I guess it would help me to go back to what your point was. Were you saying that body and environment are logically necessary to experience? If by that you mean that a brain needs a power source in order to function, then that's fairly uncontroversial. If your point was that experience can't take place without bodily interaction with the environment, that doesn't appear to be true. It happens every time you dream, it's happening to people who have received chemical paralytic drugs, it's happening to people who are locked in. The burden would be on you to show that bodily interaction is necessary to consciousness.

I have yet to see a good argument why color is "mental precept" all the way down, but presumably shape and size are not. — Count Timothy von Icarus

It's got the weight of science behind it. The brain generates experience out of a flood of diverse data. Do you have an opposing version of that story?

The burden would be on you to show that bodily interaction is necessary to consciousness. — frank

The brain generates experience out of a flood of diverse data. — frank

:up: :point:

@Count Timothy von Icarus :eyes:

"The signal exchange between consciousness and body, especially in terms of focus and information flow, is a critical area of study. For instance, while watching a movie, we're immersed in an experience that's both part of our external reality and our internal narrative. This duality of experience and "insperience" raises questions about the potential effects of screen exposure on our emotions. It's clear that sensation influences our emotional state, but the nature of this influence when mediated by screens is complex.

Our research assumes that any sensation created within our consciousness has an impact on our emotional state. However, the structure of sensations experienced through screens differs from those without. Screens induce a partial stimulation, leading to a "defocused" state in other sensory domains, which in turn triggers a subconscious response—an "insperience" that augments the low-dimensional sensation. Conversely, when we're exposed to complete external stimulation, such as being in nature, we receive a multitude of direct signals through our sensory organs, leading to high-dimensional sensations."

I brought this up 2 months ago in TreatId's thread, "Solipsism is a weak interpretation of the underlying observation" @Treatid

The terms "Defocus" and "Insperience" are new to me and my research. They were learned by me from the creator of this video in real time a few years back as I have made connections with them personally and developed a relationship over time because of a mutual interest in philosophy. I immediately was drawn to his work based on how interested and intrigued he was by the work he was putting in at the time into studying and modeling shapes from the works of Stan Tenen*[1], specifically "The Alphabet That Changed the World: How Genesis Preserves a Science of Consciousness in Geometry and Gesture, see here for more on that: Stan Tenen - Hebrew Alphabet - Geometry of Light .

Amongst other projects, one is involving devices with screens using A.I. technology, and Augmented Reality. I found the findings in the video below to be relevant to my work, which is involving 3D modeling and design. BUT THAT is why and where I got these terms. They were used and typed out in quotes above in the proper context but can be seen defined and explained by a German speaking person translating to English here in video on Youtube: A simplified Model for Augmented Sensation: Defocus, Experience and Insperience

*[1] - "STAN TENEN is the Director of Research for the Meru Foundation of Sharon, Mass. With a B.S. in Physics (1963) from Polytechnic Institute of New York University, Mr. Tenen has designed and produced optical and electronic equipment for doctors and surgeons, and holds several patents.

In 1968, while examining the Hebrew text of Genesis, Mr. Tenen noticed what appeared to be a pattern in the arrangement of the letters. This observation, which prompted thirty years of research into the history and tradition of the text, has led to a meaningful understanding of traditional teachings in a modern context. Mr. Tenen has presented his works to scientific and religious scholars throughout the United States and Israel." - from https://www.meru.org/info/TenenShortBio.html

It happens every time you dream, it's happening to people who have received chemical paralytic drugs, it's happening to people who are locked in. — frank

Unless it is happening when these people have stopped breathing, it should be evident that they are interacting with the environment in an important way.

The brain generates experience out of a flood of diverse data. — frank

Data from inside the brain?

Emergence of experience requires more than just a brain. Persistence of experience does as well. Brains are not enough. It takes more than just a brain to smell the cake in the neighbor's oven. It takes more than just a brain to remember that smell. It takes more than just a brain to hallucinate that experience.

The brain generates experience out of a flood of diverse data. — frank


Data from inside the brain?

