Being dishonest doesn't always impair our ability to apply our rationality to choices, though in this case it would, and would be morally similar to stealing through fraud. Good spotting, heh.

I am indeed very happy to pay out the money if someone comes up with the answer. I have it sitting in an account waiting for just such a person. Yeah, I must admit that I find that cynicism frustrating. Scepticism is great, and you certainly shouldn't believe everything you read on the internet, but automatically assuming that everyone is out to get you seems like a fairly poor filter as well. I like to run an assignment in my environmental ethics class where students submit arguments on where I should donate a thousand dollars of my own money, with the winning charity recieving that money, and there have definitely been some in the past who just assume the money isn't real.

Yes, I do plan on engaging with respondants.

You could always do what economists do and just use money as a proxy for freedom. The enhancement of freedom is to be valued at what people are willing to pay for it. The benefit here is that people's own decisions are helping determine the trade-offs.

Note, we are not talking about individuals' willingness to pay here but the aggregate willingness to pursue say "a cure for blindness," versus "a life extending treatment for such and such a disease." Here, the demand curve represents society's total willingness to pay (i.e. to forgo other goods and services) vis-á-vis a choice. This has the benefit of piggybacking off people's free choices in the market.

Now, there is the issue of inequality here but I feel this can be dealt with in a two-pronged fashion:

1. The theory in no way has to endorse current levels of inequality. It is perfectly consistent with much higher levels of redistribution, a strong safety net, inheritance tax, etc. In a more equal society, people's willingness to spend on enhancements of freedom will be a better proxy for goodness.

2. You can equalize individuals' willingness to pay by looking at it in terms of the % share of their total net worth and likely future income.

A third point might be that, all else equal, economic development has been key to securing freedom. It is a great proxy for life expectancy, lower crime, education, etc. In the aggregate, high wealth individuals tend to do much more to spur economic growth (or at least this is a common assumption). As such, the fact that they receive a higher weighting here is not necessarily a bug but rather a feature.

We need not say the invisible hand of the market is perfect here. We need only argue that it is the best measure, that emergent market dynamics direct us towards the greatest promotion of freedom.

And indeed this could also be used to make a strong moral case against oligopoly collusion, rent seeking, etc. while making a good argument for the regulation of monopolies and externalities.

This is only an outline. You could draw on a lot in welfare economics to make this case. It might make more sense to pair such an idea with the concept of a social welfare function so that inequality itself is dealt based on the free choices of members of the society.

People doing the wrong thing due to akrasia, or weakness of will, is not a case of their freedom being restricted, but rather them failing to do the right thing, and I think this is what you are describing here when you talk about habits. — Dan

Mental constraints are just as much a restriction to one's freedom as physical constraints are. Mental constraints of habit are how social conformity works, and how laws, and rules and training in general, work to restrict one's freedom. It is a very real restriction, because understanding our environment is what prevents us from choosing to do what is physically impossible, also it helps us to avoid mistakes, and all sorts of unnecessary risks.

You might think that there is a clearly delineated separation between physical constraints and mental constraints, but that is not the case. When we start to consider the material body of the human being, and how the physical constraints of the human body influence mental constraints, we see that the two are intertwined, just like feelings and thoughts are, and one is not easily separable from the other.

The assertion that we can know causes and effects in one but not the other seems unsupported. — Dan

The opposite assertion seems unsupported as well, only supported by some preliminary theory you have presented. Let's compromise then, and agree that we can have some degree of understanding of cause/effect relations in both, the external world observed through sensation, and the internal world observed with the mind. I think you'll agree that the issue is the causal relation between the two, not the causal relations of one or the other.

Suppose "free" means that there is not a direct cause/effect relation from the external to the internal. If there was such a direct relation, all of our thoughts would be directly caused by our sensations of the external, consequently our decisions and actions as well would be, and we'd have no free will. So, we assume that there is no direct relation of causal necessity, this supports "free will". Also it serves as the foundation for "freedom" which you say ought to be protected.

To be able to protect it, don't we need to be able to understand it a bit? Would you agree that we need to assume a source of activity within, which is not caused by external activity, as the base, the foundation, which makes "freedom" possible, and therefore that which needs to be protected?

Also, I fundamentally disagree that not choosing increases ones freedom, so all of this discussion about whether or not we can see the consequences of not choosing and instead engaging in contemplation (which does seem to be implied by what you are saying), is really just debating an ancillary claim you made. — Dan

I now believe I understand why you disagree with the principle that choosing restricts one's freedom. You do not believe that states of mind, or mental activities in general, can be constraints or restrictions on one's freedom. Consider for example, that choosing X restricts my freedom to choose not-X, not in an absolute way though, until I carry out actions associated with X, because I could still change my mind. But once I choose X, the likelihood of me choosing not-X is greatly reduced, because I will no longer consider not-X as a possibility.

