To return on topic, I think objections 1 and 2 ultimately stem from the modern tendency to only view theoretical reason or "objective knowledge" as fully legitimate. Telos is cast aside because final causation is most easily thought of in terms of practical reason*, whereas the is-ought gap only exists under the tyranny of the "objective." (Like I said, the third objection I don't see as actually following from Aristotle's philosophy.)

Now one powerful response to this sort of tyranny of the objective is Kierkegaard's view that it is ultimately the subjective that has any relevance to our lives. I won't try to summarize this, since I figure many may already be familiar with it. I did find a free anthology of his work here: https://web.archive.org/web/20230514232930/http://www.naturalthinker.net/trl/texts/Kierkegaard,Soren/Provocations.pdf

Sections 15 and 19, both of which are quite short, offer up the core argument against the "obsession with the objective."

I am skeptical of the way in which he sets the two against each other, but I do think it is instructive. I think the two "types of reflection" (subjective/objective) are intricately connected and always inform and mutually co-constitute one another. They are part of a unified, catholic whole, reason as the Logos in which "all things hold together." Without the contents of theoretical, objective reason, the striving of practical reason towards the Good becomes contentless. That said, his argument isn't without merit. If one type of reason should be held up above the other, we have probably picked the wrong one.

So ultimately, I think Kierkegaard's solution risks falling into a sort of pernicious fideism that risks even making the Good (God) set forever out of reach by a sort of all encompassing equivocity (something he tries to fix, but doesn't IMO diffuse). However, it's worth bringing up because it's a popular and powerful critique of modernity.


* Of course, telos is also seemingly indispensable so it gets resurrected in biology as "function," shows up in physics as "constraints," and then shows up in economics and the other social sciences as "utility," "well-being." But often these have to be instrumentalized in order to fit under the tyranny of the theoretical. Thus you end up with the absurdity of policymakers and doctors advocating for certain sorts of interventions "because they are associated with 'self-reported well-being,'" as if the goal was to change how people respond to surveys and not to change how they live.



You could have said the same thing vis-á-vis serfdom at the peak of the industrial revolution. Yet while it certainly would have been true that the abolishment of serfdom was a very positive step forward, it's far from clear that this offset the alienation of people from their labor, massive increase in hunger, and general collapse of social institutions that prevailed among the lower classes in that time period (nor the massive wars and colonial projects motivated by the same era defining forces).

I don't think the thesis that society is experiencing decay in some important aspects can be easily written off by pointing to progress in other areas.

More simply, the objection asks why one ought to want to be happy. For Aristotle this is sophistry. Humans do want to be happy, just as fish do want to be in the water. It's just the way we are. "We don't necessarily want to be happy," is nothing more than a debater's argument. — Leontiskos

I don't know . . . possibly I've hung out with the wrong people but the idea that "humans necessarily want to be happy" is extremely implausible to me. Here, for instance, is a person named Pat. Pat suffers from a variety of psychological, physical, and spiritual maladies that produce a kind of chronic frustration, depression, resentment, and lack of ease -- in short, what we mean by "unhappiness." If you ask Pat if they "want to be happy," the answer you will get is: "Nonsense. What you call 'being happy' is for sheep. I operate on a higher plane. Of course I'm miserable, but that is what happens when a person of true intellect sees the world aright. I wouldn't trade one minute of my unhappiness for a fool's paradise of Smiley Faces." Pat, you could say, would rather be Happy (their sense) than happy, but surely that's stretching what "happy" means. Let's face it: Pat just doesn't want to be happy, and they can give you their reasons why.

Or here, for another instance, is a person named Robbie. Robbie suffers from the same brood of ailments that Pat does. When we ask Robbie the same question -- "Do you want to be happy?" -- the reply is: "Of course I do! I'd give anything to be happy." We then recommend some basic steps that might begin to relieve Robbie's misery -- a thorough medical evaluation, perhaps, or therapy, or philosophical study, or more exercise and pleasant activities -- to which Robbie replies by explaining in great detail why none of those suggestions are options that would work for them. We go around this circle several more times and finally conclude what we must: that Robbie, despite what they say, doesn't really want to be happy. Robbie has a false self-image, that of a person who truly desires happiness, but it's easy enough to see through it.

