So if I've understood, what the ass does should not properly be called making a choice, because the ass does not indulge in ratiocination or deliberation.

And yet we would say that, for instance, the ass chose the trough on its left.

So I'm suspicious. It looks to me as if you are obliged to discount the ass's choice in order to avoid your thesis being falsified. — Banno

Why are we still talking about asses? We could say that the earthworm made a choice to cross the road, and yet we would clearly be using the word 'choice' in a highly metaphorical sense. The most basic confusion would be cleared up if we started talking about humans rather than non-rational animals. I don't know if Buridan ever actually spoke of an ass, but the idea seems a non-starter for our purposes.

But maybe that's just me. Or just you. — Banno

Yes, I think so. But you missed the heart of the post where I noted that the temporal aspect is unnecessary.

I suggest that we do make decisions - even most of our decisions - without such "deliberation or ratiocination". — Banno

That's an interesting assertion, but you didn't really engage anything I said in that last post.

Our justifications tend to be post hoc. — Banno

It's odd that you would peruse an ethics forum if you think practical rationality is post hoc.

-

When speaking to Banno, I would just clarify that by "choice" I am referring to what they call "deliberate choice". At the end of the day, I don't think such a dispute amounts to anything but semantics, but maybe I am misunderstanding. — Bob Ross

I would say that the substance of the dispute lies in whether rationality is involved in choice. For Banno it would seem that we make choices no more than donkeys or earthworms make choices, and that deliberation does not even exist except as post hoc rationalization. This is an exceedingly odd view.

Banno latched onto the part of my post where I spoke about deliberating "for a number of seconds" (I had in mind a child and their grandmother). He ignored the latter part of the post where I explicitly noted that extended deliberation is unnecessary. We choose for reasons, even when we make a fast choice. In the example I gave we swerve away from the deer for reasons, and our habits and actions are informed by our rationality. For instance, we know that by turning the steering wheel the car will turn, and that by turning away from the deer the car will turn away from the deer, and that by pressing the brake the car will decelerate. The way we use tools is highly rational, pertaining to ratiocination. Further, a person who has had a stroke or who is very old may press the gas pedal instead of the brake pedal, and this is a rational failure on their part.

In modern English we would not usually say that we deliberated in order to swerve the car, but we would say that the swerving was a deliberate choice. This is the kind of thing Aristotle is concerned with: deliberate choice. And it is the kind of thing that differs from the cookie situation. With the deer a choice was made for reasons, and the choice is potentially justifiable via those reasons. With the cookie none of this holds, and consequently there is no real responsibility that attaches to the "choice" between the two cookies. Whether grandma makes the "choice" for me or I make it myself, that 'opting' is not something that comes from anything within me.

Many on this forum labor under the idea that where there is no duration there is no ratiocination, and this is why they conflate humans and animals. For Aristotle or Aquinas even a human act which is not preceded by a temporal duration of deliberation is a rational act and the consequence of a deliberate choice. In essence, our inferential apparatus can be instantiated into habit, and this is the heart of virtue ethics.

-

To some extent it underpins my preference for virtue ethics over deontology. — Banno

I don't think it has anything to do with virtue ethics vs. deontology. Virtue ethicists don't generally deny rational deliberation. The idea of deliberation that I am positing comes from Aristotle, the father of virtue ethics.

You are now claiming that hardly any of our choices involve deliberation (before they are made). I think you are just being contrarian, as is sometimes your way.

--

E.g., I find it hard to envision how a person could deliberately cultivate a character such that they are kind, if it were not for the fact that they knew that they generally or absolutely should be kind (which is itself a moral principle). Likewise, e.g., having instilled a disposition (i.e., a habit) of being kind is not enough to know how to act kindly in every situation; or, if it is, then it is impractical for the common man with an average intelligence. It seems like, to me, a person who holds moral compasses primal over principles still will have to, as a secondary aspect of their theory, accept the necessity of the latter. — Bob Ross

Strong points. :up:

Well, in the OP you wrote:

"The latter scenario is morally permissible because either choice (of action or inaction) will result in a bad side effect (of either letting the woman die of cancer or killing the unborn human being) and the bad side effect of killing the unborn is on a par with letting the woman die of cancer." Thus separating hysterectomy from abortion, in your description, which only has the negative effect of fetal death. 2 vs 1, double vs single.

