"Family resemblances" is not an "idea" or "theory" that can be proved wrong. — Count Timothy von Icarus
My point is that given advances in the study of language it is certainly now too trivial to warrant much attention. — Count Timothy von Icarus
We might make a similar move in getting rid of the concept of "game" and moving to the broader concept of "system," (which seems to be far more common in linguistics). — Count Timothy von Icarus
So I am not sure I would conflate "triviality" with generality.
I don't really understand what you mean here by warrant attention. You either agree with the claim or you don't. People can do advanced, even rigorous, linguistics study about the structure of language and still agree with the notion of family resemblance. So unless you are suggesting that modern linguistic contradicts it, I don't understand the consequence of what you are saying. It's like saying that someone who studied the mating behavior of a certain kind of insect is not interested in questions about the definition of life - so what? People interested in specialist linguistic fields are not necessarily going to be interested in a more general concept from the philosophy of language. I suspect you conflate Wittgenstein's philosophical arguments and rhetoric against the logical positivism at the time for a full-blown scientific theory of language which it clearly is not.
Well, that may be so. I wouldn't want to comment on what linguistics does any more than I want to comment on what mathematics does. But if you are claiming that what linguistics has done replaces what philosophers do, that demands a different kind of consideration. I would expect to find that the agenda of linguistics is different from the agenda of philosophy. How far the ideas of one impact on the ideas of the other is a tricky question.there now exist ways to describe similarities in languages and codes with much more rigor." — Count Timothy von Icarus
I don't think that's quite fair to Wittgenstein.The question is not: "is it wrong " but "is it so broad as to be trivial," i.e. "all languages must share some things, but I shall not identify any," is a claim that really doesn't say anything of substance, (nor is it a novel claim). — Count Timothy von Icarus
This suggests to me that language is being seen as an abstract structure. Which I don't object to. It can be very useful. But it is not the only approach and not always useful. The big differences between TLP and PI is that language is regarded as an abstract structure, subject to logical analysis. In the PI it is regarded as a collection of practices which are part of all the other practices that go to make up a life. True, there are departments of linguistics that are more like this, but you don't seem to be talking about them. But they stand a much better chance of producing more rigorous versions of Wittgenstein's idea.Hence the reference to information theory. It turns out there do seems to be things all physical systems of communication must share if they are to communicate at all. And there are lots of things we can say about the throughput of codes, redundancy, etc. and these do indeed seem to explain a good deal about human language and its structure. — Count Timothy von Icarus
I have no idea why you thought I was referring to the vague concept of "family resemblance" in the first place and not PI65's far more provocative claim that there is no way to define what is common to all languages. — Count Timothy von Icarus
What I was objecting to is the idea that such vagueness has to be how we speak of language because it isn't possible to do better. — Count Timothy von Icarus
My comments were specifically in the context of that section being supplied in defense of the cognitive relativism thesis — Count Timothy von Icarus
Hence the reference to information theory. It turns out there do seems to be things all physical systems of communication must share if they are to communicate at all. — Count Timothy von Icarus
I think Wittgenstein's initial disappointment may have swung him a bit too far over towards seeing difficulties vis-á-vis language as insoluble — Count Timothy von Icarus
For example, the biological definition of life lists certain characteristics which are important to consider, without committing all of them being instantiated in any particular case. Or again, lists of symptoms in medicine are not always offered on the basis that all of them will be instantiated in every case. — Ludwig V
"Family resemblances" is not an "idea" or "theory" that can be proved wrong. It's a vague metaphor that one could call "true" so long as there are any shared similarities between whatever one considers to be a "language-game," (which is also a term that is left vague). — Count Timothy von Icarus
I am saying "this level of vagueness is no longer necessary or helpful; there now exist ways to describe similarities in languages, animal communication, and codes with much more rigor—to actually say something beyond the trivial and banal." — Count Timothy von Icarus
*And I should note that plenty of Wittgensteinians make admirable attempts to dispell the vagueness, even at the risk of theories that sound wildly counterintuitive and implausible. It is only a certain type that seems to really thrive on the vagueness and the ability to avoid error by never really saying anything of substance. — Count Timothy von Icarus
Interestingly enough, Wittgenstein has some interesting things to say about vagueness of concepts. ... Is an indistinct photograph a picture of a person at all? — Richard B
Also, the argument in the quote from Grayling in the OP is pretty much the argument Davidson presented in "On the very idea of a conceptual scheme". Davidson's triangulation of speaker, interpreter and truth comes in to play here, at least as a first approximation.
