I don't think nominalism has anything to do with anything said here. Nominalism is the anti-realist position on the existence of universals, and it is the minimally opposite view to platonism on this issue. Descartes himself doesn't take a position in the nominalist/platonist debate.

A willow tree is simply similar to another one in how their matter is organized. — Gregory

That is a view that resembles Francisco Suarez, bold is mine:

12. Y de esto se sigue, primer lugar, que aunque cada individuo sea la realidad formalmente uno, sin intervención de la consideración de la mente, sin embargo, muchos individuos de quienes afirmamos ser de la misma naturaleza, no son algo uno con verdadera unidad que exista en las cosas, a no ser sólo fundamentalmente o mediante el entendimiento. [...] Segundo, se deduce que una cosa es hablar de unidad formal y otra de la "comunidad" de dicha unidad; porque la unidad se da en las cosas, según se explicó; en cambio, la "comunidad" propia y estrictamente no se da en las cosas, porque ninguna unidad que exista en la realidad es común, según demostramos, sino que en las cosas singulares hay cierta semejanza en sus unidades formales, en la cual se funda la comunidad que el entendimiento puede atribuir a tal naturaleza en cuanto concebida por él, y esta semejanza no es propiamente unidad, porque no expresa la indivisión de las entidades en que se funda, sino solo la conveniencia o relación, o la coexistencia de ambas.

I will leave the translation to those interested.

On the other hand, we can't say a chair is alike another chair in how their matter is organised. Different chairs have wildly different shapes and materials. So something else must make their alikeness. Aristotle's teleology is useful here.

Note: platonism and Platonism are not the same thing.

The fact that two chairs can be different seems to me to say that the "realist" position is wrong. If you imagine a classical painting of a lake, with ducks, moss, tress, ect, it can be asked "how many forms are there there". This can't be answred at least to my satisfaction. Universals have to do with forms, which are immaterial. What a single "thing" is doesn't have to be specified by science. This is the difference between realism philosophically and basic scientific materialism: the former has trouble explaining the unity of objects while science is not so much concerned with that, or even wants to be

The fact that two chairs can be different seems to me to say that the "realist" position is wrong. — Gregory

For Plato, the two chairs are imperfect imitations of the true chair, which is its form or idea. By that account, the existence of two chairs does not disprove the realist position.

Reminds me of the famous quip in Chesterton's Orthodoxy:

Then there is the opposite attack on thought: that urged by Mr. H.G.Wells when he insists that every separate thing is "unique," and there are no categories at all. This also is merely destructive. Thinking means connecting things, and stops if they cannot be connected. It need hardly be said that this scepticism forbidding thought necessarily forbids speech; a man cannot open his mouth without contradicting it. Thus when Mr. Wells says (as he did somewhere), "All chairs are quite different," he utters not merely a misstatement, but a contradiction in terms. If all chairs were quite different, you could not call them "all chairs."

There are materialist realists. Some people posit that the are only a few universals, e.g. various flavors of quark, lepton, etc.

Then there is the opposite attack on thought: that urged by Mr. H.G.Wells when he insists that every separate thing is "unique," and there are no categories at all. This also is merely destructive. Thinking means connecting things, and stops if they cannot be connected. It need hardly be said that this scepticism forbidding thought necessarily forbids speech; a man cannot open his mouth without contradicting it. Thus when Mr. Wells says (as he did somewhere), "All chairs are quite different," he utters not merely a misstatement, but a contradiction in terms. If all chairs were quite different, you could not call them "all chairs."

Interesting, that seems to be exactly the same discussion. I think that the rebuttal is well put, in that, if there are no universals held in common by particulars, there is nothing that would cause the idea of 'chair'. Uttering 'chair' is then a self-refutation. I would argue however that the alikeness, closeness of two things may cause an idea of commonness, then allowing categorisation. Like colours, each wavelenght is its own, unique, but we group a broad range of wavelenghts under 'green' for their closeness.

Some people posit that the are only a few universals, e.g. various flavors of quark, lepton, etc. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Enter: the preon.