When in reality abortion already has two negative effects (which are in conflict), the fetal vs the maternal interest (survival vs bodily autonomy). Hysterectomy as cancer treatment in pregnancy adds a third, maternal cancer treatment. 3 vs 2, triple vs double.

You're a shill. :roll:

I've put you on ignore. You reek of the ideology of OnlinePhilosophyClub.

Name calling?

I will specifically continue to follow your postings as you're obviously well versed in Philosophical theory. As a non expert in theory (but with practical expertise in certain areas of philosophical interest) my expectation when posting (typically with a practical slant) is not that my arguments will win the day. Rather I look forward to theoretical critiques as I find the confluence of theory and practice to be significantly more interesting (and important) than the perspective of either in isolation.

I find it hard to envision how a person could deliberately cultivate a character such that they are kind, if it were not for the fact that they knew that they generally or absolutely should be kind — Bob Ross

Well, the distinction between the various accounts is not so hard-and-fast. Deontologists will still act to produce the best consequences, other things being equal, while consequentialists will choose to do unto others if that produces the best outcome.

I supose the issue here is one of which is to be king. Deontology is about what we ought to do, while virtue ethics is about who we choose to be. I take it that we can maintain a distinction between being kind because it is the right thing to do, and being kind because one would be a kind person.

The difference is in background, in whether one is choosing one's actions because of a duty or because those actions make one a better person.

What distinguishes virtue ethics from consequentialism or deontology is the centrality of virtue within the theory (Watson 1990; Kawall 2009). Whereas consequentialists will define virtues as traits that yield good consequences and deontologists will define them as traits possessed by those who reliably fulfil their duties, virtue ethicists will resist the attempt to define virtues in terms of some other concept that is taken to be more fundamental. Rather, virtues and vices will be foundational for virtue ethical theories and other normative notions will be grounded in them. — SEP

Seems as my original point is being distorted here. That was that making decisions is not always algorithmic. The APS magazine provides a neat summation of the mechanics of making choices. This will not be new to you. It shows the sort of thing I have in mind, that decisions are often biased, or heuristic, or made under pressure, and not the result of optimal rational deliberation.

Much of your post simply twists this into something you can attack. I'm not interested in responding.

The APS magazine provides a neat summation of the mechanics of making choices. — Banno

Nice succinct overview of important to understand matters. Bookmarked.

- In your concision you conflated 'algorithmic' with 'principled', and ended up confusing an exception with a rule (by using "Buridan's Ass" as the foundation for your theory of choice). Even decisions which are, "often biased, or heuristic, or made under pressure, [or] not the result of optimal rational deliberation," are still the result of rational thought, the result of thinking according to principles and practical rationality. The principle of double effect is one such principle that can be used in reaching decisions.

In your concision you conflated 'algorithmic' with 'principled'... — Leontiskos

They are not unrelated. One performs an algorithm by following set rules - principles.

You equate rational thought with following a principle. Yet there are rational choices that do not rely on principles, we do not always make use of principles when we solve problems, it is often the case that we must act despite not knowing which principles to apply, and counter-instances can be provided for any given principles. After Philosophical Investigations §201, any action can be made to conform to any principle by the ad hoc addition of suitable assumptions.

I offer coherence over obedience as a guide to rationality.


You are welcome.

They are not unrelated. One performs an algorithm by following set rules - principles. — Banno

They are not the same. To utilize a principle while reasoning is not to "perform an algorithm." You are creating a caricature.

You equate rational thought with following a principle. — Banno

No, I don't. In fact no one does that. A computer or a robot is equated with following a principle. Humans apply principles in acting.

it is often the case that we must act despite not knowing which principles to apply — Banno

And nevertheless when we do act we apply principles in so acting. That one can apply post hoc rationalization does not mean that rationality was not involved in the decision itself. You seem to keep falling into this invalid inference.