Emergence of experience requires more than just a brain. Persistence of experience does as well. Brains are not enough. It takes more than just a brain to smell the cake in the neighbor's oven. It takes more than just a brain to remember that smell. It takes more than just a brain to hallucinate that experience. — creativesoul

What about just the/a "brain" with thinking thoughts?

Part of my initial comment says, "I am considering this: perhaps these ideas are visions in the brain, independent of the individual’s subjective experience. The subjective mind possesses ideas, but not in the same way the brain perceived/s them. Ideas are interpreted differently by the brain in its visions, and these interpretations may or may not align with how a subjective being perceives these visions as ideas in their mind or in their interactions with the environment.

What if thinking thoughts* is just the brain existing/being, rather than the subjective body/mind’s doing?

*the act of thinking-that thinking might be an emergent property of the brain’s activity, rather than an action performed by the subjective mind"

I'm saying that I can talk about them, just as I can talk about your thoughts even though I can't think them. — Michael

So on your account, when we agree that the pen is red, we are talking about quite different things - the percept-in-my-mind and the percept-in-your-mind.

And so on your account we have not agreed that the pen is red.

. I just deny that colours are something other than mental percepts, — Michael

Which is no more than a play on "mental".

Oh, no. It is the indirect realism X direct realism discussion all over again. Here we go 50 pages.

Where/when did you sniff out/notice the shift, here? What page did the discussion shift? Where did those 50 pages get us you [or anyone willing to comment on this] in said thread?

Oh, no. It is the indirect realism X direct realism discussion all over again. Here we go 50 pages. — Lionino

WE?

^

Fair play, lionino rawr!!!
Hm, lion...nino...What is that, little lion boy? Just that HE recognizes some thing? Bravo!

Lionino, takes one to know one...kinda :strong: :rofl:

Yes. Mental phenomena are either reducible to brain activity or are caused by brain activity. We dream/hallucinate/see (in colour) when the visual cortex is active. — Michael

Imagine we discover an unknown tribe of humans from some remote island. After several months of studying their ways, we discover that they are particular skilled at gathering local fruit at night in a very dense tropical forest. When we go along with the tribe it is near impossible for us to find this fruit, but for the local tribe, no problem. After several more months of study, we learn that this tribe of humans has a unique layer of cells in their eyes that is not seen in other humans. We begin to suspect that this may be a reason for their skill at night in locating local fruit. After great effort, we are able to create a synthetic version of these cell in the form of a contact lenses. We put the lenses on, and go out at night to gather fruit. To our surprise, the colors of the fruit are now vibrant neon colors.

In this example, are the contact lenses causing new mental phenomena? Or, are they just allowing us to see the colors the fruit had all the time. The mental phenomena is not the cause of us seeing the colors of the fruit, the cause is the addition of the contact lenses. You mention that you need mental phenomena to make sense of hallucination. But I don't see that from a scientific point of view. For example, a person took a hallucinogen which put the brain in a particular physical state, and thus caused the hallucination. Is this not enough to explain what is happening without appeal to mental phenomena?

So on your account, when we agree that the pen is red, we are talking about quite different things - the percept-in-my-mind and the percept-in-your-mind. — Banno

No, because we're using "red" as an adjective to describe the mind-independent pen.

We all agree that this pen is red (causes red mental percepts), just as we all agree that stubbing one's toe is painful (causes pain mental percepts).

But "red" and "pain" as nouns refer to mental percepts, not to some mind-independent property of pens.

No, because we're using "red" as an adjective to describe the pen. — Michael

No, because on your account we are talking not about the red pen but each of our own solipsistic percept-of-red-pens. One your account there is no red pen.

on your account we are talking not about the red pen but each of our own solipsistic percept-of-red-pens — Banno

No I'm not.

Then what are you talking about? The red pen or the percept-of-red-pen? Over to you.

Me, I talk about red pens, and don't much fuss as to percepts.

In this example, are the contact lenses causing new mental phenomena? — Richard B

Yes.

Or, are they just allowing us to see the colors the fruit had all the time. — Richard B

The fruit just reflects light at various wavelengths and various intensities; that's it. Our eyes and brain then respond in deterministic ways to this electromagnetic energy, activating the visual cortex and producing visual percepts (including colour percepts).