Nominalism to me is the claim that language is made up by folks for their convenience, and the rules are likewise made up for convenience. It is convenient to distinguish tables from chairs so that one can tell the children not to sit on the table or they won't get any dinner.

Contrariwise, if everyone sat on tables, they would be chairs.

I think your take is counter intuitive in some ways but not in a bad way, in an interesting and compelling way. Gonna chew on it a bit...

Well this is tricky. Plato, Aristotle, or Augustine are aware that Scythians and Egyptians call things by different names, that people can make up new names for things, that language is learned, and that language is a "social practice."

What makes them realists is the fact that they believe that universals like "triangularity," exist tout court; the names are invented to name the universals. For Aristotle, the universals only exist where they are instantiated, e.g. in triangular things. For Plato they exist outside of individual instances in a way, although not in the way that individual objects exist. For Augustine the sign directs us to the universal in the Logos, and even individual instantiations of things can be thought of as signs of a sort, all effects being signs of their causes and the world itself being both a sign and in a way sacramental (an outward sign of inward things).

Likewise, the nominalist will generally allow that there is some "real difference," between tables and chairs or tigers and ants, etc. If there wasn't a difference there would be no use in making up different words for them and we wouldn't be able to tell which words apply to which things.

More modern nominalists will often say something like: the names are names for "sense data," as opposed to "properties of things." E.g., Locke would have it that universals like "red" only apply to "secondary properties," which only exist in minds, or we could consider the Kantian noumenal/phenomenal distinction which gets roped in here at times.

And then more recently you get tropes. Trope theories vary a lot, but some seem to me like essentially realism for people who don't want to say they are realists lol.

Nominalism is nominalism. You will have to be more specific with your question maybe?

From my pov, nominalism is nothing other than the Cartesian doctrine that matter is extension. — Gregory

That is ONE way of using nominalism I guess?

The literal meaning of the term is how we name/nominate items of thought/experience as X. What use abstract concepts are, how universal terms work and how these terms relate to reality are all what nominalism focuses on.

A nominal perspective is a pretty interesting one to take when thinking about stuff.

If realists are say thought is in matter in some way then they are definitely idealists in some way. And nominalism, if it's just about naming things without a basis for the designation, doesn't seem to be saying anything philosophical at all. That's were i'm at in the discussion. Why bring iideas from without and should common traits be grouped together? Is there a middle ground here?

I don't respect G. K Chesteron as an intellectual. He had too much fun(ny) doing what he did. He didn't work hard enough

Bertrand Russell's Principia Mathematica was nominalist; he treated sets as merely a means of referring to groups of particulars, partly in response to Set theoretic paradoxes, but the approach made it impossible to describe all of mathematics.

This demonstrates an unconscious tendency of nominalism; why do nominalists have a tendency to appeal to an ontology based on the existence of particulars, as opposed to an ontology that starts from a united whole?

In Bertrand Russell's case, it was in the hope of making analysis tractable in piecemeal fashion, in contrast to the British Idealists who might also be described as nominalist, but who considered reality to consist of a single holistically unified entity. But this makes analytics impossible, since it implies that a local material change to reality causes the meaning and hence definitions of the rest of reality to change.

I like your account of it, but nominalism to me is a kind of metaphysical pluralism. There is no one substance, like matter, but an unfathomable many substances, individuated by their location in space and time. With this in mind it eliminates a whole host of metaphysical abstractions like universals, ideas, substances etc, at least wherever they are postulated to exist beyond body and language.

It sounds like nominalism drowns in contingecies (and infinity?) But numbers in general do this. 1 can be divided unlessly so that there is no base unit

There is no one substance, like matter, but an unfathomable many substances, individuated by their location in space and time. — NOS4A2

I'm not sure I see a distinction here.

One thing with many aspects (due to relative position in space-time) seems functionally equivalent to many things whose only distinction is their relative position in space-time?

In any case, if the difference between things depends (solely) on the relationships between them (e.g. position in space-time) then there is no value in considering the things.

