↪Antony Nickles

But Witt shows is that the world has endless ways of being “rational” (having ways to account, though different), and so we can disagree intelligibly in relation from those practices. Ultimately we may not come to resolution, but that does not lead to the categorical failure of rationality, because a dispute also only happens at a time, in a context (which also gives our differences traction).

I don't think Wittgenstein shows this at all, as evidenced by the extremely diverse directions this thread is taken in by different Wittgensteinians. He leaves this incredibly vague; vague enough that a common take is that rationality just bottoms out in cultural presuppositions that cannot be analyzed. This view in turn makes any conflict between "heterogenous cultures" or "heterogenous language games," either purely affective/emotional or else simply a power struggle— i.e. "fight it out." This is especially true if the individual subject is just a nexus of signifiers and power discourses — Count Timothy von Icarus

The differences between language games are neither purely affective, as though pure affect could be separated from conceptual meaning, nor are they merely a matter of blind power. Convincing someone to change their perspective is not a function of coercion but of persuasion, and this is simultaneously affective and rational.

92. However, we can ask: May someone have telling grounds for believing that the earth has only existed for a short time, say since his own birth? - Suppose he had always been told that, - would he have any good reason to doubt it? Men have believed that they could make the rain; why should not a king be brought up in the belief that the world began with him? And if Moore and this king were to meet and discuss, could Moore really prove his belief to be the right one? I do not say that Moore could not convert the king to his view, but it would be a conversion of a special kind; the king would be brought to look at the world in a different way. Remember that one is sometimes convinced of the correctness of a view by its simplicity or symmetry, i.e., these are what induce one to go over to this point of view. One then simply says something like: "That's how it must be”. (On Certainty)

Can I make a rule for myself, privately? Here "privately" means "not subject to enforcement by anything else (human or otherwise)". In other words, is it possible for the correct application of my rule to be solely determined by my application of it? In yet other words, if I make my rule and determine what is the correct application of it, is it meaningful to say that I am bound by it? — Ludwig V

An individual sees the sun rise in the east on 100 consecutive days. They become aware of the rule that the sun rises in the east, and then live by the rule that the sun rises in the east.

However, as Hume pointed out, perceived constant conjunction of events in the world may be as much accidental as a rule.

From the Wikipedia article on Constant conjunction

In An Enquiry concerning Human Understanding and A Treatise of Human Nature, Hume proposed that the origin of our knowledge of necessary connections arises out of observation of the constant conjunction of certain impressions across many instances, so that causation is merely constant conjunction—after observing the constant conjunction between two events A and B for a duration of time, we become convinced that A causes B. However, this position raises problems, as it seems that certain kinds of constant conjunction are merely accidental and cannot be equated with causation.

An individual only has knowledge about the world from what they perceive through their five senses.

If an individual lives by a rule, as Hume's principle of constant conjunction shows, they cannot have discovered it through their senses, meaning that it is a rule they must have made themselves. IE, a private rule.

If the individual has made the rule, then not only will they correctly apply it but may also decide to be bound by it.

Suppose Albert lives by himself on a desert island and Betty lives in a community of one million people. Both A and B only have knowledge about the world from what they perceive through their senses.

From before, if A lives by a rule, it must be a private rule.

Even if within the community that B lives in there are public rules, B will only know about them from what she perceives through her senses. But as before, what she perceives through her senses to be a rule may in fact be accidental, meaning that if she does live her life following a rule, she must have made it herself. IE, B also lives by private rules.

IE, if individuals live by rules, as Hume's principle of constant conjunction shows, the individual cannot have discovered them through their senses, but must have made them, and in this sense are private rules. If an individual has made the rule, then they must know how to correctly apply it. However, even if the individual has made the rule, they may or may not decide to be bound by it.

An individual sees the sun rise in the east on 100 consecutive days. They become aware of the rule that the sun rises in the east, and then live by the rule that the sun rises in the east. — RussellA

It seems debatable that an individual becomes aware of a rule as described. There is quite a lot of stage setting that would occur to understand if such an individual had such a rule. For example, he would need to learn and demonstrate to a community the ability to count to 100; grasp the convention of east, west, north, south; how to pick an object called “Sun”; what it means for a “Sun” to rise and set, just to name a few. If this individual could grasp all of this, one can begin to feel confident they grasp the rule, and they have senses like the community.

However, as Hume pointed out, perceived constant conjunction of events in the world may be as much accidental as a rule. — RussellA

Yes. I believe that this issue has been much discussed in relation to Wittgenstein, though I believe it is normally framed as the difference between a regularity and a rule. There is room for some argument about exactly what Hume said or believed, but I think it would be a distraction to pursue that here.

Even if within the community that B lives in there are public rules, B will only know about them from what she perceives through her senses. But as before, what she perceives through her senses to be a rule may in fact be accidental, meaning that if she does live her life following a rule, she must have made it herself. IE, B also lives by private rules. — RussellA

IE, if individuals live by rules, as Hume's principle of constant conjunction shows, the individual cannot have discovered them through their senses, but must have made them, and in this sense are private rules. If an individual has made the rule, then they must know how to correctly apply it. However, even if the individual has made the rule, they may or may not decide to be bound by it. — RussellA

You are right to point out that each individual in a community needs to learn the rules for themselves It follows, therefore, that each of us must formulate the rules on the basis of our experience and apply them for themselves. What you seem to neglect is the point that our formulation and application of the rules is corrected by further experience. (Hume doesn't say that, but it is implicit in Hume's argument. Moreover, it is how we can distinguish between mere regularities and rules.)

An individual sees the sun rise in the east on 100 consecutive days. They become aware of the rule that the sun rises in the east, and then live by the rule that the sun rises in the east. — RussellA

But as before, what she perceives through her senses to be a rule may in fact be accidental, meaning that if she does live her life following a rule, she must have made it herself. — RussellA

I guess you mean when she makes a "leap" from the limited sample to a generalization and then treats that generalization as a rule, she has made the rule for herself. I also guess that the rule takes the form of "when the clock shows that it is morning, you can expect the sun to rise."

