Grumpy old men fight on both sides of that battle. — Paine

As a grumpy old man wise elder I agree.

Nietzsche did not like the idea of happiness because he viewed it as anti-thetical to working on a noble project; but in a deeper sense "happiness" fits well into his theory, because working on a long-term project, which one imposes upon themselves out of passion, is a way, according to Nietzsche, to find a deep and persistent sense of fulfillment...he just doesn't call it happiness.

It is something they have. "Receive" and "create" presuppose that purpose only comes from an agent.

Yes, these are interesting points. You're saying that, IF the satisfaction of a desire matches my expectation, then I am, ceteris paribus, happier than I was before. So we need to modify the original thought to reflect this. It's not "getting what we want" that would automatically make me happier, but rather the getting + the match with expectations. The takeaway here would be that "what I want" is not something that necessarily produces happiness when achieved.

Fair enough. But this pushes us back to the question of whether any of this should be phrased in terms of happiness. And, considering the Aristotelian framework of this thread, we have to ask: "English-language happiness" or something more like eudaemonia? It seems true enough that I experience something positive when a desired expectation is met, but in English, at any rate, I really don't think "happiness" is going to cover it a lot of the time. I don't mean to pick a controversial example, but it seems well suited to capture the problem: If Ellie finds herself unwillingly pregnant in the 1st trimester, she has a choice to make among (at least) three options. Even granting that the result of whatever choice she makes does meet her expectations, can we say she is "happier" without doing violence to the language? She may believe, correctly, that her condition would be worse if she had chosen either of the other two options, but simply being "better than the other alternatives" doesn't equate to happiness, I would say. Especially in a fraught case like this, happiness seems a bridge too far.

Interestingly, I think you can make a much stronger case for the result of Ellie's decision (no matter which it is) promoting her eudaemonia, her overall well-being. Sometimes doing the right thing doesn't, and can't, make us happy, though we may see that it is the right thing, and will work toward our eventual good. But here is where my example becomes controversial, so perhaps ill-chosen, because in order to acknowledge that Ellie's eudaemonia could be furthered regardless of which decision she makes, you'd also have to agree that giving birth, early abortion, and adoption are on a moral par, which many do not.

It is something they have. "Receive" and "create" presuppose that purpose only comes from an agent. — Bob Ross

What purpose do you have?

The point is that people pursue some good when they act — Count Timothy von Icarus

Yes indeed, but that good may not be named as, or experienced as, happiness; we see this in Pat's case.

Robbie's behavior seems pretty well summed up in the Ethic's discussions on virtue versus vice and incontinence. It is not the case that Aristotle thinks we always prefer virtue. One can fall into vice. One can also recognize vice as vice and still prefer it, even as one knows they should try to rise to virtue. When a person is unsuccessful at overcoming desires they know are wrong this is incontinence, — Count Timothy von Icarus

I think you're right to place Robbie in this general context, but I don't think their situation is quite described here. Robbie has "fallen into vice," yes. But they don't recognize vice as vice, because they don't believe they are making wrong choices. Nor is Robbie failing to overcome self-acknowledged "wrong desires," for the same reason; so Robbie's not incontinent. The missing piece from this attempt to describe Robbie is lack of self-knowledge. What does Aristotle say about this? Is there a term, or an ethical condition, that can describe a person who has "fallen into vice" but not only doesn't know it, but is convinced that they desire the exact opposite?

What purpose do you have? — frank

As I think is in keeping with what @Bob Ross is saying:

Same purpose everyone has: the obtainment of optimal eudemonia as end. (?)

But this won't be a purpose/end which I (or you) created for ourselves, instead being something that just is in so far as being intrinsic to our being; we can't choose against it, even when granting some form of free will. Nor would it be something received from another ego (whose very ego begs the question of what end(s) it itself has) in a cosmos devoid of an overarching/superlative purposer/creator.

What does Aristotle say about this? Is there a term, or an ethical condition, that can describe a person who has "fallen into vice" but not only doesn't know it, but is convinced that they desire the exact opposite?

This would be the state of vice—which involves the enjoyment and pursuit vice and ignorance vis-á-vis true virtue.

Incontinence is the state where a person can properly distinguish virtue from vice but still acts according to vice due to weakness of will.

Continence is knowing virtue as virtue and acting according to it, but still desiring vice.

