Can substance be further broken down into their constructive elements?
For example, bread is made of flour. Water is made of 2 hydrogen and 1 oxygen molecules.
What is res extensa made of? What is res cogitans made of? — Corvus

Descartes does not say anything about it. Those two would be fundamental, but both res cogitans and res extensa for him ultimately come from God, causally speaking.

But you're using the word 'thing' and 'existence' very imprecisely here. — Wayfarer

You say so but I don't see the explanation for such. The word is used as standard both in everything English and in philosophy: something that exists.

Surely I can reflect on myself, I can engage in reflection and analysis, but that is always something done by a subject, and the subject itself is never truly an object, as such, except for in the metaphorical sense of 'the object of enquiry'. We relate to the natural world and to others as objects of perception (although understanding of course that others are also subjects), but the 'I' who thus relates is not an object, but that to which or whom objects appear. — Wayfarer

That is fine and all. If you want to separate the "I" and say your memories of it are not equivalent to it, I would even go as far as to say that that it is accurate. But if it is the case, there is nothing to be evaluated besides physical objects, and so our view has to default to physicalism, and the self can then never be investigated.

I found the reference I was thinking of regarding Husserl's critique of Descartes' tendency to 'objectify' the mind, in the Routledge Introduction to Phenomenology, edited by Dermot Moran. — Wayfarer

Thanks, it is indeed tangential to the OP, but it is something that I am personally interested in and I will look into it.

Treating consciousness as part of the world, reifying consciousness, is precisely to ignore consciousness’s foundational, disclosive role.

This is very interesting and I resonate with it. Relating to self-reference, consciousness can never fully account for itself just like a computer could never simulate itself. But I think it is possible for it to account for itself in parts, just like a computer can simulate itself in parts.

But if it is the case, there is nothing to be evaluated besides physical objects, and so our view has to default to physicalism, and the self can then never be investigated. — Lionino

Not at all. Recall the primal dictum given to Socrates by the Oracle of the Temple of Delphi: know thyself! But that is a very different matter to knowing about an objective subject, such as physics or chemistry or cosmology. Not that they’re in any way in conflict, but you can be expert in a technical subject yet still lack the insight typically associated with self-knowledge. (I see Hugh Everett III, who came up with the Many Worlds interpretation of QM, as an example.)

Where I place Descartes in the grand scheme of things, is that he is associated with the advent of the modern world-view. Indeed my first undergraduate unit in philosophy was in Descartes: The First Modern Philosopher. Later I came to understand how the combination of Descartes’ philosophy with his co-ordinate geometry, combined with Newtonian science and Galileo’s physics, form one of the pillars of the modern world and the scientific revolution. And obviously it is a momentous cultural and historical achievement. But it also marks the advent of a particularly modern form of consciousness - the self-aware subject situated in the domain of objective forces directed by physical laws. It gives rise to what I have termed ‘the illusion of otherness’, which is the sense of separation between self and world which runs deep in modern culture - whereas in earlier cultures, there is a lived sense of kinship with nature (although not in the romantic sense that modern environmentalism understands it.) So the kind of criticism Husserl makes, is a reflection on Descartes and the human condition. This is why phenomenology becomes one of the main sources of the later existentialism of Heidegger, Sartre and others.

This is basically what I’ve been studying since I was in my twenties and debating here for the last ten years or so. I get it’s a lot to take on and also that I might be mistaken about some fundamental aspects of it.

First, I think it strikingly obvious that nothing is permeant, when one is talking about the permeance of the soul, I would think we are then talking about identity. We are born without identity and acquire it through our experiences with our social context. We are all at birth patterns made by a less-than-perfect pattern maker, our DNA, which in turn is governed by change, impermanence, and the ever-changing world. We are an energy form which is of the nature of that which experiences the energies that surround us. Like those energies that surround us, we change form to be unmanifested or manifested into something else. Define your terms, is for this argument the soul consciousness itself? There can only be a serious argument for the permanence of the soul, if the soul is thought to be energy itself.

There can only be a serious argument for the permanence of the soul, if the soul is thought to be energy itself. — boagie

:up:

edit: For example, you could argue that knowledge represents a form of energy. Then the process of coming into being of knowledge-being in an organic entity could be akin to the igniting of a fire in a combustible material. Then that selfsame fire, when the original pile of material is consumed, can be used to ignite something else, even a completely different phase of matter, like a gas. So, analogously, this soul or what I would characterize as thought-being can move through material phases, although being essentially energy. Something like that.