It seems to me that the critical component is the relationships that differentiate.

I agree that relative position (relationships) individuate. Given this, individual substances have no intrinsic properties, essence or identity. In this light the distinction between one substance and many substances is moot.

The only thing of relevance to discuss is the relationships (position) that gives rise to the distinct perceptions.

It sounds like nominalism drowns in contingecies (and infinity?) But numbers in general do this. 1 can be divided unlessly so that there is no base unit — Gregory

I'm a big fan of describing what can be observed (nominally nomanalist).

The real number line and the imaginary number plane are concepts that can't be observed. Infinitely dividing 1 isn't a practical exercise.

As noted, if we attempt to find the properties, essence and identity of the number 1 by stripping away everything else - we end up with nothing.

What we can describe are the relationships between things. The useful parts of numbers are the differences between 1, 2 and 3.

As suggests - Bertrand is still clinging to realist/universalist assumptions. He is trying to elucidate the essence of numbers where no such essence exists. The same effort invested into describing the relationships of numbers is much more productive and, I would argue, closer to the principles of nominalism.

But this makes analytics impossible, since it implies that a local material change to reality causes the meaning and hence definitions of the rest of reality to change. — sime

I think this only applies to analytics of objects.

Analysing relationships (c.f. Graph Theory) is evidently practical albeit distinct from objective analysis.

I agree with what you are saying but I think the problem is in trying to preserve objective analytics within a relational (connected) system.

That is - it is true that local changes affect meaning and definitions globally. This is an issue when you assume static meaning and definitions.

However, in a holistic system it is the relationships and how they change that are the focus. It isn't a problem that meaning changes when that is the nature of the system that we are trying to understand.

As you say - the bias towards the existence of particulars over a united whole, especially among nominalists, is passing strange. But at least some of the resistance appears to arise from attempting to apply objective (isolationist/intrinsic) assumptions to relativistic (holistic) systems.

Objective analytics don't work in a relativistic system - but that doesn't mean that a relativistic system can't be analysed - just that the mechanisms of analysis are different.

In any case, if the difference between things depends (solely) on the relationships between them (e.g. position in space-time) then there is no value in considering the things.

It seems to me that the critical component is the relationships that differentiate.

I agree that relative position (relationships) individuate. Given this, individual substances have no intrinsic properties, essence or identity. In this light the distinction between one substance and many substances is moot.

The only thing of relevance to discuss is the relationships (position) that gives rise to the distinct perceptions.

The relationship is no big concern, in my view, nor of any particular relevance. What’s to discuss? The thing is everything, without which there would be no relationship or any other contrived measurement.

In my view nominalism fails to recognize the persistent and repetitive element of things. We can take time as the framework of the demonstration: If we imagine that something, a thing, in its minimum time this minimum time is less than that which is necessary for us to realize that it is a thing. This suggests to us that although no time is the same, something must remain the same in order not to fall into an absolute difference that would not allow us to identify things. In this sense in the identity of things there is essence and universalization (repetition through difference, through different moments or times. Isn't that belong to universals?). Thus the link of essence with identity is permanence and repetition through difference. Something that links essence with identity is permanence and repetition. Even in the principle of identity, in its formulation the repetition of sign X in X=X is implied. Universals are at least something that repeats and is the same for different times.

It can be said, in a certain sense, that nominalism becomes absurd if it is carried to its ultimate consequences. For it would deny the very possibility of identity as repetition and permanence. We need time and permanence in order to distinguish and identify. Identity and difference imply each other.

I don't know the history of nominalism very well, so maybe somebody can illuminate this question with some quotes from the past — Gregory

To understand nominalism, it's best to understand how it originated and what it opposed. Its origin is usually assigned to William of Ockham, famous for 'Ockham's razor'. And what was eliminated through said razor was belief in universals, which were central to the Aristotelian elements of scholastic philosophy, for example in Thomas Aquinas.

