Anyhow, you didn't answer the questions above. If duties are just imperative statements, who is making these statements? — Count Timothy von Icarus

I answered it before. Parents, teachers, government, society, FIFA, FIDE, etc.

I didn't say that. Consequences and obligations are related. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Okay, I understand that. But I don't care about consequences. I only care about obligations. Please just tell me what "you ought" means. Everything else is a red herring.

And so "society" as a whole makes imperative statements?

But then these statements are not like the utterances of a single person in many important respects. Duties are indeed something like the "imperative demands" of society as a whole, or of institutions, etc.

They are not just like imperative demands though because they define normative goods like "being a good citizen" or "being a good basketball player." A lone person saying "do this," does not define a normative good like "what it means to be a good soldier." That's a crucial difference because so much of human life and the human good is bound up in normative goods.

Duties are indeed something like the "imperative demands" of society as a whole, or of institutions, etc. — Count Timothy von Icarus

And I'm fine with that. We understand that a phrase such as "you ought do this" just means "do this", with the additional understanding that it is the will of society as a whole (or some other authority) and not just the individual speaker.

And also the phrase "you ought do what society tells you to do" just means "do what society tells you to do", with the additional understanding that it is the will of society as a whole and not just the individual speaker.

It's not divine command theory, but it is a command theory. Ought-claims are commands phrased as if they were truth-apt propositions.

They are not just like imperative demands though because they define normative goods like "being a good citizen" or "being a good basketball player." — Count Timothy von Icarus

I don't quite understand what is being said here. To be a good basketball player is just to be a successful/talented basketball player, i.e. being able to dribble, pass, block, and shoot, scoring points, helping teammates score points, preventing opponents from scoring points, and so on.

Being a "good" citizen is a little more vague. Does this just mean that the citizen obeys society's commands?

It's not divine command theory, but it is a command theory. Ought-claims are commands phrased as if they were truth-apt propositions. — Michael

Well, on some version of social contract theory maybe. In any case the agreement is implied when following the procedure and cannot be retracted. For instance you cannot say: I promise to bring to back book X, but do not want to be bound to do it". That would be contradictory.

I don't understand what this means. Is this a physical compulsion? A , psychological compulsion? — Michael

Well, you tell me. You would like to bring it into agreement with a materialist worldview I guess. Use some introspection, how do customs compel? If you see an outstretched hand with the intention to shake yours, by what force do you feel compelled to shake back that hand? In any case you know you have a choice, so how does that outstretched hand compels you to choose? I do not feel the need to psychologize of physicalize behavioral patterns.

Because you engage in the circular claim "you ought do what this authority tells you to do". I want to know what the "you ought" part of this sentence means. A reference back to this authority is no explanation at all. — Michael

Legitimate authority. I do not know what you really want, as an explanation, but as I said one can only explain by reference to certain kind of distinctions. I can tell you the difference between a command and a legal act, or a command and a contract, or promise. What you want is an explanation why we ought to do things. The reasons are different, sometimes we ought to do things to stay alive, sometimes because some bandit threatens to do it and sometimes because you are under an obligation to do it. Such an obligation may be incurred by your promises, or your contracts, or by damages you caused another party. The difference is that you incurred am obligation because of submission to legitimate authority (whether agree or disagree in that particular instance is not relevant, you submitted yourself under its rules), you ought to keep yourself alive because of some psychological drive I guess and you ought to obey the commands of the bandit because of the same reason. They are different though from obligations. That was the point.

I addressed this here. All this talk of "violating obligations" and "being bound" is vacuous and superfluous. It is just the case that the law says "anyone who is found guilty of murder is to be imprisoned". We then choose to murder or not with this knowledge in mind, and will inevitably face whatever consequences follow if we choose to murder. There's nothing more to it. — Michael

You think it is vacuous but it is not. Your view of punishment is misguided. We do not punish because we like to do so, but because murder is wrong. On your view law is simply arbitrary. It is not. There is a pattern to it and conforms by and large to the way we treat other and like to be treated by others. this congruence between law and morality is inexplicable in your scheme. Hence, it lacks any clarificatory strength. But hey, if you want to use a scheme of thought which cannot make sense of the world as it is, be my guest.

Which just means that I agree to do what some outside authority says. — Michael

And indeed command theory as a theory of jurisprudence has been rendered obsolete after the Hart Austin debate. But as said, hold onto it if you must...:ok: Here it is in very simplified form. https://carneades.pomona.edu/2016-Law/04.HartAustin.html

What you want is an explanation why we ought to do things. — Tobias

No, it's not. I want to know what "you ought do this" means. I don't know why I need to keep repeating this?

You just respond with "you ought do what a legitimate authority tells you to do" or "you are bound by what a legitimate authority tells you to do" without ever explaining what the "you ought" or "you are bound" parts of these sentences mean.

