It seems to me someone might care about something more than what is morally good, or perhaps not care about it at all. That seems imaginable.

Yes, if we divide practical and moral reasoning into two discrete things. I see no reason to do this though.

When someone cares more about something other than "moral good," it seems to me that they are simply seeking one good over another. The thief prefers the good of what they can get from stealing. The parent who neglects their child prefers the good they derive from going to the bar, playing video games, etc. Yet in all these actions people are still motivated by a good they seek to attain through their actions.

Part of what makes contemporary ethics intractable is denuding "moral goodness" into some sort of esoteric property cut off from the rest of existence.

I'm not sure what you mean by these criteria that are independent of the freedom derived as a consequence. Could you elaborate on that?

I am asking for a specific answer and willing to pay for it. I think I've been entirely clear about exactly what I'm asking for. If you feel that deal is not beneficial, you are very welcome not to take it.

I think that is an appropriate, useful, and accurate distinction to draw. Good for me vs morally good. Categorical imperative vs hypothetical imperative.

I don't think you are using "freedom" in quite the same way. — Dan

I took the meaning of "freedom" directly from your article. Check it out:

For freedom consequentialism, the measure of value is, unsurprisingly, freedom. However, since “freedom” can mean a lot of different things, I should explain what I mean by it here.
When I use the word “freedom” in this context, I mean the ability of free, rational agents to understand and make the choices that belong to them. — Freedom consequentialism primer

As I said, not choosing, rather than choosing, provides the most freedom, because every choice made restricts one's freedom with respect to that choice already made. And, since the measure of value is freedom, as you say, then the highest value is to not choose, because this provides the most freedom. And, not choosing is what enables deliberation and contemplation. This is consistent with Aristotelian virtue, which places contemplation as the highest activity.

Also, consequentialism does not require the perspective of an observer, nor is it really connected with such a perspective. — Dan

Consequentialism definitely does require the observational perspective. It is a system which derives principles for moral action, from observations of similarly classed actions, and the effects of these actions, just like empirical science. It is an observation based theory, inductive principles concerning the utility of different types of acts, are produced, to guide in decision making.

Instead, most consequentialists claim that overall utility is the criterion or standard of what is morally right or morally ought to be done. Their theories are intended to spell out the necessary and sufficient conditions for an act to be morally right, regardless of whether the agent can tell in advance whether those conditions are met. Just as the laws of physics govern golf ball flight, but golfers need not calculate physical forces while planning shots; so overall utility can determine which decisions are morally right, even if agents need not calculate utilities while making decisions. If the principle of utility is used as a criterion of the right rather than as a decision procedure, then classical utilitarianism does not require that anyone know the total consequences of anything before making a decision. — SEP: Consequentialism

Since not choosing cannot be empirically observed and the activities derived from not choosing, contemplation and deliberation, cannot be observed as the effects of not choosing, the value of not choosing cannot be considered by consequentialism because it has no observable utility. However, it actually provides the highest value when value is measured by freedom. Therefore value measured by freedom, and value measured by consequentialist principles are two incompatible value structures. In other words, a person has the highest level of freedom to act, when not currently acting. So not acting receives the highest value when freedom measures value. Consequentialism only judges the value of actions, and therefore cannot value inaction, nor can it properly value freedom.

The concern is that when we say "this free choice to use my arm is more important than that free choice to use the cheese grater," one choice cannot be more important for being free. Both choices are free so freedom is not what is making one choice more important; there has to be some external criteria that is the basis of "more important." In terms of consequences, it is not the freedom that differentiates the choices but some other factor.

That being said, I suppose one might insist that one choice is more important because it is a freer choice.

As I said, not choosing, rather than choosing, provides the most freedom, because every choice made restricts one's freedom with respect to that choice already made. And, since the measure of value is freedom, as you say, then the highest value is to not choose, because this provides the most freedom. And, not choosing is what enables deliberation and contemplation. This is consistent with Aristotelian virtue, which places contemplation as the highest activity. — Metaphysician Undercover

I'm not sure I follow this Metaphysician Undercover. You mean to say that when I act according to my free choice, I am actually less free than when I am figuring out what I want to do?