Forms of life cannot be incommensurable because they must all occur embedded in our activities in the world. So despite not being able to speak Chinese (an increasingly inappropriate example for all sorts of reasons) we will recognise a Chinese builder or grocer by their activities… Forms of life are fastened together by all of them occurring in the world. — Banno
My problem is that I don't understand exactly what cognitive relativism is - the usual problem with an "-ism". I woud like to know what the alternative might be - cognitive absolutism?Fair enough. I don't view Wittgenstein in terms of relativism. — Apustimelogist
You draw that conlusion. I draw that conclusion. But do they drawn that conclusion? No. What follows?To take a hackneyed example, an extreme metaphysics might hold that we can say nothing about things outside of our perception. So they can say nothing about the cup when it is put in the cupboard - not even that the cup is in the cupboard. But if, when you ask them for the cup, they open the cupboard and retrieve it, they put the lie to their metaphysics by their acts. — Banno
The tricky bit is that divining a form of life may be, in many cases, a question of interpretation. As in anthropomorphization and personification.Forms of life cannot be incommensurable because they must all occur embedded in our activities in the world. So despite not being able to speak Chinese (an increasingly inappropriate example for all sorts of reasons) we will recognise a Chinese builder or grocer by their activities. — Banno
I would rather have said that forms of life are intersubjectively worked out in the world.Is there not a sense in which worlds are intersubjectively constructed through forms of life? — Joshs
I didn't know that's where it came from. Isn't it also relied on by Kripke? It seems to me a most plausible idea.I can think of no better example of this than John Searle's analysis of "Proper Names." In his analysis, he asks if proper names are just a set of descriptions. What follows in his conclusion is that proper names perform a great function in language by not being precise descriptions. — Richard B
"ontically" confuses me. It seems to me fairly obvious that "vague" is often a classification derived from the interaction of standards of clarify with the facts.Epistemic vagueness is not really much of an issue. What becomes the interesting issue is whether it is meaningful to describe reality itself as being ontically vague in any proper or useful sense. And a Peircean might rather think it does. — apokrisis
That someone is following a rule is shown by what they do. Indeed, there is in a strong sense nothing more to the rule than what one does in a particular circumstance. There is no "understand rules as we do... following the same rules, etc." apart from what we do in particular case. The rule is not understood by setting it out in words, but by enacting it.
What one says has less import than what one does. And what is meant by "this form of life" is displayed by what one does - don't look for a form of life just in language, look at what is being done.
Folk are following the same rule as you if they do what you would do.
But there are cases where a similar vagueness suits the particular needs of other sciences. For example, the biological definition of life lists certain characteristics which are important to consider, without committing all of them being instantiated in any particular case.