When the child chooses a cookie they apply a principle, "I want to eat a cookie, therefore I will flip a coin." They need not say it out loud or say it to themselves in order for the practical syllogism to be operative. When you sit down at the restaurant you apply a principle to your tastes, "I like duck therefore I will choose the roast duck from the menu." More difficult choices require more complicated principles and interactions of principles.

Practical reason is the general human capacity for resolving, through reflection, the question of what one is to do. Deliberation of this kind is practical in at least two senses. First, it is practical in its subject matter, insofar as it is concerned with action. But it is also practical in its consequences or its issue, insofar as reflection about action itself directly moves people to act. — Practical Reason | SEP

No, I don't. — Leontiskos

Then what is it you are suggesting?

it is often the case that we must act despite not knowing which principles to apply, — Banno

You said “we must act”.
And you said “act despite not knowing the principles.”

So there is acting based on principles,
and there is also acting despite not knowing the principles.

Putting aside the use of the words “must” and “knowing” for a second, it seems to me a decision or choice is a kind of “act” that only occurs when one deliberates among principles and objects chosen (or not). You need all of those things to have a choice, an act of choosing.

Like an instinct, or a reflex, some acts are not deliberate. Reflexive acts are not choices made “despite not knowing which principles apply.” They are not choices at all. They are other acts.

If you want to put acts on a spectrum where “choice” is on one side and “reflex” is on the other, you can, but this just judges how deliberate the act is, not whether a deliberate act is a choice, and a non-deliberate act is not a choice.

So if an ass appears to pause and deliberate, and then “choose” this hay or that food but the ass does not deliberate, then the outcome, whatever it may be, is not a choice, but some other effect, some other act. Like a heartbeat, it’s an act not involving choice. Nor involving principles (like “must”). Or deliberation (reasoning, or “knowing”).

Basically, if we act despite not knowing principles (along with the objects we know now deliberated as “options”), we don’t act based on choice; we, like the ass, may not be choosing anything, though we act.

And all of this can be done in an instant, because we are quick thinkers. Or some of us are.

Cheers. I don't see anything here that has not already been addressed.

Have a read of PI §201 and consider if a single principle ever implies a certain action, or whether a given action can be explained by any principle, given suitable ad hoc hypothesises.

Or look at the discussion between Lakatos and Feyerabend about what constitutes a rational methodology, and apply it to choosing what to do.

Or consider how the Duhem–Quine thesis might apply to explaining an action in terms of a principle.

Fair enough :up:

Thus separating hysterectomy from abortion, in your description, which only has the negative effect of fetal death. 2 vs 1, double vs single.

I separated the hysterectomy abortion from a “traditional” abortion; and each were outlined with 1 good effect and 1 bad effect—totally two effects each. I don’t understand where you got the 2 vs. 1 from.

When in reality abortion already has two negative effects (which are in conflict), the fetal vs the maternal interest (survival vs bodily autonomy)

They are in not in moral conflict, like I noted before: one cannot do something immoral to produce a good end. The good end of respecting the interests of the woman with respect to her body cannot be achieve at the expense of killing someone.

The bad effect of not respecting the woman’s interests in the case of a traditional abortion is not a result of an immoral action or inaction; so the agent deciding whether to carry it out cannot be morally responsible for it. On the contrary, an agent carries out the traditional abortion to produce the good effect (of which is the negation of your negative effect you referred to), then they have done something immoral because they intentionally killed an innocent person as a means towards that good end.

You said you understood this point I made earlier; but I don’t think you did, because you seemed to skip over it without addressing it.

I supose the issue here is one of which is to be king.

Why would we have to choose between deontology or consequentialism?

Deontology is about what we ought to do, while virtue ethics is about who we choose to be. I take it that we can maintain a distinction between being kind because it is the right thing to do, and being kind because one would be a kind person.

This kind of distinction, where what we ought to do is squarely in the realm of deontology, seems false to me: living a virtuous life is about being good, and this is about how we ought to live to be good. The way you’ve separated them, it seems like virtue ethics borrows from deontology to figure out what one ought to be doing.