Perfected virtue entails that one acts virtuously and enjoys/prefers virtue to vice (e.g. Socrates prefers to drink hemlock as opposed to acting against virtue in the Crito).

So you can see an immediate contrast here with Kant, who would have it that we are in a way being most good when we "do the right thing," despite having no desire to do so.

Virtue is key to true self-determining freedom. Obviously, we are not born with this freedom. Education and training in the virtues is thus essential, and Aristotle at times likens the way we learn to practice the virtues to how we learn and perfect trades/skills (techne).

Part of the incoherence in the modern tradition that Nietzsche picks up on is the way in which acting morally can seem like a burden that makes life less worth living. It is "life denying." Yet he backwards projects this onto Plato and the classical tradition. Plato by contrast has reason reaching down into and coloring the desires, and speaks of ecstatic eros for the Good, or even "coupling" with it. Likewise in St. Aquinas we have the intellect coloring all of the lower faculties given the proper orientation. Asceticism then isn't about denying the desires tout court, but rather training them in order to fulfill them more fully (freedom as giving birth in beauty). The charioteer of reason in the Phaedrus trains the two horses (appetites/passions), he doesn't kill them or pen them in a stable, but ideally has them running at full gallop as he takes off towards the sun in an act of self-generating reflexive freedom (this of course doesn't obviate Nietzsche's critique more generally, it's just that it seems a bit off the mark when ascribed to the classical tradition). Kierkegaard is often grouped with Nietzsche despite having an entirely opposite view of Christianity in part because of this same sort of insight.

I don't think this is true, but I don't think I have the ammunition to shoot it down.

I am not a historian either, so perhaps I don’t either; but it seems pretty clear that society is like a wave, and the flow is marked out by someone (or a group of people) gaining sufficient influence on the masses...this starts with an idea.

If by common knowledge you mean something known by most people, I disagree. I think if you started a thread to discuss the meaning of any of these three terms you would get quite a few differing opinions, and that's just among us amateur philosophers. The answers would be even more diverse in the general public.

If, on the other hand, you mean it is common knowledge among those familiar with Aristotle's works, I don't have a response, since I don't know enough to have a meaningful opinion.

I mean the second.

I think that human values are a reflection of human nature, whatever that means. I would have thought that means the answer to your question is "yes," but now I'm not so sure.

This doesn’t necessitate a “yes” or “no”: it is indeterminate with the information you have given so far.

Moral realism is usually a three-pronged thesis (at a minimum):

1. Moral judgments are truth-apt.
2. Moral judgments express something objective.
3. There is at least one true moral judgment.

Prong 2 is the most important one: moral objectivism. I can’t tell if you hold there are moral facts or not.

Now I have the freedom to follow where my intrinsic virtuosities lead me, although that's something easier said than done. I find many of the things I do are playful, participating in the forum is one of those.

Engaging in fun is arguably an essential aspect of becoming happy, but it is not an element of being virtuous. I am not acting, in any meaningful sense, virtuous by intending to merely do something I enjoy doing.

Happiness, virtue, and good as objective standards without making a circular argument by using each word to define the others. Actually, I think that will take us down a long and winding path, so we can leave it for now.

The concept of good is identical to the concept of value; and the property of goodness is identical to the property of valuableness. Actual, or intrinsic, goodness is actual, or intrinsic, valuableness; and thusly the highest (intrinsic) good is what is the most (intrinsically) valuable.

Happiness is the most intrinsically valuable; because it is the most intrinsically motivating (and I leave this intentionally vague for now); which makes it the chief good. It is a persistent state of supreme fulfillment and well living. It is essentially well-being.

Virtue is a habit of usually character which is excellent (relative to what is the subject of discussion). “Excellence” here is NOT a morally loaded term, and is kind of confusing for the modern man. This can be readily seen by how confusing it can be to the modern man to encounter Aristotle splitting virtues into moral and intellectual virtues; which seems odd since most people think of a virtue as inextricably tied to morality. Virtues are excellent habits of character; and this is not limited to the moral domain—e.g., the particular traits required to be a good runner are virtuous running traits because they are excellent for running.

This feels like an escape clause. Yes, follow your heart, but let me decide if your heart is up to the task.

It has to be that way: a conscience is not necessarily naturally morally sensitive and well-grounded. Wouldn’t you agree? A child conditioned by Nazi propaganda that follows their heart in their adulthood are going to make really morally egregious decisions.

