it is morally permissible and obligatory to pull the lever — Bob Ross
because either choice (of action or inaction) will result in a bad side effect (of either the deaths of five or the killing of one) and the bad side effect of pulling the lever is consequentially less severe than the bad side effect of not pulling it.
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The latter scenario is morally permissible because either choice (of action or inaction) will result in a bad side effect (of either letting the woman die of cancer or killing the unborn human being) and the bad side effect of killing the unborn is on a par with letting the woman die of cancer. — Bob Ross
6. The bad effect for the means chosen is less severe than or on a par with the alternative bad effects from the alternative means (consequentially). — Bob Ross
The Principle of Double Effect is utilitarian. What is there is agree or disagree about other than the overall balance of outcome (which is precisely what the PoDE is describing)? — I like sushi
Nuh.The Principle of Double Effect is utilitarian. — I like sushi
I have changed my mind — Bob Ross
It's much more complex than that. If anything, it's Catholic...
Not a strong recommendation in my opinion. — Banno
I answer that, Nothing hinders one act from having two effects, only one of which is intended, while the other is beside the intention... — Aquinas, ST II-II.64.7: Whether it is lawful to kill a man in self-defense?
To this effect, Dr. Mary S. Calderone tells of a group of eminent doctors who implicitly affirmed the validity of this aspect of the principle when they refused to classify hysterectomy for uterine fibroids as a therapeutic abortion, even though therapy had lead to the destruction of the fetus.
At the Symposium on Aspects of Female Sexuality, heId in New York in 1958, Dr. S.A. Cosgrove made a similar though somewhat marginal statement. He stated in this respect that he would not perform a therapeutic abortion since he did not consider it "good medicine", but that he would treat a definite life-threatening disease even if fetal death might result from the treatment. — Paul Micallef, A Critique of Bernard Häring’s Application of the Double Effect Principle
I answer that, Nothing hinders one act from having two effects, only one of which is intended, while the other is beside the intention... — Aquinas, ST II-II.64.7: Whether it is lawful to kill a man in self-defense?
In the other thread I ended up in the end saying that it is not permissible to pull the lever, but I think it is uncontroversial the PDE does not make it obligatory to pull the lever.
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The key here is that the PDE does not apply to omissions, and this is because omissions (non-acts) do not have proper effects. So I would say that you have two principles operating: the PDE which renders the act permissible, and another principle regarding omissions which renders the act obligatory.
In the other thread you were quite adamant to distinguish commissions from omissions, and you got a lot of pushback. I never actually opposed that distinction, but I put it off as a separate topic. What I would say is that there is a morally relevant difference between a commission and an omission, but this does not mean that we are never responsible for omissions, or that omissions are always permissible.
The proportionalist condition classically compares the good effect(s) to the bad effect(s) of the single action, not the effects of different actions.
That is impressive in itself - intellectual honesty on display. Cudos to you, brother Bob.
It’s a real tightrope with real pitfalls.
Just ridiculous, and if that situation actually arose I would never blame any of the falling people for any outcome. Too surreal to inform a question of morality.
You aren’t morally responsible for choosing to let 5 people die or choosing to kill 1 person, you are morally responsible for choosing not to take on a duty to make any decision given those facts, and the bad effect of 5 people dying is not intended by you.
Within my formulation, I think it would be obligatory; because, as you noted, my version compares the bad side effects of each foreseeable means (towards the end) and not just the good effect (of that end) and the bad side effect being considered (of an action). — Bob Ross
In both cases, they are intending something good but both have bad side effects; so the less severe one should be chosen. — Bob Ross
Yes, I agree. I just see that as a weakness in the classical formulation: it is completely silent on if one should pick the means with the least severe bad effects, and instead only comments on whether the bad effect does not outweight the good effect. Both are arguably important. — Bob Ross
The version of PDE that I accept is that it is permitted to bring about a bad effect in the case that [all six conditions hold]. — Bob Ross
and yet folk can dream up convolute circumstances too difficult for any given principle — Banno
1. The action in-itself is good;
2. A good effect is foreseen from that action;
3. The foreseen bad effect is not directly intended (from that action);
4. The good effect cannot be brought about without the bad effect; and
5. The alternative means for producing that good effect also cannot be used without bad effects; and
6. The bad effect for the means chosen is less severe than or on a par with the alternative bad effects from the alternative means (consequentially). — Bob Ross
There are cases in which one does not have the answer before one encounters the problem. — Banno
Making decisions is not always algorithmic. — Banno
Do you mean algorithmic, or rational? — Leontiskos
Buridan's Ass will die unless it makes an arbitrary decision. So sometimes it is rational to make arbitrary choices....if we make unprincipled decisions then we are not being rational. — Leontiskos
Why not instead think about morality in terms of values?...one cannot think about morality without principles. — Leontiskos
Buridan's Ass will die unless it makes an arbitrary decision. So sometimes it is rational to make arbitrary choices. — Banno
Why not instead think about morality in terms of values? — Banno
Demonstrate why, rather than values being needed in order to choose between conflicting principles...In that case one must still provide principles for the interaction of those values. — Leontiskos
Which trough the beast heads towards is arbitrary, and a decision that must be made. — Banno
Objection 3. Further, if two things are absolutely equal, man is not moved to one more than to the other; thus if a hungry man, as Plato says (Cf. De Coelo ii, 13), be confronted on either side with two portions of food equally appetizing and at an equal distance, he is not moved towards one more than to the other; and he finds the reason of this in the immobility of the earth in the middle of the world. Now, if that which is equally (eligible) with something else cannot be chosen, much less can that be chosen which appears as less (eligible). Therefore if two or more things are available, of which one appears to be more (eligible), it is impossible to choose any of the others. Therefore that which appears to hold the first place is chosen of necessity. But every act of choosing is in regard to something that seems in some way better. Therefore every choice is made necessarily.
Reply to Objection 3. If two things be proposed as equal under one aspect, nothing hinders us from considering in one of them some particular point of superiority, so that the will has a bent towards that one rather than towards the other. — Aquinas, ST I-II.13 - Article 6. Whether man chooses of necessity or freely?
For no particular reason. — Leontiskos
Indeed. No "principle" led to choosing this trough and not the other. — Banno
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