All I understand by these phrases is "do what a legitimate authority tells you to do".

And that's fine by me, but you and others seem to want it to mean something more, but seem incapable of making sense of what that something more is.

No, it's not. I want to know what "you ought do this" means. I don't know why I need to keep repeating this? — Michael

Yes and it can mean different things in different contexts, that is why no one can give you an exact definition. That is actually more often the case with concepts. If I tell you 'you ought to lose weight' I might mean 'it is good for you to lose weight'. If I tell you 'you ought to see this movie' I might mean that you will certainly enjoy this movie. If I tell you, you ought to pay the fine it means you are obliged to pay the fine.

If I tell you, you ought to pay the fine it means you are obliged to pay the fine. — Tobias

It’s this “obliged” meaning that I’m asking about.

So you are chasing your own tail when you ask what 'ought' means? I also do not know why you keep repeating the question in that case...

Anyway, we are back to the difference that is in play, between a command and an obligation. Well, that we went over already. Being obliged is different from being commanded, because a command is uttered by whim of the commanding entity while an obligation is incurred by following specific procedures, such as promising or contracting etc. What I do not understand is why you would hold on to a theory that does not explain a certain distinction we all feel that is relevant in favour of a theory that cannot make heads or tails of it.

Being obliged is different from being commanded, because a command is uttered by whim of the commanding entity while an obligation is incurred by following specific procedures, such as promising or contracting etc. — Tobias

And this is the fiction.

We take the command “do this”, we phrase it as the truth-apt proposition “you ought do this”, and then we believe in the existence of some abstract entity - the “obligation” - but when asked to make sense of it we can’t; we just insist that it’s more than a command.

Anscombe understood this.

What I do not understand is why you would hold on to a theory that does not explain a certain distinction we all feel that is relevant in favour of a theory that cannot make heads or tails of it. — Tobias

The distinction you feel is a delusion, perhaps a bewitchment by language.

Legitimate authority. I do not know what you really want, as an explanation, but as I said one can only explain by reference to certain kind of distinctions. — Tobias

You could (and please don't take this is prickly... it really is not) have just explained legal positivism to establish why a 'legitimate authority' could be a reason for adherence. It's a common position.

a command is uttered by whim of the commanding entity while an obligation is incurred by following specific procedures — Tobias

I think this is true. However:

We take the command “do this”, we phrase it as the truth-apt proposition “you ought do this”, and then we believe in the existence of some abstract entity - the “obligation” — Michael

This is also true. This speaks to our previous fracas but not directly. You can establish the existence of some 'obligation' in the sense of "you promised X" happened in time. You cannot establish "the promise" as it's own entity(this to me seems beyond discussion. Not because I'm stubborn but because there is literally nothing to be spoken about under that concept). This is why, i think, Michael is calling it 'fiction'. There is no logical compass that lands on "fulfill your promises". That's only ever going to be relevant case-by-case and is, in fact, a moral decision which only exists at the moment it is made. Sometimes, promises are made to be broken in service of some other greater good for instance so that 'decision' never imported what you're terming an 'obligation'. You actually didn't promise anything despite creating the apparent 'obligation' to fulfill the promise. Now, I've not gone back to Banno's response/s yet but I see this as the crucial point he (and, i'm presuming you) seems to think explains itself, rather than providing one (or, in fact, being a bad quippist - even worse). What is the promise? There is no possible answer to this without simply describing something else (a brainstate, a decision, or one's personally 'ought' motivation - Banno likes to fulfill promises, it seems. Fine).

As noted previously, "making a promise" obviously exists and imports (given honesty is involved) some reason to do something. It does not create an obligation beside you wanting to keep your promise, as it were. It is yours. It isn't 'out there' as anything.

So you are chasing your own tail when you ask what 'ought' means? — Tobias

The sense in which this is true, is that he's giving you far more opportunity to answer the question than is reasonable. He's chasing an answer that you cannot give. Which is interesting, as you seem to think that the opposite is true - that anti-realism can't explain obligations. Well, the answer there is pretty simple. You see an obstacle he (we) don't. Is that a bit more diplomatic here? What these last two pages look like is Michael wants a reason to think obligations exist outside the internal emotional state of having chosen to hold oneself to that intent.

No one has even tried to do this. It looks to me, and probably to Michael, like every one is simply talking around the point. Particularly bad in this regard is Leontiskos' posts on the previous page. They are bordering on unjustified condescensiion. Michael has pointed out that simply appealing to convention isn't actually an argument. And there the conversation seems to stall. A perfect example:

You wrote the subsidized check on the basis of a promise - a real promise that involved obligations. Without those obligations it would make no sense to write the subsidized check, and given the promise it makes no sense not to invoke it when he says you underpaid. — Leontiskos

This doesn't do anything to establish an obligation as an 'object'. It's an attempt to explain the psychology (potentially contradictory) behind why a person would fulfil their promises. And the answer (honestly, imo, well put here - despite his attempt to claim a different landing pad) is that convention has meant that if you crunch the numbers, people generally do what they say. Therefore, reasonable to expect someone's word to hold. There is nothing remotely about obligations or what the 'ought' involved is. It is states of affairs leading to a statistical outcome informing a course of action. Contradiction isn't even a problem now.