Do you agree that free will requires an internal source of activity, without external causation as proposed above? If you do, then you'll see that there must also be internal restrictions to this internally sourced activity, or else it would have no direction, and be random in its effects. But it does have direction, and this is due to the restrictions imposed by mental activities like thoughts, decisions, and states of mind. As described above, the restrictions are not absolute, and do not make the contrary action impossible, they just guide the actions in a favourable direction. This is the way laws work, they do not make the illegal activity impossible, they just serve to guide activity in a favourable direction. But just because they do not make the restricted activity impossible, this does not mean that they are not restrictions on freedom nonetheless.

I would maintain though that a vision of freedom where maintaining one's freedom requires a flight from all definiteness is contradictory, for the reasons I have stated. Here, the exercise of freedom itself makes one less free. — Count Timothy von Icarus

I don't see that your "reasons" were well thought out. You assumed an absolute freedom, which is clearly not what I was talking about.

Being determined by circumstance seems like a definite limit on freedom however. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Circumstances are not "definite" though, as things are constantly changing. That's the issue, we live in a world of constant change, where many things are by nature indefinite.

But if our ends are not determined rationally, but rather as a coping response to circumstance, then it seems to me they are less than fully free. — Count Timothy von Icarus

How are these two different? Coping with circumstance may be the end which guides the rational mind.

It seems like "survival" is functioning as the overarching end here. But sometimes it seems like some ends trump survival, e.g. Socrates' acceptance of death. If we are always oriented towards survival rather than what we think is truly best, that will be a constraint on freedom of action. We could consider here the case where Socrates succumbs to cowardice and flees even though he knew he ought not do so. Here, he is not free to do what he thinks is best, but is rather ruled over by circumstance and fear. — Count Timothy von Icarus

What one thinks is "truly best" is subjective, meaning that one's "good" actions are dependent on the opinion of the subject. Coping with circumstances is objective, making one's "good" actions dependent on the activities of the object.

If an agent is "oriented towards no specific end," but rather the ends are "determined by circumstance," then how is it not circumstance in the driver's seat? No doubt, we have to deal with the circumstances we face, but freedom would seem to come from mastering them to the extent possible. — Count Timothy von Icarus

I don't see why you think that this puts circumstances in the driver's seat. When you drive a car, and you avoid obstacles which come up in front of you, the objects are not in the driver's seat.

But you're right, freedom comes from mastering the circumstances, that's exactly the point. So if freedom is the highest value, then mastering circumstances is the means. And, if we get to the point where the circumstances are completely mastered, not just "to the extent possible", then we can set another goal, produced from this new perspective.

I think Plato has a very good argument for why reason has to guide free action. We can't very well be fully free if we don't understand why we are acting or why it is good to do so. But the "rule of the rational part of the soul," would seem to require determinant aims. — Count Timothy von Icarus

I think that using reason to deal with circumstances is a very good example of using reason to guide free action.

I mean, it's a nice idea. I don't it works, but a nice idea.

My first questions are:
1. What about things that people don't generally think of "paying" for?
2. Isn't aggregating in this way functionally the same as using a majority to resolve conflicts, except with economic flavor?

I'm not drawing a sharp distinction between mental and physical constraints, I'm simply pointing out that having a habit isn't a proper constraint in the sense of restricting your freedom. No is social conformity etc. Laws are a restriction of freedom because they come with a threat against said freedom attached.

I'm not sure what you take the opposite assertion to be in this context, so I don’t know whether i agree or not.

I mean, I certainly wouldn't go so far as to say that external states can't cause internal states, but yes I would agree with the general point that free will requires our actions to be caused by us in a way that is not just a part of a deterministic causal chain. And yes, I would agree that we need to be able to understand it a bit. And I think we do understand it a bit. Not fully, but given that what we are trying to protect is a person's ability to understand and make choices, and we can understand the ways in which that can be prevented from happening (or many of them at least), then it seems like we can get some good protecting done without having a full understanding of how free will works.

No, I'm perfectly happy to say that a state of mind could reduce freedom. I just don't think that the ones you are talking about do.

Perhaps I can clarify with an example. Let's say I choose to chop off my leg. This prevents me from doing a bunch of stuff with it in the future, but this is not problematic. So long as I am choosing to remove/destroy the thing, then I am choosing to give up those things and therefore my freedom over them.