If an individual has made the rule, then they must know how to correctly apply it. — RussellA

Well, let's suppose that's correct. Then, in this case, what she knows is that she does not determine what is correct or incorrect. The sun does. That is, if the sun doesn't rise, she will need to abandon or modify the rule.

You have not recognized the paradox implicit in the idea that I am the final authority over my own rules. If it is true, it means that nothing that I do can conflict with the rule. Which means that the rule is empty, has no force.

There is quite a lot of stage setting that would occur to understand if such an individual had such a rule. — Richard B

Yes. Hume's version of this seems to me to be that it is a brute fact of human nature that we build up expectations as a result of constant conjunctions. I'm not sure how far Wittgenstein would disagree.

Once I have exhausted the justifications, I have reached bedrock, and my spade is turned. Then I am inclined to say: “This is simply what I do". — Phil. Inv. 217

Hume is very clear that the we will not abandon our process of formulating generalizations from individual cases, no matter how persuasive the sceptic's arguments. Indeed, he recommends a month in the country as the appropriate cure for radical scepticism. The more I think about it, the less I understand why he has the reputation of being a sceptical philosopher - though he does recommend what he calls "judicious" scepticism; he's probably right about that.

Whoops

If we say that rationality is a question of our agreement in ways of life, we seem to eliminate the distinction between those agreements that we call "correct" or "incorrect" by some standard that is not set by our agreement and those agreements that are simply a matter of making a deal, so that "correct" and "incorrect" do not apply. — Ludwig V

This has been historically framed as: if a proposition is not true/false, then it is irrational (also, if not “knowledge” than belief, or, if not “objective” than “subjective”). And Witt’s point is that “rationality” is not just meeting a standard philosophy requires (sets)—like universal, generalized, a hard rule, certain, predetermined, justified, etc. (Witt will call these “metaphysical” criteria)—but that each thing has its own kind. “Forms of life” is not just something different to simply meet the same imposed requirements.

“Agreement” is here not the same either. We come to an agreement on some criteria—like how long one foot will be—but we do not agree “to” our practices (it is “agree” in the sense more of aligning, over our entire history of doing things). Still, we do judge whether, say, an apology, is correct or incorrect, but the criteria for that are different than true and false, as I can accept an apology that you do poorly (“accepting” is part of how it works differently, its “rationality” or “grammar” as Witt calls it).

Thus it seems out of place to discuss whether apologizing, in itself, is correct or incorrect, though not strange to discuss what justice is, its ideal, and yet, differently, its commitments, and, even differently, its current state, all of which we can do intelligibly, though perhaps not conclusively. The force we want of philosophy’s “rational” (justified, certain, determinative, etc.) is what Wittgenstein is claiming is the desire which makes it seem like any other way is a failure and without recourse (leading to relativism). For example:

You will understand, I suppose, that I think that agreements that are correct or incorrect are, by and large, rational agreements and the other kind are, roughly, matters of taste or convenience or pragmatics. (The difficulty of agreements about values sits awkwardly between the two.) — Ludwig V

It is exactly this framework that interprets skepticism as a theoretical “problem”, rather than the discovery that there is no fact that will ensure resolution of our moral conflicts, thus we are responsible for solving our ongoing disagreements, because we do have the means. All criteria reflect our interests in our lives (what and how we value something), it’s only metaphysical criteria that wish to step outside of any particular practice or situation.

does [saying disagreements happen at a time and place] mean that such failures can eventually be overcome at other times and in other contexts? If so, then limitation doesn't seem to lie in reason itself, but in people's finite use of it, their patience, etc. — Count Timothy von Icarus

That is exactly the point. If you do not have a preset expectation that the answer MUST ensure agreement, then a failure does not mean there is a problem with the whole system, just this instance (or just because we gave up too soon).

If the lion comment is taken head on it is just stupid. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Sorry, it is not that we cannot understand lions, just not talking ones; it is meant to be the statement of a fact, not a scientific claim (which I try to explain here), because it is said in contrast to when we CAN work out other cultural practices, to show that we sometimes just choose not to.

There is quite a lot of stage setting that would occur to understand if such an individual had such a rule. — Richard B

True, the individual must have an extensive web of beliefs in order to believe that tomorrow the sun will rise in the east.

Referring back to the OP, all these beliefs make up a "form of life".

An individual may believe they are part of a community having a particular form of life. However, an individual can only get information about any world outside them through their five senses.

One question is, is what the individual perceives a copy of the cause of such perceptions (Direct Realism) or a representation of the cause of such perceptions (Indirect Realism).

Dependant on the answer to this question, an individuals knowledge of the form of life of a community is either a fact or a fiction.

“Agreement” is here not the same either. We come to an agreement on some criteria—like how long one foot will be—but we do not agree “to” our practices (it is “agree” in the sense more of aligning, over our entire history of doing things). Still, we do judge whether, say, an apology, is correct or incorrect, but the criteria for that are different than true and false, as I can accept an apology that you do poorly (“accepting” is part of how it works differently, its “rationality” or “grammar” as Witt calls it). — Antony Nickles

I don't disagree with you. I would go further. There is a difference between agree what the criteria are to be, e.g. on what the defining example on 1 foot is to be; that is not a question of truth and falsity or correct and incorrect. (How they decide to change the standard metre in Paris is way beyond me.) Agreeing that this path is 3 feet wide is different, and true/false and correct/incorrect do apply.
Agreeing to a practice is certainly different from signing up to (learning) it, though we can sweep it under the umbrella for our present purposes. But perhaps "acquiesce" would be a more accurate term for agreeing "to" a (pre-existing) practice. But that agreement is different from agreeing with someone else where we shall go for lunch. And so on. Differences multiply. Your example of apology is a very interesting one, that I would love to discuss separately; it is very relevant to ethics.