This is an interesting discussion. Thanks for that.

You too!

I have created my own purpose of being good (to your point); and thereby commit myself to the purpose, which I have independently of my created purpose, of being a eudaimon (because that is what I was designed for).

The first is merely a decision I made, and the latter stems from what is good.

More or less, yes. We are designed a particular way, and we can choose to go against it; but we will only be damaging ourselves.

More or less, yes. We are designed a particular way, and we can choose to go against it; but we will only be damaging ourselves. — Bob Ross

OK, thanks for the comment. I'll myself shy from the term "designed" for, unlike the notion of purpose/end, the concept of "designed" does to me seem to logically entail a designer in aprioristic manners (akin to a bachelor being unmarried). This ascription of a designer being a belief I so far find erroneous due to the logical contradictions I so far find in the concept.

Evidencing logical contradictions would be a far longer argument (which I'd rather not here engage in) but, to keep things simple, as I previously alluded to: A designer of me and you, etc. would yet either a) have a purpose/end in so designing or else b) not have any purpose/end whatsoever in so designing. (A) then entails there yet being an uncreated/undesigned purpose/end which the designer him/herself pursues in their designing of our own essential nature as human beings - hence yet entailing an uncreated objective Good which this designer is yet perpetually subject to, and can in no way modify. The very same existential Good which we ourselves can either approach or deviate from via our innate impetus to pursue optimal eudemonia/well-being. While this terse argument doesn't illustrate the logical contradictions of a global designer, it does evidence how such a designer is utterly superfluous to the innate purpose of our own being. So, then, why even bother with the notion of a grand designer when addressing issues of the Good? Whereas just stipulated option (b) implies chaotic/random effects stemming from the designer as cause to our being, which is incongruous to what we know about, at the very least, the static nature of our being: that of our seeking out what we best believe to be our optimal well-being in both short- and long-term appraisals.

In short, rather than stating that we are designed in a certain way, I'll rather say that "we all unalterably are a particular way (innate seekers of optimal well-being) as human beings", this despite our otherwise innumerable differences. But maybe this quibbling with words is besides the point?

I have created my own purpose of being good (to your point); and thereby commit myself to the purpose, which I have independently of my created purpose, of being a eudaimon (because that is what I was designed for).

The first is merely a decision I made, and the latter stems from what is good. — Bob Ross

Ok. This is just the opposite of what I thought you were saying. Your purpose is to live in accordance with your nature.

Your purpose is to live in accordance with your nature. — frank

For my part, although this can have a nice ring to it, it doesn't seem to accurately convey my own take. For me, my/our purpose is simply to actualize an optimal well-being, but this is not something I can in any metaphysical sense deviate from. This of itself is existentially fixed in all of us. What I can (and often enough inadvertently do) deviate from is the very actualization of this end via the choices I make. So, in the sense you are here addressing, I'd then say my purpose - in the sense of end-driven striving I consciously engage in (rather than in the sense of an end upon which all my actions are necessarily contingent) - is to remain true to the very end of an actualized optimal well-being, something that can well be deemed identical to the notion of the Good.

I could then say that this is not the consciously upheld purpose of many - toddlers for instance - even thought they are nevertheless teleologically driven by the same telos/end, even if ignorant of it on a conscious level.

So, once this overall picture is accommodated - such that the "nature" here addressed is properly understood as the "will toward optimal eudemonia" (rather than say, one's nature of either being inclined toward selfishness or selflessness, etc.) - then, and only then, I could affirm something like "my purpose is to remain true (in the sense of accurately aiming, conformant in this way) to my true (in the sense of genuine, else genuinely immutable) nature". This, furthermore, then implies that one's true nature is, underneath it all, good, for it is in tune with the actualization of the Good. And it is this underlying nature that one can deviate from due to oneself as ego and the choices oneself as ego makes - sometimes in ignorance of what is best relative to the Good as ultimate end.

All this might be in some measure of accord to what you've quoted @Bob Ross as saying - although, as per my previous post, I myself don't subscribe to having been in any way designed/created by a global designer/creator. And so I dislike the choice of words which Bob Ross has made.