In the same way, if I choose to have a sandwich for breakfast instead of eggs on toast, I might be giving up the other (I mean, I could have both, but I wouldn't want to), but it's my choice to make (assuming some things about access to the foods in question). The making of the choice doesn't restrict my freedom, it exercises it.

Money is just used as a proxy for opportunity costs. Money is a good proxy because society is, in an important sense, organized around it. Moreover, we have lots of data on it. Yet it isn't a perfect proxy.

Ultimately, what you "pay" for any experience or thing is what you give up to get it—the "opportunity cost." For instance, walking with your sister at the park doesn't cost money, but it does mean giving up everything else you could have done during that time period (including earning money).

Wealth itself has decreasing marginal utility. Going from earning $20,000 a year to $120,000 is life changing, huge. Going from $120,000 to $220,000 is still a big deal, but it doesn't totally shift your options in the way the first move does. Whereas moving from $1,120,000 to $1,220,000 is not going to be super noticable and for the very rich an extra $100,000 is a rounding error they won't notice (even if they do care a lot about it due to the vice of pleonexia, "grasping.")

You see this in the backbending labor curve. As people make more money per hour they want to work more to get that high pay. But at a certain high level of pay they will start wanting to work less, to have time to enjoy what that money can give them.

This also helps fix the problem of inequality, in the money is "worth more" (in terms of utility) for those who have less of it.


As to the second point, I am not sure if this necessarily leads to democratization. People who aren't directly affected by something like a cure for blindness don't really participate in that market. There is a sort of aggregation here, but it is, at least according to most economists' assumptions, the aggregation of rational agent's choices based on their opportunity costs.

Obviously, I think this is open to critique at the level of how freedom is defined and the assumption that people are automatically "rational agents," making choices in an unconflicted manner. On the standard economic account, we end up assuming the heroin addict has simply made a rational calculation based on how much utility heroin is worth to him, versus other opportunity costs. This seems to be a bad assumption to me, but it is common (or at least we assume this is unproblematic in the aggregate, that movement away from rationality is just random noise that still tends to some mean).



Right, but mastering circumstances towards what end? Presumably we want to take control of circumstances to direct them towards some end we find good, else why bother trying to shape them at all?

Why do we find such ends good in the first place? Instinct? Passion? Taste? It seems to me that we will be most free when we fully understand why we pursue the ends we pursue and when we understand these ends to be good ends through a rational process.

Perhaps the natural end our behavior tends towards is survival, but once survival is assured how are new ends chosen? If it's not via a process involving some sort of rational reflection, in which ends are chosen based on what truly best, it seems like the problem of arbitrariness creeps back in. For example, to be determined by instinct alone, without any understanding of why the way one acts is choiceworthy, seems to be a less than fully free action. To be ruled over by instinct is to be ruled over by a mere part of oneself, to not fully fathom why one is acting. For it seems totally possible that we might judge the ends the passions and appetites drive us towards as inferior ends, as not truly choiceworthy.

And it seems to me that survival can be superceded as an end—that we can recognize higher ends (e.g. Socrates, St. Paul, Boethius, Origen, etc.)

Laws are a restriction of freedom because they come with a threat against said freedom attached. — Dan

The point though, is that the way that laws work is through social conformity and habit. It doesn't make sense to say that laws are a restriction, but the means by which the laws work to constrain us are not restrictions. Do you see what I mean? The law says I better not steal, and it's a restriction on my freedom because it threatens me with jail time. So I decide that I better not steal, and I create habits which always incline me away from that idea of taking the thing, if such an idea ever starts to come into my mind.

Why do you think that the law qualifies as a restriction on my freedom, yet the ideas and habits which the law helps to form in my mind, and which is what actually causes me to behave in a restricted way, are not restrictions on my freedom? The "real" restrictions are the ideas and thinking patterns within my mind, in the realm of ideas and mental activity. The external law just provides incentive for me to create those restrictions within my mind. This is what Plato showed in The Republic, the realm of ideas is more immediate to use, and so it is where the real causal power is. Today we understand this as "ideology", an the effect which ideology has on the actions of human beings.

Perhaps I can clarify with an example. Let's say I choose to chop off my leg. This prevents me from doing a bunch of stuff with it in the future, but this is not problematic. So long as I am choosing to remove/destroy the thing, then I am choosing to give up those things and therefore my freedom over them. — Dan

I follow your example well, but I think that what you need to consider is the effects of training, ideology, and even what we used to call brainwashing. Human beings are mostly not leaders, but follows, staying safe in the midst of the herd. As such they are very gullible. When we see all the many institutions which direct people in a good way, like educational institutions, and legal institutions, we overlook how all these things are really robbing people of their freedom, because the institutions are set up to do this for "the good". But people who do not get drawn in, and persuaded by that ideology, might become wayward, and they may be directed in many different ways.