So what are universals? In Scholastic philosophy, 'universals' are abstracta that typify the shared properties or essences of particulars. These were said to be real by the scholastics, hence the term 'scholastic realism'. The reality of universals was central to debates about the nature of reality and knowledge. They argued that universals exist in three ways: ante res (before things, as ideas in the Divine Intellect), in rebus (in things, as the common attributes of individual objects e.g. the dogness of dogs, the tree-ness of trees), and post res (after things, as universal concepts such as 'dog' or 'tree'). In Aristotle 'nous' (intellect) is the faculty that grounds rational thought through the ability to grasp universals. This was distinct from sensory perception, including the use of imagination and memory. The ability of the intellect to grasp universals is what enables the setting of definitions in a consistent and communicable way and explains how we can speak meaningfully about categories like 'dogness' or 'tree-ness' despite their instantiation in many diverse particulars. Realists believed that the ability to grasp universals is the unique prerogative and characteristic of reason.

See: The Theological Origins of Modernity, by M. A. Gillespie, published January 2008.

"Gillespie turns the conventional reading of the Enlightenment (as reason overcoming religion) on its head by explaining how the humanism of Petrarch, the free-will debate between Luther and Erasmus, the scientific forays of Francis Bacon, the epistemological debate between Descarte and Hobbes, were all motivated by an underlying wrestling with the questions posed by nominalism, which according to Gillespie dismantled the rational Cosmos of medieval scholasticism and introduced (by way of the Franciscans) a fideistic God-of-pure-will, born out of a concern that anything less than such would undercut divine omnipotence."

Also The Cultural Impact of Empiricism, Jacques Maritain - a good summary of the role of universals in rational judgement.

The World of Universals, Bertrand Russell (from Problems of Philosophy).

@Paine - relates to the question raised in the thread on Gerson/Aristotle.

I've been considering the Absolute vs relativism. I think there is something objective but that it's so far out there it can't be grasped. So relativism is true in that things are only proprtionally true. Abortion is wrong might be more true than abortion is right. But nothing is the Absolute. That's what came to mind when i read your post

The Absolute is a place holder

Paine - relates to the question raised in the thread on Gerson/Aristotle. — Wayfarer

I have not participated in this discussion. I recognize that you think that I need further education in these matters. I don't see how saying that advances your primary thesis.

The thing is everything, without which there would be no relationship or any other contrived measurement. — NOS4A2

But you (and everyone else) cannot describe a thing in the absence of relationships.

for all X
{

• X=not(Everything else)

}

The intrinsic properties, essence or identity of X are irrelevant. X is not what it is - X is its relationships with everything else (what it is not).

With this in mind - I fail to see how a thing is anything, let alone everything.



There are, indeed, many, many examples of relative concepts. Relative morality is, of course, an entire thing by itself.

We define words in relation to other words. Likewise for concepts - an idea takes on significance and meaning in relation to other ideas.

Your subjective experience is, of course, relative to yourself. You assimilate new experiences in light of previous experiences. Your taste in music is subjective (relative to yourself).

However, no one has ever managed to nail down a single example of a definite, unambiguous absolute.

There are no absolute definitions. There are no absolute truths. There are absolutely no absolutes.

This is a limit on knowledge. We will never be able to described a fixed point. We can only ever compare one thing to another. Language can only describe relationships. Language cannot describe an absolute.

The idea of absolute knowledge (omniscience) or absolute truth has a venerable history and was undoubtedly a driving force behind axiomatic mathematics (the home of mathematical proofs). However, the universe doesn't work that way.

In our universe, meaning is relative. A change over there impacts the meaning over here. Any change in relationships anywhere (slightly) changes meaning everywhere. Each observer perceives their own truth. Truth is dependent on context and your lifetime of experiences is a major context for your appreciation of what is true.

The quoted argument assumes that all words are universals, which is a ludicrous idea. Language has nothing to do with univerals. There is no truth in language; anyone can make a word and an arbitrary definition for it.