Perhaps there is a way to integrate POM with the idea of freer choices having priority when there is a dispute over preferences.

as I did mention though, it is better to consider this freedom being protected rather than promoted. So long as the person is able to understand and make their own choices, then there is nothing that, as it were, "needs doing". Whether the person has constrained their own choices in some fashion is (in most cases) morally irrelevant.

Also, consequentialism refers to a broad range of theories (or, if you prefer, the feature common to a broad range of theories) that share the common feature that they evaluate actions by reference to their consequences. That doesn't necessarily require observation, certainly not external observation. Also, it does seem as though you could, at least in some cases, observe contemplation

I'm not really sure what it means for a choice to be freer without reference to some restriction of freedom. I agree that it is all freedom, so when determing what is "more important" it seems like we either want to say that the some choices either involve more freedom, or that the freedom to make some choices is more important than the freedom to make others for some reason (eg, more central to is as persons) or that they by reference to which freedom one would choose over the other (as in the POM)

it is better to consider this freedom being protected rather than promoted. — Dan

It may even be beneficial to reduce freedoms too in some circumstances. The more freedom people have the greater the weight of responsibility.

This is besides the point to the problem you set out though. I am fairly sure you are more concerned with this as a potential use for AGI regarding a robust moral system to protect humans rather than cause undue harm?

no, I am concerned with solving ethics entirely. But having a system that works for ASIs would be a significant benefit of that for sure.

no, I am concerned with solving ethics entirely. — Dan

I am not really sure what you mean by "solve ethics entirely" here? Sounds a bit like attempting to count to the highest possible number. Needless to say where I think that will end.

Finding better methods is certainly possible though I think. I really do not think it takes much to show how irrelevant it is to try and offer up a tangible proof of moral absolutism. If I do then all I can say is where doubt exists doubt exists.

As I have noted to you already, there is scope to push the means of measuring further but there will never be any 100% validated methodology, only one that will work well enough under almost every circumstance (in the manner you framed the problem).

From what I have read fairly recently of Bernard Williams in 'Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy' I am inclined to view morals of obligation and such as not really within the realms of philosophy. There can be a philosophy of anything, but just because there is a philosophy of morality it does not mean there is anything essentially philosophical about Morals.

I'm not really sure tangible proof is the right form of proof for moral absolutism, but I take your point. But I think the only viable options are moral realism (and objectivism, and a few other isms, but you get what I mean), or moral error theory. So it's possible moral truths don't exist, but assuming that they do, I want to know what they are... though I'd settle for a step closer than we were before.

I'd settle for a step closer than we were before. — Dan

For the potential problems of the kind of non-sentient AI systems that may arise in the relatively near future, this is a worthy aim for sure!

I am certainly more inclined to look toward Moral Scepticism myself btw.

I'm not sure I follow this Metaphysician Undercover. You mean to say that when I act according to my free choice, I am actually less free than when I am figuring out what I want to do? — NotAristotle

Yes, that's exactly what I am saying. You are constrained by the situation you are in. If you are not presently doing anything than you have more freedom to choose than if you are engaged in an activity which is effectively restricting you already.

I did mention though, it is better to consider this freedom being protected rather than promoted. So long as the person is able to understand and make their own choices, then there is nothing that, as it were, "needs doing". Whether the person has constrained their own choices in some fashion is (in most cases) morally irrelevant. — Dan

I don't understand this difference, between protecting and promoting freedom. Bad habits are morally relevant, and habits guide our decisions when we do not take the time to deliberate. To protect one's freedom of choice requires that the person resists the formation of habits in one's thinking. To be inclined this way, i.e. to resist habitual thinking, requires that freedom be promoted, because choosing not to choose is an intentional skill requiring will power to develop, and the desire for freedom is the required intention. This is where consequentialism really fails us. It does not properly provide for the value of will power.

Also, consequentialism refers to a broad range of theories (or, if you prefer, the feature common to a broad range of theories) that share the common feature that they evaluate actions by reference to their consequences. That doesn't necessarily require observation, certainly not external observation. — Dan

To evaluate actions by reference to their consequences requires observations of actions to know the likely consequences. It is a matter of having general principles which provide predictive capacity. The principles are produced from inductive reasoning derived from observations exactly like empirical sciences. Consequentialism is an attempt to characterize moral philosophy as an empirical science.