I submit that neither Pat nor Robbie are extraordinary types, or even all that unusual. But perhaps the more important point is this: Aristotle doesn't mean "everybody" when he talks about the human desire for happiness, and we mustn't misunderstand him in that way. I believe he's speaking about a telos of the type or species "human," and asking us to conceive of a person in harmony with themselves. Such a person would understand the relation between the good and happiness; would desire both; and would have the practical knowledge to achieve them. This is very different from "All fish necessarily want to be in the water."

If we could bring him into this conversation, I think Aristotle might say: "Yes, sadly, there are those whom you have to actually convince to desire their own good, but that doesn't put the idea of 'the good' up for grabs in any important way." But wait a minute, Ari, we reply; we're talking about happiness, not the good. Aristotle smiles serenely . . . "Oh, are you?" he asks.

I don't think the thesis that society is experiencing decay in some important aspects can be easily written off by pointing to progress in other areas. — Count Timothy von Icarus

That's not really my point. My point is that, on balance, there isn't some past society or time period that is morally superior/less decayed than the societies in today's first world countries. Do you think there is? If so, when and where?

By “moral decay” I mean that we are in a period of time where morality is being by-at-large supplanted with hyper-individualism — Bob Ross

I'm not sure I agree that I see a strong connection between individualism, moral anti-realism and people's ethics in modern society. At least not in the way you are saying.

Telos is cast aside because final causation is most easily thought of in terms of practical reason*, whereas the is-ought gap only exists under the tyranny of the "objective." (Like I said, the third objection I don't see as actually following from Aristotle's philosophy.) — Count Timothy von Icarus

Telos was cast aside by Democritus about 50 years before Aristotle. 'Things do not come into existence for a purpose, but having come into existence, they find a purpose.' Both outlooks are parts of our heritage, and they're both still with us. I expect that if humanity exists 2400 years from now, that will still be the case. Don't you agree?

What makes you think I haven't read Nietzsche?!? That's a bold assumption....and I have actually.

Some thoughts.

An overall comment - a really thoughtful and well-written post.

Another overall comment - you make a lot of definitive statements about things that are matters of opinion. For instance...

Modern society is decaying; and this decay is a direct result of moral anti-realism. It is hard to say why moral anti-realism has caught wind like wild fire, but I would hypothesize it is substantially influenced by Nietzschien thought.

With this moral anti-realism, society slowly loses it’s ability to function rationally (since it has cut out The Good from its inquiry) and begins to cause people to damage themselves in the name of “you-do-you!”. — Bob Ross

To start, saying that whatever decay there is in our society is the result of moral anti-realism is unsupported, and I think, wrong. Philosophy follows society, not the other way around. Also - no society has ever functioned rationally and none ever will.

Here is a definition of moral realism from Wikipedia.

Moral realism (also ethical realism) is the position that ethical sentences express propositions that refer to objective features of the world (that is, features independent of subjective opinion) — Wikipedia - Moral Realism

Let me know if that matches your understanding. Also, I assume that moral anti-realism is the position that moral statements have no objective reality. As for that, I don't see that you've provided any evidence or argument that Aristotle's moral formulations are in any way objective.

I suggest society by-at-large goes back to Aristotle’s ideas (for the most part) to live a better life. — Bob Ross

As I see it, impossible to implement, unlikely to solve the problem you've identified, unnecessary, and damaging to societies and individuals.

The chief good for a human being is to be a eudaimon (viz., to embody the chief good [for human beings] of eudamonia [i.e., of a deep and persistent sense of happiness, flourishing, and well-being]); and this is the most persistently satisfying and deeply rewarding pursuit a person can endeavor on. Everything else is, if it does not relate somehow thereto, a mere distraction...

...the virtue of a human being too would be that characteristic as a result of which a human being becomes good and as a result of which he causes his own work to be done well. — Bob Ross

Maybe this is the my biggest disagreement with you and Aristotle in this regard. The meanings of "good," "virtue" and "happiness" are in no way objective facts.

“The happy [eudemian] life also seems to be accord with virtue, and this is the life that seems to be accompanied by seriousness but not to consist in play...If happiness [eudaimonia] is an activity in accord with virtue, it is reasonable that it would accord with the most excellent virtue, and this would be the virtue belonging to what is best” — Bob Ross

Happiness without play? That is not my experience or, I think, that of most people.