The point being that when a person makes a bad choice, you say that was their freedom to make that bad choice, and now they must live with the consequences of having made that bad choice. But this does not get to the real issue, which is why the person made the bad choice. Something misled them. The "why", why did they make that choice, I classified under "ideology", their ideology misled them. Now freedom and the goal of protecting that underlying principle which provides for freedom becomes very problematic because the lazy mind likes to follow the herd and is therefore gullible to be misled by ideology. So the underlying inclination is to neglect that principle of freedom which you wish to protect, follow the herd, and be led or misled accordingly.

Suppose I am raising my children, and I homeschool them, and do everything I can to promote free thinking and a very open mind. This I do to protect their freedom of choice from the ideologies of "the system", as i am in disagreement with that ideology.. Unless I feed them some other ideologies about "good behaviour", and instill an acceptable ideology within their minds, they may develop a hole there, which amounts to a lack of direction. Then they would be exceptionally gullible, and could be preyed upon by others with bad intentions.

What i am saying is that there's a risk going to far in protecting the principle of freedom. We want a person to develop a good strong capacity to reason, and make one's own choices from an open mind, but at the same time we want that person to be directed so as the choices are within a specific range of "good" choices. And to determine "good choices" we look to something like consequentialism.

I think we might apply Aristotle's doctrine of the mean. The principle of freedom which you want to protect is at one end of the scale, one extreme. To protect this implies allowing the person to be free from ideologies which may be harmful, to have an open mind and not to be influenced by prejudice. At the other extreme is the ideological "good" of consequentialism. We see that there is a need to have a person trained to be naturally inclined toward what is considered as good. Virtue, lies somewhere between these two extremes as the mean between them.

Right, but mastering circumstances towards what end? Presumably we want to take control of circumstances to direct them towards some end we find good, else why bother trying to shape them at all? — Count Timothy von Icarus

I think it's like I said. Once we learn how to master the circumstances, then we might be able to understand why this is good.

And it seems to me that survival can be superceded as an end—that we can recognize higher ends (e.g. Socrates, St. Paul, Boethius, Origen, etc.) — Count Timothy von Icarus

I don't think that these are examples of people recognizing higher ends rather than that they recognize that there is higher ends. I do not deny that there is higher ends, I just think that we need to address the issues which are present to us now, fulfil the immediate ends. It's a matter of taking things one step at a time. We know that we need to climb the ladder. We cannot see the top, and we have no idea where the ladder leads. However, we can always see the next step and we can work to get to the top of it. After that, we'll be able to see the next step.

I didn't mean to suggest that you were involving everybody, just everybody affected by the decision in question. In the case of the cure for blindness, I'm not sure how this is different from just going with that the majority wants (the majority of people who, as it were, have some skin in the game). And, as that idea won't fly because what the majority wants doesn't matter, I'm not sure how filtering that through economics helps.

Because a threat to your freedom is being imposed in one case (you better not steal or else), and in the other case you are just acting in a not very considered way, which is your "right" (term isn't quite accurate, but useful in this context).

I mean, the type of freedom is quite a limited one already. It isn't the freedom to do anything that is to be protected, it is the freedom to make choices over what belongs to the person in question. If you want to steal my car and prevent you doing that, that hasn't violated your freedom in a morally relevant way (depending on how I do the preventing) because stealing my car was not your choice to make.

Because a threat to your freedom is being imposed in one case (you better not steal or else), and in the other case you are just acting in a not very considered way, which is your "right" (term isn't quite accurate, but useful in this context). — Dan

So, the law is a threat to restrict one's freedom, the habit is an actual restriction of one's freedom.

If you want to steal my car and prevent you doing that, that hasn't violated your freedom in a morally relevant way (depending on how I do the preventing) because stealing my car was not your choice to make. — Dan

What is the principle you are claiming here? People attempt to steal cars all the time. Clearly, to steal your car is a choice which can be made. Are you saying that since you believe that you have the capacity to prevent me from stealing your car, (dissuade, threaten, kill me, or whatever it takes), this means that I cannot choose to steal your car? I think that if you really believe that, you are delusional.

Obviously you are confusing potential (theoretical) restrictions to one's freedom of choice, with actual (practical) restrictions to one's freedom of choice. In practise, my freedom of choice is primarily restricted by the internal workings of my body, brain, and mind, through things that influence my thoughts and feelings. Your potential actions of persuasion and threats have a secondary position by being able to influence my thoughts in a secondary way, through my use of my senses. And if you act in a way of physical violence to prevent me from carrying out what I choose, then this is not a restriction on my freedom of choice, it is a restriction on my freedom to act. In this case, my freedom of choice allows that I can choose to do what is physically impossible to do. That is actually a common situation in the case of mistaken actions.