Also, it does seem as though you could, at least in some cases, observe contemplation — Dan

This is more relevant, but no less problematic. Since these thoughts are internal, cause and effect relations cannot be properly justified. Justification requires demonstration. Wittgenstein approached this with the private language example, and decided it's better just to make judgements according to observable externalities, rather than consider internal aspects.

As psychologists know, within this internal 'realm' there is an interplay of thoughts and feelings. We can, in principle, associate thoughts with the conscious mind, as somewhat controllable, and feelings with the subconscious, having a source in sensations, and uncontrollable. However, it is quite obvious to anyone who has observed their own contemplation, that thoughts have an extension into the subconscious, and feelings extend into the conscious. And, the interplay between them is more rapid than the conscious mind observing can apprehend. This leaves determinations of cause and effect as impossible. All this indicates that consequentialism, which bases judgements on a cause/effect relation has no real merit in the internal 'realm'.

That is actually a really good illustration of why I resist the term "promote". Whether someone has a bad habit is not morally relevant. This does not (in most circumstances anyway) reduce their freedom in a morally relevant way according to FC. This is also the case when engaging in an activity. If I choose to go read a book, I don't become less free in a morally relevant way than before I decided to do so, because I am still able to understand and make those choices that belong to me to the same degree as before. It is not freedom of all kinds that is being protected here, it is specifically the ability of persons to understand and make their own choices.

You don't need to know the likely consequences of actions in order to evaluate actions by their consequences. It is certainly a good idea to discover the likely consequences of actions if those consequences determine the morality of those actions. Consequentialism is not itself empirical, but if accepted, it allows us to determine the morality of actions empirically(ish, the kinds of measures of value that consequentialist theories use range from very difficult to measure empirically to very, very difficult to measure empircally).

This last seems a bit dubious. First, it seems like I can observe cause and effect relationships within my mind at least as easily as I can in the world, probably more so. To use an example that would be morally relevant to any kind of hedonistic utilitarianism: If I remember something funny, I experience happiness. In fact, given that almost all consequentialist measures of value appear to evaluate effects that occur within the mind of people. And that's putting aside all of the psychological models that are specifically about the cause and effect relationships between emotions, thoughts, and actions. Second, it is you who is claiming that contemplation increases freedom, not me, which suggests to me that you have at least some basis for thinking that there is a cause and effect relationship between the one and the other, which you now appear to be claiming is impossible to know.

. To protect one's freedom of choice requires that the person resists the formation of habits in one's thinking. To be inclined this way, i.e. to resist habitual thinking, requires that freedom be promoted, because choosing not to choose is an intentional skill requiring will power to develop, and the desire for freedom is the required intention. This is where consequentialism really fails us. It does not properly provide for the value of will power.

If freedom is conceived of as a pure power/potency, then even good habits are deleterious to freedom since they still constrain possibilities of action.

But the virtues were generally thought to perfect freedom precisely because they allow one to act in accordance with what they think is "truly best," not because they allow someone to act "in any way at all." This would amount to mere arbitrariness, which is sort of the inverse of freedom.

So long as the person is able to understand and make their own choices, then there is nothing that, as it were, "needs doing". Whether the person has constrained their own choices in some fashion is (in most cases) morally irrelevant.

The assumption that most adults understand their own choices transparently, or that they understand the likely consequences of their actions, seems problematic.

People who are intoxicated, suffering from head injuries, or dealing with age related cognitive decline might show an increasing inability to meet these conditions, but it is in no way a binary distinction. Yet if we can be more or less able to meet the conditions for freedom, it seems like this should make us more or less free.

I suppose this assumption is what allows manipulation to be a non-issue. However, someone indoctrinated into a cult from birth seems to be facing some constraints on their freedom even when they aren't actively being threatened.

With the bar set low for "understanding" then most adults, most of the time, should be able to understand their choices.

Yes, I agree that people in those circumstances may not be able to understand the nature of their choices. People are capable of putting themselves in situations where they aren't really functioning in their full capacity as moral agents for a time and that isn't a problem. As for head injuries and significant cognitive decline (simply having a poorer memory than one used to isn't likely to affect one's freedom in a morally relevant way very often), yeah, those things seem to reduce a person's ability to understand their choices. I submit to you that this is a bad thing. Depending on what you mean, then this could be something of a binary distinction.