A key aspect of living well for a human being (and, arguably, any member of a rational kind) is living a (morally and intellectually) virtuous life; but it is important to note that, for Aristotle, “virtue” is not a morally-loaded term. For Aristotle, “virtue” is a sort of excellence which is relative to the subject, craft, etc. in question; whereas “moral virtue” is the subtype of virtue which is about moral excellence—i.e., doing well at being moral. It can be seen more clearly now that a person who wants to fulfill their nature must excel in every regard to that nature (i.e., must be virtuous); and a part of this is being moral, as morality pertains fundamentally to how to act best in accordance with what is good. — Bob Ross

Again, you haven't really defined the key words in this statement. Does Aristotle?

A broader statement - I recently started a thread - "My understanding of morals." In it I described a set of beliefs about behavior quoting Chuang Tzu and Lao Tzu, the founders of Taoism, and Emerson. This is from Chapter 8 of Ziporyn's translation of the Chuang Tzu (Zhuangzi).

What I call good is not humankindness and responsible conduct, but just being good at what is done by your own intrinsic virtuosities. Goodness, as I understand it, certainly does not mean humankindness and responsible conduct! It is just fully allowing the uncontrived condition of the inborn nature and allotment of life to play itself out. What I call sharp hearing is not hearkening to others, but rather hearkening to oneself, nothing more. — Chuang Tzu

By "intrinsic virtuosity" Chuang Tzu means our true nature, to oversimplify - our hearts, conscience. My first take is that this is exactly what you meant when you said "moral anti-realism," but as I thought about it, it struck me that's not true at all. They really are very similar, at least as you've described Aristotle's ideas.

Nietzschien thought did not take rise during or immediately after Nietzsche published his works; and I already conceded that now is arguably the best time to be alive when comparing to the past.

The recognition of The Good as legitimate and well-being as good for humanity, and this only being achieved through fulfilling one's nature, is an aspect of past societies that is superior to our own; but this in no way implies that, as a whole, there has been a better society than the ones today. I was suggesting that we are in a state of moral decay, not that we should revert completely back to a past society.

Do you see how society is shifting towards viewing what is good as people just being autonomous...to the point of extremity?

For example, there are movies being produced now, which depict putting "furies" (viz., people who think they are a different animal than a human being and mimic that animal's behaviors) in mental illness rehabilitation programs as if it is a form of persecution; because they don't want to be changed: they don't need a cure (according to them).

Another example, transgenderism is no longer a mental illness (called gender dysphoria) and is viewed, instead, as normal; because they are rationally achieving their own desire of imitating the other gender.

Another example, women by-at-large, in the younger generations, think it is self-empowering to have an only fans and find it wrong when people call them out as online prostitutes.

Etc.

Telos was cast aside by Democritus about 50 years before Aristotle. 'Things do not come into existence for a purpose, but having come into existence, they find a purpose.' Both outlooks are parts of our heritage, and they're both still with us. I expect that if humanity exists 2400 years from now, that will still be the case. Don't you agree?

I think telos is still important today, and Aristotle was right to view everything through its lens. It is essential for living a wise life, because a wise person fulfills their nature exactly because they are self-conscious of their nature and the nature of things around them.

It is misleading for many people to think of themselves as having no design and instead having to create their own purpose: that leads to radical individualism.

. possibly I've hung out with the wrong people but the idea that "humans necessarily want to be happy" is extremely implausible to me. Here, for instance, is a person named Pat. Pat suffers from a variety of psychological, physical, and spiritual maladies that produce a kind of chronic frustration, depression, resentment, and lack of ease -- in short, what we mean by "unhappiness." If you ask Pat if they "want to be happy," the answer you will get is: "Nonsense. What you call 'being happy' is for sheep. I operate on a higher plane. Of course I'm miserable, but that is what happens when a person of true intellect sees the world aright. — J

I’m trying to distinguish ‘ happy’ from want, desire, preference. When we get what we want, doesn’t that automatically make us happier than we would have been had we not achieved that thing that we wanted? Is it possible to will misery, or is that a contradiction in terms? I recognize that some believe consistent happiness is impossible , or that no growth comes without pain and suffering, or that misery brings with it its own insights, but that’s not the same thing as wanting unhappiness as the immediate goal of a desire.

Your mentions of him in the OP are simply contrary to Nietzche's moral philosophy.

It is misleading for many people to think of themselves as having no design and instead having to create their own purpose: that leads to radical individualism. — Bob Ross

I think creating your own purpose is more likely to lead you into society because humans are synergistic. For most of us, the greatest expression of selfhood is found in the company of others.