It is exactly this framework that interprets skepticism as a theoretical “problem”, rather than the discovery that there is no fact that will ensure resolution of our moral conflicts, thus we are responsible for solving our ongoing disagreements, because we do have the means. — Antony Nickles

I certainly wasn't intending to endorse moral scepticism. I'm sorry I wasn't more explicit. However, it is true that, if we regard moral debate as a practice, we have to recognize both that facts play a part in those debates and that it is not possible to deduce any moral proposition from factual propositions alone. Hence I said that moral statements "sit awkwardly" between those two (admittedly very simple-minded) categories.
On the other hand, I'm not sure about the idea that we have the means to solve all our ongoing disagreements. In the first place, I'm not sure that all moral disagreements can be resolved. I don't think there's any guarantee of that, is there? Not that we shouldn't keep trying, at least to live peaceably with each other. In the second place, it takes two to make a deal. So, in a sense, it isn't up to "us" to solve the problems, because the community of "us" breaks down.

All criteria reflect our interests in our lives (what and how we value something), it’s only metaphysical criteria that wish to step outside of any particular practice or situation. — Antony Nickles

I have no problem whatever with this. I would add that the wish to step outside any particular practice, however, is incoherent. Any attempt to do simply generates a new context.

Sorry, it is not that we cannot understand lions, just not talking ones; it is meant to be the statement of a fact, not a scientific claim (which I try to explain here), because it is said in contrast to when we CAN work out other cultural practices, to show that we sometimes just choose not to. — Antony Nickles

I have looked at your big discussion. It needs a bit of time. For the moment, I'm really quite confused here.
1. Are you saying that we can understand lions, but that if a lion could speak to us, we would not be able to understand what was said? Of course, communication would not be instant, but Wittgenstein seems to be suggesting that there is some insoluble problem. I can't see why he would think so.
2. Are you suggesting that we could work out the common ground with a lion, but that we choose not to? Which suggests that we could if we wanted to.

agreement is different from agreeing with someone else where we shall go for lunch — Ludwig V

Yes, a “form of life” is not a conclusion or argued, etc (though “acquiesce” implies choice; we are indoctrinated, assimilated—Rousseau’s “consent” unconsciously.) That is not to say we don’t have forms of argument or refutation, means of judging loyalty and fairness (“you picked last time”).

I'm not sure that all moral disagreements can be resolved — Ludwig V

Well, you are right that everything may lead to naught. But the point is that that frailty is only a possible occurrence, and so should not be interpreted into a systemic problem (concluding that there is no “rationality”, intelligibility). And Witt’s idea of a moral dilemma is not like a clash of interests about a certain type of topic (say about abortion), but when everyone is at a loss as to what to do, how to go on—which is an event (and could involve any of our practices).

I would add that the wish to step outside any particular practice, however, is incoherent. Any attempt to do simply generates a new context. — Ludwig V

But the metaphysical problem is generalized and abstracted out of time, place, actors, i.e. anything we would call “a context”.

2. Are you suggesting that we could work out the common ground with a lion, but that we choose not to? Which suggests that we could if we wanted to. — Ludwig V

This should probably be under that other post, however, the point of it here is that philosophy imagines a CANNOT situation with rationality, rather than recognizing the possibility yet simply not wanting to be responsible when everything can fall apart, or not wanting to jump in without knowing for sure beforehand that I would not be judged as wrong.

So, to answer: the ones we CAN figure out their practices (where there is a possibility), are the people with the “strange” customs (at the top paragraph of that page).

Are you saying that we can understand lions, but that if a lion could speak to us, we would not be able to understand what was said? Of course, communication would not be instant, but Wittgenstein seems to be suggesting that there is some insoluble problem. I can't see why he would think so. — Ludwig V

This is very simple, but hard for people to accept or let go of (especially philosophers, and scientists), mostly I think because it is read without the surrounding text (as if it were a claim). I am saying that Witt wanted to contrast the CAN possibility that we have with the strange people, with a CANNOT situation (where it is actually impossible—not a choice). That contrast is the extent of the purpose of that sentence. He wanted something that would be an uncontroversial “very general fact of nature” (PI #143 and p. 230) that he presumes would be accepted as a fact, such as: parrots don’t talk to themselves (#344). I would say he chose poorly (though perhaps, as worse with Nietzsche, he can’t help poking people in the eye). He is not making a claim or argument nor is it necessary for any greater reason nor within any framework or analogy—nothing matters about it (other than its contrasting impossibility). If you disagree with it as a claim, that is certainly your prerogative and understandable (it is provocative in that way); that is just not what is happening here, neither in purpose nor intent. This is Witt’s arrogant style on full display, as he will even state without argument the implications he posits for, say, “believing”, as if everyone would agree.

Your example of apology is a very interesting one, that I would love to discuss separately; it is very relevant to ethics. — Ludwig V

J.L. Austin’s A Plea for Excuses is a work about ethics in that way.

But the metaphysical problem is generalized and abstracted out of time, place, actors, i.e. anything we would call “a context”. — Antony Nickles

Well, yes. I was thinking that the same is true for mathematics; but mathematics is set up to exist in that "context". The "metaphysics" that I've seen tries to do the same with ideas that are not designed in the same way. Fish out of water. Mathematics as a whale or a dolphin. Or Wittgenstein's

We have got on to slippery ice where there is no friction, and so, in a certain sense, the conditions are ideal; but also, just because of that, we are unable to walk. We want to walk: so we need friction. Back to the rough ground! — PI 107

Yes, a “form of life” is not a conclusion or argued, etc (though “acquiesce” implies choice; we are indoctrinated, assimilated—Rousseau’s “consent” unconsciously.) That is not to say we don’t have forms of argument or refutation, means of judging loyalty and fairness (“you picked last time”). — Antony Nickles

"Consent" would do. Perhaps we need a specialized term for these situations. The thing is, in these radical situations, we are learning skills. That's not a context in which you can give "informed consent" and once you've learnt the skill, it's too late to ask questions. I didn't ask to learn English and wondering whether English is correct or adequate or whatever is meaningless - because I can only do it in English (and, possibly one or two other languages).

But the point is that that frailty is only a possible occurrence, and so should not be interpreted into a systemic problem (concluding that there is no “rationality”, intelligibility). — Antony Nickles

That's true. But I think there's another sense in which frailty is systemic. I'm referring to Nussbaum's Fragility of Goodness. But we don't need to discuss that here.