That being said, people can be more less free in the sense that more or less of their freedom is being reduced/violated/etc. For example, an alligator biting my toe off reduces my freedom somewhat, but not as much as if it bit my head off. The whole point of this exercise is to figure out how to determine which action violates the least freedom (or perhaps the least important freedom) or, conversely, protects the most.

As for cults, that depends on what the cult has taught them. If, for example, they think that they are going to be punished be an omnipotent being if they do the wrong thing, then that ignorance is reducing/violating their freedom in a morally relevant way as they are essentially always under threat.

Whether someone has a bad habit is not morally relevant. — Dan

You have a completely different understanding of "morally relevant" from what I have. A habit inclines one to act in a specific way, and if that way is morally bad, or morally good, then the habit is morally relevant.

This is also the case when engaging in an activity. If I choose to go read a book, I don't become less free in a morally relevant way than before I decided to do so, because I am still able to understand and make those choices that belong to me to the same degree as before. It is not freedom of all kinds that is being protected here, it is specifically the ability of persons to understand and make their own choices. — Dan

Switch out "go read a book" with an activity which is considered to be morally bad. When a person acts on impulse, and the impulse is related to habit, then the person's freedom is very clearly restricted. The person's ability to understand is restricted due to the force of habit. If that person decides to engage in an activity which is morally bad, due to the influence of a "bad habit", then that person's ability to choose what is good is affected in a morally relevant way.

You don't need to know the likely consequences of actions in order to evaluate actions by their consequences. — Dan

This seems contradictory. You can evaluate consequences without knowing them?

To use an example that would be morally relevant to any kind of hedonistic utilitarianism: If I remember something funny, I experience happiness. In fact, given that almost all consequentialist measures of value appear to evaluate effects that occur within the mind of people. — Dan

Sure, you can provide all sorts of examples like these, but they are simply manufactured, and do not actually justify the claim as to your ability to make such cause/effect judgements. You say, remembering something funny causes you to experience happiness, by ignoring the possibility that being happy may be what causes you to remember something funny. So your claim is merely self-deception, by framing things in a way which supports what you happen to believe.

Second, it is you who is claiming that contemplation increases freedom, not me, which suggests to me that you have at least some basis for thinking that there is a cause and effect relationship between the one and the other, which you now appear to be claiming is impossible to know. — Dan

This is a misrepresentation. I did not say that contemplation increases freedom, I said that the freedom derived from not choosing enables contemplation. The two are entwined in a mutual feedback relation. We might represent not choosing as the cause of deliberation, or vise versa, it really doesn't matter. And, that is why it escapes the consequentialist conceptual structure, cause/effect is not relevant. So, just like in your example,( happiness/remembering something funny), whichever is the cause, and which is the effect needs to be taken as irrelevant, because it cannot be decisively determined. Because of this consequentialism is inapplicable.

If freedom is conceived of as a pure power/potency, then even good habits are deleterious to freedom since they still constrain possibilities of action. — Count Timothy von Icarus

That's right, if "freedom" is assigned the highest value, then no habit can be good, as it detracts from freedom.

But the virtues were generally thought to perfect freedom precisely because they allow one to act in accordance with what they think is "truly best," not because they allow someone to act "in any way at all." This would amount to mere arbitrariness, which is sort of the inverse of freedom. — Count Timothy von Icarus

What you are showing is that perhaps freedom ought not be the measure of value. This can be approached from another direction as well. Living beings such as humans have a natural tendency to be active, so acting is a natural good. From this perspective, doing something is better than doing nothing. And, "doing something" means that your freedom is restricted by the inclination to do something, what we call "good". So "good" is an action. And doing nothing, deliberating and contemplating, is a means toward determining the good action.

What you are showing is that perhaps freedom ought not be the measure of value.

What I was hoping to show is that freedom can't be thought of purely in terms of a power/potency. Nor can it be thought of something standing over and against the good. What you describe isn't just counter intuitive, it is contradictory.

