I looked at your "here" and my computer didn't blow up - yet, and you've been a member for years. So you seem legit. But it would be helpful if you could boil the problem down to a sentence or two or three. After an admittedly very quick read, it appears to me to be the sequence, should I act, and how do I know. And what should I do and how do I know; in particular how do I weigh competing or seemingly incommensurable demands and values?

And why is not Kant's deontology a complete and comprehensive answer?

Hey welcome Dan! I won't be submitting as it's not my area of interest, I'm just responding to say :clap:

Well I'm glad your computer didn't blow up. I could boil the problem down to "how do we resolve conflicts between the freedom of different persons over things choices that belong to them?" but it that question very helpful without the context, hence the non-computer-exploding document.

Thanks

What if someone proves that it cannot be solved?

Cool challenge! I am in. Let's see if I can solve it. It seems legit and interesting, but I have a few inquiries: 

* Whether a solution is successful will be determined exclusively by me and my decision is final. — Dan

Isn't this a bit unfair? In most contests or 'challenges', the final decision of who is the best applicant is usually determined by the vote of at least three members. The quality of each solution will only depend exclusively on your criteria. Don't get me wrong, I respect it.

On the other hand: If the winner happens to be a TPF member, could we know who of us won this challenge, or will the decision be kept confidential?

Oh, what is the deadline? Do we have all summer? A month? ... just a week?

I am curious about what you would say to people who choose to have less choices. Basically they purposefully shirk responsibility and prefer not to choose.

Do we enforce a protection of choices against the will of such people? If so how can you justify this as it seems contradictory to the claims made for freedom consequentialism.

How far does paternalism factor in here if we are assuming rational and able people who are well informed and educated? I understand that it would likely enforce loss of freedom if it was judged such an action would reduce net Freedom?

This is intentionally quite a low bar to set for understanding, and means that people need not be well-informed in order to be free. They only need to understand what choices they are making and what it means to make those choices, such that they are able to apply their rationality to them. — Dan

This is a bit of a stretch considering people need a pretty high degree of understanding to contemplate possible consequences. This makes the whole scheme of Freedom Consequentialism ( as you frame it here) as somewhat elitist.

Regarding Satisficing Consequentialism I think this has better grounding when we define the 'minimal' as a kind of buffer zone rather than as an actual definitive line ... obviously this does not really help you as this is the very problem you posed that you wish to find a solution to!

If it is unsolvable then a cautious approach would make the most sense and then we find ourselves trying to resolve by Occam which side we should cut off or not. The qualitative aspect is really tricky so I do not see any simple work around that would outright counter the demandingness objection.

For these reasons I think a fresh approach may be warranted.

Interesting stuff :)

I could boil the problem down to "how do we resolve conflicts between the freedom of different persons over things choices that belong to them?" but it that question very helpful without the context, hence the non-computer-exploding document. — Dan

I'm not sure what you are asking.

Isn't this dilemma just a situational curiosity which underpins human life - particularly in multi-cultural, pluralist societies? Can there be a just way to resolve disputes when people’s rights or preferences clash? Would there not be a number of 'mechanisms' one could implement?

Are you expecting there to be a correct answer and how will you know it when you see it? How do you determine what is just? Is there an underlying assumption that for this to work you need to be a moral objectivist?

One way of approaching the problem might be thinking about the fact that wars are fought - some wars - ostensibly over freedom. Which means that a huge portion of humanity thinks it's sensible to take and give lives in exchange for freedom. So this seems to be an example of people valuing freedom over some other things.

So the challenge is, I guess, proving it.

I don't think the challenge is in principle possible to provably solve, because value doesn't seem to be a universally objective measure. In other words, I don't think there's an objective answer to "How many lives are worth exchanging for how many peoples freedom?" just like there's no objective answer to "How many scoops of chocolate are worth 5 scoops of vanilla?"

I don't think the challenge is in principle possible to provably solve, because value doesn't seem to be a universally objective measure — flannel jesus

Yes, I agree with you.