I think that unless the below is adequately addressed, without avoiding the direct question, this is a futile attempt to convince someone to believe your emotional responses are facts:

I am saying that I don't know what "Orestes had an obligation" means. I am asking you what it means and you appear to be doing everything in your power to avoid answering. — Michael

That bold is going to make this thread pages and pages more of nonsense until it's sorted.

You could (and please don't take this is prickly... it really is not) — AmadeusD

It is, but I dislike using shorthand. Usually it is just to show off your knowledge and send a reader into the woods, because something like legal positivism is stated all sorts of ways. I believe in explanation, not some reference to a certain position. Though, yes, this is a simplistic legal positivist account. However, I am also not necessarily a legal positivist. I am more Dworkinian in any case as I do believe in the reality ;) of legal principles and reject judicial discretion in hard cases but I think I hold a different position from Dworking as well, as will become clear from this post.

This is also true. This speaks to our previous fracas but not directly. You can establish the existence of some 'obligation' in the sense of "you promised X" happened in time. You cannot establish "the promise" as it's own entity(this to me seems beyond discussion. — AmadeusD

Yes, but I do not think that is at all necessary. It seems that you and Frank and Michael are under the assumption that to be really real entails mind independence. I think that is a metaphysical assumption that one need not make.

There is no logical compass that lands on "fulfill your promises". — AmadeusD

It needs no logical compass. It simply needs a society in which one expect from one another that one fulfills his promises. Of course other societies are thinkable in which the notion of promise does not exist. However we live in ours. The fact that some concept is dependent on our societal interaction doesn't make it any less real. The 'I do' establishes a marriage under the right procedures. That marriage is as real as say, a doorknob. We live in a world with doors, similarly, we live in a world with marriages. In an apocalyptic world in which our institutions have broken down, I am still married, because in the world that preceded the apocalypse the marriage was duly ordained. However, I might die and all the people remembering the institution of marriage might die. Than indeed, there is no marriage anymore. Same holds for the doorknob, in a world without doors, the material shaped in what we have known as doorknob is meaningless matter.

That's only ever going to be relevant case-by-case and is, in fact, a moral decision which only exists at the moment it is made. — AmadeusD

This I really cannot follow. At what time does it exist then? There is a moment it existed and was real and then, poof, it is gone? And when is the decision actually made, when it is made in my head or when it is uttered? I think one would prefer a theory that avoids such questions... I also actually would not know what is implied with it. The decision can be undone at any time? If it cannot and you are still bound to the decision, what is it then that binds?

What is the promise? There is no possible answer to this without simply describing something else (a brainstate, a decision, or one's personally 'ought' motivation - Banno likes to fulfill promises, it seems. Fine). — AmadeusD

It is not Banno that holds Banno accountable. Others do. Promises are relevant within a network of people for which they are relevant, but see above. What I think is the problem is that you want an explanation in terms of some sort of individual thing to which it refers, a brain state or one individual decision by an individual person. Promises, just as obligations are relational and come into being within a network of relations. I would really not know why one would hold a position that cannot make sense of obligations. I see it as a flaw of the metaphysical position in question, not the flaw of the notion of the obligation.

It does not create an obligation beside you wanting to keep your promise, as it were. It is yours. It isn't 'out there' as anything. — AmadeusD

This displays the previous point aptly. It is not me wanting to keep my promise. I might not want it at all. I might have to and legally I might well be forced to. Promises do not rest on the individual will of the promisor, but on the relationship the promise has established between promisor and promisee. I think law and actually all social rules emerge out of patterns of behavior of people. It is culturally embedded. That does not make it arbitrary, it makes it historical. It is different from 'command of the sovereign', it is also different from: "rules made by a competent authority", it is also not "the heaven of concepts above", it is a set of culturally developed practices that have attained consistence and resilience over time. My position comes down to what I know as 'interactionism', but I do not know if that is a thing in American jurisprudence, or rather native to my law faculty.

Well, the answer there is pretty simple. You see an obstacle he (we) don't. Is that a bit more diplomatic here? — AmadeusD

Yes, but I think missing the obstacle causes you to stumble. You need to hold on to all kinds of obscure positions, namely that a promise exists one moment and stops existing the next or that a promise should really be conceived of as a brain state or that an obligation only reaches as far as I am willing to be bound to the promise. That is incoherent because the whole notion of promise exists to make sure I perform the task promised even if I am unwilling to. Michael apparently thinks it does not matter whether one is ordered by a gang of robbers or whether one is taxed by legitimate authorities. If a theory causes me to have to embrace such notions, I consider the theory implausible.