A freedom defined in purely negative terms, as "freedom from any constraint," collapses into its opposite, a "total inability to choose anything." Any determinancy in thought or action becomes a constraint on freedom. In this way, "absolute freedom," the "freest we could possibly be," turns out to be a state where choice is impossible since any determinant choice is a fall from absolute freedom as pure potency.

Yet "the inability to choose anything," is the exact opposite of what is meant by "freedom." The term has collapsed into its own negation. Hence, the concept must negate its negation. We need a synthesis, a conception of freedom in terms of the self-determining capacity to actualize determinant ends.

However, total self-determination reveals its own contradictions. For we can imagine an individual with preternatural self-control and self-knowledge and still rightly ask, "but what will they choose to do?"

If freedom is defined without any reference to the Good, then there is no determinant end to which the "perfectly rational and self-determining agent," should tend. Why do one thing over any other? If this question can be answered with reason, there is no issue. But what if we claim that it cannot be answered by reason, that the (practical and moral) Good is unrelated to freedom? Then it seems that our perfectly self-determining agent must, in the end, be determined by what is wholly arbitrary. Their judgements of "what is truly best," do not flow from reason, but from "nowhere at all." Perfectly rational agents will all tend towards different goals because their goals are ultimately undetermined. But arbitrariness is the opposite of self-determining freedom.

Again, freedom has become its own negation.

Thus, in the end, perfected freedom must tend towards the Good, towards a determinant end, towards what is considered "truly best," and not towards what is chosen for "no reason at all."


We have here skipped over the issue of social freedom. Since any agent can deprive others of their freedom, or the chance to develop their freedom, there must also be some degree to which the freedom of agents is harmonized for freedom to be perfected. And this sort of social freedom must tend towards some determinant end as well. A society that organizes itself based on no determinant end would ultimately be ordered by arbitrariness. A society organized around "maximizing freedom," will be a society oriented towards arbitrariness when freedom is conceptualized as mere "freedom from constraint/determinancy."



This is a fairly Hegelian presentation of the problem, but the vision of freedom is widely consistent with Plato, Aristotle, Plotinus, St. Augustine, St. Thomas, St. Bonaventure, etc. as well as the Eastern and Oriental Orthodox/Coptic conceptions of freedom one finds in the Philokalia.

It is really more with Locke and other early moderns that we see the collapse of conceptions of freedom towards arbitrariness, and this sort of view became dominant by the 20th century. I consider this to be a major part of the "crisis of ethics."

I meant morally relevant in the sense that it is restricting the person's freedom. If I had a habit of murdering someone, that would be morally relevant in the sense that I'd be murdering people and murdering is morally bad. I meant that acting out of habit is not, in itself, restricting freedom.

To your second point, and using the same example, murdering someone as a habit would violate my victim's freedom, but it wouldn't violate mine. In this hypothetical, could have not done that and should have not done that.

Claiming that I am merely deceiving myself about my own mental states, or their order, if it conflicts with your claim that I can't observe cause and effect relationships in my mind seems like the classic, unfalsifiable refrain of the psychological egoistic when faced with altruism. It seems like if a specific memory (or for that matter a specific experience) reliably and repeatably evokes specific emotional states in me, then it would be reasonable to say one caused the other.

A mutual feedback relation appears to be a cause and effect relation, at least regarding the persistence of the thing, if not it's initial inception.

Also, regarding not knowing the likely consequences of an action, are you assuming expected value consequentialism? Because it seems that actual value consequentialism doesn't need to know the "likely" consequences of an action to evaluate it, only the actual consequences that followed from an action. That's not really relevant to the main point though, and either one would have issues if you really couldn't evaluate the consequences of actions if they involve mental states. Luckily, that appears to not be the case.

Typo in previous post. "Could have not done it" should read I could have not done it

yes I think perfectly rational agents can plausibly all want and choose different things. This need not be arbitrary, it might be instead related to what those agents want.

To say that there is nothing they "should" choose is different. They should choose what is morally right. Not because that is what rationality dictates but because that is what it means for something to be morally right. Morality is the categorical imperative, the thing we should do regardless of our desires. Why should we do what's right? Because that is what "should" means.

yes I think perfectly rational agents can plausibly all want and choose different things. This need not be arbitrary, it might be instead related to what those agents want

Right, I don't mean to deny all particularity here. There are relative goods and these will be assessed by different people based on their own unique context. In the real world people also operate under significant constraints: imperfect information and finite reasoning capabilities.