I would like to preface this by stating that I have been busy in these past weeks and even now I still am. I decided that this thread would be more conducive if I studied the topic a bit more. Ultimately I ended up researching process philosophy. The advantage of process philosophy is that ontology is not studied as focusing on substances, but instead focusing on operations (processes, duh).

Thus, in process philosophy, the soul (or mind or whatever you wanna call it) would be not the substances that stay through time but as an integrating process. This is in line with what jarva brought up, when he talked about how, in the context of Theseus ship, the object is that which undergoes change — of course, as I explained, that could be necessary but evidently it is not sufficient for identity, otherwise everything that undergoes change would be one, which might be ontologically true but not epistemically true.

In that view, what I propose is that the self could be characterised as a chain of experienced patterns that emerge subjective experience. In simpler language, the ‘self’ would be fluid, the union of many mental elements which grow (or decrease, in the case of dementia) through time, and often when we try to analyse (literally meaning untie) this process we end up atomising it in a given moment — and as someone brought up previously, some philosophers say this is a mistake based on objectifying the mind.
Consciousness then (or the soul etc) would start at birth or whenever we wanna say we first become conscious (mirror test?) and ends in death.

I believe that would work if time is continuous, however if time is discrete that would add some complications, as this “process” could be divided by virtue of itself being in time. If that would be the case, it seems that a process philosophy view of self would not be favourable against a substance view of self.

And if we have discrete time, the soul would be split temporally into several disconnected instants, each with its corresponding instantaneous mental state, and what connects them? Nothing, in the sense that a mental state only seems to be connected to a past state because it is born with the memory of that past. And why is it born with this memory? This would be a consequence of the material world and neurology, in which the brain conditions the mental state to have this memory, because the brains corresponding to the previous mental state and the current mental state have spatio-temporal continuity.

One may say that the idea of the “self” is materially false, but I would argue otherwise. Just because we cannot clearly define orange as separate from yellow and red, it does not mean orange is materially false, orange is very much real as science tells us.

These are some thoughts I have had after doing some (though not nearly enough) reading on related subjects. I am open and eager to clearly-explained criticisms and additions.

:up: The idea of self as a unified and unifying process rather than as an unchanging entity is realistic in my view. The process view goes back to Heraclitus and 'you can never step in the same river twice'. It also has resonances with Buddhist philosophy which views the individual as a 'mind-stream' (citta-santana) rather than as an unchanging unitary self (atman) and of course with Alfred North Whitehead and modern process philosophy (see this blog post).

This would be a consequence of the material world and neurology, in which the brain conditions the mental state to have this memory, because the brains corresponding to the previous mental state and the current mental state have spatio-temporal continuity. — Lionino

I don't accept that neurology or the natural sciences, generally, have an adequate grasp of the intricacies of inherited memory and the like. Consider that individuals are born with proclivities, talents, dispositions, and so on. You can account for a certain proportion of it in terms of cultural conditioning and social influence, but there seem traits which seem impossible to account for by those means (precocious talent, for instance.) Furthermore, much of what shapes and influences us is not directly available to conscious awareness or introspection. I'm sure I'd be right in saying that I sometimes do or say things for reasons (or due to impulses) the origin of which I myself am dimly aware of. Western culture has, of course, only naturalistic or materialist grounds on which to account for these factors, but I very much doubt their adequacy.

I think there's a deep underlying issue with the question of agency and moral responsibility. Of course if you accept the reality of karma then that provides the unifying principle that ties that together, but it's not widely popular in our culture.

but there seem traits which seem impossible to account for by those means — Wayfarer

Such as?

Furthermore, much of what shapes and influences us is not directly available to conscious awareness or introspection — Wayfarer

Right, we are not aware of everything that is going on in our brain.

issue with the question of agency and moral responsibility — Wayfarer

At no point were these two brought up simultaneously. You keep trying to push Indian religions because you personally subscribe to it/them, not because they are pertinent.

And I do not agree that western culture is materialistic or naturalistic, being that the west is catholic, only that it has this tendency.