For example, a person took a hallucinogen which put the brain in a particular physical state, and thus caused the hallucination. Is this not enough to explain what is happening without appeal to mental phenomena? — Richard B

I haven't said that mental phenomena aren't just particular brain states. I'm not necessarily arguing for any kind of dualism. I'm leaving that open. Maybe pain just is the firing of C-fibers, as Churchland argues. Maybe colours just are the firing of V4 neurons.

Regardless of what mental phenomena are, pain and colours are mental phenomena; they are not mind-independent properties of fire.

The noun "pen" refers to a mind-independent object. The adjective "red" describes this mind-independent object's causal role in eliciting a particular type of mental percept. The noun "red" refers to this type of mental percept.

I think I've been really clear on this.

How come "pen" picks out a mind-independent object, and not just whatever has the causal role in eliciting a particular type of mental percept. Doesn't the noun "pen" refer to this type of mental percept?

How come "pen" picks out a mind-independent object, and not just whatever has the causal role in eliciting a particular type of mental percept. Doesn't the noun "pen" refer to this type of mental percept? — Banno

Because some words pick out mental phenomena and some words don't? Even the naive realist must accept this; words like "mind", "consciousness", "pain", "pleasure", "beliefs", "disgust", and so on pick out mental phenomena.

I am simply explaining that colours are also a type of mental phenomena, not a type of mind-independent property of pens. As I said to Richard B above, the pen just reflects light at various wavelengths and various intensities and then our eyes and brain respond in deterministic ways to this electromagnetic energy, activating the visual cortex and producing visual percepts (including colour percepts).

The naive view that projects these colour percepts onto mind-independent objects, or that thinks that some mind-independent property "resembles" these colour percepts, is mistaken.

Because some words pick out mental phenomena and some words don't? — Michael

But why?

...also... — Michael

In addition to what? An individuals percept and and what? A pen, perhaps?

The naive view that projects these colour percepts onto mind-independent objects is mistaken. — Michael

The naive view that denies colour to objects is mistaken. Why shouldn't a red pen simply be a pen that reflects light at various wavelengths and various intensities?

But why? — Banno

We talk about various things in the world. Some of those things are mental phenomena, some aren't. Some of those things are trees, some aren't. I don't understand the difficulty you're having.

Your question is like asking why the noun “dog” picks out an animal and not a planet.

In addition to what? — Banno

As in, among the various types of mental phenomena, colour is one such type.

Why shouldn't a red pen simply be a pen that reflects light at various wavelengths and various intensities? — Banno

You can use the adjective "red" to mean "reflects light with a wavelength of 700nm" if you like, but when we ordinarily talk about colours (note that I'm now using a noun) – particularly when we ask if colours are mind-independent and discuss the fact that some see white and gold and others black and blue – we are talking about colour percepts, knowingly or not.

And there’s certainly no “resemblance” between a red colour percept and a surface layer of atoms that reflects light with a wavelength of 700nm. The relationship between the two is merely causal, and that the latter causes the former is a contingent fact about human biology. Different organisms with different eyes and brains can have different colour percepts in response to 700nm light. The photo of the dress is proof of that even within humans.

It happens every time you dream, it's happening to people who have received chemical paralytic drugs, it's happening to people who are locked in. The burden would be on you to show that bodily interaction is necessary to consciousness.

No it doesn't. The idea that the brain can generate experiences without any access to a very specific sort of enviornment is not "supported by science," in the least. I have already explained why. The enviornment is not simply a "power source," either, this is a comic simplification.

Does a brain generate any experience on the ocean floor? On the surface of a star? In the void of space? In a room filled with helium gas? Torn out of the skull? All your counter examples still involve brains inside bodies and bodies that are inside environments that are in the very narrow range that allow for the production of experience.

Take someone with locked in syndrome. Replace the atmosphere in the room with most other gasses: helium, argon, hydrogen, etc. They will stop experiencing. Turn the temperature down low enough and they will stop experiencing. Turn it up enough and they will instantly stop experiencing. You are abstracting away relevant details and then claiming that the brain can operate in a vacuum. The claim that "science says this is true," is particularly ridiculous. Science says there are no truly isolated systems and science also days that putting a human body in all sorts of only relatively isolated systems—even simply zipping someone into an airtight bag—will cause then to cease having experiences extremely rapidly.

