been, and, no doubt, never will be without a system of metaphysics of one kind or another….
— PeterJones

Is this from Bradley? Do you have a reference? — T Clark

Kant, Bxxxi, (translator-specific). Yeah, true, huh. Guy’s every-damn-where. Think of something having to do with theoretical human cognition, pre-quantum physics, morality/religion….plate techtonics, tidal friction, rotational inclination, relativity of space and time (sigh)……there’s a Kant quote relatable to it.

There is not only one world-theory that works he said definitively. They all work, more or less, for better or worse, sometimes, in certain situations. — T Clark

Hmm. I wonder why you think this. I can state definitively that all positive metaphysical theories are logically indefensible,and can be reduced to absurdity. This is what Bradley means by saying metaphysics does not endorse a positive result. I can also state that a neutral theory, which is the only alternative, cannot be reduced to absurdity. I'm not sure why,. as a fan of Lao Tzu, you would think this doesn't work. After all, there's got to be one theory that works.


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