Is that a bit more diplomatic here? — AmadeusD

Even though we still disagree, it is in any case a lot nicer to answer this post, so I do appreciate your effort at diplomacy :flower: :wink:

Of course you could impose one on yourself, but that you could change at whim. — Tobias

If you do what's right because you're trying to satisfy others, that's a lesser form of morality. If you do what's right because otherwise you'd let yourself down, that's the higher form.

Because he told me to, and it's rational to pay less if the person asking you for money asks for less. — Michael

Then suppose you invoke the promise and he says, "Oh sorry, I forgot about that. Never mind." — Leontiskos

*Crickets* again?

You say that his word is good enough to write the check for $975, but it is not good enough for you to invoke when he says you underpaid. You are contradicting yourself. You wrote the subsidized check on the basis of a promise - a real promise that involved obligations. Without those obligations it would make no sense to write the subsidized check, and given the promise it makes no sense not to invoke it when he says you underpaid. — Leontiskos

You are contradicting yourself. You know it is rational to invoke your landlord's promise, and you would do so in real life, but in your TPF sophistry-mode you just bury your head in the sand instead of facing up to the irrationality of your position.

I feel like the problem with challenging "obligations" based on meaning is that conceivably there are various other concepts we might use all the time that are difficult to attribute non-circular meaning but are nonetheless quite intuitive. Things like modal concepts or even sensations of experience. Even concepts like time, quantity, 'being'. Its hard to non-circularly define them but they are nonetheless extremely intuitive and we all agree about them. One might not be able to describe the sensation blue but then it is immediately apparent what a blue thing is. Why can't someone also be able to immediately apprehend a concept like 'obligation'? You then get into these my word versus yours type scenarios which are hard to resolve without changing someone'a intuitions. Maybe one should be an anti-realist about everything?! But then again maybe this just delays the my word versus yours. At the same time, I do think there is something more flimsy and malleable about moral claims compared to scientific ones. I don't find it intuitive to make sense of morality naturalistically, and I am very biased toward naturalistic explanation since they seem like the foundation upon which our inter-subjective interactions are based.

Why is it clearly not the case? Because we use the sentence "you ought not kill"? I think it's far simpler to just interpret this as the phrase "don't kill". You haven't actually explained what makes the former any different, you just reassert the claim that we ought (not) do things. — Michael

"You ought not kill" is a counsel, whereas "don't kill" is a command; that's the difference between the two.

When you sincerely promise to do something, you intend to place yourself under an obligation to do that thing, you understand yourself to be under an obligation, on account of your sincere promise, to do what was promised.

That it is possible that you could change your mind only entails that you cannot be forced to do what you promised. An obligation does not consist in some external force, but in internal consistency. If you want to say that obligations cease if and when people change, then the recognition of that should forestall you from making promises. It is dishonest to make a promise that you do not believe you will be able to keep.

What these last two pages look like is Michael wants a reason to think obligations exist outside the internal emotional state of having chosen to hold oneself to that intent.

You could do the exact same thing with "do flowers exist."

A. Flower's don't exist.
B. Yes they do, x and y are flowers.
A. Nope, all I am seeing is they you are calling them flowers. Why are they flowers?
B. Flowers have such and such properties and the word has such and such a history. This is how the word is used and and understood, to refer to flowers.
A. Nope. When you say "this is a flower," you aren't saying anything. You are just saying "call this sort of thing a flower." But why is it a flower? Why should I call it a flower? Saying "this is a flower," is just another way of saying "call this a flower, it doesn't mean anything else "
B. *Explains more of the properties of flowers, how they differ from plants, why people have the word.
A. Nope. You haven't explained what a flower is at all. You are just explaining how people use the word flower and what they think they mean by it. Explain to me what a flower is.
B. *Offers an explanation of the word and usage of "flowers" in terms of social practices and their intersection with the world.
A. So flowers aren't real. They are just a social rule saying "call some things flowers or else."
C. Offers a naturalistic explanation of both language and flowers.
A. Where is the explanation of flowers from particle physics on up? I am not seeing an explanation. What is a flower? They don't exist. All you have pointed to is how people use language and what they think they mean by words, not what the things referred to actually are. Apparently every human language strangely developed this way to say the same thing in two distinct ways. Weird, everyone but me must be confused...

The question "is it good in any absolute sense to honor one's obligations," seems like a question with some legs. The question: "do obligations exist?" is a silly question. They clearly do, and they clearly don't reduce to individuals imperative statements. They might be explicable in terms of something other than any sort of "absolute" or "human good," but they sure ain't the same thing as "do this."

You could do the exact same thing with "do flowers exist." — Count Timothy von Icarus

Or Santa Claus

ITT: People arguing about whether a French loanword entails another French loanword. Monumental indeed.