Language is also not an adequate system for universals to exist in. Uttering "chair" will not confer the same image in all minds. An idea cannot be perfectly transmitted because it requires language, which requires itself and so forth. Language comes about because humans have brains capable of prediction. Through such prediction we can allow the adequate but not perfect transmission of ideas.

Jacques Derrida introduced the concept of deconstruction, which is an interesting idea opposing these ideas if your interested and havent heard about it.

The quoted argument assumes that all words are universals — Ourora Aureis

It doesn't. It doesn't assume 'of' or 'tomorrow' is an universal — there is no of-ness or tomorrow-ness.

an arbitrary definition for it — Ourora Aureis

If you can make up a definition for it, is it arbitrary? Does it not exist in relation to other words, which refer to things in the world?

What of the cogito. I think therefore i am? What is this relative too? Fichte says it's related to others but the existent of a single personality seems objective to me

His argument against H.G.Wells is that if you can refer to the concept of chairs, well then clearly there is some non-arbitrary similarity between them all, and thus the idea there is no category of chair is ludicrous.

However, this fails because language is based upon prediction. We cannot read each others minds and so the transfer of ideas and thus what words mean, will be different between everyone. If you asked everyone to classify a set of objects into chairs and not chairs, there would be disagreements precisely for this reason. "chair" has no single definition and so refering to it is not referring to a universal.

He presumes language refers to universals, when it doesnt, in fact it cannot.

If you can make up a definition for it, is it arbitrary? Does it not exist in relation to other words, which refer to things in the world? — Lionino

If a definition has no particular reason to apply to a word, then by definition its arbitrary. Practicality of language does not negate its arbitrary nature.

Also, be careful not to make a circular argument for universals. If there are no universals then there are no "things" in the world, but simply the world exists and we recieve information from it. These "things" are simply patterns our minds have formed and structured their understanding of the world on.

I hope someday you'll read one of Hegel's logics. For him pure materialism and pure idealism are simultaneously true as a paradox from which the Absolute is a rational (logos) impossibility to find, as one discovers intellect (nous). Aquinas's "champion" Chesterton is said to be the master of paradox but all he did was create word puzzles that are logically divorced from the subject matter he wrote about. Thomism is all together too in the middle, too ordinary, too boring to possibly be true in any real sense of the word. Once his "method" is undisguised his arguments all tumble and he becomes unfitting to read.

Thomism is all together too in the middle, too ordinary, too boring to possibly be true in any real sense of the word. — Gregory

Be that as it may, and I certainly don’t agree, neither the points raised in the OP nor the philosophy of Hegel are relevant to the issue of what nominalism is. Only @Count Timothy von Icarus’ and my post actually address the question which originated in the medieval period centuries before either Descartes or Hegel.

The quoted argument assumes that all words are universals, which is a ludicrous idea.

Where does it do that?

Language has nothing to do with univerals.

Presumably it has something to do with them since you're able to refer to them with words right here.

There is no truth in language; anyone can make a word and an arbitrary definition for it.

I am not sure how this is supposed to be taken. If there is "no truth in language," am I supposed to take it that nothing you have just expressed (in language) is true?

If I make up the world ishblaqwer and say it refers to dressers that have been painted green is this now an English word? Is it a Chinese word? Can I make up new Chinese words even though I don't speak Chinese?



Ha! I do find it sort of tedious how everything he says has to be delivered in some sort of sly turn of phrase, but on the occasions where he is right they do tend to make for great quotes.

But you (and everyone else) cannot describe a thing in the absence of relationships.

for all X
{
X=not(Everything else)
}

The intrinsic properties, essence or identity of X are irrelevant. X is not what it is - X is its relationships with everything else (what it is not).

With this in mind - I fail to see how a thing is anything, let alone everything.

You, a thing, are describing things. You cannot describe a relationship in the absence of things. X is a thing. Everything else are things.

For Aristotle, the universals only exist where they are instantiated, e.g. in triangular things. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Curious that the greatest genius of history agrees with me on virtually every issue.

But to the point, isn't that view a sort of immanent realism of universals? It surely reminds me of mathematical immanent realism.