The difference is in background, in whether one is choosing one's actions because of a duty or because those actions make one a better person.

I would say that one’s duty to what is good comes first, and from that one realizes that the best way to align with what is good is to think about normative ethics in terms of living a virtuous life and not in terms of duties to preordained rules. So I guess deontology secretly wins (: even though it is still getting negated as the result. Still, though, the same can be said of consequentialism: right and wrong behavior being views solely in terms of which consequences maximizes the desired outcome is itself an absolutely applicable moral principle. So I guess deontology, in a trivial sense, wins; but this doesn’t take away from the fact that consequentialism, deontology, and virtue ethics are fundamentally contrary to one another.

I would say that one’s duty to what is good comes first... — Bob Ross

Looks a lot like deontology to me. You are suggesting that we ought be virtuous because it is our duty.

That's not how I understand virtue ethics. It's claim is more like that we ought be charitable, we ought be courageous, we ought be forgiving, and that's an end to it; there is no further step to duty, no "because".

- Thanks, that was well put. :up:

Hey Banno.

And yet we would say that, for instance, the ass chose the trough on its left.

So I'm suspicious. It looks to me as if you are obliged to discount the ass's choice in order to avoid your thesis being falsified. — Banno

I would discount the ass made a choice. If I could ask the ass what his deliberations were that led him to his “choice,” and the ass didn’t say with his mouth full of trough food, “A what? I just started eating,” then I couldn’t say whether he choose anything. I have no idea if the ass recognized options, considered one and the other, and therefore deliberately determined one, not the other, before eating.

We should stick to an example where we know a choice can possibly be made, as in the act of a human, not an ass. It’s just a bottomless pit of “but what if..” that will illuminate nothing. And why go beyond our own experience as potentially deliberate choosers to find material to hypothesize about?

consider if a single principle ever implies a certain action, or whether a given action can be explained by any principle, given suitable ad hoc hypothesises. — Banno

A principle “implies” a certain action.

I wouldn’t say a principle implies any action. That’s backwards. Choices imply deliberations using principles. Principals don’t imply choices.

If you know a person is reasonable, and they appear to make a choice (or say they made a choice unlike an ass) would say, you can imply from this that they considered principals while deliberating and making that choice. But the principles don’t require any action or implication in themselves. We need principles, objects to choose, and deliberation among these to end up with a choice.

But you said

it is often the case that we must act despite not knowing which principles to apply,
— Banno — Fire Ologist

This implies deliberation, and other acts where sometimes we do know which principals to apply, or at least think we do as part of our choice when we act.

And you said “an action can be explained by any principle,” which sounds like an action might also be explained by no principle, and really, therefore, that we may as well avoid discussing any principles when discussing all acts.

So is there a such thing as an act based on principles or not?

If you say “no” then all of your statements above that you say address my point that use the word “principal” to make your point, don’t signify anything. If you say “yes” then I am simply saying that a discussion about “choice” starts where there is an act involving deliberation among objects and principles.

You can’t deliberate without the choices and the balancing between them, which balance is equivalent to some principal. You don’t choose without deliberation. You do something else maybe, but not by choice.

Or look at the discussion between Lakatos and Feyerabend about what constitutes a rational methodology, and apply it to choosing what to do.

Or consider how the Duhem–Quine thesis might apply to explaining an action in terms of a principle. — Banno

I’m familiar with Lakatos and Quine. But I’d rather hear your take on it addressing my take. You make sharp clear points at times. Maybe I’ll learn something.

I don't see anything here that has not already been addressed. — Banno

You can’t talk about “must act” as in a more deterministic act, like a reflex, and say “act without knowing the principles,” as both involving choice. AND then talk about simply needing a suitable ad hoc, after the fact explanation using “any principal,” as if there need be no such thing as an act based principal, and retain that there are any acts based on any principals.

Seems to chase its tail in order to devour the whole possibility of a chosen act.

Maybe that’s your point - we never actually deliberate or ever choose. But if we do, principals have to be in the mix, inside the deliberation, with the optional objects chosen.