It is, but I dislike using shorthand. — Tobias

Fair - i suppose I was looking toward a situation where you'd have just outlined your personal position with reference. But in any case, it looks like we saw that similarly.

I think that is a metaphysical assumption that one need not make. — Tobias

Hmm. I really appreciate the clarity this seems to be granting me. Things don't need to be mind-independent to exist (im further down the concepts-exist-in-reality line than Banno, eg), true. But some things do. Such as, the authority in the previous element of the discussion. That exists. It's authority exists (perhaps by consent, so it's some levels above the mechanics of an interpersonal obligation) and is arbitrarily enforced to the emotional contentedness of the majority of it's subjects and little, if anything else, is involved. In this case, I can't quite see how you could then still claim obligations exist.

The same can be said of an "obligation". It's an empty space between commitment and expectation. But there is nothing there. I guess, while this example is pretty parochial in terms of what concepts its engaging:

Person A promises;
Person B that they will attend X event on date Y specifically to accompany/support. Meaning B being present is crucial.
Person B, unfortunately, perishes on date V (i.e prior to the maturity of the 'promise').
Person A feels their promise is unfulfilled.
Person B is ... dead. There is nothing to oblige. They couldn't feel one way or the other. There is no obligation.

I think you would be wrong in all conceivable respects to claim that the obligation still exists (this is worded as if momentarily granting the idea that an obligation can exist besides the two or more brain states involved).
The situation has not changed for person A. They mentally/emotionally feel their 'obligation'. This is all they had before, too. But Person B is dead. Given that there is no material difference whatsoever to Person A prior to, and after person B's death with regard to the 'obligation' (i.e it exists in their head as a commitment) either:

1. Obligations do not exist. People with commitments and expectations exist; or
2. Obligations can exist in a positivist sense only.

Now, that gets messy - the kinds of 'authority' vary, and the enforceability varies etc.. etc.. etc. etc.. but the overall point seems clear to me: the obligation only exists as an instrument of authority and does not obtain without it. However, I now anticipate some type of "well, your emotional reaction is a kind of authority". Yes, it is. But it is not an obligation. It's an enforcement mechanism. So, "obligation" is the wrong word, I'm just trying to be least-confusing.

I think that is a metaphysical assumption that one need not make. — Tobias

Fair enough, but per the above I think it's required in this case - otherwise, "obligation" can only obtain within descriptions of other things. "thing" not needing to be physically extant, here.

It needs no logical compass. It simply needs a society in which one expect from one another that one fulfills his promises. — Tobias

Seems to me here you've inadvertently dropped your point here, and picked up mine? I'm only hearing, as conclusions to these points "It leaves a bad taste" or "It would hurt the relationship between entity X and entity Y". Yep. Not an obligation? Onward...

The fact that some concept is dependent on our societal interaction doesn't make it any less real. — Tobias

It does. But that aside, what you seem to be saying is that IFF your society has the concept promises, that magics them into existence as actual things (or, to be a bit arcane - choses). This is plainly not true?

We live in a world with doors, similarly, we live in a world with marriages — Tobias

A marriage is not at all analogous to a door. Forgive if my next response is a little glib. The above is really difficult to parse...

it is also different from: "rules made by a competent authority" — Tobias

That is, by your own description, exactly what it is. A society with the same collective concept, but not enforcing authority simply doesn't have marriages the way we think of them. Which is literally, a legal instrument evidencing a commitment and expectation enforceable by the relevant authority. Telling someone you wont cheat, that you'll raise kids right, always take care of htem etc.. is meaningless to a marriage. That's just being nice to each other.

Than indeed, there is no marriage anymore. — Tobias

So, your position here is that if anyone knows about hte purported marriage, then it obtains? Yikes. That is extremely confused to me. And it also violates your entire position - if one must know of the thing for it to exist, then we're back at rejecting that reasoning and having no basis for invoking an obligation separate to the individual brain states involved. Banno's entire point is that we can accept things exist without knowing. You seem to be saying if no one knows about it, it doesn't exist - which is plainly wrong, too.

At what time does it exist then? — Tobias

The decision exists at the moment the decision is made (or thereabouts). It doesn't create anything further. It is a decision made. That's all.

I think one would prefer a theory — Tobias

This is not relevant. What one prefers is a road to the end of rational discourse.

The decision can be undone at any time? If it cannot and you are still bound to the decision, what is it then that binds? — Tobias

You're getting it.