You keep trying to push Indian religions because you personally subscribe to it/them, not because they are pertinent. — Lionino

I can see why you say that, but it's because they are a source of explanatory frameworks and metaphors which are largely absent in modern discouse.I mean, after all, the subject of the OP is 'reasons for believing in the permanence of the soul'. Who in secular culture even believes there is a soul? I know from long experience on this forum that the idea of the soul is not well-received here.

the west is catholic — Lionino

That's a bit of an over-generalisation, I feel. I do have some knowledge, very limited, of the philosophy of Aquinas, and there are Catholic philosophers I respect considerably, but I don't know if I accept their eschatology.

What a fascinating thread - thoroughly enjoyed reading it!

I am still very much at the beginning of my critical/philosophical thinking journey, so what I say here might seem really basic and unsubstantiated, but I am trying to engage more with people with such wonderful minds as those on this forum.

I found the hammer analogy very interesting. To my mind, changing a single atom changes the hammer to something different. The general perception of the hammer has remained the same - we look at it as a constituent of its parts - carbon, hydrogen, iron etc atoms stacked and bonded in a specific way giving it what the majority of people would perceive to resemble what we have come to call a 'hammer.' I feel that it is still a hammer with that one atom change, but not the same hammer. Our minds don't register this changed atom - we don't suddenly lose our hammer because one atom changed, then think we have a new hammer.

I find the perception part quite interesting. To my mind (in its relatively novice-like manner), we cannot perceive anything as existing. The electron cloud around every atom changes constantly, there is no way to determine an absolutely static template of the hammer because time is infinitely reducible, and the most infinitesimal portion of time will have changed the hammer. Our minds cannot process those changes to that degree, so we have a generalised idea of what a hammer is, how it looks to our eyes through the reflection of light, and we assign 'hammer' to it. But there can be no 'hammer' outside of this perception and....oh dear, now my brain is wondering whether our perception of the hammer actually does make the hammer exist.

Is this what Buddhism is talking about - that nothing exists and there is only emptiness, and realisation of emptiness brings enlightenment?

What are y'all doing to my tiny little pea brain!

Sorry, just to follow on from my last post...

Could it be that the 'self' does exist but in a dynamic state, always changing but, for the most part, recognisable over time if you analyse in small enough increments of time

That's a bit of an over-generalisation, I feel — Wayfarer

I don't feel so. Since antiquity, even before Diocletianus, the Mediterranean world is split into West and East. This split was reinforced with the Great Schism into making these two synonym with Catholic and Orthodox respectively.

I mean, after all, the subject of the OP is 'reasons for believing in the permanence of the soul'. Who in secular culture even believes there is a soul? I know from long experience on this forum that the idea of the soul is not well-received here. — Wayfarer

In Western philosophy, "soul" is often used as a synonym with mind, reason, etc. I cleared that up a few times in the thread and in the very first line of OP. And personally, I don't even know what else "soul" could even mean — whether we (or religious people) attribute things like transmigration and permanence after bodily death to it is besides the point.




By soul I mean mind, reason (of an individual), consciousness, that which has subjective experience — as stated in the OP. Those are sufficiently synonymous in this context. As to energy, I only recognise two types: kinetic and potential.

Could it be that the 'self' does exist but in a dynamic state, always changing but, for the most part, recognisable over time if you analyse in small enough increments of time — Daniel Duffy

That is a possibility. As suggested before, it could be that thing that undergoes change over time. But that adds a very big problem to it: where does it start and where does it end? If the distinguishing criteria of something is undergoing incremental changes, we can't say where it begins and where it ends, as nothing in this world is created or destroyed, only changed. Likewise, we go from right to left on the electromagnetic spectrum, starting from what we call orange, and we move bit by bit. At what point can we say we are no longer at orange and now at red? Surely, the border between red and purple would no longer be orange, but we have no definite answer for the border where orange turns not-orange.

An answer like that gives us a definition of soul/identity that has very loose borders.

But that adds a very big problem to it: where does it start and where does it end? If the distinguishing criteria of something is undergoing incremental changes, we can't say where it begins and where it ends, as nothing in this world is created or destroyed, only changed — Lionino

Indeed. One could argue in this case that the 'soul' (or mind, consciousness, whatever one wishes to call it) has always and will always exist within our limited understanding of time and space - just in different forms, which brings a whole host of questions around what was before the big bang and what comes after it is all over. Someone on a spiritual path might say this means the soul always lives on. Someone of a more scientific ilk might suggest that consciousness arises as a result of electrical activity in the brain, and since energy cannot be created or destroyed, only changed, some form of soul always exists, but at what point do we stop considering it a soul and just a collection of energy?