He wanted something that would be an uncontroversial “very general fact of nature” (PI #143 and p. 230) that he presumes would be accepted as a fact, such as: parrots don’t talk to themselves (#344). — Antony Nickles

OK. I think I get that. I have been known to throw off an example only to find later that it completely back-fires.

And Witt’s idea of a moral dilemma is not like a clash of interests about a certain type of topic (say about abortion), but when everyone is at a loss as to what to do, how to go on—which is an event (and could involve any of our practices). — Antony Nickles

There are such dilemmas. But there are also dilemmas where the problem is precisely that everyone "knows" what to do, but can't agree with each other, because they insist on framing the problem differently. I'm afraid abortion, in my book, is one such case.

I would say he choose poorly (though perhaps, as worse with Nietzsche, he can’t help poking people in the eye). — Antony Nickles

"Even Homer nods" and the temptation is very hard to resist, sometimes.

This is Witt’s arrogant style on full display, as he will even state without argument the implications he posits for, say, “believing”, as if everyone would agree. — Antony Nickles

I'm not sure "arrogant" quite captures it. I prefer to think that the modesty he expresses in the Preface to PI is sincere. But it can come over as arrogant. But, by the same token, I do find other philosophers to be arrogant, though perhaps not quite in the same way. It's the idea that you can (should) present examples and observations and leave the reader to work out their significance. That may be over-confident, but it's not stupid. (I read somewhere that the practice of his parents when he was a child, when he needed telling off, was to leave appropriate books by his bedside. If true, that would explain it.)

J.L. Austin’s A Plea for Excuses is a work about ethics in that way. — Antony Nickles

Yes, and much more interesting that trudging round and round the same few dogmas. I've just re-read, after several decades, Anscombe's "Intention", which is similar. But then, real ethics is not about quasi-legal rules, but, arguably, about forms of life.

once you've learnt the skill, it's too late to ask questions — Ludwig V

Yes we are born into a history of ways of doing things, but Witt’s method is exactly to make explicit the criteria for a practice (through looking at the things we say when we do it). Also, because we have a practice is why and how it can be rational to question, push back, live differently, etc.

It's the idea that you can (should) present examples and observations and leave the reader to work out their significance — Ludwig V

As well, the part people skip over is that his examples (rule-following, pointing, “seeing”, etc.) are practices that everyone can weigh in on (we each have an equal right to claims/there is no privileged position), so the proposed criteria we use, and the “grammar” of how they work, have to be accepted (by you) for it to be philosophical worth drawing conclusions from (as evidence).

I am going to start a read-though of The Blue Book soon, but the Anscombe sounds interesting.

A similar thing that crops up in these relativistic accounts is a sort of cognitive relativism. I'll let A.C. Grayling describe this one:

Cognitive relativism is a troubling thesis. Consider the point that it makes the concepts of truth, reality, and value a matter of what sharers in a form of life happen to make of them at a particular time and place, with other forms of life at other times and places giving rise to different, perhaps utterly different or even contrary, conceptions of them. In effect this means that the concepts in question are not concepts of truth and the rest, as we usually wish to understand them, but concepts of opinion and belief. We are, if cognitive relativism is true (but what does true now mean?), in error if we think that truth and knowledge have the meanings we standardly attach to them, for there is only relative truth, there is only reality as we, in this conceptual community at this period in its history, conceive it. — Count Timothy von Icarus

I guess there is a lot of "trouble" to go around when it comes to this thesis. I think we can all agree that there are different concepts. Do we need to police the use of the words "truth", "reality" and "value", so we can ensure a unifying meaning for each of these terms? If someone chooses to use the word "truth" in such a an odd way where they judge differently than myself, they act differently than myself, why should I feel trouble to such a degree that I need to relegate my concept of "truth" to mere opinion and belief? I should say that I feel more inclined to just say that their concept of "truth" no longer resembles mine; so sooner or later they are not part of the family but mere strangers.

I am going to start a read-though of The Blue Book soon, but the Anscombe sounds interesting. — Antony Nickles

I think so. Perhaps a read-through of that might be worth while - but let's do the Blue Book first.

Also, because we have a practice is why and how it can be rational to question, push back, live differently, etc. — Antony Nickles

Yes. Existing practices and forms of life are a starting-point, and one cannot start without one. There's a paradox, then, that our existing practices are a basis for questioning practices. But a paradoxical conclusion is just "contrary to or surprising" our existing beliefs and expectations - that's not necessarily a problem.

As well, the part people skip over is that his examples (rule-following, pointing, “seeing”, etc.) are practices that everyone can weigh in on (we each have an equal right to claims/there is no privileged position), so the proposed criteria we use, and the “grammar” of how they work, have to be accepted (by you) for it to be philosophical worth drawing conclusions from (as evidence). — Antony Nickles

Good point. It perhaps justifies the practice of letting the readers draw their own conclusions. Risky, though.

I guess there is a lot of "trouble" to go around when it comes to this thesis. — Richard B

Quite so. But perhaps it is a bit of a bogeyman. After all the trouble that goes with absolutism might be even greater. The key problem there is establishing that one has actually got hold of the absolute truth. All too often, one has not. It would be better if people were much more cautious and sceptical of such temptations.

I should say that I feel more inclined to just say that their concept of "truth" no longer resembles mine; so sooner or later they are not part of the family but mere strangers. — Richard B

Oh, surely, members of the same family can disagree without ceasing to be members of the family. There's no black-and-white rule here - just shades of grey.

I'm not sure how the vague metaphor here is supposed to address the point TBH.

But funny enough this is a point of contention in Wittgensteinian circles precisely because he uses a lot of vague metaphors.

Do we need to police the use of the words "truth", "reality" and "value", so we can ensure a unifying meaning for each of these terms?

On some accounts, isn't such policing the only way words can have any meaning at all?

In my personal opinion though, the answer is no. Truth has an ability to assert itself quite well in human affairs, e.g. Lysenkoism or the debate over "Aryan" versus "Jewish" physics.

Oh, surely, members of the same family can disagree without ceasing to be members of the family. There's no black-and-white rule here - just shades of grey.