It is not Banno that holds Banno accountable. — Tobias

It is (and this is directly in response to the questions in the quote immediately above this. It is Banno. If he doesn't care what hte other side of the "obligation" does in response, he couldn't care less whether he fulfills the promise. If he does care about their response, he will likely do it (assuming it causes that response that he wants) because it makes him comfortable with himself. However,

I recognise in your addendum here ("it is others") you are essentially invoking just authority. It is on the authority of the other's expectation Banno should be accountable for his promise. Sure. That has been accepted. It does not mean an "obligation" exists. It means someone expects something, and Banno doesn't want that smoke. These are, put plainly, hold-over tactics masquerading as some moral concept of "obligation". And, while i take your earlier point - these are culturally embedded and for the most part, agreeable, forms of interaction - they are arbitrary. There is no objective benchmark, or divine reason for them. It's just how we best-get-on. And that is all we can hope for, surely?

I would really not know why one would hold a position that cannot make sense of obligations. — Tobias

It can, though. The problem is you want something to exist which doesn't - and so the position seems incomprehensible (wrt obligations, anyway). To me (and, i guess Michael and Frank) we see no issue. The obligations simply don't obtain. Other, relevant and important things obtain which give the same appearance you're trying to explain with 'obligation'. We see no issue, because we don't take that position. You already took that position, and so the theory seems torturous. Understandable. I just htink you're wrong, and you think I (we) are. Fair.

legally — Tobias

yes. You're getting it (maybe ;) )

My position comes down to what I know as 'interactionism' — Tobias

This explains a whole lot about your responses around Marriage, but this just makes it all the more obvious there exists a legal obligation and where there is no enforcing authority, there is no obligation. And, here, "obligation" actually just means "threat of consequence".

ou need to hold on to all kinds of obscure positions, namely that a promise exists one moment and stops existing the next or that a promise should really be conceived of as a brain state or that an obligation only reaches as far as I am willing to be bound to the promise. — Tobias

Bold: Not my position. I was actually really, really clear to try to avoid this charge. The promise happens. It is an action not something which "obtains" in the "thing" sense. A promise can be made the same way an explanation can be "made". Its more "made out" or "enunciated". It doesn't come into existence. I would suggest thinking here of someone making a false promise again. The actions are the same. Only hte brainstate changes, and (in this story) only for the promissor.

Italics: Not only is this plainly true (to me), this is probably one of hte better descriptions i've seen. Maybe its uncomfortable? But yeah, the obligation isn't there if you don't attend to it. If you, personally, jettison your promise you have no obligation. Even if we're going to grant the obligation "thing" status, its collapsed because you pulled your support out from it.

Michael apparently thinks it does not matter whether one is ordered by a gang of robbers or whether one is taxed by legitimate authorities. — Tobias

It doesn't. One is simply "legitimate authority". The behaviour is the same (i touched on this earlier in this post, funnily enough). What could possibly be said to be different?

"Do this or I'll break your legs" - Dealer
"Do this or I'll take your kids and give them to another set of parents temporarily" - Gov'munt

I may prefer my legs broken, personally. But that aside, there are given rules, and given consequences to not following them. The "culturally embedded" concept of promise functions the same in both of the above scenarios. In fact, I would argue that both of these scenarios exist precisely because the obligation itself is no where to be found. Enforcement solves that.

reality ;) of legal principles — Tobias

Purely on a legal mind-to-legal mind basis, what do you mean here? Is the assertion that there is some kind of legal principle which actually transcends human minds? I have never been able to get on board with anything remotely close to "natural law" type arguments so Im really curious.

You know it is rational to invoke your landlord's promise, and you would do so in real life — Leontiskos

Because legal support exists. Otherwise, no one in their right mind would go to a landlord and try to hold them to their word. This is intensely naive to the history of commerce.

You could do the exact same thing with "do flowers exist." — Count Timothy von Icarus

No. You could not. And you did not. I shall illustrate why not:

A. Nope. You haven't explained what a flower is at all. — Count Timothy von Icarus

This doesn't appear to be relevant at all to the discussion. WHAT an obligation is, can be gleaned clearly from the descriptions given.
"where is it?" is the question, and flowers are demonstrably extant as "whatever it is we call flowers". This cannot be done for an obligation or promise (i use that word alittle differently, but I take yours/tobias/bannos use here). You have to describe something else. It's a shadow, at best.

Fragile? :rofl: What an idiotic inference; what makes you think I care about some random ad hominem projections beyond making the effort to call them out for what they are? I'm not interested in participating in your silly game of one-upmanship. — Janus

Here you are, Janus. I need to do no more.

Well, seems to me that the obligation exists beyond the act of making the promise. That is, to make a promise is to place oneself under an obligation. — Banno

Understood. I think, though I wouldn't assume your mind, that i've groked that correctly across all exchanges to that end. You believe the obligation comes into existence, and that you are "under" this "thing' that you posit "exists". I understand.

Now that obligation is not physical. It is not "floating around". But it does exist. — Banno

Descriptively, I'm with you - but i'm already off the bus. Onward..