But if you object to the creation of purpose, where do you advise people find that?

The OP is about Aristotle and the claim that his moral ideas are better than those that prevail in our own time. — Leontiskos

It isn't, actually. I wish it had been, because then this thread wouldn't have lost itself in the swamp of amateur social history. The OP makes a claim about society which would require hours of deep research to verify/modify/reject. That set the agenda for this thread, which at times has seemed less like a philosophy debate and more like old farts in a pub whinging about the state of the world. And Bob, for whom I have a great respect, has unwittingly cast himself in the role of the guy who knocks on your door and says, 'Don't you agree that the world is in a terrible state?', and then, if you are unwise enough to agree with him, hands you a copy of The Watchtower or some other brand of snake oil.

If Bob really wants to pursue this angle, he should write a book — a thread in a forum is not the right vehicle.

Let's by all means talk about whether Aristotle's moral ideas are better than later ideas, but let's keep it at the level of ethical theory, albeit illuminated with examples (such as our old friends the trolley and transplant problems). Social history is for sociologists and historians.

"Happiness" is the common translation for the Greek term eudaimonia used by Aristotle. It's not a great translation. Eudaimonia could also be translated as "flourishing" or "living a good life." So:

I don't know . . . possibly I've hung out with the wrong people but the idea that "humans necessarily want to be happy" is extremely implausible to me. Here, for instance, is a person named Pat. Pat suffers from a variety of psychological, physical, and spiritual maladies that produce a kind of chronic frustration, depression, resentment, and lack of ease -- in short, what we mean by "unhappiness." If you ask Pat if they "want to be happy," the answer you will get is: "Nonsense. What you call 'being happy' is for sheep. I operate on a higher plane. Of course I'm miserable, but that is what happens when a person of true intellect sees the world aright. I wouldn't trade one minute of my unhappiness for a fool's paradise of Smiley Faces." Pat, you could say, would rather be Happy (their sense) than happy, but surely that's stretching what "happy" means. Let's face it: Pat just doesn't want to be happy, and they can give you their reasons why.

Pat clearly thinks he is pursuing some higher good here. He thinks happiness, which seems to be taken as "pleasantness" is not conducive to true human flourishing. That's exactly what many later monastic/ascetic commentators on Aristotle have thought as well; true flourishing implies a victory over the body and its pleasures (or something like that). Indeed, he sounds not unlike Aristotle, who calls the life pursuing simple pleasure a "life for grazing animals," (although Aristotle is more sanguine about pleasure generally).

The point is that people pursue some good when they act unless action is to be completely arbitrary. We can't have an infinite regress of motivations. People can, of course, pursue counterfeit goods, disordered goods, or merely relative goods. The ethics is about how to avoid this.

Even Milton's Satan acknowledges this with: "evil be thou now my good." It doesn't make sense to say "evil be evil for me me," if you're going to pursue it.

Robbie's behavior seems pretty well summed up in the Ethic's discussions on virtue versus vice and incontinence. It is not the case that Aristotle thinks we always prefer virtue. One can fall into vice. One can also recognize vice as vice and still prefer it, even as one knows they should try to rise to virtue. When a person is unsuccessful at overcoming desires they know are wrong this is incontinence, whereas if they do the virtuous thing but do not enjoy it they are merely continent. But for Aristotle it is possible, with time and proper education, to come to love virtue and hate vice.

I should note though that his use of vice is very different from today's, which recalls mostly drugs, gambling, etc. For Aristotle virtue is a golden mean between extremes, so rashness or cowardliness are vices, whereas courage is a virtue. Profligacy and grasping are vices, whereas generosity is a virtue, etc.

The form of moral anti-realism taking prominence, is this “Nietzschien kind”. Not only is it bad for a human to think they can acquire happiness through fulfilling their desires but this sort of thought leads to the crumbling of society into arbitrary, narcissistic power-struggles. None of which is good for people. — Bob Ross

I am not sure what you mean here? Nietzsche talked about acquiring happiness through fulfilling desires?

100%

It is one of the most backwards things I have ever read. I think he is confusing Existential Ethics with Nietzsche maybe?

@Bob Ross The general existential view of of ethics is based on creating your own virtues in light of an absurd existence. You seem to be conflating this with one or two cherry-picked points made by Nietzsche maybe?

Confusion is all I got from reading the OP. I only managed to get a few paragraphs in before giving up.