Well, herein lies the difficulty of relying too heavily on metaphors. When it comes to family relations, it seems that they can exist even if no one believes they do. For example, if Ajax is the biological father of Ophelia, this relation of paternity exists even if neither Ajax nor Ophelia (nor any of their family members) are aware of it. And not only that, but evidence of the paternity relationship is "out there" to be discovered.

Yet because this holds for families does it mean it holds for notions of the True or the Good?

Well, herein lies the difficulty of relying too heavily on metaphors. When it comes to family relations, it seems that they can exist even if no one believes they do. For example, if Ajax is the biological father of Ophelia, this relation of paternity exists even if neither Ajax nor Ophelia (nor any of their family members) are aware of it. And not only that, but evidence of the paternity relationship is "out there" to be discovered. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Yes, metaphors (and analogies) have to be interpreted and are all too easily misinterpreted. When it comes to family relations, for example. There are also what are sometimes called mixed families, in which the "normal" biological relations do not hold. There is an awkward question about adopted and step- children, isn't there. Is the biological or social relationship the "real" parent? Opinions differ. Which illustrates my point.

I should say that I feel more inclined to just say that their concept of "truth" no longer resembles mine; so sooner or later they are not part of the family but mere strangers. — Richard B

My comment was in relation to this. But I took it, in context, to be about our social relationships - forms of life, practices, etc. So my comment was intended to refer to the social family, rather than the biological one.

Yet because this holds for families does it mean it holds for notions o f the True or the Good? — Count Timothy von Icarus

But perhaps you knew that and were pointing out the alternative conception of the family and applying the point to suggest that the True and the Good might exist "out there" whatever our relationship or non-relationship with it happens to be - and why not add Beauty to the list?
The quotation from Grayling explains well what is troubling about relativism, and there is much in our forms of life and practices that seems to point in the other direction. But Final Answers are more elusive than we might have expected and there is also much in our forms of life and practices that presents us with relative and pragmatic truths. I don't subscribe to either, or, rather, I think that both have a place in our lives. Roughly, perhaps, Absolutes are an ideal, but what we have to live with and by is lesser, in some way, but does have the virtue of being within our reach.

'm not sure how the vague metaphor here is supposed to address the point TBH.

But funny enough this is a point of contention in Wittgensteinian circles precisely because he uses a lot of vague metaphors. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Ok, point taken, I rather not hide in vague metaphors. Let us start with some quotes from Wittgenstein:

PI 23 "...Here the term "language-game" is meant to bring into prominence the fact that the speaking of language is part of an activity, or of a form of life."

PI 65 "Here we come up against the great question that lies behind all these considerations. - For someone might object against me: 'You take the easy way out! you talk about all sorts of language-games, but have nowhere said what the essence of a language-game, and what makes them into language or part of language. So you let yourself off the very part of the investigation that once gave you yourself most headache, the part about the general form of propositions and of language. And this is true.'-Instead of producing something common to all that we call language, I am saying that these phenomena have no one thing in common which makes us use the same word for all, - but that they are related to one another in many different ways. And it is because of this relationship, or these relationships, that we call them all "language"."

PI 67 "I can think of no better expression to characterize these similarities than "family resemblances"; .....And I shall say: 'games' form a family."

OC 204 "Giving grounds, however, justify the evidence, comes to an end;- but the end is not certain propositions' striking us immediately true, i.e. it is not a kind of seeing on our part; it is our acting, which lies at the bottom of the language game."

As I see it, A.C Graying desire is to hold on to the idea that there is one common essence for "truth", "reality", and "value" because the only alternative is "cognitive relativism." However, what I was suggesting is we need not fall into relativism either. First, words like "truth", "reality", and "value" will have multiple uses and thus have family resemblances that will related these word conceptually. These multiple uses are discovered by examining the forms of life which are grounded in the some human activity. That said, these concepts can take place in such radically different forms of life, the family resemblances are not strong enough to call them related. Hence, I introduce the term "stranger" to describe such a case. For example, if we visit another world where the inhabitants utilize symbols like 1, 2, +, -, etc and made expressions such as 1 + 1 = 3 were carried out, would we want to say this is some sort of arithmetic that was carried out? Or is the judgment so radically different that we would not want to call it "arithmetic"? To say "truth" is relative seems to presuppose that there is something conceptual linking all these words together but somehow the outcomes conflict. But that need not be the case, if these concepts are used is such dramatically different ways in which humans act and judge in entirely different ways, why should we even talk as if they had some relationship that deserve to fall under the banner of "truth".

There are different family structures, there are half siblings, step siblings, etc. Yet, what culture believes in people who do not have biological mothers or fathers? Outside of miracles or myth, where do people accept: "that person was never in the womb?" or "oh yes, Jessie over there is another immaculate conception?"

Absolutely nowhere is the answer. It is truly miraculous for there to be a human being without a biological father or biological mother. A cloned human being would still have a "parent" who had two biological parents and they would still (barring astounding scientific progress) need to be born.

The metaphor is only unproblematic here if one is intentionally obtuse to save it. Notice that you have to take the odd step of moving to the nebulous question of "who is the 'real' parent?" Why? Because it would sound ridiculous to say that adopted children cannot understand what it means for someone to be their "biological" parent.

If someone told you they had no father and had never been born of a woman would your reaction be a shrug and the thought: "why yes, people of some cultures aren't born, I suppose they spring forth from rocks fully formed? There is no truth about biological parentage in these parts." You have to be on a severe overdose of pomo to believe it.

And to be honest, I think the continual contrasting of pernicious forms of relativism with "Final Answers" (capitalized of course), "One True Canonical Descriptions," "The Only Right Way," and the like, is a strawman/false dichotomy.