I don't beleive in moral facts (I don't deny them, but I have heard no good reason to accept the notion) and any underlying axiom we select as foundational for our moral thinking is likely to be a matter of personal preference. The moment we identify some 'foundational truth' isn't it the case that this is built out of values we already find appealing?

Turning morality into a spreadsheet or a flowchart of equations seems to be a futile endeavour. While I am not a philosopher, it would seem to me that moral decisions pivot on empathy, context, and deep ethical considerations (built from culture, experience and language) that go beyond what can be captured in formulas and algorithms.

I think, these days, the professionals are less inclined to accept mere transcendental ideas as sufficient explanatory devices, and those of common understanding never heard of them anyway, so…..

What is your view about a problem like this? Any suggested directions?

If the problem is….

…..how to weigh freedom over different things within the normative theory of freedom consequentialism. — Dan

….my view is there isn’t a problem, or at least there isn’t this problem, insofar as I do not treat freedom as weigh-able or relatively differentiated. It is merely an altogether fundamental, hence necessary condition, by which certain types of relations are possible, and these relations pursuant to aesthetic judgements alone.

On the other hand, even if I’m entitled to a personal view, I’m fully aware that not having any letters after my name sorta limits my scholastic value.

On the other hand, even if I’m entitled to a personal view, I’m fully aware that not having any letters after my name sorta limits my scholastic value. — Mww

I haven't noticed scholastic value being a priority here.

It is merely an altogether fundamental, hence necessary condition, by which certain types of relations are possible, and these relations pursuant to aesthetic judgements alone. — Mww

So is the OP an attempt to provide a foundation for morality which somehow manages to quantify or capture freedom as something more than a contingent set of relations?

I could boil the problem down to "how do we resolve conflicts between the freedom of different persons over things choices that belong to them?" — Dan

Well, this is simple and obvious: you get a PM like your Jacinda Ardern and do what she says.

Less perfectly but more durably (so far - we'll see if it lasts!), a democratic form of government is established that acknowledges three unalienable rights, to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness, which to secure makes all others alienable, and which adopts a general set of rules for governance that holds itself as subject to its own laws. And this more-or-less the model for the free countries in the world.

And manifestly imperfect - and just here may be a clue. Freedom is about the future, and the future is always at least in part unknown. Therefore the exercise of freedom can never guarantee future results.

And so you wisely confine your question to present considerations, "How do we resolve...?" But this question must itself evolve to, "How best to resolve.., is there a best way to resolve,... and of best ways is it a one or they a many?"

After many qualifications it becomes clear that certainty is itself housed only in the most general of observations, and those at a considerable distance from any particular application. Among these the golden rule, the two fundamental commandments, and Kant's good will and his categorical imperatives.

That leaves the practical considerations of a particular matter and the need for some action, a significant waypoint in the navigation of such problems being Aristotle's Rhetoric, that is, persuasion, the need of it, the need for it to be done well, how to do it, and how to judge it. One word seems to cover all of this, "heuristics," with the proviso that what is sought is not "the good enough," but instead the best possible. And the repository of such wisdom is the society/culture itself, subject to the critical analysis of the moment.

That would be a shame, but it would be a sort of solution. Depending on how thoroughly it was proved and what assumptions the proof relied on, it could potentially be eligible for all or part of the prize.

I'm happy to shout it from the rooftops or keep it all to myself depending on what the hypothetical winner wants. It makes no odds to me at all.

Yeah, a team of experts would be great, but I haven't got one, so I'm afraid you're stuck with me.

The prize money will be reassessed yearly, so you currently have 364 days until this is reassessed. Or until someone else solves it first.

I think you may have read me a lot more paternalistic than I intended. No, so long as the person is not giving up their freedom unwittingly (such as in the example of jumping off a building because they think they can fly), then choosing to destroy things over which you ought to have freedom such that you have fewer choices in future, or simply avoid making choices, is that person's "right" (by which I mean it is a choice that belongs to them and one that they ought to be able to make)

I think I might be able to attempt a work around somehow ... might not fit into your criteria but will be fun.

Currently in the process of writing an essay on Liberty so this kinda thing is in my field of vision.