On the Ass:

I think it's a good story for introducing a problem to rationality.

The "ass" can be just any decision-maker at all. It's not particular to the animal.

The important bit is that the ass only holds to a few principles or rules in making decisions.

So as wiki points out: the ass dies because the ass holds one principle (eat when hungry, drink when thirsty, and follow the shortest path) that they starve to death. The "ass" is hungry and thirsty and the pile of hay is equidistant, with respect to the ass, as the pool of water.

Or, the example I think of first: if the ass follows the principle "Go to the closest pile of food with the most food" and both piles of hay are equitable, and the ass cannot introduce another principle (here the important bit is that the ass is an animal following a particular code of rationality which cannot be changed -- ie like an animal, in the traditional sense where humans and animals are distinct) then the ass will die while following a particular rendition of rationality.

The problem becomes: insofar that rationality is following rules, how do you introduce new rules? If there is a rule for rules, then it will fall to the same point Burridan's Ass is meant to bring up.

The idea is: Don't be an Ass.

But how to not starve while still being rational?

- If you look at the antecedents of "Buridan's Ass," you will note that none of them use an animal as the example. The reason for this is clear: animals do not demonstrate anything regarding rationality or free will given the fact that they are not generally taken to have rationality or free will. Wikipedia's very first sentence begins the strangeness, "Buridan's ass is an illustration of a paradox in philosophy in the conception of free will. It refers to a hypothetical situation wherein an ass (donkey) that is equally hungry and thirsty..." Huh!? Free will? An ass?

I suppose one might say that the example limps with respect to rationality and free will. My question is: what is the worth of this example which limps with respect to the very things in question? There's a really, really good reason why Aristotle, Al-Ghazali, Averroes, Aquinas, Spinoza, Bayle, and Leibniz talk about human beings and not asses. Did Jean Buridan ever talk about moral determinism in this way? I somewhat doubt it, as no one seems to be able to produce the source.

Wikipedia gives us the answer:

Later writers satirised this view in terms of an ass which, confronted by both food and water, must necessarily die of both hunger and thirst while pondering a decision. — Buridan's Ass | Wikipedia

It's satire that many simply haven't noticed is satire. Perhaps the original idea was that Buridan failed to account for the freedom or dynamism of the will, hence the ass. But now it seems that the joke is on us. :nerd:

Which antecedents?

I think it's a good story to highlight how we can get into a bind about decisions if all we do is follow some rules in the mode of obedience to them: sometimes the rules tell us to do both things which cannot be done. What is the rule to follow when we find ourselves in contradiction?

If we reject those rules then we won't die -- but it'll take an act of creativity and choice.

Burridan's Ass, at least as I mean to use the story, is meant to highlight how you have to make choices that don't appeal to rules (such as which rule to follow, or what rule to introduce to resolve tensions -- such as when you'll die by following a rule)

EDIT: Also, I ought say: I think it's a good story for highlighting a problem in rationality. That's the real conversation.

EDIT: Also, I ought say: I think it's a good story for highlighting a problem in rationality. That's the real conversation. — Moliere

That's sort of where I disagree. See:

I think it's a good story to highlight how we can get into a bind about decisions if all we do is follow some rules in the mode of obedience to them — Moliere

The idea is: Don't be an Ass. — Moliere

The idea here seems to be that it is a good rhetorical device. It is a good parable or lesson. Indeed, it was originally crafted as a rhetorical satire. Fine, I can see that. I can see the "lesson." The problem is that what is good as a parable or lesson or sermon is not good as being conducive to impartial reasoning. Philosophical examples are supposed to be conducive to impartial reasoning. Satire and lessons are designed to beg the question, philosophically speaking.

The other problem here is that those who appeal to this example are literally paying philosophical honor to a satirical mockery, hence the irony that, "The joke is on us." The image is meant to mock Buridan's theory of moral decision, not to be conducive to impartial philosophical argument. It is meant to be ridiculous, not instructive. Or rather, it is only meant to be instructive insofar as it is seen to be ridiculous. It is highly incongruous that today we take up the piece of satirical mockery as if it is a perfectly good philosophical example, and the problem that I have seen is that those who wield it fail to understand how it begs the question, as a lesson.