As I see it, A.C Graying desire is to hold on to the idea that there is one common essence for "truth", "reality", and "value" because the only alternative is "cognitive relativism." However, what I was suggesting is we need not fall into relativism either. First, words like "truth", "reality", and "value" will have multiple uses and thus have family resemblances that will related these word conceptually. These multiple uses are discovered by examining the forms of life which are grounded in the some human activity. That said, these concepts can take place in such radically different forms of life, the family resemblances are not strong enough to call them related. Hence, I introduce the term "stranger" to describe such a case. For example, if we visit another world where the inhabitants utilize symbols like 1, 2, +, -, etc and made expressions such as 1 + 1 = 3 were carried out, would we want to say this is some sort of arithmetic that was carried out? Or is the judgment so radically different that we would not want to call it "arithmetic"? To say "truth" is relative seems to presuppose that there is something conceptual linking all these words together but somehow the outcomes conflict. But that need not be the case, if these concepts are used is such dramatically different ways in which humans act and judge in entirely different ways, why should we even talk as if they had some relationship that deserve to fall under the banner of "truth".

Grayling is talking about the cognitive relativism thesis, not any thesis about cultural relativism. That the same symbols are used for different operations can be explained in terms of cultural relativism. Cultural relativism certainly seems to be the case. Indeed, it's so apparent and been so long accepted that it seems trivial.

The claim Grayling is discussing is the claim that it is impossible to identify other forms of life, or at least any particular variances between our form of life and others', such that translation between forms of life is also impossible. On this view, translation is impossible because we experience the world entirely differently, not because our systems are different.

If aliens use marks that look like "1+1=3" that doesn't seem to make us cognitive strangers. Indeed, if "3" is just the symbol for "2" and the other symbols match up to our usage, then our systems are almost identical.

The cognitive relativism thesis would rather be that the strangers use a form of mathematics that is so alien that we can never recognize it as such. They have their own system of pattern recognition and systematic symbol manipulation, and it is simply beyond us.

Is this possible? Perhaps in some respects. Plenty of animals have shown they can do basic arithmetic. Yet when has a pig ever used the Pythagorean Theorem or a crow solved a quadratic equation? It seems possible that aliens might have math that is as beyond us as our math is beyond pigs. It seems like more of a stretch to say different human cultures could have this sort of difference. It even seems implausible to say that all alien maths should be beyond us, given that our simple maths is not beyond crows or other more intelligent animals.

Re PI 65, I think this has simply been proven wrong by advances in linguistics and information theory. We can identify similarities. I find it hard to even imagine Wittgenstein wanting to argue this point in the modern context given his respect for the sciences.

There are different family structures, there are half siblings, step siblings, etc. Yet, what culture believes in people who do not have biological mothers or fathers? Outside of miracles or myth, where do people accept: "that person was never in the womb?" or "oh yes, Jessie over there is another immaculate conception?" — Count Timothy von Icarus

I'm sorry. I was careless. I'm would not dream of contesting the point that the way we reproduce, biologically and culturally (because reproduction happens at both levels) is bound to be important in any human form of life and any human practices.

Absolutely nowhere is the answer. It is truly miraculous for there to be a human being without a biological father or biological mother. A cloned human being would still have a "parent" who had two biological parents and they would still (barring astounding scientific progress) need to be born. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Yes. Huxley imagines the culmination in "Brave New World". It's hard not to think that being born from a jar and raised in a baby factory would have a profound influence on subsequent culture. Huxley doesn't follow through on that. Also, as it happens, the animals that we feel closest to reproduce much as we do.

If someone told you they had no father and had never been born of a woman would your reaction be a shrug and the thought: "why yes, people of some cultures aren't born, I suppose they spring forth from rocks fully formed? There is no truth about biological parentage in these parts." You have to be on a severe overdose of pomo to believe it. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Yes. Christianity seems to have latched on to the sales technique that rests on making a big attention-getting claim, even it is wildly improbable and most likely false, or, charitably, metaphorical.

And to be honest, I think the continual contrasting of pernicious forms of relativism with "Final Answers" (capitalized of course), "One True Canonical Descriptions," "The Only Right Way," and the like, is a strawman/false dichotomy. — Count Timothy von Icarus

There are people around who think that is the choice. But I misjudged you it seems. "False dichotomy" must be the answer. I'm not sure I could prove it to a determined sceptic. But empirically, our language supports both doctrines, so it must be horses for courses - in other words, a matter decided for each practice. Is that the way you would go?

if these concepts are used is such dramatically different ways in which humans act and judge in entirely different ways, why should we even talk as if they had some relationship that deserve to fall under the banner of "truth". — Richard B

Would it not be a pragmatic decision? Not that I could articulate what the criteria might be for making such a decision - whether to see all the practices linked or "truth" as multiply ambiguous. One might also go back to consider what motivates absolutism/relativism. It's a question that Cavell might ask.

Well that makes more sense. I think these sorts of biological constants (constant across diverse historical/cultural variances) is what Wittgenstein is sometimes pointing to with the "form of life." Variance within humanity occurs, and it is sometimes profound, but it occurs in the context of us sharing many other things. This is what allows us to identify morphisms between various socio-historical "forms of life" and translate between them with greater or lesser degrees of ease. But to my mind this capability doesn't jive well with the concept of entirely disparate, sui generis forms of reason (e.g., that Chinese reason is entirely different from French reason).

No doubt we would likely have a harder time translating between our own form of life and that of a comparably intelligent species descended from a squid or turtle ancestor. Yet we would still share much with these species. The difference with extra terrestrials might be even greater (although perhaps not, given convergent evolution).

I tend to think that scientists' arguments to the effect that extra terrestrials with human level technology should be able to communicate with us to some degree through mathematics are at least plausible. We would share with extraterrestrials all that is common to all corners of the universe, limits on the information carrying capacity of various media, ratios, etc. And this might profitably be thought of as an even broader "form of life," the form of life common to all organisms living in our universe.

But a good question might be the degree to which greater intellect and technological mastery allows for better translation across more disparate forms of life. It certainly seems like the application of reason and technology has allowed us to understand bee and bird communications much better for instance.

Wittgenstein's point that any set of actions is still consistent with an infinite number of rules still holds. This holds with the study of nature as well. Any sort of "natural law," based solely on past observations seems doomed to underdetermination.