I believe I mentioned this distinction between the freedom to choose and the freedom to act, earlier, briefly. If someone chooses to do what is physically impossible for that person to do, and this is evident to the person, this is an indication of irrationality, being unreasonable. So if it is the case that you have made it clear to me, that if I move to steal your car, you will physically prevent me from doing this with an act of violence, then I would be irrational to continue with that act. However, in some cases of demonstrating a point, one might rationally choose what is known to be physically impossible, to bring attention to one's conditions, as an instance of protest or something like that.

No, a habit isn't a restriction of one's freedom.

No, the principle I'm claiming is that my car, being my property, is something that belongs to me and not something that you get to make choices over, morally speaking. As I mentioned in the primer, the kind of freedom being protected here is specifically over those choices that belong to you. Whether or not to steal my car is not a choice that belongs to you, because it is [my car.

Freedom of choice vs freedom to act is not a distinction I am drawing. When I talk about "freedom" in this context, I mean the ability of persons to understand and make those choices that belong to them. But that does include being able to actually do the thing. But yes, this includes freedom to actually do the thing, rather than just choose it in an abstract sense.

No, a habit isn't a restriction of one's freedom. — Dan

So says you, but I say you do not understand freedom and the true nature of its restrictions.

No, the principle I'm claiming is that my car, being my property, is something that belongs to me and not something that you get to make choices over, morally speaking. — Dan

When you say "morally speaking" you imply that I ought not make that kind of choice. But oughts, moral principles, do not restrict one's freedom, they give us rules which serve as guidance in our decision making. The actual decisions are what restrict one's freedom.

Therefore I get to make choices concerning your property whenever I want, and I refer to moral guidance whenever I do. Nothing restricts my freedom to do this, even though some would say that I ought not covet any property of anyone else. However, it is the responsibility of each individual to follow the moral principles, and establish ways of curbing one's own inclinations toward making choices which one ought not make. The principal way of restricting one's own freedom of choice is by developing good habits. This is begun when we are very young, being trained by our caregivers, and it continues through schooling, and to some extent throughout our lives.

Whether or not to steal my car is not a choice that belongs to you, because it is [my car. — Dan

Whether the choice "belongs" to me or not, is irrelevant. The issue is whether I have the capacity to freely make that choice. And clearly I do. Therefore it is incorrect for you to say that I don't get to make a choice on this matter. If I didn't get to make a choice in this sort of matter, then every time I was inclined toward taking someone else's property, I would, and every time that I wasn't inclined to take someone else's property I wouldn't, because there would be no decision making going on, no choices, I would be acting on impulse. However, what is really the case, is that every time that I get inclined toward taking someone else's property I decide not to. Therefore I truly do make choices concerning whether or not to take someone else's property. Because I am morally responsible, I decide not to. But for you to say that I don't get to make choices in this matter is nothing but a falsity.

Freedom of choice vs freedom to act is not a distinction I am drawing. — Dan

I've noticed that. However, I think it is very important to make this distinction if you desire to understand freedom. Otherwise you'll believe that just because I am not free to actually steal your car, because you will kill me if I try, I am also not free to choose to steal your car, which the act of you killing me would demonstrate that I am free to make that choice. See, the very nature of "punishment" demonstrates that we are free to choose what we are not free to do. Therefore the distinction is a requirement if we want to understand freedom.

No, I don't imply that you shouldn't make that choice (though in this case you shouldn't). What I am saying is that your freedom to make that choice is not morally valuable because that choice doesn't belong to you. My freedom to keep my car on the other hand is valuable because my car does belong to me.

It doesn't matter whether you are habituated to good action or bad action, both are still available to you. You have free will and your habits do not get in the way of you exercising that to choose to do good, or do bad.

Whether that choice belongs to you is very much morally relevant, because that is the type of freedom that FC is trying to protect: that over those choices that belong to the person in question.

No, I don't imply that you shouldn't make that choice (though in this case you shouldn't). What I am saying is that your freedom to make that choice is not morally valuable because that choice doesn't belong to you. My freedom to keep my car on the other hand is valuable because my car does belong to me. — Dan

Now you've lost me. You appear to equivocate with "belong". Your car belongs to you. A choice which I freely make has no moral value because it does not belong to me. Are you insinuating that a choice I make is not my choice?