I like what you say about orange and red - when does it stop being orange and start being red? On the surface, when the frequency hits a certain point that has been pre-determined, we are told it is orange or red. But we have set that precedent of what is red and what is orange within our relatively limited visual spectrum. But regardless of what we call something, I suppose this is exactly the same problem as dealing with tiny increments of time...at what point does the frequency become red/orange? Frequency in this case would be just like time wouldn't it? In that there are infinite increments, and we can never find the instant it is one thing and not another, because the increments can always be made smaller.

Apologies if that's a bit rambling, it is a very interesting topic!

Our minds cannot process those changes to that degree, so we have a generalised idea of what a hammer is, how it looks to our eyes through the reflection of light, and we assign 'hammer' to it. But there can be no 'hammer' outside of this perception and....oh dear, now my brain is wondering whether our perception of the hammer actually does make the hammer exist.

Is this what Buddhism is talking about - that nothing exists and there is only emptiness, and realisation of emptiness brings enlightenment? — Daniel Duffy

Welcome to the Forum.

There's definitely something like that idea in Buddhist philosophy. Emptiness (śūnyatā) is very easily misunderstood principle, but it means basically 'empty of intrinsic or inherent existence'. Things exist as a consequence of causes and conditions, on the one hand, and because we relate to them in a certain way, on the other. A piece of stone is a hammer in the right circumstances. And of course, a hammer really is a hammer, made for a specific purpose, and something you could not do without if you needed to bang in a nail. But then, as Abraham Maslow said, if all you have is a hammer, everything looks like a nail. (This is a good intro to Buddhist 'emptiness' - which should never be, but often is, confused with nihilism.)

Someone on a spiritual path might say this means the soul always lives on. Someone of a more scientific ilk might suggest that consciousness arises as a result of electrical activity in the brain, and since energy cannot be created or destroyed, only changed, some form of soul always exists, but at what point do we stop considering it a soul and just a collection of energy? — Daniel Duffy

It's been said a few times in this thread that soul must be just energy - but energy is not intentional, whereas one would think that intentionality is at the very seat of the soul (or mind or consciousness). Another point about living beings is their ability to maintain their identity while going through change - and that identity can be maintained even through generations. Whereas inanimate material does not have that capacity (even if we can recognise its continuity. An interesting, although superficial, point - one of Aristotle's famous works is usually referred to as 'De Anima', usually translated as 'on the Soul'. I'm intrigued by the connection between 'anima', 'animate', and 'animal' - as if the soul is what 'animates' the body. Although that said, I've only ever read snippets of the actual text.)

Welcome to the Forum. — Wayfarer

Thanks, glad to be here :)

energy is not intentional, whereas one would think that intentionality is at the very seat of the soul (or mind or consciousness). — Wayfarer

Could we define intention as energy behaving in a certain way? I read somewhere about an argument between matter producing consciousness, or consciousness creating matter. Kind of like the chicken and egg, what came first question. If intention is energy, like all other energy, it cannot be created or destroyed (in our current understanding). I realise this is a big, unsubstantiated jump... just trying to explore what my head is thinking haha

Latin is definitely not the source of any of the daily English lexicon except for the few words I mentioned, French is the source of almost everything productive in English today. English did not exist at the time of Ancient Latin. — Lionino

True - Old English did not exist in either 100 b.c.e. or 100 c.e., but the language of the people who invaded Britain and that evolved into Old English, Middle English, and Modern English Did exist. French didn't exist in 100 b.c.e. or 100 c.e., either. (Anyone who really wanted to get ahead in Roman society made a point to learn proper Latin.

French words and words derived from French make up a significant portion of the English lexicon. However, it is possible to write a long trilogy (like Lord of the Rings) and use a lexicon that is roughly 80% to 90% derived from AngloSaxon. The 10%-15% remainder are generally French words acquired by Middle English.

I don't have a problem saying that Latin came into English through French. After all, French is derived from Latin. (Can't we say French is the way people in Gaul spoke Latin?)

Quite a few Latinate words were brought directly into English by English speakers who were also competent in Latin. A lot of these words were coined in the 16th and 17th centuries. Why? Because the vernacular English lexicon, a mix of French and AngloSaxon words, was short on abstract terms. An example is 'alienate' coined in the 16th century.