Please outline where and why. I don't follow, and I don't want to go on a derailed spiel on Nietzschien ethics: I'd rather contend with whatever complaints you have to offer.

Philosophy follows society, not the other way around

Philosophical idealogies are the guiding forces behind societial norms; so I don’t know how you could think the roles are reversed.

As for that, I don't see that you've provided any evidence or argument that Aristotle's moral formulations are in any way objective.

This thread was not meant to provide an argument for why Aristotelian ethics is a form of moral realism: that’s common knowledge.

As I see it, impossible to implement, unlikely to solve the problem you've identified, unnecessary, and damaging to societies and individuals.

You will have to elaborate more on this for me to respond adequately.

Maybe this is the my biggest disagreement with you and Aristotle in this regard. The meanings of "good," "virtue" and "happiness" are in no way objective facts.

Ah, so you are a moral anti-realist?

Happiness without play? That is not my experience or, I think, that of most people.

Aristotle is noting that the happy life consists in hard work, in being virtuous, and not chasing desires or passions; he is clarifying for those who conflate happiness in the richest sense with the superficial kind that kids have.

Again, you haven't really defined the key words in this statement. Does Aristotle?

Aristotle kind of does—it depends. What words do you need me to define for you?

By "intrinsic virtuosity" Chuang Tzu means our true nature, to oversimplify - our hearts, conscience. My first take is that this is exactly what you meant when you said "moral anti-realism," but as I thought about it, it struck me that's not true at all. They really are very similar, at least as you've described Aristotle's ideas.

I saw your OP, I just haven’t had time to comment in there yet; but I will.

Following one’s moral intuitions is not necessarily incompatible with moral realism, and, as a virtue ethicist, Aristotle is going to agree that a moral compass is more important than moral principles; but he will warn against blindly following one’s heart: one has to cultivate a virtueous character or otherwise they have no reason to believe they are morally sensitive and wise enough to intuit properly in nuanced situations. A psychopathic narcissist probably isn’t going make the right decision following their heart, without first reshaping it.

I am getting a bit lost: I never suggested people should create their own purposes, so I am confused why you asking me about that. Am I missing something?

I am not sure what you mean here? Nietzsche talked about acquiring happiness through fulfilling desires?

Nietzsche's moral philosophy is that there is no morality (in the traditional sense) but, rather, we create our own values and subject ourselves to our own created moral law. Our own created law is based off of our values, and our values, according to Nietzsche, on our own subjective tastes which do not reside as cognitive (but rather conative) dispositions.

I would suggest reading, if you haven't already, Thus Spoke Zarathustra: it outlines very well his "solution" to morality by way of radical invidualism.

Nietzsche also, throughout all his works, praises Epicureanism as a way to live life properly (and usually contrasted to the rigidness of Stoicism). Nietzsche's view is essentially a rationalized form (Apollonian) of Dionysian thought.

Some philosopher once said that, while common sense doesn't necessarily get the last word, it should certainly be given the first word. So I'm trying to take the contention "Humans necessarily want to be happy" on its common-sense merits, and read "happy" as what most English speakers would mean by happy.

I completely agree that this was not what Aristotle meant, but of course Aristotle did not speak English. Eudaemonia is close to untranslatable, but "flourishing" or "good spirit" will have to do, and it's a far cry from English-language "happiness." It's much closer to that sense of harmony within the human being, the identification of inner well-being with outer virtue, that I tried to hint at. And that's why I gave Aristotle that cryptic question at the end of my post, seeking to remind his interlocutor that happiness and the good are not separated in the way that English speakers believe they are.

When we get what we want, doesn’t that automatically make us happier than we would have been had we not achieved that thing that we wanted? — Joshs

This is a psychological question, not a philosophical one, I would say. For what it's worth, my answer is No. All too often, as I know from my own experience, getting what you want can be a bitter disappointment (and bad for you too!).

I'll do another post about Pat and Robbie later today, responding to Count T's placement of them in an Aristotelian framework.

Nietzsche's moral philosophy is that there is no morality (in the traditional sense) but, rather, we create our own values and subject ourselves to our own created moral law. — Bob Ross

He was correct as far as I can see. As for "happiness" ... I cannot recall him focusing on that at all (other than in a dismissive light I imagine?).

I am getting a bit lost: I never suggested people should create their own purposes, so I am confused why you asking me about that. Am I missing something? — Bob Ross

You said:

It is misleading for many people to think of themselves as having no design and instead having to create their own purpose: that leads to radical individualism. — Bob Ross

Are you saying people should see purpose as something they receive? From where?