Yes, there is very much an underlying assumption of moral objectivism, among several others which I have helpfully detailed in the primer provided.

I'm really glad people are interested, but I will remind you that there is an email address set up for questions and potential solutions because I sent this to a couple of forums and fifty philosophy departments, so trying to keep up with communication in every avenue is going to be difficult

So is the OP an attempt to provide a foundation for morality which somehow manages to quantify or capture freedom as something more than a contingent set of relations? — Tom Storm

I’m not really sure. It is described as a “…theory (…) (that) has advantages over other moral theories…” so it attempts to construct a moral foundation, yes, albeit predicated on consequentialism.

As for freedom arising as something more than a contingent set of relations, I’d agree with that. As I mentioned, I think freedom is that by which relations of a certain kind are even possible, which removes it from being a member of all such relations, which in turn makes it more than any set of them, contingent or otherwise. I just don’t know if that’s what the OP, as you say, manages to capture.

Yeah, a team of experts would be great, but I haven't got one, so I'm afraid you're stuck with me. — Dan

I wish I could help with this challenge, but I am far from being a trustworthy philosopher/thinker. I am a total novice. :lol:

I haven't finished yet, but I made it a good deal through and have a question:

In general, I think defining ethics in terms of freedom can work, since free beings—unconstrained by ignorance or circumstance—will chose what is good, what causes them to flourish, etc.

However, it seems to require a certain view of freedom for this to work. Whereas if freedom is primarily defined in terms of potency—"the ability to choose anything"— then we seem to be open to all the critiques of post-Enlightenment morality as defined in terms of "rational agents" (e.g. Nietzsche, MacIntyre, etc.)

So my question is, why does the "rational agent," care about other's freedom? I didn't catch this.

And then some other thoughts that may or may not be useful:

So, freedom consequentialism’s measure of value is the ability of persons to understand and make their own choices, specifically those choices regarding what to do with their mind, body, and property. It is generally best to think of this kind of freedom as to be protected rather than promoted. So long as a person is able to understand and make their own choices, they have their freedom...

It is only the freedom over things that already belong to a person that matters, so getting more stuff over which a person can have freedom is not morally valuable. Things are bad, on this measure of value, when they prevent a person from being able to understand and make their own choices.

Is the assumption that any adult is "free?" I am just not sure how this works with experience. It seems that "weakness of will," or incontinence are ubiquitous human experiences, as is acting against our goals out of ignorance.

I personally like a slightly modified definition of free acts based on Lynn Rudder Baker's definition. I would say an act is free when:

We want to do x and we actually do x.
We want to want to do x. (i.e., Frankfurt's second order volitions)
We do x because we want to do it (it is not a coincidence, our wanting is causally involved in the process)
We would still want to do x even if we understood the full provenance of why we want to will x (i.e., there is not some fact we might discover that would make us no longer want to do x)

These conditions, particularly the last, are difficult to meet entirely. This is no issue, an act can be more or less free, people more or less self-determining; freedom is not bivalent. But then it seems to me that freedom is exactly the sort of thing that needs to be "promoted," through education, self-discipline, etc.

There is a sense in which the virtues can be trained (Aristotle), and this seems to allow for greater self-determination. There is also a sense in which techne, knowing "how to do things," is essential to being free to do things. One isn't free to "tutor kids in calculus," if one doesn't know calculus for instance, and a society isn't free to traverse continents in a day if it has not discovered jet engines and the principles of lift. But techne in particular tends to be something that must be fostered, promoted, and taught, and it also often requires various "things" to be put into practice.

It also seems to me then that property is going to be very relevant to freedom. Hell, that's a big reason why people covet money, they think it will "make them free." A retired person who loses all their savings might no longer be "free to stay retired," for instance. Leisure must give way to work; they are coerced into an action they do not want to engage in by the loss of their property (and this could obviously work in reverse with gaining property).

as well as saying again that questions are best addressed to the email address provided as I won't be able to stay on top of every avenue they come through otherwise, I would suggest you may be making some moral assumptions unknowingly. For example, when you say that those who are free are unconstrained by ignorance or circumstance (which appears to be a much more demanding type of freedom than the kind I have detailed) that they would choose what is good or what makes them flourish (which I don't think is necessarily true), this appears to assume some connection between morality and flourishing.