, I think you can make a much stronger case for the result of Ellie's decision (no matter which it is) promoting her eudaemonia, her overall well-being. Sometimes doing the right thing doesn't, and can't, make us happy, though we may see that it is the right thing, and will work toward our eventual good — J

My objection to Aristotle’s concept of happiness as eudaemonia, and this whose ethical theories are influenced by it, is that it conflates the hedonic and the cognitive aspects of experiencing. As a result, it fetishizes intent over sense-making. One can allegedly ‘want’ suffering , pain or misery instead of pleasure and happiness. We make decision all the time between short term reward and long term benefit, between the thrill of the moment and an ‘eventual good.’ But in doing so, we are not dealing with different forms of the hedonic, but different ways of making sense of the situations that will produce happiness. In other words, it is the cognitive aspect of goal-seeking that is involved when we choose none route to happiness over another. Choosing the longer term benefit over the immediate reward requires construing this far off reward within the immediate situation.

Thanks, very helpful. No need to run this into the ground but I still feel there ought to be a separate category other than merely "state of vice" to describe people like Robbie. You say this involves "the enjoyment and pursuit of vice," and this is indeed how we think of wicked or vicious people -- but Robbie isn't like that. Robbie hates the condition they are in, and has no desire to keep pursuing it . . . or so they say. Do we need to say that Robbie "secretly" or "deeply" enjoys being stuck in misery, in order to explain their condition? I'm not sure that's right. But in any case, I would hesitate to judge Robbie by the same yardstick I'd use to judge the typical, "standard" person in a state of vice.

These are two outlooks we've inherited about the innateness of goodness:

1. Hebrew: You're born blank. You don't know good from evil, and must learn it. Jews see the Mosaic Law as the only description of good and evil available to mankind. You're specifically warned about the dangers of taking your own council. You can tell if a person is good by their circumstances because if they're good, God rewards them.

2. Persian: The universe is divided in half between good and evil and you're born knowing the difference between the two. To be good, you have to actively reach out for the good side and push away from the evil. It's a journey. This is the origin of the idea that progress is good. You can't tell if a person is good from their circumstances. A poor person can be good if they're progressing. A rich man can be evil if he's in stasis, and since the poor are more inclined to want change, they're more likely to be good.

There are other ideas we've inherited, like the idea that goodness is about revelation. This is a companion of the idea of original sin. We're born bad, clothed in flesh, and we're on a mission to return to a heavenly state, so goodness is about bringing the truth out into the open, or the Roman idea was that they were on a mission (given to them by Mars) to bring peace to the earth. In both cases, good is always just out of reach. All you get is doses of it from time to time.

Of all of these viewpoints, the Jewish one is the only one that allows you to be satisfied with what you've got. You studied the law. You put it into practice. You're doing ok. Anyway, it's a way to analyze the emotional tones in your viewpoint.

One can allegedly ‘want’ suffering , pain or misery instead of pleasure and happiness. — Joshs

Masochism as one extreme example of this. Running a grueling marathon so as to successfully arrive at the finishing line as another. But both these cases will make ample equivocation of "happiness" and "suffering". The masochist consciously suffers only when they cannot obtain their conscious happiness in - consensually it must be added - experiencing physical pain or else some form of physiological discomfort, such as humiliation. They will however be consciously happy when their masochistic acts are fulfilled as intended. Same can be said of the marathon runner (here even placing aside the issue of runner's high). Or else of someone who desires to experience misery so as to feel repentant for what they deem to have been a former willfully committed wrong. And so forth.

One however cannot at the exact same time and in the exact same respect both consciously want X (as one's end/goal) and consciously want not-X (as one's end/goal) - as will, for example, be the case when X = one's own future misery. This irrespective of the myriad possibilities regarding the at times discordant agencies we experience as felt emotions which can on occasion occur within the preconscious or else un/subconscious mind in whole.

My objection to Aristotle’s concept of happiness as eudaemonia, and this whose ethical theories are influenced by it, is that it conflates the hedonic and the cognitive aspects of experiencing. As a result, it fetishizes intent over sense-making. — Joshs

That affirmed, are you here arguing that at least some sense-making is non-intentional (be it either conscious or unconscious)?

Of all of these viewpoints, the Jewish one is the only one that allows you to be satisfied with what you've got. You studied the law. You put it into practice. You're doing ok. Anyway, it's a way to analyze the emotional tones in your viewpoint. — frank

There are other ways to appraise the mentioned viewpoint, but fair enough. As to the Jewish perspective you've mentioned, full satisfaction does not occur. Otherwise there would be a complete cessation of will/desire in all respects culminating in literal bliss, which does not happen to egos.