When we get what we want, doesn’t that automatically make us happier than we would have been had we not achieved that thing that we wanted?
— Joshs

This is a psychological question, not a philosophical one, I would say. For what it's worth, my answer is No. All too often, as I know from my own experience, getting what you want can be a bitter disappointment (and bad for you too!). — J

It’s both a psychological and a philosophical question. It would be strictly a psychological question if I were looking only for an empirical explanation. You said getting what one wants can lead to disappointment. Understood in terms of temporal sequence, I begin with a desire, which already has in mind its object, at least in a vague way. What I have in mind is a source of happiness for me in the instant I imagine it. If I achieve that desire, if what I actually get reasonably matches my expectation, it will make me happier in the instant I get it, just as generating the image of it in my imagination does. What you’re talking about is a situation where what I actually achieve doesn’t reasonably match my happiness-producing expectation. The ‘real thing’ doesn’t stack up against what my expectation produced in my imagination. Your point seems to be that reality often falls short of our dreams. I dont disagree with this. I’m simply saying that, strictly speaking, it is not the case that we dont want to feel happy, since the feeling of being happier is built into the very concept of desire. Desire is the expectation of obtaining an object or achieving a goal that will make us happier than we would be if we didn’t obtain that object.

That set the agenda for this thread, which at times has seemed less like a philosophy debate and more like old farts in a pub whinging about the state of the world. — Herg

Ha!! I like that. On the other hand, much of philosophy is exactly that.

Good post.

The fact that posters decided to pile on a premise that the thread rests on rather than the thread itself is the posters' fault, not OP's.

For example https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/15250/if-existence-is-good-what-is-the-morality-of-life starts by setting a premise and establishing that the thread is not the place to discuss that premise. The first reply to that thread is in fact praising it for the way it was set up and "making the boundaries of the discussion clear". I think the boundaries of this thread were clear, Leontiskos thinks so too.

The book comment applies to every thread here that puts forward a thesis. It is silly.

With a bit of Swift's Battle of the Books, pitching the Ancients against the Moderns, thrown in for extra flavor.

Grumpy old men fight on both sides of that battle.

[Not saying that to diss this thread]

Philosophical idealogies are the guiding forces behind societial norms — Bob Ross

I don't think this is true, but I don't think I have the ammunition to shoot it down.

This thread was not meant to provide an argument for why Aristotelian ethics is a form of moral realism: that’s common knowledge. — Bob Ross

If by common knowledge you mean something known by most people, I disagree. I think if you started a thread to discuss the meaning of any of these three terms you would get quite a few differing opinions, and that's just among us amateur philosophers. The answers would be even more diverse in the general public.

If, on the other hand, you mean it is common knowledge among those familiar with Aristotle's works, I don't have a response, since I don't know enough to have a meaningful opinion.

Ah, so you are a moral anti-realist? — Bob Ross

I think that human values are a reflection of human nature, whatever that means. I would have thought that means the answer to your question is "yes," but now I'm not so sure.

Aristotle is noting that the happy life consists in hard work, in being virtuous, and not chasing desires or passions; he is clarifying for those who conflate happiness in the richest sense with the superficial kind that kids have. — Bob Ross

I'm have never been an especially happy person, by whatever definition you use. That being said, I have never been happier than since my retirement. Now I have the freedom to follow where my intrinsic virtuosities lead me, although that's something easier said than done. I find many of the things I do are playful, participating in the forum is one of those.

Aristotle kind of does—it depends. What words do you need me to define for you? — Bob Ross

Happiness, virtue, and good as objective standards without making a circular argument by using each word to define the others. Actually, I think that will take us down a long and winding path, so we can leave it for now.

Following one’s moral intuitions is not necessarily incompatible with moral realism, and, as a virtue ethicist, Aristotle is going to agree that a moral compass is more important than moral principles; but he will warn against blindly following one’s heart: one has to cultivate a virtueous character or otherwise they have no reason to believe they are morally sensitive and wise enough to intuit properly in nuanced situations. A psychopathic narcissist probably isn’t going make the right decision following their heart, without first reshaping it. — Bob Ross

This feels like an escape clause. Yes, follow your heart, but let me decide if your heart is up to the task.

This is an interesting discussion. Thanks for that.