Edit:

Which antecedents? — Moliere

Aristotle, Al-Ghazali, Averroes, Aquinas, Spinoza, Bayle, and Leibniz — Leontiskos

Saying "we ought to be virtuous" is expressing a duty to being virtuous: I take those to be the same thing, so I am not following your distinctions here.

Yeah, good point. I did that too quickly.

One of the failings of 'mercan English is its inability to distinguish it's ass from its arse.

heh. I certainly am murikan, and have no knowledge of the ass/arse distinction lol

I think no matter which normative ethical view one takes, it will have to hold some set of absolute moral principles as fundamental; however, this does not mean all normative ethical views collapse into deontology: they are useful "modes" of thinking about normative ethics. Wouldn't you agree?

I think that I'm getting along with the satire, though?

Basically rationality can't just be reduced to a set of deterministic rules. Though I'll admit I've not read the original text or anything -- it's certainly an example that's been "handed down" to me that I think through as an example that demonstrates how one cannot hold to just one principle or two principles or something along those lines. At one point we may find ourselves in contradiction and if all we do is hold to two contradictory principles we'll do nothing but compute them (if that is our true desire), and die.

Since we fall into contradiction, at least strictly logical determinism is false?

That's not how I understand virtue ethics. It's claim is more like that we ought be charitable, we ought be courageous, we ought be forgiving, and that's an end to it; there is no further step to duty, no "because". — Banno

I think this relevant due to

I think in Aristotle there is a "because", but it's based upon roles -- and the only roles he considers as truly eudemon are the politician and the philosopher. (and, in the end, notes how the philosopher is actually better lol)

The bit where I get hesitant is where he considers the slave as having a properly moral place within society, and that the master ought have slaves to direct them towards their good.


EDIT: At least with respect to virtue-ethics that focus upon character to a point where you can have what are almost two types of being among the same species due to one being the ones who say "bar bar bar bar" and the others being clearly virtuous.

At one point we may find ourselves in contradiction and if all we do is hold to two contradictory principles we'll do nothing but compute them (if that is our true desire), and die. — Moliere

This strikes me as a strawman, but perhaps we can let it stand as a warning. Perhaps you wish to warn, "You may not be doing this, but be sure that you do not do this." This is fine as far as it goes, and I have said similar things:

Truth be told, PDE is an unwieldy principle. There are cases (such as the hysterectomy) where it seems to obviously apply, but it has often been noted that in other cases the principle can be easily abused. Our topsy-turvy discussion in the other thread got at some of the nuance involved. — Leontiskos

This is the sort of ambiguity that seems to always follow the PDE, namely cases which are hard to decide. So this is in line with the tradition of the PDE, and I think it is good to recognize such limitations. — Leontiskos

Now a parable is able to do what a rational argument could never do, and parables certainly have their place in ethics. Yet as I see it, this parable of yours stands, but only on one foot. In the world of parables, it feels a bit flat and one-dimensional, perhaps because its roots go no further than satire; its target has no more depth than the determinist or monomaniac.

The better parable as I see it is not Buridan's Ass, but Balaam's Ass. At times wisdom will speak through the beast, from the source it is least expected, and it will cut through the rationalizing foolishness of the rider. Granted, there is no good reason why Balaam's Ass cannot speak through Buridan's Beast (and yet we have now left syllogistic).

Lastly, I will point out that lessons and parables and warnings have their place, but of all things they are least helped by repetition. To beat the drum of a parable or a warning again and again does no good, especially if it stands only on one foot. It will tire and collapse, and lose what efficacy it might have had. Confusing the parable for a philosophical example causes it to fall prey to this form of repetition.

(You often give voice to a tongue that should not be foreign to philosophy but is nevertheless opaque to the analytic philosophy that dominates English-speaking forums like this one. Your style of pacifism is a potent example. I am not averse to speaking in this tongue, but only rarely would I expect it to bear fruit in a place like this. It's hard to speak about parables in a place like this.)