An example is 'alienate' coined in the 16th century. — BC

Alienate is French, as evidenced by the -e ending, and the word already existed in Latin.

I don't have a problem saying that Latin came into English through French — BC

You shouldn't, because French is English's mama.
Besides, little of what you said connects to my original statement.

Let's also not forget that Latin was the language of the educated classes until well into the early modern age. This has had particular impact on the philosophical lexicon as that subject was very much the preserve of the learned classes. The particular term I mentioned that @Lionino queried was the translation of the Greek 'ousia' into the latin 'substantia', and thence into the English 'substance', which is the legitimate etymology of that term. The point being, this word has a meaning in philosophical discourse quite different to that in ordinary speech, and that the conflation of the two meanings of 'substance' has unfortunate implications for philosophy.

which is the legitimate etymology of that term — Wayfarer

I don't understand why you keep repeating this over and over, it is weirdly funny. You are not Latin. You are French.

You shouldn't, because French is English's mama. — Lionino

And the granny? Latin. :snicker:
Or... West Germanic, in the Indo-European language family?

French is Latin, but aged.

French is Latin, but aged. — Lionino

Finally! You just admitted French is Latin. :smile:

Finally! You just admitted French is Latin. :smile: — javi2541997

Haha I never denied it!

Haha I never denied it! — Lionino

Jajajaja una leche!

I should have found out about this article before making this thread.

The Simple View (SV) is the view that "that there are no informative, non-trivial persistence conditions for people, that is, that personal persistence is an ultimate and unanalyzable fact".

SV has two versions, IM (identity mysticism) and WR-INI (weakly reductive and in independence non-informative).
IM is: "X at t1 is identical to Y at t2 if and only if X at t1 is identical to Y at t2".
WR-INI is: "X at t1 is identical to Y at t2 iff there is some fact F1 about X at t1, and some fact F2 about Y at t2, and F1 and F2 are irreducible to facts about the subjects’ psychology or physiology, and X at t1 is identical with Y at t2 in virtue of the fact that the propositions stating F1 and F2 differ only insofar as that “X” and “t1” occur in the former where “Y” and “t2” occur in the latter".

"In their most prominent variants [in WR-INI], these elements [F] are due to references to souls, Cartesian Egos or other spiritual or immaterial substances and/or properties."
We can promptly think of objections to that:
"Initially the idea underlying this claim may appear prejudicial; ultimately it is based on a number of widespread but not universally accepted beliefs about the naturalness of the world and the nature, validity and theoretical implications of physicalism."

"According to this general stance, either both psychological and physiological continuity relations are fully reducible to a domain in which physical explanations are couched, perhaps in terms of the basic elements of a final and unified theory of physics, or they belong themselves to such a domain". So basically, personal identity is either grounded in a non-physical element, or it is ultimately grounded on physical elements. That was my worry when making this thread that, if physicalism obtains, personal identity is arbitrary and continuation of consciousness illusory.

"Nowadays, the Simple View is disparaged as a theory only maintained by thinkers whose religious or spiritual commitments outweigh the reasons that speak against their views on personal identity."

Reductionism:

"Psychological Criteria of personal identity hold that psychological continuity relations, that is, overlapping chains of direct psychological connections, as those causal and cognitive connections between beliefs, desires, intentions, experiential memories, character traits and so forth, constitute personal identity"

"Two apparently physiological theories of personal identity are at bottom psychological, namely (i) the Brain Criterion, which holds that the spatiotemporal continuity of a single functioning brain constitutes personal identity; and (ii) the Physical Criterion, which holds that, necessarily, the spatiotemporal continuity of that which sustains the continuous psychological life of a human being over time, which is, contingently, a sufficient part of the brain that must remain in order to be the brain of a living person, constitutes personal identity"

"Consider a test case. Imagine there to be a tribe of beings who are in all respects like human beings, except for the fact that their brains and livers have swapped bodily functions: their brains regulate, synthesize, store, secrete, transform, and break down many different substances in the body, while their livers are responsible for their cognitive capacities, basic integrated postural and locomotor movement sequences, perception, instincts, emotions, thinking, and other integrative activities. Imagine the brain criterion to be true for human beings. Would we have sufficient reason to believe the brain criterion to be true for members of the tribe in question as well, if we were aware of all facts about their physiologies? No, precisely because the brain criterion is true for human beings, a liver criterion would have to be true for members of this tribe. There is nothing special about the 1.3 kilograms of grey mass that we carry around in our skulls, except for the fact that this mass is the seat of our cognitive capacities."