It doesn't matter whether you are habituated to good action or bad action, both are still available to you. You have free will and your habits do not get in the way of you exercising that to choose to do good, or do bad. — Dan

I think you are in denial, refusing to recognize the reality of the situation. When a person is habituated in a specific way, that person naturally proceeds in the way of the habit any time that the circumstances warrant that activity. Your behaviour in this discussion provides a real example. Through your education you have been inclined to think in a specific way about freedom. This habituation of your thinking patterns closes your mind to what I am saying, so you continually deny that what I am saying is the truth.

Maybe it will help to understand if we characterize habits as neural patterns. Once initiated, the pattern is followed, restricting the possibility of choice in that thought. That habituated way of thinking is a restriction on the person's freedom to choose and to act.

If you studied Plato, Augustine, and Aquinas, instead of whatever philosophy you did study, you would understand that habits truly do get in the way of one's freedom to choose and do what is good. Directed by Socrates, Plato questioned the relation between virtue and knowledge. It was claimed at the time, that virtue is a form of knowledge. However, Socrates demonstrated that a person can know what is good, yet not do it. Augustine, delved much deeper into this subject, how it is possible that a person knows what is good, yet may consistently act in a contrary way. Aquinas developed the role of "habit" in restricting one's capacity to choose to do what one knows is good. In other words, the person has the knowledge of what they ought to do in the circumstances, yet does otherwise, because the person's freedom to choose to do what is good is compromised by the person's preexisting habits.

Whether that choice belongs to you is very much morally relevant, because that is the type of freedom that FC is trying to protect: that over those choices that belong to the person in question. — Dan

This statement appears to rely on an incoherent sense of "belong". You appear to be saying that when a person chooses to do something while under the influence of habit, the choice does not "belong" to the person. I assume that criminals will be using that defence in court. "I am not responsible for my criminal activities because those choices don't belong to me." Are you saying that a person is not responsible for one's habitual actions because the choices involved don't belong to the person, they come from the teacher? is that how you account for education? A person acquires ways of thinking from one's teachers, such that the ways of thinking involved don't actually belong to the person who acquires them?

No, I am saying that only the freedom to make certain kinds of choices is morally valuable. Specifically, the choices over that which belongs to the person, their mind, their body, and their property.

I am not "in denial", though I am denying the truth of your assertion. I do not lack understanding, your claim just isn't so.

You can characterize them as neural pathways if like, but a reinforced neural pathway does not prevent a person from choosing to think differently.

People are able to act against their habits and, in some cases, they are morally required to do so. Knowing the right thing to do and not doing it does not show that you were unable to do it.

No, I am not saying that being "under the influence of habit" affects whether a choice belongs to a person at all. I am saying that habits are not a relevant factor because they don't restrict freedom. I am also saying, seperately, that the only freedom that is morally relevant is the kind over those things which belong to us. These are two seperate claims.

No, I am saying that only the freedom to make certain kinds of choices is morally valuable. Specifically, the choices over that which belongs to the person, their mind, their body, and their property. — Dan

No, no, no, this is not true at all. The most morally valuable choices we make are concerning others, when we help them, or choose to hurt them. You know, like "love thy neighbour". The choices derived from that principle concern other persons.

You can characterize them as neural pathways if like, but a reinforced neural pathway does not prevent a person from choosing to think differently. — Dan

Remember, I didn't say that a habit restricts freedom in an absolute sense, it restricts in the sense of facilitating one specific decision at the expense of others. It doesn't make it impossible to choose otherwise, as will power, and the will to break a habit demonstrate. It restricts by making one choice the easy choice and anything else much more difficult.

People are able to act against their habits and, in some cases, they are morally required to do so. Knowing the right thing to do and not doing it does not show that you were unable to do it. — Dan

I've been through this already. I'm not talking about absolute restriction, making something impossible. I am talking about restrictions in the same sort of way that laws restrict us. Laws don't make criminal activity impossible, yet they are understood to restrict our freedom.

No, I am not saying that being "under the influence of habit" affects whether a choice belongs to a person at all. I am saying that habits are not a relevant factor because they don't restrict freedom. I am also saying, seperately, that the only freedom that is morally relevant is the kind over those things which belong to us. These are two seperate claims. — Dan

You are inconsistent, because you say that laws restrict our freedom, but habits do not.

I mean, I think I disagree, but I'm also not saying that the choices can't involve other people.

What I am claiming is that the measure of moral value is the ability of free, rational agents to understand and make their own choices. By "their own choices" I mean choices over those things that belong to them, their minds, bodies and property.

I mean, a choice being "difficult" in that sense is morally irrelevant. It's not a real restriction on the choice.

Again, laws restrict our freedom because they come with threats attached. If laws didn't carry the threat of punishment, they wouldn't restrict our freedom either.

