Again, what is the problem?

You seem to have missed the point. The utterance of T counts as placing S under an obligation to do A. — Banno

I haven’t missed it. I’m asking you to justify this claim. It doesn’t follow from Searle’s list of necessary and sufficient conditions. His conditions only talk about intending to be placed under an obligation, but intentions do not prima facie entail the intended.

Your mention of Anscombe was interesting. Do you care to fill it out? — Banno

Here are two sentences:

1. You ought do this
2. Do this

The first appears to be a truth-apt proposition, whereas the second isn’t. But beyond this appearance I cannot make sense of a meaningful difference between them. The use of the term “ought” seems to do nothing more than make a command seem like a truth-apt proposition. It’s make-believe a la fictionalism.

I didn't use the word problem at any point. Anscombe is wrong if she is using that etymology for an argument, because the etymology presented is wrong. The meaning of "binding" no longer existed in French, which is where obligation comes from.

I’m asking you to justify this claim. — Michael

Well, that's what promising is. I'm at a loss to explain it any further.

Can you offer an alternative meaning for "promise"

Here are two sentences:

1. You ought do this
2. Do this

The first appears to be a truth-apt proposition, whereas the second isn’t. But beyond this appearance I cannot make sense of a meaningful difference beyond them. The use of the term “ought” seems to do nothing more than make a command seem like a truth-apt proposition. — Michael

Oh, very nice. I like that.

As a first response, if you are given a command, by someone with the authority to command you, then "do this" does imply "you ought do this".

If your boss tells you to take the tray to table five, you ought take the tray to table five.

It does seem that you are ignoring an important social aspect of language: that we do things with words, including placing ourselves and others under certain obligations.

Can you offer an alternative meaning for "promise" — Banno

Searle’s conditions 1-6 seem sufficient. But again, even 7 and 8 don’t entail the existence of an obligation.

As a first response, if you are given a command, by someone with the authority to command you, then "do this" does imply "you ought do this" — Banno

The problem with this claim is that I cannot make sense of the difference between “do this” and “you ought do this”. At best it just claims that “do this” entails “do this”.

Anscombe talks of obligation as if it functions only under a law, citing medieval etymology. From what I understand the word derives from obligationem, "a binding". It's the "counts as" that is peculiar, binding and worthy of consideration. — Banno

In the past Michael has said that God would not change things, but there is good reason to doubt Anscombe's etymological inferences. William Diem, in addressing the Medieval sense of obligation, says:

In short, the law must have the ratio of due, and it is due in the same sense in which we say that something is due to someone else, i.e., some sort of debt. This is simply to say that, for Aquinas, debitum encompasses both the notions of ‘moral duty’ and ‘debt to another.’ Consequently, law, by its nature, regards our duties to others and their corresponding rights.

It may appear that Aquinas is incorporating an accident of Latin into his account of obligation: Debitum can mean either something owed (i.e., a debt) or something that must be done (a duty). It is worth remembering that debitum—though most frequently used to mean due or debt—is just the passive participle of debeo, which can be used with moral signification to mean ‘must.’ Aquinas in his treatment of law and justice is taking debitum and cognate terms with both senses at once. He is essentially treating these two meanings of debitum not as two discrete meanings—which would render these passages equivocal—but as two interrelated, and mutually implicative concepts.

This identity of debitum ad alium with moral obligation or moral duty, as perceived by reason, is the principal contention of the paper, so let us pause a moment to consider the plausibility of this point. — Diem, Obligation, Justice, and Law: A Thomistic Reply to Anscombe

Searle’s conditions 1-6 seem sufficient. But again, even 7 and 8 don’t entail the existence of an obligation. — Michael

Sorry - can you give an account of what making a promise is, that does not involve placing oneself under an obligation? Is it your contention that one ought not keep one's promises?

The problem with this claim is that I cannot make sense of the difference between “do this” and “you ought do this”. At best it just claims that “do this” entails “do this”. — Michael

Then perhaps you ought not get a job waiting on tables? It is beginning to look as if you are describing a peculiarity of your own psychology rather than something of general interest.

It appears we disagree as to the nature of "obligation".

1. You ought do this — Michael

The backstop here is the way you will also claim that terms like 'ought' and 'should' make no sense to you if they are interpreted in their colloquially normative sense. See our conversation where you do precisely this: link.

Sorry - can you give an account of what making a promise is, that does not involve placing oneself under an obligation? — Banno

Searle's conditions 1-6 that you linked me to. I would copy them here but I cannot copy and paste from that document and I'd rather not manually type it all out.

Is it your contention that one ought not keep one's promises? — Banno

My contention is that a) it hasn't been explained what obligations are and b) it hasn't been explained how/why promises entail obligations. Even Searle's account doesn't explain this.

It appears we disagree as to the nature of "obligation". — Banno

I don't even know what an obligation is, if something more than a command. I have asked several times for an explanation.

The backstop here is the way you will also claim that terms like 'ought' and 'should' make no sense to you if they are interpreted in their colloquially normative sense. See our conversation where you do precisely this: link. — Leontiskos

The colloquially normative sense is just to treat a command as if it were a truth-apt proposition. It's fictionalism. If you think there's more to it than that then I'd need an explanation and a justification for them.

The colloquially normative sense is just to treat a command as a truth-apt proposition. — Michael

As I said:

Michael is presumably saying that obligations don't exist, because you can't place yourself under an obligation, because there is nothing about the past that can oblige one to act in any particular way in the present. He wants to rewrite all future claims about one's own behavior in terms of strict conditional logic, and because conditional logic cannot represent the inner dynamics of things like promising and obligation, for Michael they must not exist at all.