Yeah, no, the brain and the liver are defined exactly by their functions, as what causes the brain and the liver to have such and such functions is the physical make-up of their cells, the nephrons and the neurons. A brain that stores, secretes and breaks down substance in the body is no longer a brain because it is made of nephrons or something that ultimately works the same as nephrons, making it a liver.

"We can further distinguish between three versions of the psychological criterion: the Narrow version demands psychological continuity to be caused “normally,” the Wide version permits any reliable cause, and the Widest version allows any cause to be sufficient to secure psychological continuity (cf. Parfit 1984). The Narrow version, we may note, is logically equivalent to the Physical Criterion."

"A criterion of personal identity tells us what our persistence necessarily consists in, which means that it must be able to deliver a verdict in possible scenarios that is consistent with its verdicts in ordinary cases."

"First, some attempts to cash out personal identity relations in psychological terms appeal exclusively to direct psychological connections. These accounts face the problem that identity is a transitive relation (see 1.a.) while many psychological connections are not"

"Appeal to overlapping layers or chains of psychological connections avoids the problem by permitting indirect relations: according to this view, the old man is identical with the kid precisely because they are related to each other by those causal and cognitive relations that connect kid and teacher and teacher and old man."

"Opponents of the psychological criterion typically favour a physiological approach. There are at least two of them: (i) the Bodily Criterion holds that the spatiotemporal continuity of a functioning human body constitutes personal identity (cf. Williams 1956-7; 1970; Thompson 1997); and (ii) the Somatic Criterion holds that the spatiotemporal continuity of the metabolic and other life-sustaining organs of a functioning human animal constitutes personal identity (cf. Mackie 1999; Olson 1997a; 1997b; Snowdon 1991; 1995; 1996)."

Utter slop, but the article provides enough counter-arguments.

Quasi-psychology:

"Assume, for reductio, that personal identity consists in direct memory connections. In that case the kid is identical with the primary school teacher and the primary school teacher is identical with the old man; the old man, however, is not identical with the kid. Since this conclusion violates the transitivity of identity (which states that if an X is identical with a Y, and the Y is identical with a Z, then the X must be identical with the Z), personal identity relations cannot consist in direct memory connections."

Theseus' ship but goofy.

"Second, memory alone is not necessary for personal identity, as lack of memory through periods of sleep or coma do not obliterate one’s survival of these states. Appeal to causal and cognitive connections which relate not only memory but other psychological aspects is sufficient to eradicate the problem. Let us say that we are dealing with psychological connectedness if the relations in question are direct causal or cognitive relations, and that we are dealing with psychological continuity if overlapping layers of psychological connections are appealed to (cf. Parfit 1984)."

"consider the case of Teletransportation above: if at t2 Y on Mars remembers having had at t1 X’s experience on earth that the coffee is too hot, then, necessarily, X at t1 is identical with Y at t2. The dialectic of such thought experiments, however, requires that a description of the scenario is possible that does not presuppose the identity of the participants in question. We would wish to say that since X and Y share all psychological features, it is reasonable or intuitive to judge that X and Y are identical, and precisely not that since we describe the case as one in which there is a continuity between X’s and Y’s psychologies, X and Y are necessarily identical. If some psychological predicates presuppose personal identity in this way, an account of personal identity which constitutively appeals to such predicates is viciously circular."

A decent article, but very shallow overview.

Otherwise, I will remain in doubt, and in absence of any evidence of permanence, I will default to the position that it does not stay at all, and that we are constantly as always dying, as the comic posted in the first page depicts. — Lionino

It seems like you are asking about perdurance, not permanence. The word "permanence" tends to lead to these sorts of considerations:

I’d cite the abundance of veridical near death experiences as evidence of the soul and an afterlife. — Captain Homicide

It seems to me that whether the soul exists from moment to moment and whether the soul exists after death are related questions, with related arguments.

But sticking to perdurance, it strikes me as a subset of the induction problem. If one takes Humean premises then proof of perdurance is impossible. If one takes Aristotelian premises then familiarity with the nature of the soul can allow one to understand that it has the property of perduring. These are two top-level approaches.

Thus, in process philosophy, the soul (or mind or whatever you wanna call it) would be not the substances that stay through time but as an integrating process. — Lionino

Wouldn't the same questions arise, but in this case about the process rather than the substance? It seems that we would simply move to asking whether the process perdures over time.