Yet if we set aside this problem for the behavior of inanimate nature, then it seems like we have decent grounds for determining the "rule-like" strictures organisms hold to. For one, the finite computational and information storage capacities of organisms would seem to rule out rules like "repeat pattern y for 100 years, then begin pattern z." For another thing, natural selection seems to rule out the adoption of a great deal of potential rules. One might not be able to identify a rule that is "set in stone," or similarly a description that is "set in stone," and yet the range of possibilities can be winnowed down enough to have a pretty good idea of where things lay, at least under prevailing conditions. Or as Robert Sokolowski puts it: we might not ever grasp the intelligibility of some entity in every context, but this does not preclude some grasp of it in some particular set of contexts.

But to my mind this capability doesn't jive well with the concept of entirely disparate, sui generis forms of reason (e.g., that Chinese reason is entirely different from French reason). — Count Timothy von Icarus

But has not history shown that what intelligent people called “reasonable” and “unreasonable” has changed from time to time.

But has not history shown that what intelligent people called “reasonable” and “unreasonable” has changed from time to time

This is playing off an equivocation in how "reasonable" is commonly used. Of course, if we take "reasonable" to mean something like "appropriate and fair" then this does change quite a bit from time to time and place to place. But this is cultural relativism, not cognitive relativism. This is not "sui generis forms of reason."

The claim of cognitive relativism is that the reason of ancient Greece or of Advaita Vedanta might become completely inaccessible to us—utterly unfathomable. Scholastic logic—its syllogisms and demonstrations—these might seem to make sense to us, but really it's a totally different type of reason. What they mean by "the law of non-contradiction" is not related to what we mean the same term, etc.

On this view, if one reads Aristotle's Organon, it might seem that Aristotle is discussing a logic quite similar to our own (and to "common sense") but really there is no way for us to know if we mean the same thing. Being separated by vast cultural differences, it rather seems we should not mean the same things when we refer to syllogisms, premises, etc.

And yet this thesis seems entirely implausible. For instance, I have never heard of a culture who does arithmetic completely different from any other culture. Where is the arithmetic that is untranslatable?

Now the cognitive relativist can always claims that different forms of arithmetic and logic only seem translatable—that we don't really understand Aristotle or Shankara at all. However, this seems pretty far fetched. And aside from that, it seems to leave the door open on an all encompassing skepticism, for on this account how can anyone be sure that they truly share a form of life with anyone else?

And yet this thesis seems entirely implausible. For instance, I have never heard of a culture who does arithmetic completely different from any other culture. Where is the arithmetic that is untranslatable? — Count Timothy von Icarus

Yep, and this was my point, if they are completely different in action/ judgement, why call it arithmetic at all.

And aside from that, it seems to leave the door open on an all encompassing skepticism, for on this account how can anyone be sure that they truly share a form of life with anyone else? — Count Timothy von Icarus

Well it will not be from some self evident absolute certain proposition. But that we act and judge similarly in most case to sustain the form of life.

You are both rushing ahead far too quickly. We'll get into trouble if we get too far ahead of ourselves.

I think these sorts of biological constants (constant across diverse historical/cultural variances) is what Wittgenstein is sometimes pointing to with the "form of life." — Count Timothy von Icarus

I'm not at all sure the biological is what W meant by "forms of life". It is, indeed, something that all human beings share. However, some people talk of "a common humanity", which is also hard to interpret, but seems to be related more to the possibility of what we might call a personal relationship. But we are also quite ready to classify some human beings as inhuman or subhuman or animal - mainly on moral grounds, but sometimes in reference to the breakdown of social structures.
Two points about these issues make them special. In this context, we are dealing with ourselves. This makes the issues very different. So far, science has proceeded on the basis that the scientist is an observer who can observe without (normally) affecting what is observed. That has already broken down in sub-atomic physics and breaks down even more dramatically in psychology and neurology. (I'm simplifying here, of course. Some relatively independent observation is possible.)
But in these context, understanding people, the subject of observation is also observing the observer. This sets up a different level of interaction between observer and observed.

But this is cultural relativism, not cognitive relativism. — Count Timothy von Icarus

So we have three levels - at least - of forms of life. Biological, cultural, cognitive. How many more? In any case, all these are intertwined and inseparable in practice. I mean that what we actually have to deal with is the combination of all the levels in action.

We would share with extraterrestrials all that is common to all corners of the universe, limits on the information carrying capacity of various media, ratios, etc. And this might profitably be thought of as an even broader "form of life," the form of life common to all organisms living in our universe. — Count Timothy von Icarus

It would indeed. But we would face the problem of detecting life before we could progress to detecting conscious "rational" life. No doubt we would be "limited" by comparisons with what we acknowledge as life on this planet. But a form of life that can thrive on Venus would, surely have to be rather different from the forms of life that thrive on Earth. No matter, the comparison with Earth is a starting-point and that's all we really need.

On this view, if one reads Aristotle's Organon, it might seem that Aristotle is discussing a logic quite similar to our own (and to "common sense") but really there is no way for us to know if we mean the same thing. Being separated by vast cultural differences, it rather seems we should not mean the same things when we refer to syllogisms, premises, etc. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Your discussion is really very ambitious. If we consider all the possible problems at once, they will be overwhelming. We need to deal with each problem as it comes up, with the tools (intellectual and technological) we have at hand. If you had asked Aristotle to build a nuclear collider, it would have been an overwhelming, impossible problem. Now look at us!

Now the cognitive relativist can always claims that different forms of arithmetic and logic only seem translatable—that we don't really understand Aristotle or Shankara at all. However, this seems pretty far fetched. And aside from that, it seems to leave the door open on an all encompassing skepticism, for on this account how can anyone be sure that they truly share a form of life with anyone else? — Count Timothy von Icarus

The underlined phrases are the give-away that something is being smuggled in to the argument. Those nebulous doubts are the essence of scepticism. But the desire for perfection is the enemy of progress. So it is best to do what we can and progress as we can, without being put off by the destuctive fears and ambitions of the sceptic.

Wittgenstein's point that any set of actions is still consistent with an infinite number of rules still holds. This holds with the study of nature as well. Any sort of "natural law," based solely on past observations seems doomed to underdetermination. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Underdetermination is another bogey-man. If we have a rule that works, we use until it doesn't - then we come up with another one. We can't possibly deal with all the possibilities at once, so we deal with what we have to hand.