"ontically" confuses me. — Ludwig V
Well, no. It's not about conditioning.Wouldn't this just be behaviorism? — Count Timothy von Icarus
These questions don't help me much. What is Nature? What does "actually" mean in the phrase "actually indeterminate"? Where there is no fact of the matter, there is no state. By definition. Assuming conventional views about how language works.Can Nature be actually indeterminate and not just always determinate? Is there a state where there is no fact of the matter, and thus not even properly any "state"? — apokrisis
I'm sympatheric. But I'm not sure that "graded" necessarily implies "relativities". The colour spectrum is a series of graded stages in a continuum, all of which is, in a sense, deterministic (definite). To say that "exist" can always be something implies by the same token that it can always be something else.We shift from talking about yes or no absolutes – such as determinism – to graded relativities. That gives us more options that might better fit what we see. — apokrisis
This doesn't convey any clear meaning to me. Perhaps I'm just being dense.To exist can always be some mix of the definitely constrained and the radically free. As in chance and necessity. — apokrisis
That's true. Family resemblances don't necessarily result in disagreement. It's just that decisions are made, not on the basis of a single, conclusive, criterion, but on various criteria, different in different cases. Think of how we talk about the resemblances between member of a family.There is no "One True Feature," to point to for defining life, but we generally don't have much disagreement over whether prions or self-replicating silicon crystals are alive. — Count Timothy von Icarus
Pedantically, I think you must mean "was a fossil alive". You are right. We can be (but may not be) quite specific about the criteria that determine each case. It's just that different critieria apply in different cases.Is a fossil alive? Does it have the right sort of family resemblance? Obviously, to answer the second question means being a specific about what might constitute such a resemblance. — Count Timothy von Icarus
That someone is following a rule is shown by what they do. Indeed, there is in a strong sense nothing more to the rule than what one does in a particular circumstance. There is no "understand rules as we do... following the same rules, etc." apart from what we do in particular case.
Pedantically, I think you must mean "was a fossil alive". You are right. We can be (but may not be) quite specific about the criteria that determine each case. It's just that different critieria apply in different cases.
We can be (but may not be) quite specific about the criteria that determine each case. It's just that different critieria apply in different cases.
My point is that if people are thinking about rules differently then there is a difference, regardless of whether or not their behaviors are identical. Your wife might act the same way if she feels duty bound or somehow coerced into acting like she loves you as if she really loved you, but surely her interpretation of what she is doing (playing the loving wife versus being in love) matters. — Count Timothy von Icarus
But I'm not sure that "graded" necessarily implies "relativities". The colour spectrum is a series of graded stages in a continuum, all of which is, in a sense, deterministic (definite). — Ludwig V
This doesn't convey any clear meaning to me. Perhaps I'm just being dense. — Ludwig V
Yep. So where are we now?A rule isn't just "whenever behavior is the same." — Count Timothy von Icarus
Learning the rules is not playing the game.But on an account that there is "nothing more to the rule than what one does in a particular circumstance," I'm not sure how you're supposed to explain these situations. — Count Timothy von Icarus
And how does one demonstrate that they understand the rule, apart from moving the piece? There is a way of understanding a rule that is not found in stating it, but in following it or going against it in a particular case....people move the bishop diagonally because they know that's the rule. — Count Timothy von Icarus
Learning the rules is not playing the game.
And how does one demonstrate that they understand the rule, apart from moving the piece?
ou posts do not come through on my mentions. That's somewhat discourteous.
There is no "One True Feature," to point to for defining life, but we generally don't have much disagreement over whether prions or self-replicating silicon crystals are alive. — Count Timothy von Icarus
Right, learning the rules is a prerequisite to playing the game. — Count Timothy von Icarus
understanding — Count Timothy von Icarus
Yes, this is pretty much the point of family resemblances so I just don't really understand what you are criticizing about it when you agree with it. I feel like you are attributing more to this concept than required and criticizing it for things not intended.
And what is understanding over and above the ability to enact or demonstrate understanding?
Attributing rules to the behavior is chronically underdetermined / indeterminate on some level, and this issue regresses chronically. You can observe some behavior whose description by a rule is completely indeterminate; nonetheless, a person attributes a rule anyway.