But, to answer your question, a rational agent may not care about others freedom. There's a longer discussion to be had there, but suffice to say that I wouldn't assume that moral facts are motivating to others, and if people fail to care about what is moral, then so much the worse for them.

While I disagree that one is not free to tutor kids in calculus if one doesn't know any calculus, I take your point. However, as I pointed out, it is not all freedom that is to be protected, only the protection of those choices that belong to you. That kind of freedom is not violated by jet engines not having been invented yet.

And again, it is likely that questions on this forum will not recieve prompt replies and may go unreplied to entirely. It is not the best place to ask them.

I'm really glad people are interested, but I will remind you that there is an email address set up for questions and potential solutions because I sent this to a couple of forums and fifty philosophy departments, so trying to keep up with communication in every avenue is going to be difficult — Dan

And again, it is likely that questions on this forum will not recieve prompt replies and may go unreplied to entirely. It is not the best place to ask them. — Dan

This is unfair and I don't think it is in the spirit of the forum.
You were happy enough 8yrs ago to participate and reap the rewards of your discussion:
https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/284/a-new-normative-theory-and-a-phd-thesis

I was curious to see how the 'PhilosophyNow' forum members responded to your OP:
The first post from FlashDangerpants ( I remember him well!)

I for one have never heard of 'freedom consequentialism' before, so I went to have a look for some. Currently the only literature on the subject appears to be Daniel's PhD thesis, available here:

For a bit of what it's about, here's a para from near the top of that...

My goal in constructing my normative theory is to determine how free, rational agents ought to be or act, where “ought” is understood in an objective and universal sense, assuming that this question has an answer.
Because this is my goal, I put free, rational agency, or “personhood” at the heart of my theory. The measure of value I use is the ability of persons to understand and make their own choices, as being able to do these two things in conjunction is the defining characteristic of free, rational agency. In this way, my theory shares the advantage deontology has of closely connecting moral value with moral agency.
Because my theory is also consequentialist, it shares the advantages utilitarianism has of not having to draw a strong distinction between action and inaction, and of being able to make clear recommendations in most circumstances by analysing the consequences of the various courses of action available. So, to the extent that one thinks that morality should describe the way all persons ought to be or act, or that one finds both consequentialism and a close connection between moral value and moral agency appealing,one has a reason to be interested in my theory

I'm very unlikely to challenge for the 10K prize myself, being the incorrigible moral skeptic that I am, but the idea at least seems interesting enough to try and stop VA from drowning the thread before it can get going as he does to everything else in this wretched garden of choke-weeds. So I will at least work through the paper and see if I can find a few snippets here and there to discuss.

Who knows, maybe Henry will be inspired to get him that 10K in cold hard Southern Hemispherical cash? He likes bit of freedom.
https://forum.philosophynow.org/viewtopic.php?t=42605

You have clearly worked assiduously with follow-up on your thesis.
And it is good that you did as promised and referenced a forum poster on p131 of your thesis pdf:
https://ir.canterbury.ac.nz/server/api/core/bitstreams/e2660406-4892-435f-bd0a-17b8ee5318c4/content

And now, you will benefit from more insight offered by people perhaps initially attracted by prize money but mostly who also have experience and knowledge and generously share their thoughts and ideas.
It would be a pity if you didn't continue in active discussion. It is in interaction that we learn...

Just my thoughts. As someone who doesn't appreciate so-called 'prize money' and rules being set as inducement. But will follow the various comments with interest...

I am offering a prize of $10,000 — Dan

Yeah, that is bait to get people to do free work on your theory.

Yeah, that smells like bait. — Lionino

The $10,000 is in New Zealand Dollars. Seems legit. The prize is not in virgin-bitcoins or loser ‘ethereum’ scam at least. Everything that comes from NZ is rather reliable to me.