But has not history shown that what intelligent people called “reasonable” and “unreasonable” has changed from time to time. — Richard B

Of course it has, and that's a good thing. On this planet, the common tradition gives a reasonable basis for making reasonable translations from one epoch to another.

Yep, and this was my point, if they are completely different in action/ judgement, why call it arithmetic at all. — Richard B

The supposition is not really specific enough to sensibly answer the question. We have to make decisions step by step, acknowledging mis-steps as we discover them

Well it will not be from some self evident absolute certain proposition. But that we act and judge similarly in most case to sustain the form of life. — Richard B

That I can agree with.

One need not take as one's target so radical a form of the thesis to show that cognitive relativism is unacceptable, however. This can be demonstrated as follows. Suppose that cognitive relativism is the case. How then do we recognize another form of life as another form of life? The ability to detect that something is a form of life and that it differs from our own surely demands that there be a means for us to identify its presence and to specify what distinguishes it from ours. But such means are unavailable if the other form of life is impenetrable to us, that is, if it is closed against our attempts to interpret it enough to say that it is a form of life. This means that if we are to talk of other forms of life at all we must be able to recognize them as such; we must be able to recognize the existence of behaviour and patterns of practices which go to make up a form of life in which there is agreement among the participants by reference to which their practices can go on. Moreover, if we are to see that the form of life is different from our own we have to be able to recognize the differences; this is possible only if we can interpret enough of the other form of life to make those differences apparent. And therefore there has to be sufficient common ground between the two forms of life to permit such interpretation.

I would agree from this perspective. Those who engage in the language game of “forms of life” need to agree in judgment when it comes to pointing out differences. You can call this the observing community. Yet, if another community is so radically different in terms of action and judgment and its use of symbols, communication is impossible under such circumstances. However, it is not impossible for the observing community who can see these differences to carry on conversation among themselves since there is agreement in use and judgment in their language.

The supposition is not really specific enough to sensibly answer the question. We have to make decisions step by step, acknowledging mis-steps as we discover them — Ludwig V

I would I have something like this in mind:

From RFM 153 “What does people’s agreement about accepting a structure as proof consist in? In the fact that they use words as language? As what we call “language”.

Imagine people who used money in transactions; that is to say coins, looking like our coins, which are made of gold and silver and stamped and are handed over for goods. But each person gives just what he pleases for goods, and the merchant does not give the customer more or less according to what he pays. In short this money, or what looks like money, has among them a quite different role from among us. We should feel much less akin to these people than people who are not acquainted with money at all and practice a primitive kind of barter. “But these people’s coins will surely also have some purpose!” Then has everything that one does a purpose? Say religious actions.

It is perfectly possible that we should be inclined to call people who behaved like this insane. And yet we dont call everyone insane who acts similarly within the forms of our culture, who uses words ‘without purpose’. (Think of the coronation of a King)”

I agree that we would not want to call that practice paying for goods. What else we might say might depend on further information. For example, are gold and silver rare or common in their environment? Do they appear to value it? And so forth.

In short this money, or what looks like money, has among them a quite different role from among us. — Wittgenstein RFM

Certainly, I would agree with that. Further investigation required. On the other hand, I wouldn't dream of calling them insane. This practice is incomprehensible but there's no need - yet - to dismiss it as insanity. After all, there's a preliminary investigation needed to work out whether insanity is a concept that can be applied to them at all.

And yet this thesis seems entirely implausible. For instance, I have never heard of a culture who does arithmetic completely different from any other culture. Where is the arithmetic that is untranslatable? — Count Timothy von Icarus

This is where this issue began. I think what I was trying to say that a concept of arithmetic that was incommensurable with our arithmetic seems to me incoherent. I can imagine a practice that appears to be like arithmetic, but isn't. But I can't imagine a practice of arithmetic that couldn't be translated into our arithmetic. The possibility of translation is a criterion for classifying a practice as arithmetic. I suppose we might find, as it were, fragments of arithmetic in various practices, but not a coherent single system. Or there might be parts of our arithmetic discernible in their practice and other parts missing.

However, it is not impossible for the observing community who can see these differences to carry on conversation among themselves since there is agreement in use and judgment in their language. — Richard B

Yes. But that would exclude the possibility of the kinds of interaction that would allow us to say that these people are people, or possibly even that they are alive.

Re PI 65, I think this has simply been proven wrong by advances in linguistics and information theory. We can identify similarities. I find it hard to even imagine Wittgenstein wanting to argue this point in the modern context given his respect for the sciences. — Count Timothy von Icarus

This is quite a claim and strongly put that the idea of "family resemblances" has been proven wrong. Please provide some references to support such a claim. For that matter, let me provide a reference that contradicts your point that there is no support from linguistics. In a well thought out critical study of Wittgenstein, Jerrold Katz, in his book, The Metaphysic of Meaning, presents his linguistic theory on meaning that actual support this idea of family resemblances. He states the following in Chapter 2, pg 110:

"I do not doubt the correctness of Wittgenstein's finding that there is nothing more than family resemblance in the cases like the application of 'game', but this finding is far from a general argument against essentialist definition. The supposition that the finding provides such an argument rest on the notion that a definitional account of the semantics of general terms is incompatible with family resemblance in the application of words like 'game.' But, in the case of at least one definitional account- the proto-theory and the "top-down" approach-family resemblance is exactly what is predicted!"

Re PI 65, I think this has simply been proven wrong by advances in linguistics and information theory. We can identify similarities. I find it hard to even imagine Wittgenstein wanting to argue this point in the modern context given his respect for the sciences. — Count Timothy von Icarus

What have these advances found to contradict the idea of family resemblance?

Re PI 65, I think this has simply been proven wrong by advances in linguistics and information theory. We can identify similarities. — Count Timothy von Icarus

But Wittgenstein doesn't argue that we can't identify similarities. He just argues that we do not need to identify a single similarity as the basis for every characteristic.

And the upshot of these considerations is: we see a complicated net-work of similarities overlapping and criss-crossing: similarities in the large and in the small — Phil. Inv. 66

Similarities are the elements of family resemblances.