However, look at your last sentence. If people's choosing what they choose is "based on what they want," and this is to fix the problem of arbitrariness, then what people desire—the good they seek in action—has to be something determined rationally. Such "wants" have to follow from something, to be grounded in "reasons."

To say that there is nothing they "should" choose is different. They should choose what is morally right. Not because that is what rationality dictates but because that is what it means for something to be morally right. Morality is the categorical imperative, the thing we should do regardless of our desires. Why should we do what's right? Because that is what "should" means

People should choose to do what is right because "right" means "you should choose this?" IDK, this is precisely the sort of thing that makes people say contemporary ethics just collapses into emotivism. "It just is," sounds unconvincing.

Plus, I'd tend to side with Aristotle on the intuition that the virtuous person should enjoy their virtue, or even Plato's view that the good person loves being good. If the good is not desirable then goodness is a limit on freedom. Goodness ends up being an unpleasant thing that constrains our freedom to the extent that we find it binding—which is strange if goodness also just is maximizing freedom. This is especially odd if we think one of the good things about freedom is precisely that it lets us avoid what we dislike and attain what we find good.

I'm inclined to agree with Hume that rationality is means-ends, rather than normative in the sense of setting rational goals. We want what we want, and rationality tells us how to get there (I wouldn't go quite as far as Hume in this regard, but that's rather a different issue.

Less "it just is" and more, "if morality is the way in which persons ought to be or act regardless of their wants, then asking why they ought to follow it is a bit pointless".

Goodness isn't a limit on our freedom. If I have many options and am free to pursue any of them, but only some (or one) of them is the right option that I should pursue, that doesn't limit my freedom at all. It may be helpful to think of freedom as allowing moral agents to determine what they do with their lives. Rather than proscribing that there is a good life everyone should pursue, the good is in each person being able to determine what they pursue, or don't pursue, by being able to make choices regarding what belongs to them. If you want to pursue creating great art at the expense of your own happiness, that's fine, it isn't morally better or worse than pursuing your own happiness, it's just personal preference. Where morality comes in is if someone takes away your choices (the ones that belong to you) that allow you to do so. The good is really just removing the bad, and the bad is in moral agents not being able to make use of the faculties that make them moral agents in the first place.

Yeah, I think that it is incorrect that people will necessarily enjoy their virtue (that is how I am interpreting your use of "should" here, correct me if I'm wrong) or doing the right thing. Doing what is right might well be a pain in the proverbial. It seems entirely plausible that one might not wish to help someone, but do so because it is their duty. Further, while their motives would not be morally relevant, I might think that the person who does the right thing because it's right (What Kant might call acting from duty) even when they don't personally want to more praiseworthy than the person who does good and always wants to and enjoys it.

Any determinancy in thought or action becomes a constraint on freedom. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Right, this is truth, determinacy is a constraint on freedom. Why try to deny it?

the "freest we could possibly be," turns out to be a state where choice is impossible since any determinant choice is a fall from absolute freedom as pure potency. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Nothing I said makes choice impossible. It's just a matter of recognizing as fact, that to choose is to intentionally limit your own freedom. What's wrong with that? Our freedom is significantly limited by the circumstances in which we live, so there is never the issue of "absolute freedom" anyway. Where do you get that idea from? However, it is the case, that not choosing is a way to sustain one's maximum freedom.

Yet "the inability to choose anything," is the exact opposite of what is meant by "freedom." — Count Timothy von Icarus

You are misrepresenting what I said. It is not "the inability to choose anything", it is a case of willfully not choosing anything. The ability to choose remains, therefore choice is not impossible as you claim, it's simply a matter of none of the possible choices appearing to warrant being chosen at the present time. As a result of not choosing, one maintains the freedom to choose, and perhaps as time passes, one choice may appear to warrant choosing, or another possibility, which hadn't been apprehended earlier may enter the mind. The latter is the obvious benefit of not choosing. One's freedom with respect to that specific choice is maintained, and at a later time a better option may appear, and the person is still free to choose that, having not already chosen something else.