Brain function requires a constant exchange of matter, information, energy, and causation across the boundaries of the brain. Dreaming and locked in syndrome are not remotely counterexamples of this.

Does a brain generate any experience on the ocean floor? On the surface of a star? In the void of space? — Count Timothy von Icarus

You should read up on Boltzmann brains.

I am quite aware of the Boltzmann Brain. What do you think the relevance is?

The noun "pen" refers to a mind-independent object. The adjective "red" describes this mind-independent object's causal role in eliciting a particular type of mental percept. The noun "red" refers to this type of mental percept.

I think I've been really clear on this. — Michael

Imagine you're in a debate. Your opponent keeps using the same word, but it feels like they're using it in different ways to make their point. That's called an equivocation fallacy. This tricky tactic can make an argument seem solid when it’s really not.

They use a word or phrase with more than one meaning, but act like it’s just one. That confuses things.

How does the equivocation logical fallacy work? You can think of the equivocation fallacy like a chameleon. A chameleon can change its color to blend into different surroundings. Similarly, a word in an equivocation fallacy changes its "color" or meaning to fit different parts of an argument. This tactic can mislead people or just cause a lot of confusion.

Looks like an equivocation to me. Proudly so even.

Also...

Weird that a chameleon would change my mental phenomena(the color of the chameleon) and result in blending into its surroundings which are not my mental phenomena.

You asked if brains can generate experiences in the vacuum of space. Boltzmann brains are formed in the vacuum of space, and “in Boltzmann brain scenarios … Boltzmann observers who have the same series of experiences as me … vastly outnumber normal observers.”

So, yes, apparently brains can generate experiences in the vacuum of space. All that is required is the appropriate neural activity, regardless of what causes and maintains it.

Weird that a chameleon would change my mental phenomena(the color of the chameleon) and result in blending into its surroundings which are not my mental phenomena. — creativesoul

They change the way their skin reflects light. Different wavelengths of light elicit different colour percepts.

Sorry, I wasn't trying to be comical or ridiculous. I was just saying that my experience doesn't have to reflect interaction with my environment. I have long had a recurring dream about a house that opens up into another house. Though I've experienced being in this weird house multiple times, it doesn't exist. My environment at the time was my bedroom. It appears that experience was generated by my brain.

The conclusion is just that interaction with the environment isn't necessary for experience. If it was, I wouldn't be able to have that dream. I wasn't trying to argue that a brain in a void can have experiences. There was a fair amount of what you said that I could have engaged, I just didn't want to do one of those posts where I'm responding to each sentence you wrote. That kind of discussion gets complex and off topic.

Are you under the impression that Boltzmann brains actually exist? They are a thought experiment, the inferred result of a universe with an infinite duration. If the Big Bang marks the begining of our universe it is vanishingly unlikely that a Boltzmann Brain has ever existed or will come to exist at any relevant time scale. If the universe has any sort of "Big Crunch" or "Big Tear" or "Big Reset" Boltzmann brains will never exist.

You might as well be arguing that people can walk through walls or teleport because theory might allow for the possibility at some incredibly small probability.

So, yes, apparently brains can generate experiences in the vacuum of space. All that is required is the appropriate neurological activity, regardless of what causes and maintains this activity.

This shows a misunderstanding of the thought experiment. The Boltzmann brain is a critique of the Boltzmann universe, the idea that the observable universe could arise from chance thermodynamic fluctuations. The point of the Boltzmann brain is that it is far more likely for random fluctuations to result in a smaller system, the minimum needed to produce any given interval of conciousness. The Boltzmann brain says absolutely nothing about brains alone producing conciousness in the vacuum of space. It would be silly if it did, since this is considered a biological impossibility. If random thermodynamic fluctuations are to produce any given interval of conciousness they will clearly need to include an environment in which a brain is actually able to produce conciousness.

It in no way says that a human brain can generate conciousness at a temperature close to absolute zero, without any oxygen, etc.

Are you under the impression that Boltzmann brains actually exist? — Count Timothy von Icarus

No, I’m saying that they are a coherent concept and consistent with current scientific understanding.