What I am claiming is that the measure of moral value is the ability of free, rational agents to understand and make their own choices. By "their own choices" I mean choices over those things that belong to them, their minds, bodies and property. — Dan

I really do not think that this could suffice for a foundation of "moral value". It requires a determination, or judgement as to what qualifies as "one's property". This begs the question of the right to ownership. This would place laws and government, which determine ownership, as logically prior to moral principles. The principles which determine ownership would be amoral, being outside of morality. Then those with power would dictate who owns what.

I mean, a choice being "difficult" in that sense is morally irrelevant. It's not a real restriction on the choice. — Dan

I don't know about you, but I find that difficulty is a very real restriction on choice. If there is a very easy way, and a very difficult way, to achieve the same end, no one would choose the difficult way. Clearly the degree of ease or difficulty is a real restriction on one's freedom of choice. Look, if I apprehend something as so difficult that it is impossible, the restriction becomes virtually absolute, I will not choose to do what I know is impossible.

Again, laws restrict our freedom because they come with threats attached. If laws didn't carry the threat of punishment, they wouldn't restrict our freedom either. — Dan

I know, but you are not paying attention to the way that threats can restrict freedom of choice. The threats only act to deter the deciding agent, through the person's mind, via thoughts. The threat of punishment makes me think twice about stealing your car. It is this activity of thinking, I might get caught, I might get punished, which is what really restricts my freedom of choice. Threats of punishment don't deter, and therefore don't restrict the freedom of, the person who doesn't care, or who doesn't think about getting caught. Therefore it is not the threat of punishment which restricts freedom, but the thinking of the person who apprehends the threat of punishment, which restricts the freedom. This is no different from the restriction of freedom involved with the choice about something which is difficult to do. One restricts freedom with the thought of "I can't do that, I might get caught and get punished", while the other restricts freedom with the thought of "I can't do that, it's too difficult".

Not at all. Property can only be owned in a morally relevant sense if it can be owned without laws and property.

Difficult and impossible are not the same thing. Further, people do choose difficult things all the time. Further, not wanting to do something and not being able to are not the same thing.

That is like saying that nailing your hands to a wall doesn't restrict your freedom, since it is your hands that are preventing you from moving. The two thoughts are not morally similar, as one requires the person to choose while their freedom is at risk (due to the threat of punishment) while the other is just someone choosing not to do something.

That is like saying that nailing your hands to a wall doesn't restrict your freedom, since it is your hands that are preventing you from moving. The two thoughts are not morally similar, as one requires the person to choose while their freedom is at risk (due to the threat of punishment) while the other is just someone choosing not to do something. — Dan

You know, there is always reasons behind one's choices, whether it's a threat, a deadline, love, friendship, hate, revenge, or one of a myriad of personal goals. Your characterization of "the other is just someone choosing not to do something", appears to be intended to mislead. There is no such thing as "just someone choosing", choices are made for a reason, or reasons.

The issue is whether a choice is unduly restricted. We live in a dangerous world, one's freedom is always at risk, that is why we ought not take decision making lightly. However, the issue is not the ways in which one's freedom is at risk, it is the ways in which one's freedom is actually restricted. Nailing a person's hands to a wall is not analogous with a threat. This is why you need to differentiate between the freedom to choose and the freedom to act. It's one thing for you to deter my freedom of choice with a threat, and quite a different thing for you to restrict my freedom to act on a choice I've freely made, with physical violence.

No, the threat really does restrict your freedom. It isn't just a reason to act, it is coercing you to act in a way by threatening your freedom. Choosing to do someone for the other reasons you mentioned is not the same, as the choice is free and not coerced.

A threat to one's freedom is not an actual restriction of one's freedom.

So we're right back to square one. Coercion restricts one's freedom by having an influence on the way one thinks, and therefore one's choice, just like habits restrict one's freedom by influencing the way that one thinks, and therefore one's choice. It is the person's choice which actually restricts the person freedom to act, not the threat, because the person could choose to disregard the threat. Therefore the threat is not a real restriction. You say that a threat coerces, but only if it succeeds, and the fact that it may fail demonstrates that it doesn't actually restrict one's freedom to choose. The necessity required for causation is lacking. It's something else (how the person who is coerced responds to the threat) which actually does the restricting.

Your refusal to acknowledge the reality of the restrictions on the freedom of choice, and the freedom to act, is just evidence that the habits of a closed mind restrict one's freedom to adequately judge an hypothesis.

I agree that thought is mediating the way which coercion violates someone's freedom, but it is doing that by making the person make a choice between one of their freedom's being violated and another. In the case of the habit, the person's choice isn't being restricted at all. These things are different.