It seems like you are asking about perdurance, not permanence. — Leontiskos

Those are sufficiently synonymous, but if you wanna make the distinction, I am talking about the former, not of life after death, yes.

it strikes me as a subset of the induction problem — Leontiskos

In the sense that "From that I am the same person I was before, I can't infer that I will be afterwards."? My question is a bit more extreme, it denies the first premise. Though the focus is indeed on the future, as the past is past, the question also applies to the past: ¿how do I know I am the same person I was minutes ago, but not another person with the same memories due to us sharing the same bodily brain?:

And why is it born with this memory? This would be a consequence of the material world and neurology, in which the brain conditions the mental state to have this memory, because the brains corresponding to the previous mental state and the current mental state have spatio-temporal continuity. — Lionino

This naturally relies on there being a material world. I am not sure how an idealist/panpsychist would reply, or perhaps there is no such problem to them.

If one takes Aristotelian premises then familiarity with the nature of the soul can allow one to understand that it has the property of perduring — Leontiskos

How so? Descartes dogmatically attributes duration as an attribute of the substance, with no justification (Principles Part 1). The alternative is that it is constantly being annihilated and created through time; although it is not an appealing alternative, he does not address or refute that possibility.

The question has mind-body dualism as a premise, as can be seen — especially non-eliminationism about mental states. Though I think the eliminationist physicalist still has to give some account of personal identity.

It seems that we would simply move to asking whether the process perdures over time. — Leontiskos

The process is the perdurance through time, so, if there is such a thing as some experience in time, and each successive point in time there is another experience, the soul is the interconnectedness of those experiences, that gives rise to a sense of self which is the subject.

To give a horrible analogy, the origin and the outflow of a river and everything in between is the consciousness/soul at a moment in time for substance philosophy; for process philosophy, it would be the river flowing itself.

Edit: there were some screw-ups, they have been fixed now.

the soul is the interconnectedness of those experiences, that gives rise to a sense of self which is the subject. — Lionino

Is this not just the continuity afforded by memory?

We can also say that, for instance, a tree has a persistent identity over time. I plant a tree when a child and then seventy years later I see the tree has grown into a mighty Eucalypt. The tree is a concatenation of self-regulating processes including metabolism. The material constituents are constantly changing, and the form is constantly morphing, but nonetheless it is distinct from all other trees. Shall we then say with Aristotle that trees and all other living things are, on account of hylomorphic perdurance, ensouled?

In the sense that "From that I am the same person I was before, I can't infer that I will be afterwards."? — Lionino

In the simple sense of, "How do I know that what I have known myself to be will perdure into the future?"

My question is a bit more extreme, it denies the first premise. Though the focus is indeed on the future, as the past is past, the question also applies to the future: ¿how do I know I am the same person I was minutes ago, but not another person with the same memories due to us sharing the same bodily brain? — Lionino

This sounds like a concrete objection to a perdurance view, namely, "But what if you were recreated as a separate person who has the same memories because they possess the same bodily brain?" If such an objection obtains then perdurance fails, but to ask about the objection is different from asking about perdurance per se.

This gets to the separate argument that perdurance is the prima facie view, and that it should stand if there are no good objections.

How so? — Lionino

Familiarity with the soul shows that it perdures, just as familiarity with wood shows that it burns. This familiarity comes both with respect to our own souls and with respect to other person's souls. For example, I can continue my chess game with my friend from yesterday because his soul and mine perdured from yesterday to today.

The alternative is that it is constantly being annihilated and created through time; though it is not an appealing alternative, he does not address or refute that possibility. — Lionino

I don't know if it's the same excerpt, but your quote from page 1 seems to conclude in the idea that one is dependent for their existence, and "that conservation and creation differ merely in respect of our mode of thinking and not in reality." This gets at the idea of distinctions without any difference. If one person says that we are conserved in existence at each moment and another says that we are recreated at each moment, and there is no adjudicable way to distinguish these two views, then what are we even talking about at that point?

The process is the perdurance through time, so, if there is such a thing as some experience in time, and each point in time there is this same element, the soul is the interconnectedness of those experiences, that gives rise to a sense of self which is the subject. — Lionino

We can define 'soul' as "the interconnectedness of those experiences," but in that case the original question seems to simply morph into the question of whether this "soul" exists.