It is a promise, it is an obligation. — Banno

Which is it? I am already sensing self-confused response here.. They aren't the same thing in either this post, or your quite thorough responses to Michael. So why are they here?

the undertaking of an obligation — Banno

Is an act - which clearly exists 'in time' as they say. So, so far, descriptively, I'm still with you. This fits my account nicely. I just don't make use of "thing" here, rather than "act". To the above "calling out", this is apt - If the promise causes the obligation, they aren't the same thing - could you be pressed to say the promise "occurs" and creates "an obligation"? If so, we've made some headway.

Not nothing. — Banno

This one is somewhat hard to respond to, because I can see exactly what you're trying to point out. But the answer is: the question makes no sense. If both parties (assuming no one else knew) have forgotten, there isn't anything to be spoken about. There is nothing. We are playing God with time and perspective to even have this discussion. IN real life, that can't happen.

and again the promise exists. — Banno

Ok, for hte moment ignore that previous response, because this is interesting. How does it exist if neither the commitment, or expectation, currently exist? This indicates there must be a "something" out there in the world which constitutes that promise. What/where is it once both parties forget?

is the promise the sum of all the brain states of everyone who has heard of it? — Banno

On my account, which is probably quite incomplete in the sense that this has never interested me as something to write about before - it exists as the two complimentary brain states of "commitment" and "expectation" on the opposite sides of the act of promise. Promises happen - no issue. Those two brainstates then result, and are (barring mental weirdness) inextricably linked to a single end. That, to me, is enough to fulfil the concept. Perhaps more than.

I gather that you would like to argue that promises are brain states? — Banno

The above may have already done this for me, but not quite. They are highly relevant, but they are not, individually "an obligation" or 'a promise'. The act of 'promising' creates brain states. The relation between them (which is a state of affairs only, on this account) is where people want to say some third thing, "the obligation", comes in. I deny this. The two states obtain. The "obligation" is just a description of the resulting emotional states of the two parties. You describe the two brain states - indicate the emotional states (determination and expectation, i guess), and you're done. There's nothing further to add (again, on my account). We don't need to go further to explain what's happening here...

a similar structure that each and every person that has heard of the promise has in their brain? — Banno

I really like this, which is why I've quoted it, but I don't take that, no. Other than the two "assigning" parties, as it were, other brain states aren't relevant. This can be easily accepted because it also applies to your account. The two parties involved are the relevant ones, in either account (unless you disagree? Interested if so).

And what ab out written promises, or audio recordings - are these also promises? And how does the promise move from one page to another? If it is a physical state, then the nature of that state is quite irresolute. — Banno

I don't think the situation changes, unless we're talking Law again in which case - lots to be said! But roughly, yes, they are records of promises. Not acts as above, but recordings. The only difference here is they create legal obligations which are actually just rules pursuant to punishment or loss of some kind. Not hte same thing we're talking about, to be sure.

The promise seems to be something quite apart from any such physical state. Isn't it more a construction, put together by people using language to get things done? Isn't it a way of undertaking an obligation in a social and linguistic context? — Banno

But why shouldn't we talk of such things as existing? Along with money, property, friendship, and so much more. We live in a complex of social constructs. — Banno

These two go together well, and make for a relatively straight-forward set of things to respond to at once.

To me, no, it doesn't seem that way at all. BUT, giving some credence to that version of things, the 'promise' is literally an act made. The obligation might come into existence, but the promise exists ephemerally as a decision, not a 'thing'. It doesn't exist anymore than 'the decision to shut the fridge' exists. If you feel that decisions 'exist' as 'things' then that's fine. I suppose I would put this in the category that 'personality' goes in. It can exist, and then not exist(perhaps as the exact firing of certain exact neurons at an exact moment?). No issue.

Yes, I think "obligation" is a language game we use to allow us to get things done. We socially enforce promises made to avoid the chaotic nuisance a majority-dishonest society seems to devolve into. I do not think this means it 'exists'. It is a useful fiction. A heuristic-type thing, perhaps? A concept under which we denote instances, but under which no actual token occurs. Its descriptive only - maybe this can be thought of as similar to "dancing around the point". It does not actually occur. But we use it all the time to symbolize certain behaviour and the resulting emotional response to it.

In terms of why we shouldn't think of these things as 'existing' - I note the stark difference between "money/property" and "friendship". The former can literally be pointed at, even in the endless contexts in which they occur - the concept is unchanging and we have millions of tokens to be analysed. The latter is ... grey, and probably just a symbol for several emotional states that people can share. They can be transferred to other people, which says to me it relies on the brain state involved to even get off the ground as a concept - in reality, there is no 'friendship' to be talked about. There are activities and attitudes - in a certain box, we'll call these reciprocal attitudes friendship. But whence aquaintancship? Friendship? Bestfriendship? Friendswithbenefitship? Also, to note, people's version of what constitutes a friendship vary quite a bit. The particular emotional states required aren't set. It's, at best, an indicator that someone one (or people) are within a range of emotional states with regard to one another. That's not actually a thing. That occurs with anyone who has interacted. We're just sort of picking a colour and going with it.