If freedom is defined without any reference to the Good, then there is no determinant end to which the "perfectly rational and self-determining agent," should tend. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Right, this is the exact nature of "freedom", there is no specific end toward which the agent "ought" to be inclined. This allows the agent maximum capacity to act according to the circumstances, not being constrained by any sense of "ought". What's wrong with that? That is what survival requires, the maximum capacity to act according to the circumstances. So if survival is important to the agent, then freedom from "the Good" is justified.

Then it seems that our perfectly self-determining agent must, in the end, be determined by what is wholly arbitrary. Their judgements of "what is truly best," do not flow from reason, but from "nowhere at all." — Count Timothy von Icarus

You seem to be forgetting about the natural constraints of the circumstances within which one lives. The existence of such is obvious. The agent's judgements are not arbitrary, nor do they flow from "nowhere at all", they are produced in accordance with the agent's understanding of one's circumstances. Furthermore, since no two sets of circumstances are the same, the agent must have maximum possible freedom of choice to be able to best deal with any possible set of circumstances.

A society organized around "maximizing freedom," will be a society oriented towards arbitrariness when freedom is conceptualized as mere "freedom from constraint/determinancy." — Count Timothy von Icarus

Like I just explained, it is not a matter of arbitrariness, because the circumstances we find ourselves in are not arbitrary. The circumstances are however, to a large degree, unpredictable and often dangerous. This necessitates that the agent must have maximum freedom of choice to be able to best deal with whatever comes one's way. Your conclusion of "arbitrariness" is completely unfounded because you completely ignore the natural constraints of circumstances.

I meant that acting out of habit is not, in itself, restricting freedom. — Dan

Acting out of habit clearly does restrict one's freedom. The habit forms an inclination which prevents the person from choosing to do otherwise, in a way contrary to what the habit inclines, therefore restricting the person's freedom of choice to do otherwise. That is why habits are so difficult to break. The person's freedom to choose an activity other than the habitual activity is greatly restricted due to the force of the habit. Notice that the habit is described as an acting force of influence. It doesn't make the contrary choice impossible, but it still acts as a restriction.

To your second point, and using the same example, murdering someone as a habit would violate my victim's freedom, but it wouldn't violate mine. In this hypothetical, could have not done that and should have not done that. — Dan

I don't quite understand "murdering someone as a habit", unless you are saying that the person is in the habit of murdering people. If so, I agree that the person could have not done the murder. But that is not the issue. The issue is that to have not done a murder, the person would first have to break the habit. And breaking the habit requires the will power, and forcing oneself not to choose (as I explained earlier) what one is inclined toward choosing. So the person is free to not murder, but to exercise that freedom, the person, being influenced by habit, first needs the will power to abstain, and not to choose to murder. This restraint from choosing is what enables the person's freedom not to murder, because the person is already inclined to choose to murder. So the person's freedom to not murder is only actualized by the person's will not to choose, because if the person allowed oneself to choose the choice would be to murder, by the force of the habit.

Claiming that I am merely deceiving myself about my own mental states, or their order, if it conflicts with your claim that I can't observe cause and effect relationships in my mind seems like the classic, unfalsifiable refrain of the psychological egoistic when faced with altruism. It seems like if a specific memory (or for that matter a specific experience) reliably and repeatably evokes specific emotional states in me, then it would be reasonable to say one caused the other.

A mutual feedback relation appears to be a cause and effect relation, at least regarding the persistence of the thing, if not it's initial inception. — Dan

None of this justifies your claim that one might have a clear determination of which is cause and which is effect.

Also, regarding not knowing the likely consequences of an action, are you assuming expected value consequentialism? Because it seems that actual value consequentialism doesn't need to know the "likely" consequences of an action to evaluate it, only the actual consequences that followed from an action. That's not really relevant to the main point though, and either one would have issues if you really couldn't evaluate the consequences of actions if they involve mental states. Luckily, that appears to not be the case. — Dan

By deferring to "the actual consequences that followed from an action, you are further demonstrating the reliance on observation and inductive reasoning.

I'm still waiting for you to show a reliable way to demonstrate the likely consequences of mental activity. An angry person for example might yell, or get violent, or turn and walk away. How could you know which is most probable?