So for Michael promises don't exist, and what he calls a "promise" is a promise shorn of all obligation. — Leontiskos

So for Michael promises don't exist — Leontiskos

That depends on what you mean. Here are two propositions:

1. Promises exist
2. People promise to do things

If (1) and (2) mean the same thing then I agree with (1). If they mean different things then I need an explanation of this difference.

Michael is presumably saying that obligations don't exist — Leontiskos

That depends on what you mean. Here are two propositions:

1. Obligations exist
2. People command others to do things

If (1) and (2) mean the same thing then I agree with (1). If they mean different things then I need an explanation of this difference.

Searle's conditions 1-6 that you linked me to. — Michael

Without (8), the promise does not count as undertaking an obligation. And that, apparently to all except your good self, is the very point of making a promise.

I don't even know what an obligation is, if something more than a command. — Michael

Perhaps an obligation is a binding of an individual to the performance of an act. It can be brought about by, amongst other things, promising and commanding.

If you do not consider yourself to be bound to enact those things that you promise, then it seems to me that you have simply misunderstood the nature of making a promise.

Failure to commit.

That depends on what you mean. Here are two propositions:

1. Promises exist
2. People promise to do things — Michael

I am curious whether you think contracts exist. If no one is obliged to fulfill a promise, then surely no one is obliged to fulfill a contract? You will say, I think, "There is a penalty but no obligation." But then what is the one who breaks contract being penalized for? Is there something he failed to do?

Without (8), the promise does not count as undertaking an obligation. — Banno

Even with (8) it doesn't count as undertaking an obligation.

Here are two propositions:

1. S intends to produce in H the knowledge that the utterance of T is to count as placing S under an obligation to do A.
2. The utterance of T is to count as placing S under an obligation to do A.

Searle uses (1), and (1) does not prima facie entail (2).

Perhaps an obligation is a binding of an individual to the performance of an act. — Banno

This is yet another thing that needs to be explained. What does it mean to be "bound" to the performance of an act?

I just either do it or I don't. What are these other things you're trying to introduce?

Even with (8) it doesn't count as undertaking an obligation. — Michael

If you do not agree that someone who undertakes an obligation is not thereby obligated, then I have no more to offer you.

I am curious whether you think contracts exist. If no one is obliged to fulfill a promise, then surely no one is obliged to fulfill a contract? — Leontiskos

Yet again you still haven't told me what it means to be obliged to do something.

You will say, I think, "There is a penalty but no obligation." But then what is the one who breaks contract being penalized for? Is there something he failed to do? — Leontiskos

He didn't do what he was contracted to do and so as per the terms of the contract (or the law in general) he is penalized.

That's all there is to it. I don't understand what this additional thing – the "obligation" – is, or what part it plays.

If you do not agree that someone who undertakes an obligation is not thereby obligated, then I have no more to offer you. — Banno

That's not what I'm saying. I am saying that Searle's conditions – even with conditions (7) and (8) – do not entail that when one promises to do something one is agreeing to undertake an obligation.

You are just reasserting the very thing that needs to be justified.

He didn't do what he was contracted to do and so as per the terms of the contract (or the law in general) he is penalized.

That's all there is to it. I don't understand what this additional thing – the "obligation" – is, or what part it plays. — Michael

Take a contract. You tell me that you will build me a house in a year, and if you don't complete it in that time you owe me $25,000. The year completes and the house is not completed. Do you owe me $25,000?

Take a contract. You tell me that you will build me a house in a year, and if you don't complete it in that time you owe me $25,000. The year completes and the house is not completed. Do you owe me $25,000? — Leontiskos

Yes.

I am saying that Searle's conditions – even with conditions (7) and (8) – do not entail that when one promises to do something one is agreeing to undertake an obligation. — Michael

So what do you think - if someone undertakes an obligation, are they thereby obligated?

If so, then you seem to be claiming that making a promise is not undertaking an obligation. And that does not appear right.

Yes. — Michael

When I say that you owe me $25,000, why couldn't you just say, "I changed my mind," like before? ()

There's sunshine, for the first time an a few weeks, so later.

then you seem to be claiming that making a promise is not undertaking an obligation — Banno

Yes. I've been very clear on that. This is true even using Searle's definition of a promise. Your claim that if S promises to do A then S has undertaken an obligation to do A is as of yet unsupported.

Why couldn't you just say, "I changed my mind," like before? (↪Michael) When I say that you owe me $25,000, why couldn't you change your mind? — Leontiskos

Well I can certainly change my mind and not give you the money, and then face whatever punishment follows.

I don't really understand your question.

Well I can certainly change my mind and not give you the money, and then face whatever punishment follows. — Michael

So if you change your mind and renege, do you still owe me the money, or not?

So if you change your mind and renege, do you still owe me the money, or not? — Leontiskos

Right, by "owe" you mean "obligated to give you the money"? Again, you haven't told me what it means to be obligated to do something. I just either do it or I don't.

Right, by "owe" you mean "obligated to give you the money"? Again, you haven't told me what it means to be obligated to do something. I just either do it or I don't. — Michael

Well, you are the one who told me that you owed me the money. What did you mean when you affirmed that proposition?

Well, you are the one who told me that you owed me the money. What did you mean when you affirmed that proposition? — Leontiskos

I was thinking of it in terms of the conditional "If I don't do X then Y will happen", and that this proposition does not entail "I ought X".