Yeah, that is bait to get people to do free work on your theory. — Lionino

:lol:

Yeah, that is bait to get people to do free work on your theory. — Lionino

It's not hard to get people here to do your philo work. You don't need to offer them money. Just say, "hey, I have this neat new ethical theory. Try and rip it to shreds." And engage honestly and without ego.

In the case of the habit, the person's choice isn't being restricted at all. — Dan

I explained why the person's choice is restricted by habit. The habit prevents the person from properly considering other options. This is a very real and very strong restriction to one's freedom to choose. The most significant restriction to one's freedom of choice is a failure to consider all the possibilities. The person is free to choose any option, but literally cannot choose an option which doesn't come to mind. The best option may not come to mind, due to the person\s preexisting habits of thinking, so the person's freedom to choose that option is restricted accordingly.

And, back to the point we started with, making a choice restricts one's freedom in much the same way. The choice is made, and the person proceeds accordingly. Proceeding with the choice firmly decided restricts one's freedom to choose otherwise.

The most significant restriction to one's freedom of choice is a failure to consider all the possibilities. — Metaphysician Undercover

This isn't a restriction. I'm with Dan on this. A restriction would mean you are unable to do the thing. In this case, you're just misguided. Any instance where a further option is suggested to you leaves you open to considering it. Your personal habits only prevent you from bringing options up within yourself - and even then, not really. Habits are flimsy, mentally speaking, versus the ability to take on new information.

Proceeding with the choice firmly decided restricts one's freedom to choose otherwise. — Metaphysician Undercover

I wouldn't be surprised if Dan just laughs at this. It's nonsensical.

I think Amadeus has covered my response to habits fairly well. An option not occurring to you is not a restriction of your freedom. It's just you not thinking about an option that you had.

A restriction would mean you are unable to do the thing. In this case, you're just misguided. — AmadeusD

But that is exactly the case with Dan's perspective. Dan thinks laws, and the threat of punishment are restrictions. But these do not prevent one from carrying out those acts. Neither of us assumes that it is necessary that a restriction prevents in an absolute sense, to be a "restriction", so this criticism is completely irrelevant.

This is why we need to distinguish between freedom to choose and freedom to act. Here we have the basis for impossibility, restriction in an absolute sense. Some things chosen are impossible to achieve in actions due to physical restrictions. This is the case when someone is physically prevented with violence for example. Physical impossibility is an absolute restriction, making the chosen act impossible.

And, in the context of freedom of choice some options are impossible for a person to chose because they are not present to the person's mind. Do you agree that a person is unable to choose an option which is not within that person's mind? This would be the case when the person has a lack of knowledge for example. An observer with more complete knowledge would say that the person should have chosen X, but in reality it was impossible for the person to have chosen X because the person did not have that knowledge. This impossibility of choice is comparable to physical impossibility of action.

Any instance where a further option is suggested to you leaves you open to considering it. Your personal habits only prevent you from bringing options up within yourself - and even then, not really. Habits are flimsy, mentally speaking, versus the ability to take on new information. — AmadeusD

Yes, suggesting a further option makes that option available, and the restriction is no longer complete, absolute, in the sense that this choice is no longer impossible for the person. But that is irrelevant to the fact that this choice was impossible at the prior time.

Now the force of habit is very relevant. If choosing the newly presented option requires thinking in a way not familiar to the person, the option will automatically be rejected. This is very evident in discussions at TPF. People are firmly entrenched in their habits of thought, so that it is extremely difficult to teach them to accept a new perspective. This relates to the attitudes underlying one's use of language, which Wittgenstein talked about in On Certainty, as bedrock propositions or something like that. These underlying principles, which are actually attitudes, are what a person assumes cannot be doubted. This makes it extremely difficult to change a person's habits of thought, and accept a new option which is unacceptable from the perspective of the existing attitude. Therefore mentioning a further option brings that option into the realm of possibility, but existing habits still restrict one from choosing it.

What do you mean by "not really" in this sentence?
"Your personal habits only prevent you from bringing options up within yourself - and even then, not really."
Your habits dictate the information available to your thinking mind, information in memories. This is a very real and absolute restriction, you simply cannot dig up information which has been forgotten. And, the way that your mind works, in its habits, greatly restricts your capacity to take on new information. The new information must be taken up in a way which is consistent with the existing way of thinking. If it's not, it's rejected as incomprehensible, or nonsense. This fact is very evident at TPF.

It's just you not thinking about an option that you had. — Dan

It's a lot more than simply not thinking about something, it's knowledge not held, information not available to that thinking mind. An observer might say option X was available to the person, but if the person was lacking in that information, the option was not available to the person.