People doing the wrong thing due to akrasia, or weakness of will, is not a case of their freedom being restricted, but rather them failing to do the right thing, and I think this is what you are describing here when you talk about habits.

I mean, I think I can have a reaosnably clear understanding of mental causes and effects in the same way that I can have a reasonably clear understanding of causes and effects outside of my mind. By observing that one follows the other, theorizing a causal mechanism that explains how one might cause the other, and then testing that casual mechanism in ways that attempt to falsify it. Obviously our minds are complex, but so is the world, there are plenty of confounding variables to be had in both. The assertion that we can know causes and effects in one but not the other seems unsupported.

Whether the consequences of an action are good or bad is not the same as whether we know whether they are good or bad, but I agree that the latter does rely on observation (though induction is less clear). I would say that describing what is "most probable" in terms of an action leading from a mental state is probably inappropriate as it involves a choice. But predicting how a thought might lead to an emotion seems doable. Also, I fundamentally disagree that not choosing increases ones freedom, so all of this discussion about whether or not we can see the consequences of not choosing and instead engaging in contemplation (which does seem to be implied by what you are saying), is really just debating an ancillary claim you made.

It is not "the inability to choose anything", it is a case of willfully not choosing anything. The ability to choose remains, therefore choice is not impossible as you claim, it's simply a matter of none of the possible choices appearing to warrant being chosen at the present time.

Perhaps I should have spelled it out a bit more, it is not that action is physically impossible. Rather the issue is that at it is impossible for any determinant thought or action not to make someone less free. I would maintain though that a vision of freedom where maintaining one's freedom requires a flight from all definiteness is contradictory, for the reasons I have stated. Here, the exercise of freedom itself makes one less free.

Like I just explained, it is not a matter of arbitrariness, because the circumstances we find ourselves in are not arbitrary. The circumstances are however, to a large degree, unpredictable and often dangerous. This necessitates that the agent must have maximum freedom of choice to be able to best deal with whatever comes one's way. Your conclusion of "arbitrariness" is completely unfounded because you completely ignore the natural constraints of circumstances.

I'm not ignoring constraints, although I was speaking in abstract terms. Being determined by circumstance seems like a definite limit on freedom however.

I am not really sure how this is supposed to be a rebuttal. Freedom seeks no determinant end, but that's ok because the free individual will be prompted along by circumstances outside of their control?

And to the extent that we try to control our circumstances it seems we will have to have some end in mind, no? But if our ends are not determined rationally, but rather as a coping response to circumstance, then it seems to me they are less than fully free.

Right, this is the exact nature of "freedom", there is no specific end toward which the agent "ought" to be inclined. This allows the agent maximum capacity to act according to the circumstances, not being constrained by any sense of "ought". What's wrong with that? That is what survival requires, the maximum capacity to act according to the circumstances. So if survival is important to the agent, then freedom from "the Good" is justified.

It seems like "survival" is functioning as the overarching end here. But sometimes it seems like some ends trump survival, e.g. Socrates' acceptance of death. If we are always oriented towards survival rather than what we think is truly best, that will be a constraint on freedom of action. We could consider here the case where Socrates succumbs to cowardice and flees even though he knew he ought not do so. Here, he is not free to do what he thinks is best, but is rather ruled over by circumstance and fear.

If an agent is "oriented towards no specific end," but rather the ends are "determined by circumstance," then how is it not circumstance in the driver's seat? No doubt, we have to deal with the circumstances we face, but freedom would seem to come from mastering them to the extent possible.

I think Plato has a very good argument for why reason has to guide free action. We can't very well be fully free if we don't understand why we are acting or why it is good to do so. But the "rule of the rational part of the soul," would seem to require determinant aims.

I for one think this is great fun, and will definitely be submitting an answer. Some people are being way over-cynical. No one here knows whether you would ultimately follow through or not, but even if you do not, it is an enjoyable dream, and great motivation to put our best philosophical foot forward.

That being said, I do hope for your own sake that you follow through. Being dishonest impairs our ability to freely make a rational choice on whether to expend the time and energy in participation, and so is deeply immoral :P

Do you plan on engaging with your respondants?