If you ask Pat if they "want to be happy," the answer you will get is: "Nonsense. What you call 'being happy' is for sheep. I operate on a higher plane. Of course I'm miserable, but that is what happens when a person of true intellect sees the world aright. I wouldn't trade one minute of my unhappiness for a fool's paradise of Smiley Faces." — J

It sounds like you're asking Pat if he wants to be happy at the cost of naivete, and he says no. Naivete is for him a very pronounced form of unhappiness.

Of course, in our culture "happiness" has become much more psychological than eudamonia. For example, lots of people will skip the "happiness pills," but it's not because they don't want to be happy, it's because they don't think the pills produce happiness. They don't think psychological ease is happiness. Pat seems to fall easily within this group.

Robbie replies by explaining in great detail why none of those suggestions are options that would work for them — J

Robbie, by your own admission, does not believe that your advice will make him happy (because it is not achievable for him). This doesn't mean he doesn't want to be happy; it only means he doesn't think you are giving good advice.

But perhaps the more important point is this: Aristotle doesn't mean "everybody" when he talks about the human desire for happiness — J

I think he surely does.

If we could bring him into this conversation, I think Aristotle might say: "Yes, sadly, there are those whom you have to actually convince to desire their own good, but that doesn't put the idea of 'the good' up for grabs in any important way." But wait a minute, Ari, we reply; we're talking about happiness, not the good. Aristotle smiles serenely . . . "Oh, are you?" he asks. — J

In the very first pages of the Nicomachean Ethics Aristotle connects happiness with the good. You could say that for Aristotle not everyone wants to be virtuous, but not that not everyone wants to be happy. Everyone does want to be happy, and they try to do so within their unique circumstances.

As to its name, I suppose nearly all men are agreed; for the masses and the men of culture alike declare that it is happiness, and hold that to “live well” or to “do well” is the same as to be “happy.” — Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, I.4

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Edit:

What does Aristotle say about this? Is there a term, or an ethical condition, that can describe a person who has "fallen into vice" but not only doesn't know it, but is convinced that they desire the exact opposite? — J

If "exact opposite" means virtue then we are speaking about the akrates. On the other hand, someone who desires vice is the akolastos that you read about in Kevin Flannery’s paper, “Anscombe and Aristotle on Corrupt Minds.”

Robbie hates the condition they are in, and has no desire to keep pursuing it . . . or so they say. Do we need to say that Robbie "secretly" or "deeply" enjoys being stuck in misery, in order to explain their condition? I'm not sure that's right. But in any case, I would hesitate to judge Robbie by the same yardstick I'd use to judge the typical, "standard" person in a state of vice. — J

Robbie is the akrates. Generally we say about Robbie that he is conflicted. See my post <here>:

The incontinent man (the akratēs) is one who desires correctly but does not act correctly. For example, the alcoholic who wishes to be sober but, overcome by his bad habits, is unable to act thusly. Nowadays we think of akrasia as relating to psychology, but for Aristotle it was central to ethics.

Some of the other proximate categories are helpful in situating the idea. The depraved man (akolastos) desires incorrectly and acts in accord with his desires. Then comes the akratēs, described above. Then comes the continent man (enkratēs), who desires correctly and acts correctly, but only with difficulty or effort. Then comes the temperate man (sophron), who desires correctly and acts correctly (primarily in relation to pleasures), and without difficulty or effort. At the further extremes, even apart from considerations of pleasure, stand the bad man (kakos) and the man of practical wisdom (phronimos). The commonality between the akratēs and the enkratēs is that they are both divided internally, at odds with themselves. Contrariwise, the akolastos and the sophron are both internally unified, acting as they see fit without internal contradiction. — Leontiskos

, are you here arguing that at least some sense-making is non-intentional (be it either conscious or unconscious)? — javra

If it matters to us, if it is important to our goals, then we are implicitly aware of it, even if we don’t know how to articulate it explicitly in words.