These are all murky, "best we've got" terms for things that we 'feel' but do not actually exist, is my view there (though, again, this hasn't interested me to talk about before so Its entirely possible more good exchanges like this might change the view).

We live in a complex of social constructs. — Banno

I agree. Mostly in the mind. Shared delusions don't cause things to exist.

Because legal support exists. Otherwise, no one in their right mind would go to a landlord and try to hold them to their word. — AmadeusD

Nonsense. People succeed in this sort of thing all the time without legal means. @Michael has literally been arguing that the landlord would only honor his promise if he were irrational, which is an even stronger form of the argument you give. Here is the whole post:

Then suppose you invoke the promise and he says, "Oh sorry, I forgot about that. Never mind."

Is he being irrational in this? Is he deluded and engaged in bullshit?

You say that his word is good enough to write the check for $975, but it is not good enough for you to invoke when he says you underpaid. You are contradicting yourself. You wrote the subsidized check on the basis of a promise - a real promise that involved obligations. Without those obligations it would make no sense to write the subsidized check, and given the promise it makes no sense not to invoke it when he says you underpaid.

The point here is not that the landlord must, of absolute necessity, honor his promise. That is a strawman form of obligation. The point is that it is rational for him to do so, and therefore it is rational for you to invoke the promise when he says you underpaid, and therefore it is rational for you to write the check for $975 in the first place.

This sort of thing happens all the time in real life. Compare this to a different person who writes a check for $975 for no reason. Do they have recourse? Of course not. They are in an entirely different situation. The only difference between the two cases is an obligation. — Leontiskos

Nonsense. — Leontiskos

I see you've chosen to deny what is clearly a reasonable take, in terms that themselves indicate you're not thinking very clearly.

Here is the whole post: — Leontiskos

I read the whole post. Do with that what you will.

- It's your second post and you're already out of arguments?

Your response was "nonsense" and then reposting the post from which I quoted.
I don't know what to do with that level of sillygooseness ( my tongue is rather in my cheek but i got the same impression from you.. so *shrug* lol)

- That's fair. Neither one of us has really made any arguments in this exchange. My point though, was that arguments had already been made in the exchange with Michael, and in quoting my post I was invoking some of those. @Michael didn't answer my question because he can't both sustain his position and also give a plausible answer:

Is he being irrational in this? Is he deluded and engaged in bullshit? — Leontiskos

I was in effect posing this same question to you, which is why I said that your argument (or assertion) is the same as his but less strong (as you focused on the tenant rather than the landlord). My argument addresses his argument, and therefore it a fortiori addresses yours.

LOL Fair enough.

I can't see how. They are not parallel questions to me. I was addressing whether or not there is an obligation Not what one would do about it. My glib response to your initial point was quite clearly apt and reasonable.

Before tenancy enforcement infrastructure, you would be an absolute moron to try to 'force' your landlord's hand. You're out on your arse.

As I noted elsewhere (actually, I think it was a different topic, but im leaving that lead in) what people do about things isn't the same as "whether or not" in regard to those things. So, my point illustrates a different issue: There is no obligation. THere is enforcement. Without adequate enforcement, do whatever you want as regards your promises or 'obligations' (i have at length noted that I don't think that even makes sense, but hey - a new comer :) )

I read the whole post. — AmadeusD

Not well.

Before tenancy enforcement infrastructure, you would be an absolute moron to try to 'force' your landlord's hand. — AmadeusD

The point here is not that the landlord must, of absolute necessity, honor his promise. That is a strawman form of obligation. The point is that it is rational for him to do so, and therefore it is rational for you to invoke the promise when he says you underpaid, and therefore it is rational for you to write the check for $975 in the first place. — Leontiskos

Yeah, Im unsure you read my most recent response in this case. Your re-quoting simply leads me to illustrate for you the same mistake. We are just not addressing the same thing.

I read it fine. You don't seem to want to see I'm talking about something other than what you're trying to say. Which, I also think is dumb - but I don't take Michael's position on that. Neither are acting rationally (wrt some promise or obligation) without the infrastructure. The Landlord, though, in pre-infrastructure world, is acting rationally as to his power to elicit his desired response. So, we agree that the obligation is irrelevant. I hold it doesn't exist.
So, you got that bit wrong too :) Fantastic!

... you intend to place yourself under an obligation to do that thing ... — Janus

Which means what?

We have all these different phrases:

1. You ought do this
2. You should do this
3. You must do this
4. You are obliged to do this
5. You have an obligation to do this
6. You have a duty to do this
etc.

They all seem to express the same concept, but nobody is giving a coherent account of what this concept is.

All I ever understand by these phrases is "do this". It's just been phrased as if it were a truth-apt proposition, leading to the misplaced belief that it means something more.