Well, the idea of interactive binary and contradictory oppositions is fairly familiar. Is it descended from the idea of dialectic? Are you saying that each term is relative to the other? In the examples you cite, that would seem to be right. But you can't mean that all systems have just two elements, surely?Chance and necessity, flux and stasis, are various ways of saying the same thing, capturing the same systems logic, that should be familiar from Greek metaphysics. — apokrisis
I'm not sure that there are not other kinds of system as well, where elements interact neither top/down nor bottom/up, but neighbour/neighbour. How does this connect to Wittgenstein?Its systems science. A system is the hierarchical story of top-down constraints shaping local degrees of freedom, and those local degrees in turn acting bottom-up to (re)construct the globally prevailing state of constraint. So in Peircean jargon, the continuity of global lawful synechism and the discreteness of local tychism or chance events. — apokrisis
Yes, of course you're right. It's just that that it isn't like the resemblances between one dog and another, but between a dog and a sculpture of it. We wouldn't confuse a fossil with a living member of the species, would we?Actually, I meant "is." A fossil bears a close resemblance to the organism it is a fossil of. This could be considered a "family resemblance" in the metaphorical sense, no? — Count Timothy von Icarus
Yes, you're right. Vagueness is not necessarily OK. But I think that W has a point if he's saying that sometimes it is all you've got.Right, well, this is precisely what my comment was on. Wittgenstein knows he is being vague. He calls himself out on it. And he seems to say "yup, but what can you do?" Well, I think we can do better. If you're vague enough, you can avoid ever being "wrong" (a plus I suppose), but potentially at the cost of triviality. — Count Timothy von Icarus
One could conceivably learn the rules of a game without ever playing a game, which is a problem for your description. — Count Timothy von Icarus
How does this connect to Wittgenstein? — Ludwig V
In classical physics, which is known to describe correctly macroscopic objects (to a hitherto practically unlimited accuracy) when quantum effects are imperceptible, all magnitudes have a definite value at any given time that can in principle be simultaneously known with certainty at that moment by their measurement, even though they may not always then be predicted with certainty; for example, when the classical evolution is chaotic, or may be difficult to measure. Hence, vagueness is considered alien to classical physics.
In the case of microscopic entities to which Quantum Mechanics pertains, there is vagueness the origin of which is substantially different. Vagueness in quantum mechanics appears endemic, arising directly from the indeterminate nature of quantum entities themselves rather than a choice of concepts within a flexible theoretical framework. Indeed, in quantum physics spatial location can be almost entirely indeterminate, such as when the momentum is specified with extremely high precision, say in the case of a free electron.
Unlike the situation of macroscopic entities with vague geographical characteristics, it is not the case that the concept electron is overdetermined in the sense that the criteria for it to have a unique spatial location—or for that matter, for it to be spatially dispersed—cannot be satisfied in principle; nor is the concept of electron underdetermined in the sense that the definitions of its physical properties are insufficiently precise.
In the case of quantum systems, properties can be considered objectively indefinite and sets of propositions regarding them complementary to specific other sets of propositions, so that it becomes impossible to jointly attribute them. Thus, quantum mechanics involves a unique form of vagueness distinct from those considered before.
It would be vacuous for a biologist to say "all life shares a family resemblance," and to stop there. Whatever "all life," is it must surely have some sort of resemblance to be deemed "all life" in the first place. What biologists do in reality is posit a constellation of features that make up this "family resemblance," e.g. having a metabolism, undergoing selection, etc. If one stops at the metaphor and introduces nothing else one hasn't said anything. All of being can be said to resemble all that is in some way or another. — Count Timothy von Icarus
I suspect you conflate Wittgenstein's philosophical arguments and rhetoric against the logical positivism at the time for a full-blown scientific theory of language which it clearly is not. — Apustimelogist
I feel like you are attributing more to this concept than required and criticizing it for things not intended. — Apustimelogist
I would say no, understanding has a phenomenological element. — Count Timothy von Icarus
As a previous poster already pointed out, all empirical science is undetermined. The problem of underdetermination is about as broad as the Problem of Induction or the Scandal of Deduction. It would seem to make most knowledge impossible if one demands "absolute certainty." That's why I never found the arguments about rule following from underdetermination particularly convincing. You could make the same sort of argument about Newton's Laws, quantum mechanics—essentially all empirical claims, or about all induction. That the future is like the past is "undetermined," as is memory being reliable. Thus, the issue of under determination is as much a factor for any sort of social rule following as it is for some person designing their own board game and play testing it by themselves; democratization doesn't eliminate the issue. — Count Timothy von Icarus
But I don't think this warrants nescience vis-á-vis phenomena like "understanding a rule," that we are well acquainted with either. The demand for "absolute certainty" is the result of a good deal of ridiculousness in philosophy — Count Timothy von Icarus
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