If it matters to us, if it is important to our goals, then we are implicitly aware of it, even if we don’t know how to articulate it explicitly in words. — Joshs

I don't yet see how this answers the question I asked. Consider cases of non-wanton addiction where the addict consciously knows better, wants to cease the addiction, but can't on account of their total mind's goading to persist in the addiction. Yes, quitting an addiction is possible, but the greater the addiction the more difficult so doing becomes. Here, then, the conscious being in question holds a sense-making wherein quitting is deemed beneficial. But the same person's unconscious mind (to simply a complex issue) for the most part at least engages in sense-making wherein continuing the addiction is held onto as beneficial. The consciousness concerned must then navigate between the long-term good of ceasing the addiction which they consciously acknowledge and the short-term bad of experiencing a potential horde of bad consequences (from physical pain to lack of mental clarity which would then destabilize the tasks which the person knows they must do, etc.) that would result where the person to in fact cease the addiction. A thousand and one complexities and variations ensue; I know. But, to get back to my initial question:

Is any of this sense-making - both on the part of the consciousness involved and on the part of their own unconscious mind which stands in opposition to their conscious will - in any way independent of some form of intent ... and, thereby, non-intentional in quality?

If not, then I don't understand how Aristotelian-ism "fetishizes intent over sense-making" ... this since the later is then fully contingent on the occurrence of the former.

As to the Jewish perspective you've mentioned, full satisfaction does not occur. Otherwise there would be a complete cessation of will/desire in all respects culminating in literal bliss, which does not happen to egos. — javra

Yea. The Jews have never caught a break from holocausts long enough to disappear into the oblivion of bliss.

:rage: A mischaracterization of what I said.

No, I understood you. I was just saying they've always had an external source of grief. They don't have to generate it for themselves like Gentiles do.

↪Herg The fact that posters decided to pile on a premise that the thread rests on rather than the thread itself is the posters' fault, not OP's. — Lionino

Bob presented us with a supposed evil (the moral decay of modern society) and offered Aristotelian ethics as a cure. That was his justification for promoting Aristotelian ethics in the rest of his OP. If you remove that justification, all you are left with is a neutral precis of Aristotle. Bob was not being neutral: he was being passionate. Whether you agree with him or not, he had a serious point to make. Let's not take that away from him just to save his blushes.

Interestingly, Bob's justification is consequentialist: "if we were Aristotelians, the consequence would be an improved society". Bob has in the past pooh-poohed consequentialism, yet here he is arguing like a true consequentialist. As a partially lapsed consequentialist myself, I note the fact with a certain wry enjoyment.

The book comment applies to every thread here that puts forward a thesis. It is silly. — Lionino

Well, of course any philosophical debate can fill a book. But sometimes you can have a useful debate in a much smaller space. The problem with Bob's thesis is that because it makes sweeping claims about social history, the present state of society, and the supposed cause of that state (rampant moral anti-realism), it needs a lot of space in which to provide evidence and arguments to support these claims. There just isn't the space to do it here.

I was just saying they've always had a external source of grief. — frank

Dude, have you mingled with any Jews? They too have familial troubles, etc., to not even get in trite dis-satisfactions such as being occasionally hungry or thirsty.

"Full" satisfaction in the sense of "complete" ... hence in literal lack of any want whatsoever. I was under the impression we are here addressing philosophical issues - rather than colloquial sentiments and affirmations. And, since you "understand me", who the hell ever said that literal bliss equates to oblivion? This being a rather materialist/nihilist interpretation of the issue - which I do not hold.

Is any of this sense-making - both on the part of the consciousness involved and on the part of their own unconscious mind which stands in opposition to their conscious will - in any way independent of some form of intent ... and, thereby, non-intentional in quality?

If not, then I don't understand how Aristotelian-ism "fetishizes intent over sense-making" ... this since the later is then fully contingent on the occurrence of the former — javra

As I wrote to Philosophim in another thread, addiction is so powerful because the rewards are immediate and the detrimental effects are more gradual. The drug makes one sicker and sicker, pulls one of out of social world and into isolation more and more completely, but one also knows that the immediate effect of one more fix or hit or drink is to make one forget about all anxieties. One has to learn to see immediate repercussions of the long-term harm, immediate repercussions that are so powerful they override the immediately gratifying effects. They used to call this ‘hitting bottom’ in alcohol addiction , but many never hit bottom.

You're still not addressing how Aristotelianism fetishizes intent over sense-making. OK, then.

- Yes, this seems right to me. :up: